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ABSTRACT OF THESIS 
The personal reign of Alexander III of Scotland saw a dramatic 
reversal of the weak monarchy, divided community and external 
interference which had characterised his minority. Alexander III's 
policies raised the status of the monarchy in the realm and united 
the community, which was by that time developing a sense of 
nationhood. 
This unity was demonstrated when, on Alexander III's death, 
guardians were elected to rule in place of his grand-daughter, 
Margaret. These guardians attempted strongly to defend the threatened 
independence of the realm until Margaret's death. 
I 
The ensuing succession crisis gave Edward I of England the 
opportunity to assert his claim to overlordship of Scotland . and it 
was in his court that the rival claims to the throne were contested , 
resulting in the declaration of John Balliol as King of Scots. The 
records of the case reveal conflicting contemporary attitudes to the 
. 
succession system and to the status of the king and kingdom. 
Edward I's continued insistence on King John's vassal status, 
however, created a tripartite conflict involving King John, the 
Scottish community and Edward I, which led to the Scots forcing 
Balliol into rebellion against Edward I, who deposed him and 
subjected Scotland to a military occupation. 
Uprisings were organised in Scotland to re-establish native 
government under a series of guardianships which chose to govern in 
the name of King John. This period saw a notable growth in the 
self-awareness of the Scottish community, and further development of 
constitutional theories. 
Two years after the period of guardianship had ended with a 
re-submission to Edward I, Robert Bruce led a further rebellion, and, 
making use of the strength of both monarchy and community which had 
developed since 1249, he established himself on the throne, secured 
the independence of the kingdom and recreated . in some measure, the 
"Golden Age" of Alexander III. 
By 1329 the outward appearance of continuity with the time of 
Alexander III belies the strong undercurrent of development which had 
affected Scotland in the intervening period. The concept of 
monarchy, in particular, had developed as a symbol of national 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Scottish War of Independence has been the subject of much 
study, partly as a result of the popular romantic image created by 
such story-tellers as John Barbour and Blind Hary. Amongst the many 
publications dealing with this period are a few which have rightly 
earned the reputation of seminal works, and which have greatly 
increased our knowledge and understanding of this difficult, but 
crucial, stage in Scotland's history. 
However, there is a gap in the historiography of the period: no 
work has as yet given full treatment to the role of monarchy in the 
events of the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries. Most 
have centred either upon the political events themselves, or upon 
other aspects of the period, such as the personalities involved, or 
the part played by specific sections of the community. It is my 
contention that the idea of monarchy and the r8le ascribed to the 
monarchy by the Scottish community were of vital importance in this 
period . and have not yet been the object of adequate study. 
This work is therefore, quite unashamedly, a Imonarcho-centric' 
study of the first war of independence, intended to explore the 
development of the concept of monarchy in Scotland throughout the 
period, and to assess the influence of that concept and its practical 
application on the course of events and on the consequent development 
of Scottish identity and society. Other aspects of Scottish society 
in the period, perhaps most saliently the church, are included only 
to the extent to which they directly affect the realm and its 
monarchy. This is a work concerned primarily with matters political, 
2 
and is not intended to be an exploration of theories. Political 
theory is, of course, involved, but the works of philosophers and 
theorists are studied only where they make a direct contribution in 
clarifying conceptual development. For the present purpose political 
theory is best studied from the contemporary documentary record 
evidence. It is through what men wrote that one can discover what 
was their attitude to themselves. The thesis is thus principally 
based on the standard primary sources normally used for study of the 
period. Printed editions have frequently been checked against their 
manuscript originals. Only where omission or variance has been found 
of such significance as to alter interpretation has reference been 
made to original rather than more readily available printed versions. 
The organisation of the thesis is primarily chronological. In 
an attempt to retain a useful element of thematicism,, however, the 
events of 1286 - 1291 are dealt with only sketchily in their 
chronological sequence, and find more detailed treatment in the 
section on guardianship, which is divided under three thematic 
headings. Similarly,, the reign of Robert I is treated, to some 
extent. thematically. The war, as far as is practical, is considered 
apart from the internal politics and administration of the realm. It 
is hoped that any unwieldy disruption of chronological sequence is 
outweighed by the advantage of the partially thematic approach. 
Finally, the chronological confines of the work have been 
dictated partly by the limitations of time and space. The period 
from 1249 to 1329 is, however, acceptable for the purpose in hand. 
Too many studies omit the reign of Alexander III which, as a fine 
example of what 'good' . strong monarchy was deemed to be,, is 
3 
essential for an understanding of the calamity which befell Scotland 
after 1286. To end with the reign of Robert I may seem, in some 
ways, premature, but is nonetheless logical. It lends the study a 
fortunate symmetry, the establishment of strong, prosperous rule both 
foreshadowing and following a time of decline and adversity. 
Comparison of the situations at the beginning and end make possible 
an assessment of the effects of the central period. More 
importantly, to extend the study into the reign of David II would be 
to enter a new phase of the national struggle; it would also be to 
enter a new phase in the relationship between the Scottish crown and 
community, which could only be satisfactorily examined in a work 
which continued through until, at least, the mid-fifteenth century. 
The period from 1249 to 1329 displays a cohesion which makes it a 
satisfactory unit of study: the problems encountered during the 
reigns of David II and his successors are of different character and 
must be examined elsewhere. 
* *** *** * ** ** ** * ** ** * 
14 
CHAPTER ONE 
ALEXANDER 111,1249 - 1286 
When King Alexander II of Scotland died on the island of Kerrera 
on 8 July 1249, the Scottish crown passed, apparently without 
question, to his son and heir, Alexander. Aged just a little under 
eight years, this child was inaugurated as Alexander III on 13 July* 
1 
In the traditional ceremony at Scone the young king was acclaimed by 
the community of Scots, enthroned on the ancient and symbolic 'stone 
of destiny' , consecrated, invested with a mantle, had his genealogy 
proclaimed by a Gaelic bard,, and the magnates of the kingdom made 
obeisance to him. 
2 It was a ceremony which stressed the changing 
I 
nature of the Scottish kingship: the 'stone', the largely fabulous 
genealogical recitation . and the part played by the ancient grouping 
of the 'Seven Earls 
3, 
symbolised the Celtic past, while the homage of 
the magnates, the consecration by the bishop, and above all the age of 
the king signified the modern 'Anglo-Norman' elements of the monarchy. 
A seal of minority has survived from the early years of 
Alexander's reign, depicting the king carrying sword and sceptre, and 
wearing a crown. Symbolising at once the might, authority, justice 
and Christian leadership which was expected to emanate from the crown . 
the seal highlights the contrasting nature of the monarchy, when it is 
remembered that in 1249 the r6le was assigned to an eight-year-old 
boy. The existence of the 'minority seal' may be taken as a 
recognition of the dubiety of the king's edict. However, other 
evidence, such as the full royal style on the seal, and the lack of 
5 
any officially appointed guardian, would tend to contradict this idea. 
More probably, the seal was a practical expression of the governmental 
situation. Professor Duncan is probably right to suggest that those 
acts given under it should be either confirmed or repealed after the 
king came of age. 
In his inauguration ceremony Alexander III was given all the 
theoretical implements of rule. The rites performed at Scone within a 
week of the death of Alexander II gave his son all the insignia of 
monarchy and the consent of the community to rule the kingdom. There 
must, however, have been a realisation among the community that an 
eight-year-old, whatever his 'right' and theoretical position, could 
not hope to wield these implements. The power had necessarily to lie 
in the hands of the community or a section of it. It seems, then, 
I 
that there was a feeling that authority to rule came from the crown 
itself, as well as its holder. Had a well-developed theory of 'the 
crown' existed in Scotland, there would have been little need for the 
king to be inaugurated so young. Authority apparently still stemmed 
from the king. That a nascent theory of 'the crown' did exist, 
however, is shown by the fact that Alexander III's regnal year was 
dated not from his inauguration, but from the date of his father's 
death 
5; 
the authority of the crown never died. Nonetheless, it was 
obviously felt that royal executive power could only be wielded by or 
on behalf of an inaugurated king. The concept of I the crown I and the 
person of the king had not yet become properly distinct, and the role 
of the community in government had not yet been formalised. These 
were elements of political theory and practice which were forced into 
being by circumstances later in the century. 
6 
This apparent immaturity in Scottish political theory can be no 
object of wonder. Little threat had been posed to the stability of 
the monarchy since the beginning of the twelfth century. The ruling 
line had, in the main, provided able kings who had established in 
Scotland a strong personal monarchy, founded upon the right of 
inheritance by blood, and upon the assent of the community, in 
accordance with older Celtic practice. No lapses in royal authority 
had forced exceptional constitutional arrangements on the realm; even 
Malcolm IV had been able to carry some personal authority, having 
taken the throne at the relatively mature age of twelve. No crisis 
had yet affected the country which had forced a notable advance in the 
theory of I the crown' . The notion existed, but it was still 'the 
king' who embodied authority 
I 
in the mid-thirteenth century. 
In 1249, therefore, he who gained control of the king controlled 
the government of the kingdom. No formal agreement had been reached 
regarding regency before Alexander II's death, and there is no record 
of any formal deliberations on the subject by the community 
thereafter. In effect, then, the faction which could command most 
support would become supreme. Alan Durward . at the head of a family 
which had wielded much influence under Alexander II, apparently tried 
to establish his own supremacy by claiming the right personally to 
knight Alexander III before his inauguration. 
6 
Presumably this 
action, the first conferment of elevated status on the king, would 
have singled out Durward as the pre-eminent member of the community, 
who therefore had the right to lead the government in the king's 
name. 
7 Durward's attempt failed, but nonetheless, perhaps by virtue 
of some deal with the king's mother, Marie de Coucy, he did, in the 
first instance, gain supremacy. 
7 
The administration of the kingdom weathered the establishment of 
this new regime with a remarkable degree of continuity and stability. 
The business of government continued unstinted 
8 
and although his 
personal rule can only have been a fiction, the record of the council 
held in Edinburgh in June 1250 makes it clear that the power in the 
kingdom was deemed to emanate from the king himself: 
"Alexander, by the grace of God king of Scots, to all 
true men of his whole land, greeting. Know ye,, 4hat, with 
the counsel of our magnates, we have given.... 
However, the instability of the kingdom, most apparent in the 
continued friction between the two most powerful baronial factions,, 
the Comyns and the Durwards,, resulted in a weakening of this 
government and the loosening of its grasp on the realm. Disturbance 
and disorder became rife, and Fordunts description of the situation 
indicates that the judicial system at least, if not the entire 
administrative structure, was in a state of extreme disrepair. 
10 
Lawlessness, corruption. and desecration of the church' s properties 
and rights 
11 
rendered this the antithesis of good royal rule: 
"For he who saw the poor crushed down in those days, the 
nobles ousted from their inheritance, the drudgery forced 
upon the citizens, the violence done to churches, might 
with good 51ason say, Woe unto the kingdom where the king 
is a boyll' 
It appears that the clergy were particularly unhappy with the 
situation, and, encouraged by the opposing Comyn faction, they 
appealed to Henry III of England to attempt to remedy the 
situation. 
13 This he was keen to do, for the weakness of the 
I 
Scottish government gave him a first-rate opportunity to revive the 
old claim to English sovereignty over Scotland; the approaches made 
to the papal curia by the Scots 
14 
. in search of the rites of unction 
8 
and coronation for their king 15 , found no favour with him. The weak 
Durward regime was forced to curry favour with Henry, and arranged a 
marriage between Alexander and Henry's daughter Margaret. On 
Christmas Day 1251, Alexander was knighted by Henry 111 
16 (an act 
which, from the English king's point of view, at least, was full of 
significance) , and on the following day the marriage took place at 
York. 17 One English chronicle relates that, following the ceremony, 
the English king demanded homage of Alexander both for the lands 
which he held in England and for his Scottish kingdom. 
18 The homage 
for Scotland was, we are told,, refused, and no further discussion 
took place. Guisborough confirms that homage was done 
19 
. but the 
story of the homage demanded for the kingdom must be very dubious. 
It may be that, as a pure formality, the request was made in order to 
keep the ancient claim alive, but the lack of any reference to such 
an important constitutional issue either in the official records or 
in any other English or Scottish chronicle places extreme doubt on 
its veracity. 
In any event, Henry was to act, in the following years, as if a 
recognition of supremacy had been given. Acting nominally out of 
concern for the estate of his daughter and son-in-law,, he effected 
the removal of Alexander III's council - the ruling Durward faction - 
and procured their replacement with the Comyns and their supporters. 
It seems that Durward may have been the author of a devious plot to 
gain the throne for himself 
20 
, and Henry used this treason to 
overturn Durward's government 
21 
: he ousted or forced the resignation 
of all the main officials of the Scottish household,, and appointed 
two of his own barons 
22 
to represent his interests in the Scottish 
9 
23 
court . Although he dissociated himself, in name at least, from the 
appointment of a new Scottish royal council, his influence must 
nevertheless have been great. 
The new government, however, soon became even less pleasing to 
Henry III than the one it had replaced. Either his representatives 
were powerless, or, as seems more likely, they co-operated with the 
Scottish magnates , who showed little respect for the interfering 
English king. His concern for the welfare of his daughter is the 
most frequently-cited cause of Henry's discontent. Certainly, there 
is evidence that the conditions in which she and the young king lived 
were far from I regal 1 
24 
. and Henry III must indeed have felt genuine 
concern for her wellbeing. This was not, however, the only reason 
for his action against the Comyn government. When he required 
military assistance for a campaign in Gascony in 1253, his 
lieutenants in England demanded that Alexander and his council should 
attend a meeting at Edinburgh 
25 (presumably intended to sanction 
aid). That the Scottish king attended a meeting in his own kingdom, 
to which he had been peremptorily summoned by the officials of 
another king, seems improbable. The expected aid, in any case, was 
not forthcoming; only the ousted Alan Durward, who had made his peace 
with Henry III, went with the English magnates to Gascony. 
26 Another 
source of contention was the money levied by the papacy in Scotland 
27 8 
to support an English crusade . which the Scots refused to pay 
2 
By the summer of 1255 this situation had become intolerable to 
Henry. The Scottish government (including his own nominees) was 
foiling his attempts to have Scotland administered in England's 
interest 
29 
, and so, having first found out on which of 
the Scots he 
10 
could depend, in August 1255 he came to the border. On this occasion 
there was no formal dissociation of Henry III from the replacement of 
Alexander III's counsellors30: "at the instance of" the English king, 
and with the advice of named Scottish magnates,, the Comyn party were 
removed from office. No place in council would be given to them 
until they had "atoned" for their offences to both kings. It wa s 
further "agreed" between the kings that unless by reason of major 
trespass, the new council (named) would remain in office for seven 
years, or for a shorter period as dictated by Henry and Alexander. 
Further safeguards for the integrity of the Scottish administration 
were to be the affair of the Scottish king and his council. These 
arrangements were sealed by an oath sworn by Patrick earl of Dunbar 
on the soul of King Alexander. A rather weak addendum notes that 
i 
Henry undertook to return the document containing these provisions to 
Alexander at the end of the seven years, and that no prejudice to the 
(unspecified) rights and liberties of Scotland should arise out of 
the arrangement. This clause is somewhat devalued by the memorandum 
appended to the document which states that Alexander provided it "by 
command" of the king of England. 
31 A dangerous precedent had been 
set for the arrangement and supervision of the administration of 
Scotland by the English king. The king of Scotland . and the 
authority of his crown, were, at this time, undeniably inferior to 
those of England. 
Henry's actions, of course, constituted exactly the type of 
intervention which the Scots, under both previous leaderships,, had 
sought to avoid. The refusal of military service and the resistance 
to previous intervention had been the results of a feeling that the 
11 
English king wished to dominate in Scotland, that his wish was 
without right, and that it should be resisted. In effect, this 
period saw the community in defence of the kingdom. Admittedly, the 
defence was divided, and was without organisation: no impression is 
gained of a unified nation in conflict with an oppressor, but 
nonetheless, the feeling of national identity, albeit in its infancy, 
was expressed. 
32 It was a feeling which was to have clearer 
enunciation in 1278, with Alexander's refusal of homage,, and which 
was to spread rapidly after Alexander's death. 
However, parchment promises could not ensure Henry III his 
influence over Scotland. Alexander III's personal authority was as 
yet fictitious: his title was merely a stepping-stone to power for 
any who wished and had the opportunity to wield it. By 1257 the 
I 
ousted Comyn faction were in a position to exert power to force 
Alexander and the new government to negotiate with them,, talks in 
which Henry III involved himself fully. 
33 These talks aimed at 
ensuring peace in Scotland . but failed, and in October 1257 the 
Comyns, led by Walter earl of Menteith,, seized Alexander and tried to 
gain control once more. 
34 Henry III prepared an invasion force to 
quell the rebellion 
35 
, but other affairs diverted his attention, and 
on this occasion his interference was much more limited. 
The Comyns, too, experienced problems. Freed from the power of 
the Durwards, Alexander III, now aged seventeen, seems to have been 
more of a force to reckon with,, and was no longer prepared to be 
dictated to by any of the rival parties. In a treaty which the 
Comyns made with the Welsh, who were rebelling against Henry 111 
36 
9 
reference is made to the possibility that Alexander might force them 
12 
into a truce with Henry III, or that he might be persuaded to join 
their agreement. This confirms that Alexander refused to be ruled by 
the Comyns. His actions against the Durwards (even if overstated by 
the Melrose Chronicle, as Professor Duncan suggests37 ) show that he 
was equally independent of them. Henry III's political defeat by his 
own barons 
38 
left him unable to control events in Scotland, and the 
resultant settlement of September 1258 
39 
was one which probably 
reflected the wishes of Alexander . to which Henry had no option but 
to accede. 
Alexander III had come to terms with both factions, and a new 
council was appointed which comprised men of both camps. The English 
king promised to give help and advice to this council. 
40 This 
concession may, have been bought by the inclusion of four Durward men 
in the council 
41 
, but it seems more likely that Henry wished to 
retain his influence, which, given his weaker position in 1258, could 
only be achieved through 'counsel'. An attempt on his part to obtain 
a promise of good behaviour from the new council 
42 
was a notable 
failure. The events of 1258 showed that Henry III no longer had the 
power to enforce his will on Alexander III. 
The years 1259 and 1260 show the resumption of more equitable 
relations between the kingdoms. Both realms were asserting 
themselves, evening out the rather one-sided state of affairs which 
had prevailed for most of the decade. Marg aret's unpaid dowry was 
requested 
43 
. Henry was pushed to return a promised document 
44 
(perhaps the agreement of 1255) . and to give his support to a 
Scottish coronation. 
45 
On his part, Henry III successfully requested 
a visit of the Scottish king and queen to England 
46 
. which took place 
13 
in November 1260.47 By that time it is clear that Alexander, now 
aged nineteen, was in personal control of the Scottish government, 
and that his minority had, de facto, ended. 
48 
The events of 1249 - 1260 pose some interesting and significant 
constitutional questions, in the light of subsequent events. By what 
authority did the councils in Scotland rule? By what authority did 
Henry III intervene, what were his motives in so doing, and how was 
he regarded by the Scottish counsellors and king? The key to an 
understanding of the period lies in the position of Henry III. The 
traditional view has been to see Henry's actions as those of a 
concerned and loving father and father-in-law. Professor Duncan, 
although challenging the traditional interpretation of the minority, 
nevertheless accepts this view of Henry III, refusing to impute any 
darker motives to the English king. 
"Neither document nor chronicle suggests that Henry III 
claimed to interfere by virtue of lordqVip. He 
interfered as a neighbour and father-in-law. " 
Such a picture of Henry III seems to betray an inexplicable 
unwillingness to ascribe to him the type of attitude to Scotland held 
by every other English king from William Rufus to (at least) Edward 
III. The ancient claim to overlordship may or may not have been 
unfounded, but it certainly was no 'legend', and was naturally 
exercised when circumstances allowed. No king could justly claim to 
rule another kingdom in virtue of the fact merely that he was the 
father-in-law of that realm's king. In 1251 Henry III requested that 
the j>ope should not accede to the Scots' request for coronation and 
unction of their king, on the grounds that the king of Scots was his 
liegeman. 




a right which only an overlord could expect. He may have asked for 
homage for the kingdom of Scotland,, and certainly he required 
Alexander to swear an oath to "faithfully and inviolably observe" the 
provisions of a settlement which he had, to all intents and purposes, 
imposed on the Scottish king. Although he had been nominally 
dissociated from the appointment of a Scottish council in 1251 . there 
was no such constitutional nicety in 1255, and in that year Henry' s 
action was indeed to attempt to impose 
"a constitutional straitjacket ... for an extraordinarily long period, which implied in effect that Henry was 
himself to control the 5 government of Scotland for as long 
as he possibly could". 
His possession of the 1255 document, so incriminating to the realm's 
sovereignty that its return was demanded, similarly belies the 
friendly nature of Henry's intervention, as do his vain requests for 
military service in both 1253 and 1258. 
To what extent Henry III, or any other English king, believed in 
the right to overlordship must be debatable. However, he, like all 
English kings of this period . was keen to promote that claim when the 
opportunity was afforded. To reject that motive for Henry's actions 
in the minority of Alexander III is blindly to deny him much of the 
political sense and statesmanship which characterised his rule. 
Given that Henry III was imposing his will on Scotland in a 
thinly veiled attempt to make good the old claim to English 
overlordship, the actions and motives of the other parties become 
clearer. In 1251 the Durward faction was removed from office because 
S 
it followed policies which were distýteful to Henry III. Four years 
later the Comyn faction suffered a similar fate for precisely the 
same reason. This fact must devalue the old view which, with 
15 
reference to the minority, simply labelled Durward 'pro-English' and 
Comyn I anti-English' . Both groups, when first in powerg refused to 
govern within the strictures of English hegemony. In so doing, they 
followed an instinct which asserted the freedom of Scotland from such 
external interference. Whilst the concepts of 'the crown' and 'the 
nation' may not have been fully developed in this period, they 
certainly existed, and influenced men's actions. 
In 1255, however, the situation changed, with the Durward party 
regaining power entirely due to the exertion of English influence. 
They owed their position to the fact that Henry III believed that his 
interests were likely to be served more fully by them than by the 
Comyns. In Henry's eyes, at least, the division into pro- and 
anti-English parties was thus real enough after 1255. The events of 
1258 emphasise this, when Henry's efforts were channelled, albeit 
unsuccessfully, into re-establishing Durward, and through it English, 
control in Scotland. The fiercely opposing partisan views of the two 
major chronicle sources also support this view: the Melrose 
Chronicle's treatment of Durward and his English-favoured allies as 
traitors to the realm, compared with Fordun's distrust of the Comyns 
and his eulogism of Henry 111 
53 
, gives truth to the view that the 
second half of the minority did indeed see factional division on 
patriotic grounds. What had happened was that the completeness of 
Henry III's power in 1255 had thrown the Durwards entirely into 
dependence on him. To retain power (which, irrespective of national 
allegiance, was the primary objective of both parties) . they had to 
govern in accordance with Henry's wishes. If they co-operated . they 
held, in effect, a seven-year contract. The Comyns, in opposition to 
16 
the Durwards, thus found themselves also in opposition to Henry III. 
As the English king's power waned as a result of problems at home, 
the Comyn faction used their anti-English stance to oppose the 
Durwards and inveigle their way back into power in Scotland. Their 
stance appears to have appealed to Alexander III (although he was no 
longer prepared to be controlled by any group), who used the coup of 
1257/58 largely to rid himself of English interference. The events 
of 1258 thus show the first real assertion of the Scottish crown's 
independence by Alexander III. His inclusion of the Durwards in the 
new council in 1258 may have been partly a sop to Henry III,, but it 
must also be seen as an attempt to create some unity within the 
Scottish community, to avert further civil strife, and to strengthen 
his independent rule of the kingdom. For part of the minority, 
t 
therefore, it is fair to see the struggle in terms of pro- and 
anti-English factions, not because of a greater innate patriotic 
feeling on one side than the other,, but because of the opposing 
circumstances in which the two groups found each other: either in 
power and in favour with Henry III, or powerless and opposed by him. 
The Durwards, although included in the council of 1258, never 
regained the glory of their former position, perhaps discredited by 
their pro-English activities towards the end of the minority, and by 
Alexander's fear that, if given the opportunity, they would once 
again try to re-assert themselves to the exclusion of others. Ev en 
although Alexander III and Henry III quickly established good 
relations after the minority, the continued favour which Henry III 
showed to some of the ousted Durward supporters 
54 
may have acted 
against their gaining power in Scotland. 
17 
The fundamental character of the minority is thus of resistance 
to English overlordship, at first by the Durwards, who gave in to 
English pressure after 1255, then, more consistently, by the Comyns, 
and finally by Alexander III himself. The concept of nationhood was 
still in its infancy, and found no explicit written expression, but a 
feeling that a threat was posed by English domination was clearly 
present in the community. The threat had, after all, been shown in 
the church's (and the crown's) twelfth-century struggle against the 
grasping metropolitans of York and Canterbury, and in the 
mid-thirteenth century it was the community and the king' s turn to 
oppose these ambitions. The defence was ill-organised and 
inconsistent, and hardly displayed any national unity. With 
hindsight, though, this serves to highlight the growth in political 
awareness which became apparent at the end of the century,, when 
constitutional crisis struck the realm. Even during the minority 
itself, an awareness for the need for organisation grew: the visit of 
Alexander III and his queen to England in 1260 shows the development: 
the queen was allowed to remain in England after Alexander's return, 
to give birth to her expected child, on the condition that if 
Alexander should die before her return, she and the child would be 
handed over without delay to a committee of guardians consisting of 
four bishops,, five earls and four barons, no matter what conditions 
55 
prevailed in the two kingdoms. This could hardly have been a 
proviso sought by Henry III, and demonstrates a new awareness on the 
part of the Scots that in such a situation unified and organised 
action was essential in order to keep the peace and weather the 
threat which a weak monarchy posed to the sovereignty of the crown. 
18 
It is reminiscent of the regency arrangement made in 1286 and on 
several subsequent occasions. Once learnt, the lesson was never 
forgotten. 
For the most part, the rest of Alexander III's reign saw a 
fairly steady growth,, politically and economically, which rendered 
Scotland strong , stable and prosperous by the last quarter of the 
century. An important element in this growth was the consolidation 
of the western boundaries of the kingdom. The western isles and the 
remoter areas of the western mainland had for long owed allegiance to 
the Norwegian king. This posed a threat to the kings of Scots and 
was frequently troublesome also for the kings of Norway, who 
excercised little or no control over these unruly outposts of their 
dominions. For some time, the Scots had entertained ambitions to take 
I 
the isles, which had figured significantly in Scottish politics at 
various times, and occasionally certain of the lords of the area had 
recognised Scottish authority rather than Norwegian, realising that 
the immediate power of the Scottish king was a force more to be 
reckoned with than the distant Norwegian overlordship. However, the 
allegiance, when given, was rarely more than nominal, and it was a 
policy of the thirteenth-century kings of Scots to bring the west 
more completely under their control. Alexander II had died during 
such an attempt . and Alexander 
III was fully aware of the need for 
his authority to extend to the logical confines of the kingdom. 
This policy, naturally, led to conflict with the kings of 
Norway. From time to time tension appeared in relations between the 
realms, when merchants or ambassadors were imprisoned 
56 
, but early in 
Alexander's personal reign, conflict became more overt. In 1261 a 
19 
Scottish embassy went to Norway to discuss the problem of the isles, 
and was held by the Norwegians. 
57 A Scottish force . led by the earl 
of Ross on the king's behalf, attacked the isles in the following 
year 
58 
. and Hakon IV's reaction was to prepare a mighty fleet to 
re-conquer the islands for Norway, and re-assert their Norwegian 
ownership. Alexander responded by preparing for the defence of the 
kingdom in case of full-scale invasion59 . but that proved 
unnecessary. When Hakon's fleet arrived on the west coast in the 
late summer of 1263 
60 
, it was to find only lukewarm support from the 
islesmen,, which seriously undermined its effectiveness. Nonetheless, 
Rothesay castle was taken, and, in an attempt to encourage Alexander 
III (who came to Ayr) to negotiate more favourably, the Norwegians 
penetrated into Loch Lomond and devastated the Lennox. The 
I 
negotiations were fruitless, however, and the invasion came to an 
untimely end in the autumn, when storms drove some of the ships 
a shore . and a battle was fought between a 
Scottish force and the 
Norwegians. Both sides claimed victory in the Battle of Largs; 
probably neither suffered badly, but it was enough, combined with the 
worsening weather, to convince Hakon IV of the futility of extending 
the campaign. He sailed northwards, exacting tribute from the 
islands as he went, and arrived in Orkney in October. Here he fell 
ill . and died in December. 
The failure of the western campaign, the death of Hakon IV, the 
unwillingness of many of the islesmen to antagonise the Scottish 
crown, further Scottish action in Caithness and the west which 
brought many of the nobles of the area to King Alexander's peace, and 
above all the surrender of the king of Man 
61 
to Alexander III,, who 
20 
threatened the island with invasion in 1264 
62 
persuaded the new 
Norwegian king, Magnus IV$ to negotiate. After prolonged 
negotiation, peace was made in July 1266 
63 
, in the Treaty of Perth , 
which ceded the isles (excluding Orkney and Shetland) to the Scottish 
crown in return for a payment over four years of four thousand merks, 
and an annual payment thereafter of one hundred merks. It provided 
that the islands were to be subject to the laws and customs of 
Scotland, that any who wished to remain under Norwegian lordship 
could leave unimpeded, and allowed for the free return of Norwegian 
goods and men suffering shipwreck on the Scottish coast. It wa sa 
mature and realistic settlement, which recognised that the islands 
were ungovernable from Norway, and that any attempt to retain them 
would merely cause futile bloodshed. To Alexander it gave the 
financial and military resources of the isles (without which it is 
doubtful if Robert I could successfully have waged his war against 
the English early in the next century). and the opportunity to start 
assimilating the nobility of that area into the Scottish community. 
The events which led to the Treaty of Perth were the most 
spectacular of which we hear in Alexander III's reign. The key to 
the period's designation as a 'Golden Age' appears to have been its 
stability and peacefulness. In 1265 the Scottish king prepared to 
give Henry III aid against his rival, Simon de Montfort, but the 
forces he had gathered were not required. 
64 Fordun also tells us of 
the Scots king and clergy's refusal to bow to papal demands for a tax 
of the Scottish church in aid of the English crusading effort65 I 
although Scots did apparently take part in Louis IX's second crusade 
of 1270, in which David earl of Atholl, Adam earl of Carrick "and a 
great many other Scottish and English nobles" died. 
66 
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Also on crusade was Prince Edward, the heir to the English 
throne when, in November 1272, Henry III died. Edward I was crowned 
at Westminster in August 1274, an occasion which Alexander III, his 
queen and many Scots nobles attended. 
67 This occasion marked the 
beginning of the next phase of the English claim to overlordship of 
Scotland. Alexander III went to Westminster as an English baron, in 
virtue of his English lands, although a written assurance was 
provided that no prejudice would redound to his kingdom by his 
attendance. He did not, however, perform homage for those lands, a 
matter which was a point of discussion for several years. 
68 
In 
October 1278 Alexander III went south again, to perform the homage, 
having first obtained the necessary promises that his attendance 
would in no way prejudice the rights and liberties of his realme 
69 
On 28 October, at Westminster, Alexander performed the homage for his 
English lands, but denied strongly that any homage was due to Edward 
for the Scottish kingdom 70 : 
"nobody but God himself has the right to homage for my 
realm of Scotland . and I hold it of nobody but God 
himself". 
This followed an attempt by Edward and his advisers to open the claim 
to overlordship, by reserving the right to discuss the matter in the 
future, or seek homage "if it was due" . Alexander's action in 
swearing his oath vicariously (a right reserved for kings) , and his 
firm reply to the suggested homage for the kingdom, put paid, for the 
moment, to English ambitions. At a time when Alexander III was at 
the height of his power, and Edward was still a young king, he can 
have had little hope of any more fruitful outcome, but this episode 
nevertheless indicates that Edward , like other English kings before 
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him, was aware of the old claim, and would press it should a suitable 
opportunity arise. 
About the same time there appears to have been some general 
tension disrupting the otherwise good relations between the two 
kingdoms. Earlier in 1278 there had been some fairly serious trouble 
on the border, according to Fordun a dispute between the kings "about 
71 the boundaries and marches of the two kingdoms" .A meeting was 
held in Berwick towards the end of March, attended by the bishops of 
St. Andrews, Glasgow and Dunblane "with a great many earls and other 
nobles" . and the bishops of Norwich and Durham, the sheriff of 
Newcastle , and "a great many other knights and clergy" on the English 
side. The exact nature of the dispute which called for a gathering 
of such distinction has been lost to posterity, but the problem was 
I 
not solved by the meeting, and "they went away without having settled 
the business". 
The remaining years of Alexander's reign appear to have been 
characterised by peace, good relations with other kingdoms, and 
strong rule. The question of the succession to Alexander III seems 
to have been the only blight on an otherwise almost idyllic period. 
In early 1275 his queen, the English king's sister, died72' , leaving 
Alexander with two sons, Alexander and David (born in 1264 and 1273 
respectively) and a daughter, Margaret. The last five years of 
Alexander's own life saw the death of all three children: David in 
1281, Margaret in 1283, and Alexander (married, but childless) in 
1284.73 In 1281 Margaret had married Erik II of Norway, and at her 
death she left an infant daughter, the only heir in direct line to 
Alexander III after 1284. To a country enjoying the fruits of strong 
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government, and apparently secure for the future, the death of all of 
the king's children was an almost unthinkable tragedy. The hope for 
the future now lay in Margaret, the 'Maid of Norway' . If the king 
should produce no more heirs, she would bear the burden of leading 
Scotland. It was to this role, as a queen, that Alexander III 
referred in a letter to Edward I in April 1284 74 . shortly after 
Prince Alexander's death, when he reminded Edward that "much good may 
75 come to pass" through Margaret. The death of his children spurred 
Alexander III to the search for a second bride, in order to secure 
the succession. In 1284 he was already in his forty-third year, and 
there could be little time to waste if a minority was to be averted. 
lbus I 
"King Alexander, by the advice of his liegemen, took 
steps to send his ambassadors - to wit, his chancellor,, 
Thomas of Charteris, Patrick of Graeme, William of St. 
Clair, and John of Soulis, knigh ts - to look him out a 
spouse sprung of a noble stock. So, wi-thout delay or 
tarryi ng at all, they went off to France" . 
TU 
In case the effort to produce another heir failed, however, Alexander 
held a parliament at Scone in February 1284, at which an impressive 
array of the baronial leaders of the Scottish community swore to 
accept and uphold Margaret 'Maid of Norway' as the heir to the king,, 
should no further offspring be born of the king or his late son, 
77 
Their actions in consequence of this undertaking were to be subject 
to the judgement of the Scottish bishops, who must therefore be 
assumed to have been privy to it, and in agreement. The entail of 
1284 was thus an agreement by the community of Scots to uphold 
Margaret in her rights to the crown, should she indeed be Alexander's 
only heir at the time of his death. 
24 
The idea that Alexander could be succeeded by a female was not 
new to the Scots in 1284. In 1281, when the king's daughter had 
married Erik II, the young prince David had not long since died. The 
possibility of Prince Alexander's death was foreseen in Margaret's 
marriage trea tY78 . in which it was stated that 
"If it should happen that the lord king of Scots should . by some calamity, die without a legitimate son, or leave 
none of his sons, however legitimate,, and the said 
Margaret has children of the king of Norway, she and her 
children will succeed the said king of Scots, and her 
children, or she herself if she is without children, [will succeed to] the kingdom as well as other goods, 
according to the law and customs of Scotland". 
The duty of the king to provide for the succession was one which had 
to be taken seriously, even in the apparently secure situation of 
1281. 
The agreement of the nobles to accept Margaret 'Maid of Norway' 
failing other heirs, did not end Alexanderts quest to leave the realm 
secure. Late in 1285, the king married Yolande, the daughter of the 
79 Count of Dreux. But the marriage was short-lived, and the quest 
for heirs unsuccessful. In the following March, Alexander III died 
at Kinghorn in Fife, when, after a council in Edinburgh, he was 
returning late at night to his new bride. His horse stumbled and 
threw him, and the king was found dead the following morning. 
80 
The community, keen to avoid the turmoil which had so damaged 
the kingdom in the early years of Alexander's reign, picked up the 
reins of government quickly and in a surprisingly organised manner, 
but that could not obscure the catastrophe which had befallen the 
land. With hindsight it is possible to see the change in Scotland's 
fortunes which followed the death of this king. In 1286, however, 
the calamity was as real: Alexander III had led the nation out of a 
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period of internecine strife and corrupt and ineffective government, 
to a state of unprecedented stability, peace and prosperity. He had 
increased and consolidated the boundaries of the kingdom, and, 
according to Fordun 
81 
at least, his reign saw justice and well-being 
abound. The tragedy of his death lay in the fact that this most 
successful of kings, but for his untimely death,, could have had 
longer in which to give Scotland the benefits of his leadership. The 
feelings of the community at his death are best summed up by the 
probably contemporary fragment of poetry preserved in Wyntoun' s 
chronicle 
82 
. which, it should be noted, makes no reference to the 
events which followed: it is, in truth,, a lament for a well-loved 
king. 
"Quhen Alysander oure Kyng wes dede, 
That Scotland led in luive and le, 
Away wes sons [plenty] of ale and brede, 
Off wyne and wax, off gamyn and gle: 
Oure gold wes changyd in to lede. 
Cryst,, borne in to Vyrgynyte, 
Succoure Scotland and remede, 
That stad is in perplexyte. " 
To discover how King Alexander had established this near-utopian 
situation in Scotland, it is necessary to look beyond merely the 
political events of his reign. The abundance of ale, bread, wine and 
wax (staples of medieval life),, gold and simple happiness was the 
result of his conduct of the judicial, administrative, and economic 
aspects of day-to-day government. 
The Regiam_Majestatemi the only Scottish medieval tract which 
goes into any depth about the duties of the king, places great stress 
on the judicial side of his government: the king is the fount of 
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justice, the upholder of good, and the crusher of evil. Through his 
maintenance of justice . the people of his realm are protected from 
oppression and wrong. Fordun's criticisms of the governments of the 
minority centred on the lawlessness of their leaders, and the 
consequent 'drudgery' suffered by the people of the kingdom, in 
contrast to the prosperity enjoyed under Alexander's rule, which was 
notable for fairness and discipline. The 'most free justice' which 
the men of Scotland were 'known to enjoy' 
83 
was the result of more 
than the king's noble-spirited mind. It came about through careful 
judicial administration: good choice of justiciars and other royal 
officials, strict attention to their conduct and to judicial 
practice. Only by ensuring that the law was fair, and that it was 
enforced in a manner designed to benefit the litigants ratber than 
the judiciary, could men enjoy I free justice' . 
Alexander III certainly made full use of the judicial system 
established by his predecessors, which had been so abused in his 
minority by, for example, Alan Durward being the 'sole justiciarl of 
Scotland. 
84 
Probably from the time of the king's assumption of power 
in 1258, Alexander Comyn, earl of Buchan, was justiciar of Scotia 
85 
(the land to the north of the Forth), and held itinerant courts at 
which, if he himself was not available, a substitute of similar rank 
and standing took his place. 
86 
Hugh Berkeley was justiciar of 
Lothian . also from 1258, and in 
Galloway John Comyn of Badenoch held 
the post from 1258 at least until 1264, and possibly until the end of 
the reign. 
87 The evidence for the regularity of justiciars' courts 
in Alexander III's reign is not plentiful, but records of courts held 




leave one in no doubt as to the activity of these officials. 
References to such bodies as 'the full court of Fife, 
89 
. and to 
figures such as Idempsters'90 and judices9l, and to the money raised 
from judicial process 
92 
, are a further sign of the activity of the 
local judiciary, even if its actual effectiveness cannot be gauged. 
The other important official in the locality, not merely for 
justice (although that was a large part of his function) . but for 
general fiscal and civil administration, was the sheriff. There is 
every evidence that in his minority and in his personal rule, 
Alexander's reign saw full use of the system of sheriffs. Ibis is 
hardly surprising, since it was primarily through the sheriffs that 
any government kept control of the land: a network of loyal sheriffs 
was essential to the success of the administration. Without them the 
judicial and fiscal organisation was necessarily chaotic. The names 
of many sheriffs have survived from this reign 
93, 
showing that 
sheriffs were in office in practically all (if not all) of the thirty 
or so sheriffdoms which existed in the mid-thirteenth century. There 
is no reason to be believe that a full complement of sheriffs was not 
in office throughout Alexander's reign, and that they did not carry 
out their full judicial function. Certainly, sheriff courts 
94 
were 
held to inquire into both civil and criminal cases, and to pass on to 
the justiciars, or to the royal court, those matters which could not 
be resolved at the local level. 
The extent and efficiency of the judicial system did not absolve 
the king of personal responsibility in such affairs. The king's own 
court was the final court of appeal: those who failed to find justice 
28 
at the hands of his judiciary took their pleas before the king 
himself , who gave judgement with the advice of his council, or in 
full parliament. 
95 
At this stage, the differentiation between a 
meeting of the king's council and of parliament is unclear. Many 
meetings of the council are recorded, but not all would appear to 
merit the description 'parliament'. being too limited in their 
composition. Between 1258 and the end of the reign at least twelve 
gatherings or colloquia, were held, but it is not easy to assign each 
to a recognisable category. 
96 Probably the composition and status of 
'parliament' as opposed to 'council' was as yet undefined, and thus 
the bodies which dealt with the Treaty of Perth, the confirmation of 
the possessions of Dunfermline Abbey, and the 1284 settlement of the 
succession 
97, 
whilst not described as parliaments, may safely be 
q 
assumed to have been such. Matters of purely judicial interest, not 
touching upon the rights or possessions of the crown, or the 
interests of the realm as a whole, may safely have been left to the 
scrutiny of a more select group of the king's advisers, a body of 
less representative nature. To carry the distinction further in a 
period of such scanty record evidence is probably over-ambitious. 
However vague our knowledge of the procedures by which Alexander 
III fulfilled his judicial function, it is nevertheless certain that 
he established a formidable reputation as a firm, but fair, judge. 
Fordun's description of the unrighteous gladly bending before him, 
their necks voluntarily placed in the noose in case hanging should be 
his will 
98 
. though clearly a piece of poetic indulgence, nevertheless 
gives the impression of a much-respected, fair and impartial judge. 
29 
The king and his council, of course, were responsible for more 
than merely the judicial side of government: they formed the 
executive body which had oversight of all aspects of the realm's 
administration. The king could not rule alone; his council had to 
approve and lend assent to his legislation, and indeed to the entire 
conduct of his office. The 'community', although not a term found in 
documents of Alexander III's reign, was clearly considered to exist, 
represented by the king' s council. That the king governed through 
the 'common council' (commune consilium) 
99 
of his magnates, implied a 
mutual responsibility for the realm's well-being, which was the basis 
for the massive part played by the community in the struggle for 
national integrity which was to follow the death of Alexander III. 
Closest to the king in the administration of the realm were 
t 
those members of the council who held high office, pre-eminently the 
chancellor and the chamberlain. 
100 The chancellor held the king's 
Great Seal . which was used to authenticate almost all Scottish royal 
writings in this period. His position was therefore of fundamental 
importance to the realm. Without his use of the seal to give 
credibility to royal acts, and without his office, which physically 
produced those acts, the king had no public voice in the realm; his 
grants of land, his legislation, his judgements and edicts, had no 
means of communication to the governed. Such an important office was 
therefore always held by one who was trustworthy and learned - 
usually a high-ranking cleric. Alexander's first chancellor was 
Robert, abbot of Dunfermline . who had been given the post near the 
beginning of the reign. He was ousted from office (and from his 
abbacy) in 1251, being replaced as chancellor by Gamelin. Although 
30 
he too was removed from office in the coup of 1255, Gam elin remained 
prominent, being chancellor of the see of Moray until 1257 
101 
, and 
bishop of St. Andrews from late 1255 (although in exile until 
1258). 102 His successor in office was Richard of Inverkeithing, 
bishop of Dunkeld, and he in turn was replaced in the coup of 1258 by 
William Wishart, archdeacon of St. Andrews. In 1273, when Wishart 
became bishop of St. Andrews, he relinquished the chancellorship to 
William Fraser, dean of Glasgow (who also succeeded Wishart as bishop 
of St. Andrews in 1279) - Late in the reign, Alexander appointed as 
his chancellor Thomas of Charteris, about whom less is known, 
although earlier in the reign he had held the archdeaconry of 
Lothian. 103 This succession of prominent,, well-educated men is a 
testimony to the importance of the office. Although not all of them 
t 
held the office with equal integrity 
104 the appointments 
nevertheless demonstrate that no administration could afford to be 
without a chancellor who was sympathetic to the regime . and of 
sufficient ability and standing to carry the office with dignity. 
The chancery, or king's writing office, was run by clerks under 
the direction of the chancellor. They administered the issue of 
documents, kept the records, and one particularly trusted clerk was 
sometimes given power to deputise for the chancellor when other 
duties monopolised his time. 
105 The chancery was also ultimately 
responsible for the financial side of government: the accounts of 
sheriffs, juSticiars, and other royal officials had to be submitted 
to the exchequer for audit, but at this stage the exchequer was less 
of an independent office than a sitting of a financial court made up 
of members of the king's council. In this court the chamberlain and 
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especially the chancellor played a key role. The chancellor was, 
therefore, 
-par 
excellence, the right-hand man of the king in 
government. His function was not limited to the tutelage of the 
king's seal, but involved him in both administrative and fiscal areas 
of the government, which rendered his faithfulness. efficiency and 
integrity invaluable assets to the king. Alexander III's reputation 
as a good ruler must have rested largely upon his choice of 
officials, particularly his chancellors. 
The royal chamberlain was another vitally important officer, 
although he held less political power than the chancellor. He ran 
the king's household, supervising a battery of clerks who handled the 
provision of food, clothing, furnishings and the other needs of the 
ki 
I 
ng and those who were in attendance on him. The running of the 
household of necessity closely involved the chamberlain with the 
royal income. 
106 He appears to have been primarily responsible for 
the income received from the burghs, and his position, with the 
chancellor, in the court of exchequer, gave him an important place in 
the economic administration of the realm. The money received from 
all sources - rents, fermes and profits from demesne lands, feudal 
incomes, justice, import and export duties and customs, and other 
occasional taxation - all passed through the hands of the relevant 
local officials, who accounted to the exchequer. Any surplus came 
through the exchequer to the household, and in turn it was the 
chamberlain who disbursed money to those whose accounts showed a 
justifiable deficit. The financial duties of the chamberlain were 
important in the 'good' government of Alexander III, for should he 
fail to find the necessary income for the household, the king would 
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be forced to impose unduly upon his subjects, perhaps to an extent 
constituting oppression. The thirteenth-century tract, 'The King's 
Household I. makes it clear that the chamberlain Is duty was to provide 
for the king and his court without such burden on the land. Fordun's 
comments regarding the 'poor crushed down' and 'the drudgery forced 
upon citizens' under the Comyn administration of 1251 1255, and the 
'grinding of the poor' under the Durwards in 1255 1257 107 . draw 
attention to the financial burden of bad government. It is 
noteworthy also that in 1326 Robert I imposed a tax on the community 
because the war had so drained the royal coffers that the estate of 
the crown could not be upheld "without intolerable burden on the 
people". 
108 
The prosperity which Alexander III's rule brought to Scotland 
was not,, of course, the result only of careful administration of the 
internal affairs of the kingdom. It had a great deal to do with the 
relations between Scotland and other kingdoms, which regulated trade, 
and fed the realm Is economy. Alexander was fortunate in being able, 
for most of his reign, to uphold good relations with the countries 
with which Scotland traditionally traded. In times of peace, trade 
with England must have accounted for a large percentage of the 
realm's commercial activity. As has been seen, from the time of his 
assumption of the reins of government in 1258, Alexander III and his 
English counterparts, by and large, managed to maintain friendly 
relations, and what evidence we have suggests that intercourse 
between the realms was of a normal and healthy nature. 
109 Disputes 
on the border over trade were inevitable, and sometimes appear to 
have caused tension 
110 
, but most seem to have been settled amicably 
33 
according to the appropriate 'laws and customs. 
ill 
Detailed 
references to trade and merchants are few, but are sufficient to 
demonstrate that trade in such commodities as wool and corn was 
common between the realms,, although subject to the restrictions and 
difficulties experienced by either country in the regulation of its 
economy, or its relations with other kingdoms. 
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Norway, in the earlier part of Alexander III's personal rule, 
obviously posed special problems with regard to trade. Nonetheless,, 
the fact that trade had been disrupted was a pointer to the more 
normal state of affairs. In June 1264 Henry III wrote to King Magnus 
of Norway'13 regarding tension in trading relations which had led to 
English ships and merchants being arrested. As well as asking 
redress for these offences, he accused Magnus of making war on the 
I 
Scots, which, in the interests of all three countries, he requested 
him to cease. The Treaty of Perth itself made provision for the 
retention by their owners of ships of either country which were 
wrecked on the coasts of the other, another certain indication that 
intercourse across the North Sea was common. Indeed, the treaty was 
probably made with commercial interests in mind. No good could come 
of continued conflict between the two countries, which disrupted 
trade and diverted money to defence or hostilities. Alexander's 
initial refusal to negotiate in 1264 was probably an attempt to win 
time in order to gain a better negotiating standpoint. That he 
wished for peaceg however, partly in the commercial interest, cannot 
be doubted, and is supported by his patience with the protracted 
negotiations which led to the treaty in 1266, when Alexander knew 
that he could take and hold the isles by force. 
34 
Scotland's traditional trading grounds in France, the 
Netherlands and the Baltic must have been actively worked in this 
period. The hides and wool which were Scotland's largest exports 
were bound to be plentiful in a time of prolonged peace, and even 
during war-time the merchants of those areas were willing to run the 
gauntlet of English blockades to continue that trade. Specific 
examples of this trade are scarce in Alexander's reign, but the 
general picture given in the Exchequer Rolls 
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, with frequent 
references to imported goods such as wine, to customs duty, to export 
goods, and to shipping, shows clearly enough that Scotland was making 
full use of her stability to improve her economy. Again, the English 
evidence is helpful. In January 1265 two Scottish merchants 
complained to Henry III that they had been seized in Great Yarmouth 
with the two Flemish ships which they had freighted in Scotland with 
goods to go abroad. 
115 The well-known complaints of John Mazun of 
Bordeaux against Alexander 111 
116 
, which were later to figure in the 
downfall of King John, are another sign of trading activity. Another 
two merchants, this time from Aberdeen, were taken near Great 
Yarmouth in 1272, on their way to St. Omer with a cargo of wool, 
ox-hides, salmon, timber, deer-hides,, lambskins and "much other 
117 
merchandise" . Another similar case saw 
the loss of wool and other 
goods by Berwick merchants on their way to Dieppe. 
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Trade was, of course, encouraged by its own success. The 
plentiful supply of money which strong rule brought to the kingdom 
itself stimulated commerce still further: the prosperity of the 
kingdom,, in theory at least, could enter an upwards spiral only to be 
broken by outside influence. It was therefore an important feature 
35 
of the king's economic policy that he should keep a careful watch on 
the money supply, and prevent any drain of cash out of the country 
which did not produce sufficient return. Many kings passed 
legislation prohibiting the export of cash 
119 but no example is 
extant from the reign of Alexander III. His resistance, however, to 
some of the taxation imposed by the papacy may well have been partly 
for this reason. Quite apart from the implications for Scottish 
sovereignty of grants in aid of an English crusade, the two thousand 
merks sought in 1266 and the teind sought thereafter 
120 
represented 
considerable sums of money, for which no commercial return could be 
expected. Though some papal levies were met 
121 
. apparently without 
question, demonstrating the king's willingness to pay his kingdom's 
share for the defence of Christendom, these extra demands were an 
unacceptable threat to the economic prosperity of the realm, and were 
therefore resisted. 
The main elements of Alexander III's rule of the kingdom which 
gained him the reputation as a king who had brought almost untold 
benefit to the realm were thus his defence and consolidation of the 
kingdom's independence and possessions . his fair and f irm 
administration of justice, efficiency in matters fiscal and economic, 
and,, above all , his success in maintaining peace. Few kings had 
managed in the past to produce such consistent results in all these 
f ields. The fact that Alexander's success grew out of a decade of 
factional strife . corrupt government and external interference 
renders his achievement more remarkable in the same way that the 
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accomplishments of Robert I are highlighted by the despair which had 
gripped the kingdom before, and in the early years oft his reign. In 
the fragment of poetry quoted by Wyntoun and in Fordun's obituary of 
Alexander III there are even hints of the concept of sacral kingship: 
while Alexander III was at the helm, all was well with the country, 
and the necessities of life were never scarce. To these authors at 
of all that was best in a king, and no harm least, he was the epitomp 
could come to a kingdom which was under such leadership. 
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This attitude is interesting, for it implies that the practice 
of good rule was in fact closely related to the theories of kingship 
which were prevalent at that time. Abstract political theory can 
sometimes reflect little more than the impractical idealism of 
philosophers. 
123 However, if we compare what seem to have been 
f 
regarded as the good points of Alexander's rule with the attitudes 
of, for example, Aquinas and Dante towards secular rule, and the 
requirements laid down in Regiam Majestatem, it appears that 
Alexander III did embody the ideal of the archetypal 'good king' . 
Political theory in the thirteenth century was a field of study 
which reflected the 'transition and crisis' which was affecting 
Christendom in that period: 
"On one side was the old idea of the fundamental unity of 
mankind,, expressed in a universal Fhpire and in a 
universal Church. On the other , the new and modern 
experience of a number of independent a1 les, 01.9ý4 *t 
gradually becoming aware of their independence ." 
The emergence of this new style of monarchy, and these new, 
self-aware political units, made necessary the expression of how, in 
the new situation, authority should be wielded. Aquinas and Dante 
came to the conclusion that any political unit, of whatever nature . 
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required regimentation, and that the most effective method was rule 
by one man who carried the authority of the communitas. This laid 
immutable responsibilites on the chosen ruler to govern in the 
interests of the whole community . for tyranny (that state where the 
ruler wields power in his own interest, rather than in that of his 
people) would bring about the downfall of the community: 
"the people (do not exist] for the sake of the king ý 8n 
the contrary, the king is for the sake of the people" 
"it is of the nature of kingship that there should be one 
to rule and that he should do so with 12% view 
to the 
common good without seeking private gain" 
"a 4pt king makes rich the earth, but the miser destroys 
it 
"in such circumstances [tyranny] there is im security, 
and all is uncertain: for there is no law". 
The material and spiritual welfare' of the ruled are thus placed at 
risk by the bad ruler. To avert this danger, the choice of king had 
to be carefully made: he must be of the true 'kingly' character and 
ability. 
Secondly, restrictions must be placed on the extent of royal 
power . even to the point of deposition. 
There was a feeling that a 
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ruler could not be bound by the laws which he himself had made 
but that he should voluntarily submit himself to them, being aware of 
his moral responsibilities, and of the judgement of God upon him. He 
should act in obedience to, and in fear of, God, and therefore not 
look down upon his people in pride, nor oppress them. 
This most fundamental duty, to promote the common weal, finds 
expression in two basic ways: the king must establish 'peaceful 
unity' and uphold equitable justice. Through these two kingly 
functions liberty and stability will be found, and the people will 
38 
thus be able to live at peace,, increase their material prosperity, 
and through love for their fellow-men, grow spiritually and be led 
closer to God: 
"the most important task for the rulerly& any community 
is the establishment of peaceful unity" 
lleverý, 3ýingdom divided against itself shall be laid 
waste" 
1 
"the world, 3ýp best ordered when justice is at its 
strongest". 
Dante, at least, felt that man could only fulfill his true potential 
"in the quietude or tranquillity of peace"133,, and that one leader 
was required for a kingdom to achieve the necessary unity and peace: 
"his office is to provide freedom and peace for lip as 
they pass through the testing-time of this world". 
The importance of law,, of impartial justice, of unity and of 
I 
peace, however, did not proscribe the use of might and warfare. But 
these were tools of kingship to be used only in the interests of 
justice. In a situation where justice demanded the resort to arms, 
God would come down on the side of righteousness. In this way God 
controlled the temporal conflicts of mankind, and by his judgement 
gave authority to those who ruled men. 
Regiam Majestatem 
135 
was an attempt to schematise the law of 
Scotland, to produce a digest which accurately reflected the state of 
law by which the Scots were governed. In many respects its comments 
on the rights and responsibilities of the royal office are therefore 
a more practical expression of political theory than the works of 
philosophers. Nevertheless, it paints very much the same picture of 
the position of the king in the realm. It speaks of the reciprocal 
duties of the king and his subjects, and the legal and moral 
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obligation on the king to uphold law and justice. We are told of the 
limitation of his power, specifically in relation to alienation or 
diminution of the realm and infringements of the 'rights' of his 
subjects, and of his position as a ruler who derives his authority 
directly from God, with no other human superior. Most emphasis, 
however, is laid on his absolute duty to provide equitable justice 
and fair laws,, by which means the realm could find peace and 
stability. The king is . above all .I the lover and author of peace I. 
His majesty could be made glorious in warfare, but only in pursuit of 
peace, to curb rebels or other challengers of his authority who 
threatened the well-being of the community at large. 
With obvious application to the requirements of a national 
I 
kingdom, this tract amply reflects the theories of good rule which 
were expounded in the thirteenth century: in theoretical terms at 
least, Scotland appears to have been on a par with other European 
countries in her political development. The conduct of his reign 
shows that Alexander III, who was almost universally recognised as a 
'good king' , matched the demands of this theory most commendably. 
The minority, of course, with its weak and divided government open to 
external threats which endangered security, was the antithesis of 
good rule. Alexander's own attempts at governmenit, however, were 
more successful. His dealings with Norway show him defending and 
increasing the physical realm, using warfare where peaceful 
negotiation had failed. The Treaty of Perth 
136 
itself reflects the 
theory . as expounded above, in various ways. 
It was made "with the 
counsel of his magnates" , and was an agreement "between the foresaid 
kings, their kingdoms, and the kingdoms' inhabitants". The clauses 
40 
in the treaty referring to the rights of those in the isles to leave 
if they so wished, to the punishment of disturbers of the peace, and 
to the amnesty towards those who had trespassed under the previous 
regime, demonstrate that the treaty concerned, and was made on behalf 
of, all the people of both kingdoms. Similar references to the king 
governing with, and for, his subjects may be found in, for example qa 
confirmation of the lands and privileges of Dunfermline Abbey: 
"I Alexander, by the grace of God king of Soots, son of 
Alexander,, illustrious king of Scots, with the kingly 
authority, and the power and consent of the bishops, 
earls and barons of my kingdom, and thelýpstimony and 
acquiescence of the clergy and people... ". 
The marriage treaty of 1281 states that Alexander acted 
"in his name, and in the name of the noble maiden 
Margaret, his beloved daughter, with the consent of the 
lord Alexander his ý5, and the whole of the council of 
the said lord king". 
Other such references to government by counsel of the community, and 
in the interests of the realm as a whole, are commonplace, and prove 
that the limited concept of medieval government which views it as 
conducted in the interests of a narrow section of the community, is 
flawed: in theory at least, government was exercised in the 
interests of all. 
Returning to the Treaty of Perth, one finds frequent reference 
to the questions of truth, peace, and law. King Magnus, it is 
claimed, participated in the agreement because he was "a friend of 
peace and a fosterer of justice" . and out of 
"reverence for God and for love and diligent observance 
and cherishing of peace, the expulsion of danger to 
friends, and the avoidance of slaughter of men". 
Alexander, in his turn, is described as "a devotee of truth, and 
lover of peace and concord". He takes part "for good peace,, and so 
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that harassments and troubles may be averted" . Once the lands in 
question had been ceded to Scotland, all men, 
"as well lesser as greater, shall be subject to the laws 
and customs of the realm of Scotland and be judged and 
dealt with according to them". 
The 'most free justice' enjoyed by the Scots has already been 
adverted to. 
Finally, the king has no superior but God alone. This element 
of the theory is also reflected in the Treaty of Perth: for the 
greater security of its terms, the kings bound themselves to uphold 
the agreement, and consented to subject themselves to papal sanction 
(specifically including excommunication) if they failed. Their 
authority was derived from God, a fact which they explicitly accepted 
in the acknowledgement of the power of his delegate on earth to 
sanction them should they fail in their duties to uphold peace and 
justice. 
Alexander III's refusal to render homage to Edward I for his 
kingdom of Scotland clearly states his contention that 
"nobody but God himself has the right to homage for the 
realm of, 
_*otland, 
and I hold it of nobody but God 
himself". 
The defence of the liberties and rights of the kingdom was 
fundamental to the king's r8le, and was demonstrated also in the care 
taken to ensure stable succession. The deficiency of government 
under a weak king and divided community had been demonstrated in 
Alexander's minority: his duty to the kingdom, for its unity and 
stability, and for the consequent peace and justice in which its 
people would live, was to provide for firm rule after his death. 
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Obviously, the holding of parliaments, the administration of 
justice, and the firm, non-oppressive conduct of government,, which 
have been discussed above, further promote the idea that Alexander 
did attempt to live up to the expectations of the governed. Hi S 
success can only be judged by the peace and unity which he did 
maintain, and in the eulogistic comments made by, for instance, 
Fordun and the anonymous poet quoted by Wyntoun. Of course, that 
laws and judgements were made was no guarantee that they would be 
upheld . and it must be severely doubted that true justice in the 
interests of all, weak or strong, rich or poor, could exist in 
mid-thirteenth century Scotland. Nevertheless, the conduct and 
documentation of Alexander IIIts reign do assert that his government 
was founded upon an attitude to his duties and responsib, ilities, and 
achieved the prosperous and peaceful results,, which were consistent 
with the theories of good kingly rule as they appear to have existed 
in the thirteenth century. 
Scotland,, in the reign of Alexander III, was thus one of the new 
nation-states of Europe, aware of her independence, and organising 
her affairs in a manner very similar to that of most other kingdoms. 
The king was the central and most powerful figure in the realm, and 
while his rule was strong and beneficial the community was called 
upon to play little part. The place of the community in goverment, 
however . was recognised: their counsel was vital to just government, 
and their assent was a major part of the royal authority. This 
common responsibility, however, was not yet well-formalised. The 
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minority of the king had shown the community to be a disparate group, 
concerned more with personal power than with the interests of the 
realm. The great achievement of Alexander's reign, then, was not the 
prosperity which peace brought to the realm, but was the unity which 
he imposed on the community. Firm rule, and the insistence on the 
absolute independence of the kingdom, had wrought a change on the 
community: by 1286 it was a body which, in the face of extreme 
adversity, was able to work as one to maintain a large degree of 
peace and stability, far from the hopelessly divided and 
factionalised collection of self-seekers which had been its status in 
the mid-thirteenth century. Talking of 1251,, Fordun commented that 
"these councillors were so many kings". 
140 
In contrast, his 
treatment of the events of 1286-89 displays a firm impression of the 
I 
community as one body, ruling the kingdom as would a single king. 
Alexander III's rule undoubtedly saw a strengthening of the 
place of the monarchy in Scottish society. This was to be expected 
in such a prosperous time: to support the king was to benefit the 
kingdom. The consequence of this was the enhancement of a feeling of 
national identity which undoubtedly existed by this period. The 
growth of a concept of 'the community of Scots' was part and parcel 
of such an identity, and the apparent selflessness with which the 
community set about its duty to the kingdom in 1286 was the result of 
the notion that the welfare of the kingdom as a whole was more 
important than the personal interests of any individual, and that the 
duty of all was to work for the common weal. 
Theories of 'guardianship' and of communal responsibility 
during times of royal absence found no place in the expositions of 
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the thirteenth-century philosophers, whose concept of kingshipi 
although dressed in fresh terminologyt found its roots in the 
biblical message of justice and peace. As we shall find out, 
expressions of theory followed upon the practical solutions to 
Political difficulties. During Alexander III's reign the concept of 
a joint, 'contractual' responsibility for the rule of the kingdom had 
found its way into Scottish political thought. By the end of the 
reign the concept was ready to be put into practice: for a quarter of 
a century a successful king had amply fulfilled his part of the 
contract, and one of his legacies to the kingdom was the ability of 
the community to sense its own part. In 1286 it possessed the unity 
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CHAPTER TWO 
QUEEN MARGARET, AND THE GREAT CAUSE 
1286 - 1292 
1 
At his death in 1249, Alexander II left Scotland a legacy of 
constitutional problem in the form of an underage king. Alexander 
III's legacy in 1286 - an underage queen - has been seen as an 
unprecedented constitutional disaster. Scotland had survived 
Alexander III's minority, and by later in the century was enjoying 
the fruits of strong government and peace. The events following his 
death,, however . were to have less fortunate repercussions, for they 
heralded almost three decades of faction, al 'strife, civil war and 
intermittent invasion before stable, independent rule was 
re-established. 
It has become customary for historians to blame all the 
misfortunes which Scotland suffered in the last decade of the 
thirteenth century on the death of Alexander III. This must in part 
be due to Bower, who, writing in the fifteenth century, told of a 
parliament held in 1286, at which there was apparently "bitter 
pleading regarding the right of succession to the kingdom of Scotland 
2 
between Robert Bruce ... and John Balliol". 
This reference, the only 
evidence for such an event, has been used, along with the 
disturbances caused by Bruce in the south-west of the country in the 
autumn of 12863, and with the pact made at Turnberry in September of 
that year 
4, 
to show that the dissension which led to the Great Cause 
56 
started immediately upon the death of Alexander 111.5 Such an 
assumption is unjustified. A crisis of sorts there certainly was in 
1286: Bruce's rebellion is evidence enough of that. However . there 
is no proof that the community was divided about the identity of the 
monarch. Alexander III had left an heir, Margaret, 'Maid of 
Norway' , who had been recognised as heir-apparent by the community 
(including Bruce and Balliol) in 1284. The marriage treaty of 1281 
had also made provision for the inheritance of the throne by someone 
in Margaret's position, should the situation arise. The succession 
law, as it appears to have been understood in 1286, was plain: unless 
the late king's widow bore a posthumous child 
6. the heir to the 
throne was Margaret, daughter of Erik II of Norway. There is no 
evidence to suggest that her status was challenged. 
I 
The April parliament very probably did meet, although there is 
no record evidence to support the fact. Fordun, a generally reliable 
source, mentions it7, but makes no reference to any pleadings 
regarding the throne. Bower's account of the wranglings of Bruce and 
Balliol, if based on anything other than hindsight (its position in 
Bower's text, after his account of Margaret's life, makes it more 
likely that it refers to 1290 than to 1286). probably refers to 
arguments about their rights to the throne in the event of Margaret's 
death. Such an issue would have bearing on their position in the 
realm, and it may well be that they each sought to have their rights 
as heir-apparent recognised, in order to assume supremacy in the 
regency, in like manner to Alan Durward, who had sought to secure his 
own position of superiority in 1249 by attempting to knight Alexander 
III before his coronation. Bruce and Balliol both failed in 1286: no 
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decision was reached regarding Margaret's heir, but a committee of 
six guardians - two earls, two barons and two bishops - was elected, 
and an oath to uphold the rightful heir to the throne was sworn by 
the nobles. 
8 
This oath was probably ambiguously worded, in order to 
allow for the possibility that Yolande would indeed bear a child - 
Neither Bruce nor Balliol was included in the guardianshipt and 
it seems that Bruce left the parliament, returned to Carrick, and 
began to raise a rebellion against this government9, from which he 
felt unfairly excluded. It is in this light that we should see the 
acts of violence of the autumn of 1286, rather than as a premature 
attempt to take the throne. The Turnberry Pact, by which Bruce and 
his associates swore an oath in support of Richard de Burgh, earl of 
Ulster'. co-incidentally referrting to the one I 
"who, by reason of the blood of the lord Alexander, king 
of Scotland, of happy memory, who last died, will gain 
and obtain the kingdom of Scotland, according to the 
ancient custýqs hitherto approved and used in the kingdom 
of Scotland" . 
has been given unmerited significance for Scotland's constitutional 
situation. Generally, it is assumed that it implies a Bruce claim to 
the throne, but the assumption is unjustified. The pact is worded in 
no more specific a way than any other document referring to the heir 
to the throne in 1286. One document, for example, dated July 1286, 
which relates to the payment of dowry to the late Prince Alexander's 
widow, refers to 
"the most high lord the king of Scotland 9 whomsoever he 
may be, or the person or persons who occupy his place 11 or 
who are, or who shall be governor of the said realm". 
This document is not usually regarded as a counter-claim to the 
throne, and its wording rather supports the contention that what was 
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at stake was not the throne . but the regency. The Turnberry pact is 
no more than it purports to be: a bond supporting the earl of Ulster q 
saving allegiance to the king of England and to the rightful heir to 
the Scottish throne, that is, Margaret or Yolande's hypothetical 
child. 
Bruce's attempt to overthrow, or fight his way intot the 
guardians' government, did little more than cause temporary disquiet. 
The guardians called out the feudal levies of the kingdom 
12 
to combat 
the threat, apparently with some degree of success: there is no 
report of any major action, the revolt appears to have been purely 
localised, and relative peace seems to have descended fairly quickly. 
Had there been any general confusion about the succession, it seems 
likely that either a Balliol rising would have paralleled Bruce's, or 
that Bruce would have gained more widespread support, and would have 
proved more troublesome. To claim that Bruce sought the throne in 
1286 is necessarily to deny Margaret's right to rule. Such a denial 
could rest only on the grounds of her sex, since her status as 
Alexander III's closest heir, failing a posthumous child of the king, 
was unquestionable. There is no evidence which suggests that the 
Soots rejected the idea of a queen-regnant. They had agreed to such 
a course in 1284 . and the events of 1286 - 1289 show quite clearly 
that the community accepted Margaret's position and prepared to meet 
the challenge presented by it in a mature, organised, and politically 
assured manner. 
By the late autumn it was clear that Yolande would produce no 
alternative heir 
13 
. and the guardians who had been elected in April 
set about the task of sustaining the government on behalf of 
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Margaret, who was accepted as the I lady of Scotland I. Despite the 
Bruce rebellion, these guardians ruled with a good measure of 
stability. In the summer an embassy was sent to Edward I in 
Gascony. 14 Its intention was probably to inform him of the turn of 
events . and to ensure that no threat was posed to Scotland from south 
of the border. If promises of friendship and protection could be 
secured from Edward I. and support for government on Margaret's 
behalf was forthcoming, Erik of Norway would be much more likely to 
allow Margaret to come to Scotland, and so let Scottish politics run 
their course, the monarch being resident in the kingdom. It is also 
possible that the marriage of Margaret to the young Prince Edward was 
mentioned in these negotiations. Such a bond would certainly have 
ensured the support of Edward I. and in 1286 it is unlikely that 
Edward's ambitions with regard to Scotland were as clear as they were 
in 1289, when the Scots tried to ensure that no deals affecting them 
C1 were struck between Edward I and Erik II without their knowlkge. 
Above all, the Scots required internal stability in 1286, and freedom 
from hostile foreign intervention. The appointment of guardians, and 
the dispatch of embassies to treat with the English king were 
attempts to obtain that state of affairs. 
By the end of the year , then,, Margaret was queen of Scots, and 
only her inauguration was lacking to complete the official 
commencement of her reign. 
15 It is noticeable that by then documents 
referring to such as "the king whosoever he may bell cease,, and 
although Margaret is not actually found with the title 'queen' until 
1289, she was clearly regarded as such. In April 1288 Pope Nicholas 
IV issued bulls to Scotland regarding the election of Matthew, bishop 
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of Dunkeld. Among them was one specifically addressed to "Margaret, 
beloved in Christ, the daughter of our son, the illustrious king of 
Norway". 16 If it is not accepted that the pope regarded Margaret as 
queen, then it must be explained why he sent a bull regarding the 
election of a Scottish bishop to the infant daughter of the Norwegian 
kingl The same pope, in November 1289, sanctioned the marriage of 
Margaret to Prince Edward. In that bull, the case is stated 
explicitly: 
"It is clearly remembered how... the king of Scots went 
the way of all flesh, with no male children of his own 
living, and the beloved daughter in Christ, Margaret, the 
daughter of our beloved son Erik illustrious king of 
Norway, the granddaughter of the foresaid king of Sco ý19 
succeeded that king of Scots in the foresaid kingdom". 
Also, in the early stages of the competition for the crown in 
1291 - 12929 it was stated specifically that the discussiýns 
concerned the "right of succession in the kingdom of Scotland . now 
vacant by the death of the noble lady Margaret ... of late the queen 
and lady of that kingdom". 
18 
Between 1286 and 1290 Margaret was 
accorded various titles: 'heiress of Scotland' 
19 




'damsel of Scotland? " These must all convey the special 
relationship between Margaret and the kingdom, but the one which was 
most truly and formally hers, and which was frequently used in 
1289 - 1290 . was I queen I. 
22 There was no doubt in the minds of 
contemporaries that she was the rightful monarch of Scotland. 
Government by the "guardians of the kingdom of Scotland, elected by 
the community" 
23 
continued on her behalf, and gives every indication 
of having pursued conscientiously the normal, every-day affairs of 
government. Edward I treated the guardians in the same way that he 
would have treated a monarch, communicating with them frequently 
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regarding such routine business as border , justice and mercantile 
affairs. 
24 The country appears to have proceeded with its business 
in a remarkably normal fashion. 25 
However, despite its apparently ordinary appearance, the 
guardians' rule was weak, and subject to much disobedience. The 
treaty of Salisbury 
26 
,a tripartite agreement involving Scotland, 
England and Norway, signed on 6 November 1289, was designed to 
achieve a situation in which Margaret would be obeyed "as a lady, a 
queen, and the heir of the foresaid kingdom of Scotland, and that she 
should be ordained and praised just as other kings are in their 
kingdoms". It also made provisional arrangements about her being 
sent to Scotland. On the same day as that treaty was signed, Edward 
I issued a plea to the prelates, magnates and the whole community of 
f 
Scotland, to obey the guardians to whom rule was delegated on behalf 
of Margaret, "lady and queen". 
27 The urgency with which the 
guardians sought Margaret's arrival in Scotland was understandable: 
she could then be inaugurated, so allowing her personal reign to 
begin officially, and the guardians' government, then ruling actually 
in her name, would have that added air of legality which might 
command greater respect in the kingdom. 
At the same time , negotiations were proceeding with regard to 
the queen' s marriage. 
28 
Edward I. certain that Margaret would be 
married to his own son, had already petitioned the pope for a 
dispensation allowing the marriage. 
29 As noted above, these 
negotiations may well have been initiated soon after Alexander III's 
death, and although the treaty of Salisbury stated that Margaret was 
to come to Scotland free of any marriage contract, it seems probable 
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that the Scots were in some haste to secure the marriage. There is 
no contradiction in that. In the treaty of Salisbury the Scots' 
demands were made in the interests of self-determination: safeguards 
were taken against the possibility that Erik would make an agreement 
about the marriage which was prejudicial to Scottish interests. This 
in no way conflicted with their desire that a marriage agreement 
should be reached as soon as possible. 
The Scots' wish for the accomplishment of a marriage treaty is 
indicative of their pressing need for strong government. With 
Margaret married to the heir to the English throne, Edward I would be 
obliged to offer belp and support to those wbo governed on ber 
behalf . Even as early in the proceedings as Salisbury, that support 
had been forthcoming in týe form of Edward's order for obedience to 
the guardians' government. This is a much more realistic explanation 
for their haste than the suggestion that the guardians "set about 
30 finding a king through the marriage of the kingdom's heiress". The 
finding of a king was not their aim. Government by guardians would 
have continued in any case, for an infant king was of no more use to 
the Soots than an infant queen. A major threat to stability was the 
presence of a powerful and ambitious neighbour, and therefore, by 
supporting the plan that Margaret should marry the heir to the 
English throne, the Scots at once averted a potential danger, and 
found a new and useful ally. There was no question of Margaret being 
regarded as unfit for rule. She had been accepted as heiress in 
1284, and long before Salisbury was signed she was quite 
unequivocally called 'queen'. 
31 The Scots' diplomacy of 1288 - 1290 
was aimed at finding English support, not an English king. This 
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interpretation of the motives behind the Scot's desire to achieve the 
marriage is supported by a letter which they wrote to Edward I in 
March 1290, in which they declared that they appreciated the good 
done for Scotland by Edward I and his predecessors, and indicated 
that the proposed marriage, of which they had heard rumours, would be 
agreeable to them if certain conditions, which on that occasion they 
left unspecified, were met. 
32 This letter was clearly intended to 
solicit Edward's favour, and it provided the basis for the 
negotiations regarding the marriage itself. 
The Scots had much to gain through the marriage of Margaret to 
Prince Edward: in the short term, relief from potential hostile 
intervention and support against other troubles; in the long term, 
the benefits 
t 
of peace between the two kingdoms, which could be 
brought about by a joint monarchy. They also had much to lose: 
perhaps the independence of their kingdom. They were well aware of 
this danger . and so in March 1290 the Scots made it clear that their 
acceptance of the proposed marriage would not be unconditional. When 
the treaty was finally signed at Birgham on 18 July 1290 
33 
9 it was an 
elaborate attempt to protect all Scotland's liberties, both political 
and legal, whilst arranging for the marriage of Margaret, "the heir 
and queen of the kingdom of Scotland" . to Edward. the heir to the 
English thone. The "rights, laws, liberties and customs of the 
kingdom of Scotland . in all things and over the whole of that kingdom 
and its marches" were to be perpetually observed. All ecclesiastical 
elections were to be made within the kingdom, homages and services 
relating to the kingdom of Scotland were to be taken within that 
kingdom, justice towards her subjects was to be performed only within 
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that kingdom, taxes, hosts and suchlike were only to be imposed under 
the circumstances in which a king of Scots could impose them, and no 
parliaments for internal affairs were to be held outwith the kingdom. 
Perhaps it was a futile attempt, but the Scots were trying to withold 
all concessions to total union or incorporation, whilst nevertheless 
recognising that their queen would probably be resident in England. 
That the rights of neither kingdom were to be increased or decreased 
must have been a forlorn hope. Even although the Scots' conditions 
had apparently been met, the treaty held qualifications such as 
"saving the right of our said lord [Edward I]. and of any 
other whomsoever . which has pertained to him. or to any 
other, in the marches or elsewhere ... before the time of 
the present agreement, or which in any right way ought to 
pertain in the future". 
Whilst not entirely vitiating the safeguards for independence, the 
deliberate vagueness of this statement,, in view of previous and 
future claims of English supremacy, must have been recognised to be a 
loophole in the Scots' case, which they would undoubtedly rather have 
seen omitted. However, the Scots had made their stand. They had 
pushed their policy through almost to its conclusion, and had brought 
about a treaty which would have married their queen to the English 
throne. They thus gained the political support which they required, 
endeavoured to maintain their kingdom's independence and tried to 
affirm that the Scottish crown would be held by the queen, rather 
than by any husband who may have been found for her. But the treaty 
was never fulfilled. As requested, Erik II arranged for Margaret's 
passage to Scotland, and in late September 1290 she left Norway on an 
English ship. 
34 In early October Bishop Fraser of St. Andrews wrote 
to Edward I, telling him of the rumour that 'our lady the queen' was 
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dead, "on which account the kingdom of Scotland is disturbed , and the 
community distracted" . 
35 In keeping with the style of recent 
relationships between the two countries, Fraser asked Edward I to 
help keep the peace, should the rumours prove to be true, so that 
those in authority might stand by the oath which they had taken in 
1286 (although then of less wide significance) , to establish on the 
throne the rightful heir. In 1286 the succession had been obvious. 
In 1290, on the death of Margaret, it was not. Scotland had survived 
one crisis only to enter another, far more serious. 
The situation in Scotland in late 1290 . when the death of Queen 
Margaret became widely known, must have been particularly difficult. 
There was no obvious choice of heir and although Bishop Fraser 
r36 clearly thought in terms of a Balliol king the community seems to 
have been far from unanimous on the matter, and civil war must have 
been imminent. Fordun's picture is of friendly, if unavailing, 
discussion amongst the nobles, but the reason that he gives for their 
indecision, 
"because they justly feared the power of the parties, 
which was great, and greatly to be feared; and partly 
because they had no superior who could, by his unbending 
power, carry their award into 31xecution, or make the 
parties abide by their decision" 'I 
probably reflects a truer image of the tension which existed in the 
country. The Processus of Baldred Bisset mentions the "dissension 
about who by right ought to succeed , 
38 
, and the record of the 1321 
Anglo-Scots negotiations talks of "dangerous contention" at this 
time. 39 The letter which Bishop Fraser wrote to Edward I in October 
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1290 makes note of the warlike preparations which were being made by 
Bruce and others, and other documents, such as the charter by Balliol 
in which he styled himself "heir of the kingdom of Scotland" 
40 
and 
the document usually known as 'The Appeal of the Seven Earls of 
Scotland' 41 , which apparently was intended to prevent Balliol hastily 
being made king, show the rapid formation of opposing factions in the 
country in support of the claims to the succession by Balliol and 
Bruce respectively. 
Beyond this, very little of the Scottish situation following 
Margaret's death can easily be reconstructed. Sources are sadly 
lacking until March 1291 9 by which time Edward I had become involved. 
Only conjecture can explain why the Scots found themselves unable to 
choose a king, and in what manner Edward I took his place as judge of 
the matter. It seems probable that the situation in Scotland was 
such that, as suggested by the narrative sources, the opposing 
parties were so evenly matched, and the remaining guardians 
42 
so 
weak, that no coercion could be applied to ensure that a decision 
would be obeyed. 
The nature of the involvement of Edward I must also remain a 
mystery, unless new evidence is produced. That the Scots were so 
naive as to invite him to assume a position of more than a simple 
arbiter is scarcely believable. If such an approach was made, it is 
arguable that it was seized upon by Edward to further the imperialist 
ambitions held by his dynasty towards Scotland; a certain show of 
force, followed by demands for recognition of his superiority, were 
sufficient to establish him in a strong position, given the inability 
of the Scots either to act independently or to withstand his power. 
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Edward I may have received no invitation to intervene,, but imposed 
himself on the disorganised Scots, possibly with an initial air of 
neighbourly goodwill . or perhaps making his ambitions clear from the 
start. He may indeed have received an invitation to judge a case, but 
the clear constitutional implications of such a move make it 
improbable, and it should be borne in mind that Fordun states 
specifically that the Scots had no superior to whom they could look 
for judgement. The assurance given by Edward on 12 May 1291, that 
although the Scots came 
"at our request... to Norham, to treat of matters 
touching the foresaid realm, we wish and grant that their 
having come south of the Tweed- can not turn to their 
prejudice nor to their realmls"IF3, 
may be a hint that Edward offered his services as judge in the 
matter, on a 'one-off' basis, with a specifi6 agreement that no 
prejudice would redound to their present and future status. If so 1, 
it was an agreement which was indeed naively made. 
It has been suggested that Edward I had no intention of coercing 
the Scots into any sort of unexpected subjection, and that he acted 
uprightly on the strength of his beliefs. It is claimed that the 
shows of force which he made were in no way connected with the demand 
for recognition of superiority, and that the Scots were unjustified 
in later claiming that the subjection was void because it had been 
forced upon them. 
44 
This view is surely too one-sided: there is 
evidence which sugests that the Scots were to some extent 
hoodwinked in 1291. The Scots were in a very weak and divided 
position. Thus, when we read of a fleet "keeping command of the sea 
near Holy Island . lest food should come into Scotland" , and which was 




the early months of 1291, we must, in the absence of any other 
explanation, assume that Edward was preparing for the eventuality of 
resistance and, therefore, that his plans were of a nature which was 
likely to arouse resistance in the Scots. His summoning of feudal 
levies to Norham 46 . to coincide with the early days of the Great 
Cause,, and the payment of "divers crossbowmen, foot archers and the 
fees of their constable s, 147 for the same period, suggests rather more 
than the "simple escort" which has been ascribed to Edward by 
Professor Stones and Dr. Simpson. 
48 
A naval blockade and a sizeable 
body of troops on the border must have been enough to show the Scots 
that Edward was serious about his intentions. It seems unlikely that 
those intentions were merely to 'keep the peace', as Fraser had asked 
in October 1290: a naval blockade would not have been effective for t 
that purpose. The peace which he wished to keep was King Edward's. 
That these arrangements were made by March 1291 implies that by then, 
despite the apparent frankness of the assurance given in May, Edward 
fully intended to extort an admission of his superiority from the 
Scots. Indeed . even as early as May 1290 
he had granted the Isle of 
Man, then a Scottish possession, to Walter Huntercombe. 
49 
It is, of course, unlikely that the Scots were totally unaware 
of these arrangements . and that they succumbed 
to them suggests that 
they were unable to resist. From such a position they were 
exceedingly unlikely to have requested Edward's intervention. Hi s 
statement that he invited them to Norham 
50 
. along with the lack of 
any extant invitation to Edward from the Soots (a document which it 
would surely have been in Edward's interests to preserve along with 
the other proceedings of the case), indicates that his intervention 
69 
was made of his own volition, and was an attempt to take advantage of 
the weakness of the Scots in order to subject them to his own rule. 
The invitation to Edward, which figures only in non-contemporary 
narrative sources . may well be a story concocted by the Scots at a 
later date to prove their own naive innocence, and Edward's 
treachery. It is noteworthy that the Processus of Baldred Bisset, 
written before any of the propaganda of Bruce's reign, specifically 
states that there was no invitation to Edward, who was "intervening, 
51 
as it were, without having been asked" The earliest narrative 
source which mentions an invitation is Guisborough's chronicle 
52 
: 
even it was written after 1300, and was composed not from original 
sources, but from another compilation. 
53 
Edward's claim to rightful overlordship of Scotland went back 
I 
many generations. Its justification, however, is open to question, 
and it seems unlikely that he genuinely believed in the 
straightforward feudal inferiority of the northern kingdom, given his 
failure to pursue that right at earlier opportunities. He could have 
claimed the wardship of the Maid of Norway after the death of 
Alexander III, and, if his belief in his crown's right to feudal 
superiority over Scotland was genuine, by failing to claim that 
wardship he was certainly being "neglectful of a duty laid on him by 
tradition, and even perhaps by the terms of his coronation oath". 
54 
In all probability the intention of Edward I in 1291 was to take 
advantage of the weakness of the neighbouring kingdom to establish 
himself as the adjudicator of the disputed succession to its crown, 
and thus, in fulfilment of a long-standing dynastic ambition, to 
become its overlord. This does not imply the ascription to Edward I 
70 
of any villainous character defect: any medieval monarch in his 
position would have taken a similar course of action. 
Of course, that no formal invitation for Edward to intervene was 
issued by the community of Scots does not imply that none of the 
Scots involved had suggested, or would welcome such a move. The 
stories told by some later chroniclers that Edward tried to impose 
his will on Scotland by offering the crown to Bruce, if he would hold 
it as Edward's vassal 
55 
, may contain some kernel of truth. There is 
a considerable body of evidence which suggests that Bruce was 
manoeuvering in any way which would increase his chances of winning 
the throne. Immediately prior to the Great Cause he was attempting 
to gain possession of the lands of Garioch, which, having been the 
possession of David earl of Huntingdon in the late twelfth century, 
had been divided between the descendants of Earl David's three female 
heirs, Bruce, Balliol and Hastings. The agreement between Bruce and 
Sir Nicholas Biggar, who was to bring court action to recover for 
himself Balliol's and Hastingst shares of the land which he 
simultaneously surrendered to Bruce 
56 
. would seem to have been a plot 
to increase the Bruce power and influence in Scotland, and perhaps to 
provide a precedent in favour of the unity of the kingdom which, 
according to one argument, should have been divided between Bruce, 
Balliol and Hastings. 
Probably less than a year later, the 'Appeal of the Seven Earls 
of Scotland 
57 
was issued, in an attempt by the Bruce faction to 
block any elevation of Balliol to the kingship. It contained an 
appeal to the crown of England for assistance in the affair, and may 
well indicate that had it been left to the community of Scots to 
71 
decide, Balliol would have been chosen as king. It was therefore in 
the Bruce faction's interest that Edward I should become involved in 
the case. 
Other evidence for Bruce' s involvement in bringing about the 
English intervention lies within the course of the Great Cause 
itself. Firstly, there is the claim of Florence, count of Holland, 
and his agreement with Bruce. Florence's claim 
58 
, that David, earl 
of Huntingdon, from whom Bruce, Balliol and Hastings all claimed 
their descent, had resigned his right to the throne, thus rendering 
Florence's own descent (through a sister of Earl David) the most 
direct, was backed up only by the flimsiest of evidence, and it is 
strange that it was given any credence. Indeed, if, as seems likely, 
there was no authentic evidence for the supposed resignation, 
Florence cannot have expected his claim to have been taken seriously. 
It is possible that Florence, who for some time had been in 
negotiation with Edward I regarding the marriage of his son to 
Edward's daughter 59 , was picked upon by Bruce as a likely obstacle to 
the Balliol cause. A claim entered by him would not,, in the 
circumstances, be blocked by Edward, and by its very nature it was a 
stumbling block to Balliol's ambitions. The idea that Bruce in some 
way promoted Florence's claim is supported by the fact that Bruce and 
Florence apparently never contested each other's claims, and by the 
agreement made between them in June 1292 
60 
. whereby if either of them 
were awarded the throne , the other would 
be given one third of the 
royal lands, in return for knight-service. Thus, even if Bruce's own 
cause failed, which it was bound to do if Florence's succeeded, the 
Bruce family would still hold vast influence in Scotland: Carrick, 
72 
Annandale, Garioch and this extra portion. The I Appeal of the Seven 
Earls' also testifies to some relationship between Bruce and 
Florence. Although it was clearly Brucian propaganda, amongst its 
other complaints was that the Count of Holland had been unjustly 
deprived of the earldom of Ross, and that he was the rightful heir to 
the kingdom, failing the heirs of Earl David. 
This evidence supports the idea that even before the Great Cause 
began, and throughout the course of it, Bruce was scheming to ensure 
that his family gained the maximum amount from the situation, and 
that his attempts to defeat the Balliol threat to his position may 
have included his support for the involvement of the English crown 
and the claim of the count of Holland. It is conceivable that the 
claim of Erik of Norway should be seen in the same light. The 
ambassadors of King Erik had previously been in England . not with the 
intention of claiming the Scottish throne,, but to press for the 
payment of the dowry of Margaret, daughter of Alexander 111.61 When 
they returned to Edward's court in June 1292, this was still part of 
their brief, along with their submission of Erik's belated claim to 
the kingdom 
62 
, as ascending heir of 
his daughter,, Margaret, which 
appears to have been a mere after-thought. The ambassadors clearly 
knew very little about it, for when questioned by the court regarding 
it,, in November . they retorted that 
they must consult Erik before 
answering. 
63 
They would thus seem to have been but poorly equipped 
to press the claim. The only interest which might have been served 
by this weak claim was Bruce's. who required at all costs to hinder 
the Balliol cause. Even Erik seems to have been half-hearted about 
it,, having taken no action between June, when it was entered, and 
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November, when it was examined. Apparently he expected to gain 
nothing from it, other than perhaps a greater forum in which to air 
his grievance about the money owed to him by the Scots. If, as seems 
possible, Bruce was also involved with this claim 
64 
, it shows him to 
have continued scheming, almost right to the end, in order to 
influence the course of the Great Cause in his favour. 
Thus Bruce's involvement in the Great Cause may have been more 
complex than has previously been recognised. His eagerness to defeat 
the cause of Balliol, no doubt to be seen in his reported gathering 
of troops with his allies the earls of Mar and Atholl as early as 
October 1290 
65 
, and his position as a prominent English noble, both 
lead, along with the other evidence, to the conclusion that he may 
well have been one of the main instigators of the English involvement 
in the problem of the succession to the Scottish throne. Bruce, of 
course, although one of the protagonists of the affair,, was by no 
means the only competitor to be an English vassal, and the evidence 
for his leanings towards English intervention implies that there may 
have been a considerable number of Scots who, in attempting to avert 
the likely elevation of Balliol to the throne by the majority of the 
comunity, looked to England for assistance. Edward probably 
installed himself as adjudicator without a formal invitation, but 
that by no means implies that all Scots opposed his action. Indeed, 
most of the claimants were subjects of the English king, and would 
not object to his intervention, as is shown by their readiness (in 
contrast to the community of Scots' reluctance) to accede to Edward's 
demands. 
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If we now return to the days between the death of Margaret and 
the opening of the Great Cause, it is possible to suggest a 
conjectural course of events. The situation of near-war between Bruce 
and Balliol prompted a vague approach to Edward I by Bishop Fraser, a 
Balliol supporter, asking for Edward's help to keep the peace until 
the king (Balliol) could be established on the throne. Following 
this, the Bruce faction, unwilling to be so promptly suppressed, 
began to manoeuvre to hinder Balliol's elevation to the kingship, and 
to promote their own interests. The attempts to gain the Garioch, 
the 'Appeal of the Seven Earls' , and encouragement of semi-spurious 
claims were all symptoms of this policy, which was upheld throughout 
the case. Scotland was hopelessly divided, and Edward I. having been 
approached by both sides for assistance,, decided to intervene, and I 
use the situation in order to press the long-standing claim of the 
English kings to overlordship of Scotland. He then invited the Scots 
to a meeting of the English parliament at Norham 
66 
, with the 
intention of stating his claims and his terms for the settlement of 
the dispute. The Scots, being aware of his military arrangements,, 
and doubtless glad to find some way out of their dangerous 
predicament, attended his summons. He had anticipated their desire 
to discuss their answer to his claims, and had planned an adjournment 
for the purpose, by the end of which the troops which he had called 
to service were also in attendance at Norham. Although not a large 
force, they would pose a sufficient threat to the Soots to convince 
them that any outright opposition was unwise. The assurance by 
Edward I that the Scots would suffer no prejudice by coming south 
seems first to have been issued with a safe-conduct on 9 May, the day 
75 
previous to Edward's proposition of his overlordship. Ibis 
assurance, although rather meaningless, being mere common form,, was 
neither disregarded nor broken. On that first visit, the Scots did 
indeed suffer no prejudice,, and on subsequent visits the situation 
had changed, since the claimants who entered the case had accepted 
the claims to overlordship, had sworn fealty, and were thus 
legitimately treated as vassals. 
The events of the following eighteen months, the course of the 
Great Cause itself, are less difficult to reconstruct. The records 
of the court, which were kept in detail by Edward's officials, exist 
in various forms, and from them a fairly accurate narrative of the 
proceedings can be compiled. 
On 10 May 1291 
67 
the assembly met for the first time, and it was 
I 
explained that Edward wished to settle the dispute, for which purpose 
he required the Scots to recognise his overlordship. The Scots 
replied that they required time to discuss this demand, and probably 
on the following day were granted an adjournment of three weeks. The 
assembly reconvened on 2 June, by which date the English soldiery 
were in attendance, and the Scots gave their answer about the 
question of overlordship. The official English record states merely 
that the Scots had nothing with which to deny the claims, but the 
answer actually given was that, lacking a king, the Scots themselves 
could not reply to such a claim, about which they, although not 
wishing to doubt Edward's belief in it, knew nothing. In cavalier 
fashion this reply was ruled ineffectual, and the case continued on 
the assumption of Edward's superiority. Ten of the competitors then 
entered their claims, and met the requirement of acknowledging 
Edward's overlordship and jurisdiction. 
76 
Having dealt with the main preliminaries, it was then possible 
to decide on the procedure which the court would follow. Probably on 
3 June it was decided that the two main contenders, Bruce and 
Balliol, should each appoint forty auditors 
68 
, which number would be 
augmented by an additional twenty-four, nominated by Edward. The 
auditors were to hear the cases put forward by the competitors, and 
report back to the king. On 4 June the competitors agreed that 
Edward should have sasine of Scotland . so that, actually possessing 
it, he could formally bestow it upon the successful candidate. After 
the naming of the auditors, on 5 June, the place and date of the next 
meeting of the court were decided upon, and over the following few 
days the passing over of the rule of Scotland to Edward was 
completed. Castles were given up to his custody, a new chancellor 
I 
was appointed, an Englishman was nominated to join the remaining 
Scottish guardians,, and the king's peace was proclaimed. This 
process was complete by 13 June, on which date an adjournment was 
announced until 12 August. During the next two months oaths of 
fealty to Edward were sworn by most prominent Scots, and further 
arrangements were made for the administration of Scotland until the 
end of the interregnum. 
On 3 August the court reconvened in Berwick, the written 
petitions of twelve competitors (the thirteenth was Erik of Norway, 
who did not present his case until later) were produced, and after 
some discussion the case was again adjourned until the next 
parliament met, in Berwick, on 2 June 1292. During that long 
adjournment Edward and the competitors were at work concerning the 
case. For instance, in November two inspeximus of the alleged 
77 
document supporting the claim of the Count of Holland were issued,, 
Edward I applied unsuccessfully for papal confirmation of the 
submission of the competitors, and doubtless much activitY took place 
in attempting to prove cases,, destroy them, and ascertain their 
validity. However, when eventually the court reconvened in June 
1292, it appears that the long spell of activity had achieved little. 
According to reports of the auditors who heard the pleadings of the 
competitors, difficulties had arisen which added to the complexity 
and length of the proceedings, and Edward therefore ordained that a 
decision should first of all be made between Bruce and Balliol, and 
that the other claims be postponed until thereafter. At the 
beginning of June Erik of Norway presented his claim. There was 
discussion about what laws should be used in such a case, and it was 
t 
decided to ask for foreign opinion. On 14 June the agreement between 
Florence and Bruce was sealed. Pleadings then took place between 
n- 
Bruce and Balliol . and by the end of June it was agreed that enough 
had been heard to enable a decision to be made between them. At the 
beginning of July documents attesting Edward I's right to hear 
Scottish cases in England, notwithstanding his 'no prejudice 
assurance' of May 1291, were issued, and another adjournment seems 
then to have taken place until October 1292. 
When the court resumed on 14 October there was more discussion 
of the laws to be used in the case, and possibly further pleading 
between Bruce and Balliol. At last, on 6 November, it was decided 
that Bruce's claim could not stand up against Balliolls, and the 
court then went on to judge the rest of the claims against that of 
Balliol. Bruce then submitted a second claim, that the kingdom, as a 
78 
fief of the English crown, was partible, and accordingly sought a 
third share of it "minus the name and dignity of king". More 
discussion took place regarding the question of partibility,, which 
idea was finally rejected. On the following day, Bruce resigned his 
rights to the kingdom to his son Robert, probably to ensure 
continuity of the family claim to the "name and dignity of king" in 
future generations. The nearness of degree to the common ancestor 
was no longer of importance after the decision of 6 November, and so 
Bruce's resignation in no way weakened the claim. Interestingly, the 
Robert Bruce who received the claim resigned his rights to the 
earldom of Carrick to his son Robert only two days later, in a 
document addressed to "the magnificent and serene prince, the lord 
John, by the grace of God illustrious king of Scots". 
69 
It must be 
assumed that the eventual outcome of the case was by then a foregone 
conclusion, but it is nevertheless interesting to find such a clear 
recognition of Balliol's victory from the Bruce family even before 
that victory had taken place. The next few days saw the treatment of 
other pleas. Claims were submitted, discussed, withdrawn, and 
adjournments were given to allow several competitors to gather more 
information, and to submit written pleadings. Eventually, on 17 
November, the final judgement was given. Eight claims had been 
withdrawn, two were declared void because they had not been pursued, 
and the judgement of the court was given against two more. The one 
claim to survive was that of John Balliol, who was declared to have 
the right to the kingdom. Orders were given for the sasine of the 
kingdom and its castles to be transferred to him, and the dates for 
his coronation, homage and fealty were arranged. On 20 November he 
79 
swore fealty to Edward I; ten days later, on St. Andrew's Day, he was 
inaugurated at Scone; and on 26 December he swore homage to Edward I 
for the kingdom of Scotland and for all his English lands. Scotland 
once more had a king, of sorts. 
The main issues raised by the events of October 1290 to December 
1292 were the law of succession to the throne in Scotland . the type 
of law to which appeal should be made in the settlement of such a 
dispute, and the status of Scotland: was it an independent kingdom or 
a vassal state, and of what significance was that question in the 
Great Cause? These are important issues, fundamental to the nature 
of Scottish politics,, and to the character of the Scottish kingdom 
and kingship in that period. 
The pleadings of the Great Cause, stressing as they do the 
lineage and pedigree of each claimant, are ideal sources from which 
to gain an idea of the contemporary native view of the succession 
system. The answers of the foreign lawyers to the appeal of Edward I 
70 
also provide contemporary opinion regarding the case. Other 
narrative sources, such as Fordun, give an idea of how, at a later 
date . the system was deemed 
to have worked in the 1290s , although 
such sources tend to be brief, are rarely unbiased, and are sometimes 
contradictory. 
Despite arguments to the contrary, it is unlikely that the 
claims of the count of Holland, John Hastings, Erik of Norway, and 
most of the other competitors were ever seriously entertained. it 
seems probable that only Hastings, Bruce and Balliol actually 
believed that they might gain by their claims. The others were 
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simply expressing the medieval fondness for controversy and 
71 litigation, and a desire to appear in the public eye" . Six of the 
claimants had illegitimate descent 72 . an indisputable barrier to 
succession in the thirteenth century, and of the remaining seveng 
only two were to be honestly considered. Robert de Pinkeny claimed 
to be descended from a younger sister of David, earl of Huntingdon 
(through whom Bruce, Balliol, and Hastings claimed), and had no real 
or supposed document such as Florence's resignation with which to 
bolster up his case. John Comyn of Badenoch held his descent from 
four generations further back in the royal line beyond Earl David, 
and so was in no situation to contest the more immediate pedigrees of 
the others. It seems unlikely that the Scots would have seriously 
contemplated the claim by ascent from Erik II, if for no other reason 
, 
than its political consequences. John Hastings, too, cannot have been 
seriously heard. Had it not been that in the latter part of the 
proceedings he and Bruce fought on common ground, it is unlikely that 
his claim would have received the attention which it has, for by then 
it had been well established that a kingdom, unlike a lesser fee, was 
not partible. It is noteworthy that he, among the majority of 
claimants, was ignored in the narrative accounts of the dispute. The 
partition of the kingdom was a course of action which is unlikely to 
have been accepted by the Scots, or considered by Edward I,, who did 
not pay a great deal of attention to Hastings. 
The case for Florence, count of Holland . was equally 
unpromising. Notwithstanding the attention paid to him at the time . 
and the arguments put forward on his behalf since 
73 
9 it is 
inconceivable that he could have had any chance of winning his case, 
81 
or that he seriously expected to. Like the others, he was merely 
seeking publicity and, as suggested above, his involvement may have 
been instigated by Bruce for political motives. "Purely formal, not 
to say frivolous,, 
74 is a fair comment regarding Florence's claim. A 
resignation such as Florence claimed had taken place would have been 
an event of great national importance, and as such would have been 
widely known and discussed amongst the nobility of the realm. There 
would have been other record of it than the instrument of resignation 
itself . and it would have been remembered by those of the kingdom who 
were removed from that period by only one or two generations. it 
must have been known that Florence could provide no authentic 
evidence to support his claim, which was thus of no value. 
The conduct of the Great Cause itself is conclusive evidence of 
t 
the contemporary opinion that Florence's claim was insupportable. 
When the order was given to appoint auditors, it was Balliol (with 
his brother-in-law, Comyn) and Bruce who chose most of them, none of 
the other competitors sharing in the task. It thus seems that even 
then the court recognised that its judgement would be given either to 
Bruce or to Balliol. One year later the case was no nearer 
completion,, and when it became apparent that the process was too 
involved for a conclusion to be reached within an acceptable period . 
it was decided, on 2 June 1292, to shorten the proceedings by first 
deciding between Bruce and Balliol, and then judging the victor 
against all the others. At this stage, the only logical step, had 
any credence whatsoever been given to Florence . would have been 
immediately to establish the validity of his claim, which, had it 
proved legitimate, would have annulled the claims of Brucel Balliol, 
82 
Hastings and Pinkeny. Since the remaining eight were weaker casest 
in effect, the establishment of Florence's right would have settled 
the matter. If Florence had been regarded with any suspicion of 
belief, therefore,, the decision made on 2 June 1292 was, at best., 
ill-advised. That Edward decided to judge first between Bruce and 
Balliol was a straightforward recognition that the settlement of the 
dispute lay between those two men only. 
The law by which the claims of Bruce and Balliol should be 
assessed was not well defined. The marriage settlement of 1281 
75 
and 
the entail of 1284 are the only practical expressions of the law as 
it stood in the late thirteenth century, and whilst they are clear 
enough,, they state it no further than the obvious principles of 
primogeniture: 
I 
"Since it has pleased the Most High that our lord 
Alexander, eldest son of [king] Alexander, has gone the 
way of all flesh with no lawful offspring surviving 
directly from the body of the said king, we bind 
ourselves and our heirs straitly by the presents to our 
said lord king and the heirs descended from his body 
directly or indirectly who by right ought to be admitted 
to succeed to him and in the faith and fealty by which we 
are bound to them we firmly and faithfully promise that 
if our said lord king happens to end the last day of his 
life leaving no lawful son or sons, daughter or daughters 
of his body or of the body of the said Alexander his son, 
we each and all of us will accept the illustrious girl 
Margaret, daughter of our said lord king's daughter 
Margaret... and lawful offspring descended from her,, as 
our lady 7%nd right 
heir of our said lord king of 
Scotland. " 
The king's sons succeeded the king. Failing them, their sons became 
the king's heirs, and, failing any direct male descendents, females 
were admitted: the king's daughter, failing whom, her children, male 
in preference to female, became eligible to succeed. It was 
according to that understanding of the law that Margaret had been 
83 
accepted as heir in 1286, when it became known that she was the only 
heir of Alexander III. Upon her death,, a more complex situation 
arose, since there was then no direct descendent of the monarch. 
At that point, collateral relationships became involved. Beyond 
the elementary principle that the king' s son inherited before his 
daughter . however, no statement of the law of Scotland concerning 
collaterals existed. There being no descendants of Margaret, it was 
necessary to look back in time, to the most recent monarch of whom a 
descendant could be found. By going back four generations it became 
possible to find an heir in direct line. The living male 
representative of the eldest of the daughters of the younger brother 
of King William the Lion, David, earl of Huntingdon77 . was her 
daughter's, son, John Balliol. David's second daughter had left a 
son, Robert Bruce, and the third daughter had also left a son, whose 
son was John Hastings. Strict adherence to the principles of 
primogeniture would look first of all to the eldest daughter and her 
descendents; only if they failed would other collateral lines be 
considered. However,, there was at this point some controversy. 
Common law, by which some of the claimants insisted the system was 
regulated,, stated that sisters should inherit together . the eldest 
carrying, by right of ainesse, the title or dignity to her husband or 
son This rule had been applied, for instance,, in the division of 
the earldom of Chester earlier in the thirteenth century. Thus 
common law would have given the title of king to Balliol, but would 
have divided the land of the kingdom between Balliol, Bruce and 
Hastings. It was on this principle that Hastings made his claim. 
However, it was almost universally accepted that Scotland, as a 
84 
kingdom, could not be treated as were lesser fees, and was 
impartible. Common law was therefore inapplicable, and the law to be 
applied was still in question. The most consistent view of the 
Parisian lawyers whom Edward consulted in the case was that if no 
Scottish custom existed, then English custom should be invoked,. 
78 
But no English custom existed which was directly applicable to this 
unprecedented case, and English law was as ill-defined as its 
Scottish counterpart. 
The crux of the matter lay in the preference for line or degree. 
Balliolls argument was supported by the contention that "the 
eldest-born daughter alone is entitled to succeed in an indivisible 
f eull . 
79 This inferred that Bruce's mother could have had no right of 
inheritance to pass on to her son. Such a view of the succession 
also implied that the right of inheritance belonged to the line, and 
to its current representative, no matter how close, or distant, to 
the common ancestor. Thus interpreted, the succession law left no 
doubt that the throne was, by right, Balliolls. 
The argument, however, that no female, of whatever line, could 
inherit before a male of equal degree, on which Bruce founded his 
claim that Balliol's mother could have had no right to pass on, was 
equally supported. Modern works state that 'representation' had by 
then gained clear precedence over the more archaic preference of 
'degree' 
80 
9 but such conclusions must partly 
be founded on the 
outcome of the Great Cause itself. The Parisian lawyers gave a 
majority verdict that if no established custom could apply to the 
case, then the nearest in degree should inherit. That the case took 
so long, was so involved, and that it attracted varying opinions, 
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serves to illustrate the confusion which reigned in the 12903. Much 
of the source material which might help to elucidate the problem is 
of limited value: the contemporary or later narrative material is 
fiercely partisan, and even the opinions of the lawyers are rendered 
suspect by the way in which the question was put to them. The 
phrasing distinctly implied Scotland's total inferiority to the 
English crown 
81 
, and hence cast doubt on the country's status as a 
kingdom, leading to an underplaying of the insistence that the law to 
be applied must refer to a kingdom rather than to a lesser fee. 
Custom,, then, was the crucial factor: the competitor who could 
prove precedent clearly in his favour would undoubtedly win the day. 
Repeatedly it was stated that native custom should apply: 
"in the kingdom of Scotland it stands as certain and 
approved custom in the succession to that kingdom, that 
in any line of descent, ascent or collateral, the 
firstborn son, or he who proceeds from the firstborn son 
or daughter, should be preferred in succession to that 
kingdom, and in that case it follows that that cus 
circumscribes all law, or any other right whatsoever". 
Many of the written petitions appeal, with varying degrees of 
dubiety, to custom. John Comyn submitted his claim "according to 
the laws and customs of the kingdom of Scotland" . words which also 
appeared in the petition of Balliol. 
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But it was by no means 
certain that precedent did in fact favour the claims of Balliol. 
Even if it could be proved, as seems likely, that by the law of 
primogeniture Balliolls case was the stronger, this was no argument 
against the usages of Scotland, if they could be shown to oppose it. 
Thus Balliol, in his initial petition, in establishing his right 
according to the rules of primogeniture, claimed that this 
represented the "law and customs" of Scotland. 
84 Similarly, Bruce 
86 
referred to "law and justice" . in saying that the nearest in degree 
in the collateral lines should inherit. 
85 He also tried to prove 
precedent, by citing Alexander JI's supposed recognition of bim as 
next heir to the kingdom, should that king have died childless. 
Bruce contended that this proved that he was regarded , in 1238 at 
least, as the nearest heir to the throne, setting a precedent for his 
recognition as rightful heir in 1290.86 
In the later pleadings between Bruce and Balliol, much use was 
again made of custom. Bruce averred that there was "no custom of the 
realm of Scotland" in opposition to his statement that the nearest in 
degree should inherit. 
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He then claimed that the custom of the 
Scots supported him, since younger sons had inherited before the sons 
of elder sons on many occasions: 
"Custom and usage in the succession of the kings of 
Scotland is plainly thus,, that it happens in Scotland 
that if a king has two sons, and the elder son has a son, 
the brother comes to reign in Scotland before the son of 
the elder brother, by proximity of blood, aý;, can be seen 
demonstrated in the chronicles of Scotland. "" 
This statement was,, of course, true. Under the Celtic system of 
succession, in theory, the person chosen for the kingship was the one 
most fitted for the task who was a descendant within four generations 
of a previous king. Often, this was the king's brother or cousin. 
Between 843 and 1034 there is no example to be found of a 
father-to-son succession in the Scottish monarchy. 
89 Frequently a 
brother, or other relative of the same degree, inherited, although 
not, as Bruce would have it, because of their "proximity of blood". 
His claim that a younger son would succeed in preference to the son 
of an older, dead son, was never tested in that periodi although it 
is likely that, had it been tested,, it would have proved accurate, 
87 
since the brother would probably have been more fitted to rule than 
the son, being older and more experienced. It was a system which 
looked neither to primogeniture nor to degree, but to kinship, 
suitability and seniority. Most of Bruce's examples, however, were 
at least two centuries old: his appeal was to ancient custom, but did 
it reflect the law current in his own time? It is undoubtedly true 
that elements of the old system remained in Scottish thinking: 
concessions to the strict rule of primogeniture, such as the 
acceptance of Margaret in 1286, were made only in the absence of more 
suitable alternatives. Balliol's stress on the right of ainesse, 
which would have carried the entire impartible inheritance to his 
line, was, however, equally convincing, and was to some extent 
supported by more modern precedent,, which showed a preference for 
lineal descent. 
There was, in effect, no conclusive precedent. Both competitors 
appealed,, with equal veracity, to custom, which in the end was merely 
proved to be inadequate in the face of an unprecedented situation. 
This fact was recognised by the Scots auditors when they failed to 
give a definite reply to Edward's question about which law should be 
used : 
"they replied that on account of the discord which 
existed between them regarding the laws and customs of 
Scotland, for a case so arduous, and which had never been 
heard in times past, they could not advise the lord king 
in thi s mall'--r without major 119V counsel and ful 1 
deliberation" . 
In recognition of the failure of native law and custom, and of 
English law, Bruce appealed to a higher law, the "natural law", or 
"the law by which kings rule". Natural law was a concept favoured by 
medieval theorists, who hesitated to govern the actions of kings by 
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lesser, man-made laws and customs (such as primogeniture) , since it 
was by those lesser laws that the kings ruled their subjects: a king 
could not be bound by a law of which he was the author and executor. 
In his initial petition,, Bruce claimed the succession "according to 
law and Justice"91, although he failed to specify then precisely 
which law he meant. Later in his pleadings he said that his claim 
was consistent with "the law by which kings reign". 
92 He did not 
make it clear from whence this law emanated,, or what it said. He 
justified his appeal to this undefined law by claiming that 
"custom of the people and tenants cannot bind the 
sovereign who is named king, nor do him prejudice, 
because kings are establishe6to govern the people, and 
not to be governed by them". 
Thus Bruce, whilst nonetheless trying to prove precedent in natural 
law, argued against the use of custom and of Scots law in general, on 
the grounds that kings were above such laws. Bruce' s contradictory 
attitude to law seems to betray a sense of weakness in his case: he 
may have been clutching at straws. The appeal to natural law carried 
the inherent flaw that despite its divine origins (things natural 
being considered closer to the divinity than human fabrications such 
as common law), it was even less defined than any native law. Bruce 
was able to invoke it to support his case because it was no more than 
an abstract concept, and as such it can have carried little weight 
with his contemporaries. Aware of this difficulty, Bruce allied his 
natural law with "imperial law". Empire, he said, was above 
kingdom, and he thus invited Edward I to judge the case "as his 
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sovereign lord and emperor" . This "law by which kings rule", thus 
identified with natural law and imperial law, was made to decree that 
the male heir nearest in degree should inherit, that the right of 
89 
ainesse could not be passed on to an heir if it had not been invoked 
in the lifetime of the heiress to whom it initially accrued, and that 
such a right could in any case only be used in certain circumstances, 
which did not pertain at the time in question. 
95 Bruce's main 
contention, then, was that Balliol's mother could, under no 
circumstances,, have claimed more right to the throne than Bruce 
himself, a male of the same degree. Since she could not pass on 
right which she did not in the first place possess,, Balliol's own 
claim to the kingdom was therefore without foundation, leaving Bruce 
as the rightful king. 
On the face of it,, Bruce had a strong case . if he could prove 
that there really was a law which demanded settlement of the dispute 
as he claimed. The case for the use of imperial law may also have 
t 
been strengthened by the formation of the court . which was perhaps 
modelled on the centumviri, an ancient court of the Roman Empire. 
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However, his association of natural law with imperial law also 
implied that England and Scotland were inferior to the empire, a 
point which would have been hotly disputed by both English and 
Scottish representatives. His appeal to Edward to judge as sovereign 
lord and emperor also undermined the strength of his resort to 
natural law. Scotland was not at that time an independent sovereign 
state. Bruce, along with the other competitors and the guardians, 
who effectively represented the community of Scots, had acknowledged 
Edward I as overlord of Scotland, had taken oaths of fealty to him,, 
and had agreed to his being given sasine of the Scottish kingdom and 
castles. Representatives of Edward I shared in the government of 
Scotland. Thus . if a higher law was required . the law of England . 
90 
clearly at that time a superior state, should have been sufficient. 
Bruce's answer to this point was that both Scotland and England, 
notwithstanding the relationship between them, were kingdoms. The 
task in hand was to choose a king. The law invoked to do so must 
therefore be one which ruled kings, rather than the common law of any 
kingdom. Balliol . on the other hand, countered with the proposition 
that 
"since the realm of Scotland is held of the crown of 
England, and of no empire, then it would be to the 
prejudice of the crown of our lord the king if it was to 
be judged by imperial law in his court". 
97- 
Edward should judge the case "according to the rules of his crown and 
of his kingdom of England". Balliolls contention was that Scotland, 
as a land which had been held by homage from the kings of England 
"from time beyond memory". should be treated as any other impartible 
fief of that kingdom. 
"The king of England, superior lord of the realm of 
Scotland, should judge and decide between those seeking 
the said kingdom of Scotland according to those laws and 
customs by which the same king of England judges and 
decides for lands and tenements pertaining to his crown 
which were occupied within his kingdom by his 
ancestors ... that is, by the common 
law and custom of his 
kingdom, a not by any other law or custom 
whatsoever. " 
Balliol, in a manner of speaking, thus claimed that the realm which 
he sought to rule, despite its title, and the title of its ruler, was 
not a true kingdom, but merely an appendage of the kingdom of 
England, and should thus be judged according to English common law. 
The question of Scotland's status is, of course, important. 
These arguments give us an insight into what a kingdom was in the 
minds of men who were not concerned with abstract theory, but with 
political fact, material welfare, power, and personal relationships. 
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The claimants were, in true opportunist fashion, quite able and 
willing to argue points in which they did not believe, if it would be 
instrumental in gaining them the crown. After the initial judgement 
against him, Bruce felt no scruple about entirely changing his plea, 
from one which supported the idea of the 'kingdom' to one which 
relied on the status of Scotland as being no more than that of an 
English fief. Edward himself seems to have been in two minds about 
the status of the country: he always took pains to stress his 
"superior and direct dominion"99, but nevertheless, he usually 
referred to Scotland as a 'kingdom' or 'realm' . While claiming that 
the overlordship had always pertained to him and his predecessors, 
Edward nonetheless felt that he had to ask, and explain his reasons 
for asking,, for the sasine of the kingdom. Had he really believed 
that Scotland was no more than a fief of his crown . he surely would 
have claimed its sasine on the death of Margaret in 1290, through 
normal rules of nonentry. He accepted that Scotland had its own 
laws . customs and goverment. but now claimed that he was superior to 
that government, and had the right to infiltrate his own 
representatives into it. Edward I thus had a dual vision of 
Scotland, as kingdom, and as fief: in effect, like that of the 
competitors, his political theory was dictated by opportunism. 
The readiness of these men to change their attitudes to 
Scotland, and,, apparently, to their concept of the state, to suit 
their own material gain, makes a discussion of the 'kingdom' as seen 
through their eyes difficult and perhaps pointless. However, despite 
this, issues are raised which point to important questions which must 
be asked when trying to establish what a kingdom was, and therefore 
92 
deciding by what law the disputed succession to the crown of Scotland 
should be settled. 
Scotland was, de facto, a fief of England in 1291. Whether or 
not this was the normal state of affairs, whether or not the kingdom 
had been justly or unjustly reduced to that state, the sasine of the 
land was undeniably held by the crown and the king of England. 
Vassal-kingdoms were not, of course, unknown . and there may be a case 
for regarding certain periods of Scottish history in that light. The 
conduct of thirteenth-century Anglo-Scottish relations, however, 
precludes the contention that in this period Scotland was widely held 
to have had such a status. On the other hand,, the nature of the 
Scottish realm was further brought into question by the traditional 
enthronement ceremony. The feeling in most of Europe was that a 
king,, to be fully recognised as such, had to receive the spiritual 
insignia of unction and coronation, which instilled in him the divine 
power through which the true king ruled. Scotland's ancient 
inauguration ritual, lacking these elements, was to the detriment of 
the case for Scottish sovereignty, and was a matter of some concern 
to the Scots, who in 1221 had petitioned the pope to allow these 
rites to be performed at Scottish coronations. The request was not 
granted, because, significantly, the pope was not then willing to 
commit himself to such a recognition of Scotland's independence. 
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This episode was used as evidence during the Great Cause that 
Scotland could not be an independent kingdom: when the foreign 
lawyers were asked for their opinions, the question put to them 
specifically mentioned that the king of the country in question was 
"neither crowned nor anointed, but only placed in a royal seat by the 
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earls, barons and prelates of the kingdom" . and that the kingdom was 
held "of another king, as superior and direct lord of that kingdom, 
for homage ... ". 
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These questions about the status of Scotland were not in fact 
answered in the Great Cause. The relationship between the two 
kingdoms, in truth, was and always had been vague and open to change, 
consequent upon the fluctuations of their individual political 
situations. In 1290, when the Scots were weak, they committed 
themselves to a recognition that theirs was a vassal kingdom. But 
that was a matter of political expediency which was soon to be 
invalidated by claims of coercion, and in itself made little 
difference to the fundamental, undefined relationship between the two 
kingdoms. There was in fact no ready-made law by which the case in 
t 
point could be decided. The final judgement showed the duality of 
thought, the contradiction, and the confusion of contemporary 
attitudes to the kingdom. The first part of the judgement, between 
Bruce and Balliol, was made according to the 1291 situation, in which 
Scotland was not a separate kingdom with the right to be treated 
under a higher law than that of its subjects. Scotland was a fief of 
the kingdom of England, and, therefore,, according to the common law 
of England, working on the principles of primogeniture, it was 
decided that Balliol had a better claim to the throne than Bruce. 
The second part of the judgement, however, was made on the assumption 
that Scotland was a kingdom, the integrity and unity of which had to 
be upheld. 
Once Balliol had won his case against Bruce, he had to argue 
against the case for partition then brought by Hastings and Bruce. 
A4 
This represented, of course, a remarkable volte-face on behalf of 
both of the protagonists. Balliol, from arguing that Scotland was a 
fief, and should be judged by common law, turned to press that 
Scotland, as a kingdom, was impartible, and had to be preserved 
intact in order to avoid destruction of the integrity of the royal 
dignity. To be fair . Balliol had previously defended the 
impartibility of Scotland . saying that whilst he wished in no way to 
limit the actions of his overlord, his petition implied that 
Scotland,, as a kingdom, was impartible, unlike lesser fiefs. 
102 This 
was inconsistent with the main part of his case at that point in the 
proceedings, but it was the argument which he pursued later, in the 
face of Bruce and Hastings, and shows that Balliol was as opportunist 
as all the other competitors: the nature of kingship, the definition 
I 
of kingdom, and the laws which were used to govern such concepts,, 
were undefined, and could be cited differently,, according to the 
needs of the moment. 
Bruce, from claiming that Scotland . as an independent kingdom, 
was to be dealt with under a higher law, turned to the case that, as 
a mere fief, like all other English fiefs, it was partible. This 
was,, in view of the attitude to Scotland displayed in the first part 
of the judgement, a fair case. Even the great earldoms and baronies 
of England were not immune from partition, as had been shown by the 
treatment of the earldom of Chester in the 1230s, a case in which the 
fathers of Bruce and Balliol, and Hastings' grandfather, had all been 
involved. 103 The lands of the earldom had been partitioned between 
the co-heirs, and the dignity of earl had beeng eventually, 
surrendered to the crown. Balliol's claim that Scotland should be 
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treated as any other impartible English fief was unsupported by any 
example. According to common law, English honours such as the 
earldom of Chester were partible. Doubtless with the Chester case in 
mind, and seeing that Edward had used common law in the first part of 
his judgement, Bruce and Hastings claimed that 
"the inheritance, the lands, of the king of Scotland were 
partible, in accordance with the common law both of 
England a 184 Scotland, among the representatives of female 
co-heirs" I 
and that 
"even if the land of Scotland be called a kingdom, the 
land it T8V is nothing else but a lordship or an 
honour". 
It was a claim which was correct and consistent with the decision 
made against Scottish sovereignty earlier in the case, and Bruce was 
within his right6 under the common law, in such a case, when he 
sought "a third part of the lands of Scotland with all their 
liberties and pertinents, excepting the name and dignity of king". 
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However, common law was not used in the second part of the 
judgement. Suddenly,, Scotland seems to have assumed the status of a 
kingdom, and, according to the higher law to which Bruce had 
originally appealed in vain, it was declared impartible. 
107 Given 
that decision,, it became inevitable that the judgement was to be 
given in favour of Balliol, who, accordingly,, was informed on 17 
November 1292 that his was the greatest right to the throne. 
One cannot help feeling that Bruce, "unprincipled 
opportunist" 
108 
as he may have been, had justifiable cause for 
complaint in 1291 - 1292. His claim that the kingdom of Scotland was 
his had been defeated on the grounds that Scotland was not a proper 
kingdom,, and was thus subject to common law. His second claim,, 
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according to common law, that one third of Scotland pertained to him, 
was then defeated on the grounds that Scotland, as a kingdom, was, 
according to the higher law which ruled such affairs, impartible. If 
it is fair to say that the judgement was entirely just, and that 
Edward was "rather legalistic than unscrupulous" 
109 
. then the status 
of Scotland, the importance of her vassaldom, and the significance of 
her inauguration rites had all changed between 5 and 17 November 
1292. 
The final judgement, however, notwithstanding its inconsistency, 
was probably the one which did truly reflect popular opinion about 
the status of Scotland. It was, historically, a kingdom in its own 
right. Despite his officious blusterings about direct dominion,, 
Edward I recognised that Scotland was a kingdom, and he knew that his 
f 
claim that it was, and had always been, a mere fief of England was, 
at best, contentious. Had he been truly convinced of his claim, the 
course of events between 1286 and 1292 would have been very 
different: he did, in effect, recognise Scotland's independent status 
when he chose to ask for recognition of his overlordship, instead of 
merely assuming it; he did so again when he assured the Scots that 
neither they nor their realm would suffer prejudice by coming south 
of the Tweed to treat upon the vacancy in the kingdom; he did so yet 
again by promising to restore the castles and land of Scotland "in 
the same estate as they were in when we were given sasine" 
110 
; and 
finally, of course, Edward I admitted Scotlandts status when he gave 
his decision in favour of impartibility. Thus Edward, and probably 
the members of his court, whilst doubtless fondly hoping that 
Scotland would remain a vassal state . must have been aware that its 
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tradition was as a separate kingdom, and that its servile status of 
the moment was a temporary condition, brought on purely by the 
accident of dynastic failure. Balliol and Bruce, and the Scots 
attending the court, must also have believed that Scotland was a 
kingdom. Certainly, the competitors were willing to jeopardise that 
status if it would bring them to a better position - to that extent 
they were opportunists - but they cannot have doubted at the outset 
and at the end that Scotland was a separate kingdom with its own 
traditions. The later activities of both Bruce and Balliol as kings, 
tend to support that contention. They were willing to give in to 
vassaldom temporarily in order to gain the kingdom, but having 
achieved that end, pressure from the community,, and indeed their own 
interests, demanded that they should apply themselves to achieving 
independent control of Scotland. They knew that submission could 
only be temporary. 
The question of the inauguration rite was similar. Whilst there 
had been doubts cast upon the sovereignty of Scotland's unanointed 
kings,, it was, as Balliol pointed out, well known that there were 
other examples of kings who were neither anointed nor crowned. He 
claimed that these ceremonies were only symbolic of the king's power 
and character, and were not essential to constitute the king. 
ill 
What the status of kingdom implied, with reference to this realm at 
least,, was sovereignty. All knew that Scotland, unless forced into 
submission by circumstances (as in, for instance, 1174 - 1189), was 
independent of any other state, had its own government, and made its 
own laws. The Great Cause was in itself a freak event, in that it was 
the result of the state being weakened to such an extent that it gave 
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in to subjection to another kingdom, and allowed that kingdom to 
intervene and make law concerning it. However, the eventual 
insis ence of the Scots on the status of their country and on the 
implications of that status prevented further erosion, and over a 
period of time the qualities of the kingdom were to be painfully 
reasserted. 
Much discussion has been given to the question of the rectitude 
of Edward I's judgement in 1292. By some, his legal uprightness has 
been devoutly defended . while for others his conduct has been the 
subject of vituperation. Both views betray a misunderstanding of the 
complexity of the issues at stake. The Great Cause was not merely a 
court case to decide who was to be the King of Scots, with a correct 
and an incorrect solution. The protagonists were not merely 
opportunists striving to gain the best deal for themselves out of a 
confused situation. Opportunism undeniably figured largely in their 
motives, but to decry them on those grounds is hypocritically to 
apply modern moral judgements to the events of the thirteenth century 
in a manner which is unbecoming in serious historical analysis. 
The significance of the Great Cause lies not in the legality or 
corruption of its conduct, but in the contemporary attitudes which it 
reveals regarding the nature of a kingdom and the laws which governed 
kings. It displays, in rare fashion, a single moment in the 
development of political and legal thought, and reveals the confused 
and disorganised state of thirteenth-century constitutional theory. 
The Scots and the English undoubtedly regarded their lands, by this 
period, as separate entities: nations, kingdoms, realms, or any other 
99 
such title. But the court case of 1291 - 1292 shows that their ideas 
concerning the constitutional and legal significance of that concept 
were as yet at an early stage in their development. The normal rules 
of legal settlement broke down when there was no precedent, no 
custom, to which appeal could be made. None of the established laws 
were capable of providing a satisfactory answer to this unprecedented 
situation, and in the end an ill-defined mixture of legal theory was 
used to construct a solution which, at least superficially, satisfied 
the requirements of the two crowns. 
If Bruce, as has been suggested, did have genuine cause for 
grievance in 1292, it is equally true to say that, had the judgement 
gone the other way, Balliol would have had as good grounds for 
complaint. One claim was as good as the other: precedent and custom 
i 
could be shown to support both, and there was no established law 
which could distinguish between them. Settlement in favour of Bruce 
could equally have met the requirements of the kingdoms and reflected 
the confused nature of the Anglo-Scottish relationship. 
There being no law, Edward I may well have made his decision on 
grounds other than legalistic consideration. That the weight of 
contemporary opinion did in fact favour Balliol is possible, but 
cannot now be proved, and it is equally possible that in the end 
Edward made his choice out of consideration of which man was more 
likely to bow to English overlordship. This was certainly how the 
events were interpreted by Scots in succeeding generations, although 
the propagandist requirements of the Brucian line must also be borne 
in mind when dealing with such evidence. But even if mere expediency 
was the deciding factor for Edward I. it should not be held as 
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reprehensible. Both men had legitimate claims, between which no law 
could decide: in such a situation, on what grounds other than 
personal preference could an overlord make his choice? If Edward I 
did indeed choose the king whom he considered to be more tractable, 
he was to be disappointed, for, as was to be demonstrated many times 
after 1296, he underestimated the strength and unity of the Scottish 
community. 
The Great Cause was indeed a "considerable achievement in 
politics, administration, and law". 
112 The records, biased as they 
may be, do give a remarkable insight into the viewpoint of 
contemporary non-theorists regarding succession systems, the law, and 
the nature of a kingdom. However, it should not be seen in a vacuum, 
with reference only to these legalistic concepts. More important 
than all of these, was the part which the Great Cause played in the 
political history of medieval Scotland. Seen in the context of the 
events which foreshadowed it, and with those which followed . the 
Great Cause is a vital part of the course of Anglo-Scottish 
relations, which, more than any other scene in that protracted drama, 
helped in some strange, perverse way to consolidate Scotland as a 
political entity. At the opening of 1293, Scotland had a king, the 
relationship of whom with the crown of England had been established 
by the events of and preceding the Great Cause. That troubled 
relationship was to be the anvil on which, eventually, Scotland's 
nationhood was reshaped. 
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(A. L. Poole, Domesday Book to Magna Carta, P-3 & 
n., pp. 143,312. ) Pope Alexander III, in his 
confirmation of the bull Laudabiliter, mentioned 
the 'kingdom' of Ireland (Hiberniae, regni; 
of. Giraldus Cambrensis, Opera (Rolls Series) V,, 
PP-318-19). John's style probably betrays Henry 
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king of Ireland. There are several other 
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century; e. g. T. Hearne, Liber Niger Saccarii I, 
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Stones and Simpson, Edward I II# PP-3-4) is 
therefore of great significance. That the 
courtesy title lady most often appears beside the 
title 'queen' (e. g. Ibid. ) must add weight to this 
supposition. When the Scots referred to 'our 
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The Reign of John Balliol, 1292 - 1296 
The reign of John Balliol has aroused much discussion among 
historians, a fact which seems mildly absurd,, since it lasted for 
only three-and-a-half years, about one eighth of the average reign of 
Scottish kings in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. The 
reason for this preoccupation is remarkably little connected with the 
man himself . the significance of the reign resting rather on the 
unprecedented turn in Anglo-Scottish relations which had taken place 
previous to Balliolls accession. However, despite this fact, 
commentators have frequently summed up Balliol's reign with an 
I 
attempted character study of the man himself . Such an approach is 
unsatisfactory: too little is known about Balliol to enable any 
adequate conclusions to be drawn about his character, and, in any 
case, the course of events did not follow so much from his 
personality as from the vagaries of the political scene . over which 
he had little control. Thus, for example, the description of Balliol 
as "rather an ordinary man facing an impossible political situation" 
1 
is in no way adequate as a description of the prevailing situation in 
late thirteenth-century Scotland. 
For a more satisfactory assessment of this remarkable period in 
Scottish history one must look, above all, at contemporary thought. 
The events and consequences of this reign, perhaps more than those of 
any othert arose from conceptual, rather than personal or even 
political foundations. What mattered to the Scottish community. and 
what must eventually have been the root cause of Balliol's failure to 
retain his crown, was not the fact of Edward I's overlordship; nor 
log 
was it Edward's hearing of appeals from the Scottish courts. Clearly, 
Balliol and the Scottish governing community,, in 1291, when they 
agreed to allow Edward to adjudicate what was fundamentally a 
Scottish judicial matter, had been prepared to accept overlordship 
and its judicial implications, while nevertheless expecting to be 
able to continue to rule Scotland by Scottish legislation and 
administration. The problem was not the fact of overlordship, but 
rather its intellectual implications. John was the 'King of Scots'. 
the fount of justice, upon whom the people depended for freedom from 
injustice and tyranny. His most fundamental duty as a king was the 
protection of his people through justice, of which he, through the 
dignity of his office, was the primary source. However , the 
implications of acknowledging another king as overlord contradicted 
this,, the basis of his kingship. If he, despite the bestowal upon him 
of the 'dignity' of the crown, was not the primary source of justice 
in the community, could he in fact claim to be truly its king? 
The community of the realm must have been aware of this 
difficulty; the very concept of Scotland as a 'kingdom' . so often 
discussed, and eventually upheld, in the adjudication of the 
succession, was at stake. The tradition and experience of centuries 
had led the Scots to believe that their land was, de facto, a 
kingdom, no matter what arguments of legal minutiae might be aduced. 
Even the period of 1174 - 1189, when King William had been forced to 
bow to English overlordship, had not threatened Scottish sovereignty 
in this way, for his submission was undeniably the result of 
coercion, and, in any case, Henry II had not challenged William's 
right to rule Scotland. The judiciary had not been subject to 
110 
English review, and no English royal edicts had dictated to William 
how he was to carry out his governance. 
2 
In Balliolls reign, 
however , an attack was launched at the theoretical roots of Scottish 
kingship, and at the status of I kingdom' . In short, the entire 
foundations upon which Scottish identity and government had been 
built were in danger of being undermined. The problems of Balliol's 
reign are thus to be seen from the point of view of the implications 
for the fabric of Scottish society of conflicting ideas regarding the 
nature of his kingship. 
When John Balliol finally won his case before Edward I, and was 
proclaimed King of Scots in November 1292, it may have come as 
somewhat of a surprise to him. The youngest son of his family 
3, he 
would not have been brought up to embody the relatively new Balliol 
claim to the Scottish throne. The deaths of his elder brothers,, 
however, left him as head of the family, with a duty to pursue its 
claims to aggrandisement when the opportunity arose. His family was 
not long-establ i shed in Scotland, but through good alliances in the 
century preceding their elevation to the kingship, the Balliols had 
greatly increased their fortunes to become exceedingly powerful, 
wealthy and well fitted for the royal connection now bearing fruit in 
King John. Their acquisition of great estates in Galloway, through 
the marriage of John's father to Devorguilla, the heiress of that 
lordship, had greatly enriched them, and John's position as lord of 
Galloway must have been effective in producing the prestige which had 
to be attached to the one who was to be King of Scots. The court in 
Norham and Berwick had declared him the rightful heir, and the Scots 
ill 
were probably pleased at last quickly to inaugurate a king in 
traditional style,, who would be expected to fulfil a traditional 
-1 role. His position as a major land-holder and powerful baron must 
also have been of consequence in their willingness to accept him as 
their king. 
Also relevant to his position with regard to the community, 
however, was his close connection with the Comyns, one of the oldest, 
and perhaps the most influential, of Scotland's Anglo-Norman noble 
f amilies. Their vast territorial possessions, which included Buchant 
Menteith, Badenoch and much of Galloway, were matched by the leading 
r "'le 6) which for some considerable time they had taken in Scottish 
government. 
4 Having risen to great prominence in the reign of 
Alexander II, they had led one of the parties which took power in the f 
minority of Alexander III,, had figured greatly in the guardians' 
government of 1286 - 1290, and were undoubtedly in the very forefront 
of Scottish political life. During the first guardianship, Comyns, 
or representative's of families closely allied to them by marriage or 
political af f iliation . held almost a third of 
Scotland's 
sheriffdoms. 
5 Alexander Comyn, earl of Buchan was also justiciar of 
Scotia, which office passed after his death to Andrew Moray (who was 
married to John Comyn Is (the competitor I s) sister) . and again . later . 
to John Comyn, earl of Buchan (Alexander's son). 
6 
John Comyn of 
Badenoch also held the justicarship of Galloway for much of the 
thirteenth century. 
7 The Balliols, in acquiring their land and 
influence in Scotland, had also gained marriage alliance with this 
pre-eminent family, who were themselves not unrelated to the royal 
house. King John's sister, Alianora,, was married to John Comyn, the 
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It is certain that the support which the Comyns gave Balliol in 
his attempt to win the crown was considerable. Their own claim to 
the throne was by this time very weak, but by backing Balliol they 
greatly increased their chances of enlarging the sway which their 
family already held in Scotland. John Comyn's own claim was lodged 
merely in order to record, in case of future eventualities, his 
family's links with the royal house, and, in his petition for the 
throne, he averred that he wished his claim to bear no prejudice to 
that of John Balliol 
8, 
whom, clearly, he wished to be the successful 
candidate. It is noticeable that many of the auditors chosen by 
Balliol in the Great Cause were of families which had been involved 
in the Comyn party of the 1250s, who were actual kinsmen of the 
Comyns, or were clerics, the patronage of whose benefices lay with 
f 
the Comyns or their supporters. It is possible to prove family 
relationships with the Comyns for a considerable number of the 
auditors, and when those who had earlier political affiliations are 
added, the list of 'Comyn men' among Balliolls auditors grows to 
around half the total. 
9 
There is less evidence for direct Comyn influence during the 
actual reign of Balliol,, but nevertheless, it does seem that the 
Comyns were close to the centre of power. A study of the witness 
lists of Johnts acts emphasises this: John Comyn of Badenoch, John 
Comyn,, earl of Buchan, Geoffrey de Mowbray, Patrick Graham, Gilbert 
de Umphraville, earl of Angus, and William, earl of Ross make up the 
majority of those who appear regularly. 
10 
Furthermore, of the 
fifteen non-clerics whose seals were appended to the treaty of 
Paris 
11 
. and whom we may therefore safely assume to have been the 
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king's inner council, three were Comyns, two had Comyn wives, and 
three more were related to the old Comyn party of the 1250s. 
12 
It seems, then , that Ball iol Is support in Scotland was 
significantly based on this family which, as demonstrated by the 
events of the preceding half-century, had great pretension to control 
the government, a fact which must be of relevance to King John's 
position in the kingdom. The Comyns, through marriage alliance with 
the Balliols, had found the means of re-asserting their power in the 
government of Scotland. 
Without the allegiance of the Comyns, the support which Balliol 
could have commanded in his bid for the throne would have been 
significantly less infl uential than that of his major rival, Bruce. 
13 
The complex pattern of Comyn alliance which seems to have been used t 
to prop up the Balliol claim suggests that John was as much a Comyn 
candidate for the throne as a Balliol one. As king, his control may 
well have depended on Comyn support, and it is perhaps not too great 
an overstatement to suggest that in some ways Balliol should be seen 
as a mouthpiece for the Comyn rule of the kingdom: certainly, the 
Comyns provided the power behind his government. 
Despite the uncertainty of his relationship with Edward I, and 
the influence wielded by the mighty Comyns in Scotland . there is no 
evidence to suggest that Balliol was not aware of the responsibility 
of government which his kingship laid upon him, nor that he was not 
prepared to act accordingly. What little is extant of his legislation 
and parliamentary business shows that the government of the country 
was carried on with some degree of thoughtfulness and success. His 
duty was to keep peace, so that responsible and peaceful members of 
114 
society could live without fear of disturbance from oppressors of any 
sort. Balliol's principal legislative acts were concerned with 
achieving exactly that aim in the area of the kingdom where 
previously royal control had been most lacking: 
"the lord king, for the observance of the peace and 
stability of his kingdom, has stated and ordained that 
the lands underwritten will be a sheriffdom... to be 
called the sheriffdom of Skye". 
T4 
Similar edicts were issued creating sheriffdoms of Lorne and 
Kintyre. 15 It is noteworthy that two of the new sheriffs were men 
who were prominent relatives and supporters of the Comyns, 
16 
a point 
which can hardly be co-incidental. The king is here fulfilling his 
traditional function, the promotion of peace, and therefore 
prosperity, within the community. 
I Most of the rest of John's records deal with his treatment of 
judicial - matters. Parliament was 
the highest court in the land; the 
king was its supreme judge, and is found, in a parliament held only a 
few weeks after his accession to the throne, attempting to untangle 
some of the legal affairs left as his legacy from the interregnum. 
Some of the cases have become famous: MacDuff's plea about his share 
of the lands of the earldom of Fife,, 
17 the plea of the monks of 
Reading regarding their alleged right to the priory of May 
18 
. and the 
case of the money claimed by the count of Flanders as due to 
him from 
the marriage of his daughter to the son of Alexander 11119, for 
example. Others show the normal . day-to-day business of a 
hard-worked judiciary. While the latter have not come to symbolise 
the failure of King John, and so have not gained the fame of the 




had imprisoned officers of the crown "against his fee 
115 
and pledge, and against the laws used in the realm of Scotland", or 
the settlement of the dispute between William Bisset and the bishop 
of St. Andrews over the lands of West Calder 
21 
, were clearly treated 
with as great a sense of importance. King John set about the 
judicial and administrative business of government in similar fashion 
to any king. 
It has been tempting to describe Balliol as a rex 
-inutilis, 
a 
king who was useless,, since he could or would not fulfil the 
obligations which his office laid on him, to the ruination of the 
kingdom. 22 This could explain why his people rejected John, and all 
but removed him from office, and why his overlord spurned him, and 
took away the dignity which he had so recently conferred. On the 
other hand, the impression which one gets of Balliol's parliament 
t 
attempting to do justice to those who sought it, and legislating for 
the welfare of the kingdom, shows that such a view of Balliol must be 
at least partially unsatisfactory. 
However, in one respect Balliolls position must have been 
contradictory to his status as king. Fordun states that in Edward's 
court in September 1293, King John suffered "numberless insults and 
slights, against his kingly rank and dignity". 
23 These 'insults and 
slights' were the consequences of his acceptance of Edward's right to 
call his judgement into question. In accepting the status of a 
vassal king, Balliol removed from himself the position of supreme 
judge, and with it perhaps also the true dignity of the crown. One 
of the oppressions which it was his duty to prevent,, in order to 
retain a just and righteous society,, was the tyranny of rule by a 
foreign power. Regiam Majestatem makes this clear: 
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"our illustrious king ... has no superior but God himself ... and ... by the might of his strong right hand ... may... all Re days of his life be victorious in 
subduing his foes". 
Balliolls acceptance of the necessity to do homage for the kingdom, 
his willingness to play second fiddle to Edward I. and perhaps also 
to his own noble mentors, the Comyns, show that on this more 
political level he had no aptitude to be a king of Scots. In effect, 
he was aI sub-king I, and it must have been felt that this in some way 
negated his royal dignity, because it was no part of the Scottish 
idea of kingship as established thoughout the previous two centuries, 
and which had been expressed so recently as the Great Cause. This 
idea was to be affirmed again in the later propaganda; for instance, 
in the document prepared for the Anglo-Scottish peace negotiations at 
I Bamburgh in 1321 . the Scots claimed. in answer to the English version 
of Balliol's election, rule, and deposition,, that 
"by common right, one equal cannot hold sovereignty 
(" imperium) over another, and thus a king cannot be 
subject to a king, nor a kingdom to a kingdom ... and thus 
it must be allowed that the kingdom of Seq and does not 
owe subjection to the kingdom of England". 
Al 
The document went on to rehearse the Scots' version of events up 
until the beginning of the Great Cause . at which point they claimed 
that since the right to judge had been usurped through force and 
guile, Edward's judgement was of no significance, "as if judgement 
had not been made". The nature of that judgement was not even 
mentioned in the document, and neither are any of the events 
thereafter until the English invasion and oppression, when the Scots 
"gave freedom to ... their legitimate lord, Robert Bruce... and 
recognised him as the true heir to the king dom" . They had claimed 
that a king could not be subject to a king. Therefore Balliol,, who 
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indisputably was subject to Edward I. could not have been a king, and 
so accordingly was deemed unworthy even of a mention. So, when it 
suited their propagandist purpose of discrediting Edward I's attempts 
to prove an established overlordship in Scotland, the Scots used 
their own avowed theory of sovereignty to prove that John Balliol 
could not have been a true king. It is interesting to note, howevert 
that the Scots accepted his acts as valid, and that even after his 
deposition he wa s still recognised as king by the various 
guardianships and by the community. 
26 
Presumably this was justifiable 
because he had been inaugurated as king, and acted with the authority 
and consent of the community. Their government in his name would 
carry similar authority after his 'deposition' . When his actions ran 
contrary to his status, however, as in his attendance at King 
Edward's summons,, he acted against the interests of the community,, 
against the wishes of at least a sizeable proportion of it, and 
without its consent. It may thus have been possible for the 
contemporary community to uphold the notion of John's kingship, but 
yet deny the validity of his acts of vassaldom. 
John, of course, must have been aware of this anomaly in his 
position. Willing to accept the dignity and power which the crown 
offered him, ready to govern the country in accordance with 
traditional principles, he nevertheless had to jeopardise the very 
basis of his kingship, supremacy in the kingdom, in order to gain and 
retain it. This ambivalence in his position may well explain why 
Balliol appears to have found the kingship a rather thankless task. 
In a later statement, which, although undoubtedly made under duress, 
nevertheless serves to illustrate the mixed feelings with which he 
left Scotland , he claimed that 
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"when he possessed and ruled the realm of Scotland as 
king and lord of the realm, he found in the men of that 
realm such malice, deceit, treason, and treachery, 
arising from their malignity, wickedness and, 
stratagems ... that it is not his intention to enter or go into the realm of Scotland at any time to come . or to interfere in any way with iý,.. or even ... to have anything to do with the Scots". 
The awkwardness of his position was inevitable, given that 
Edward I wished to exert his authority over Scotland in a manner 
previously unknown. The events of 1290 - 1292 had left Balliol in no 
doubt that Edward was his lord, not only in his capacity as an 
English noble, but also with regard to his kingdom. In the Rotuli 
Parliamentorum there is a licence to King John to infeft Agnes de 
Valence in certain lands held in chief of the English crown, in 
payment of damages adjudged to her in Edward's court at 
Westminster. 28 Here, Balliol had clearly lost his case against Agnes 
de Valence in Edward's court, and was now having to pay damages to 
her, as he would have had to do had his position been no more than 
that of an ordinary nobleman. His elevated station earned him none 
of the preferential treatment which other kings of Soots had enjoyed 
in their dealings with English kings. 
29 
So, Balliol regarded Edward I as his liege lord. Receiving the 
kingdom from him and doing homage specifically for it, all the while 
being treated as a normal English baron, must have contributed to 
impressing on Balliol the superiority which Edward held over him. 
This superiority was shown in more ways than just the matter of the 
appeals which required Balliol's attendance at English courts. 
Throughout the first year of John's reign numerous orders were sent 
to him regarding every-day matters of government. Only about one 
week after his inauguratio. n. "John, by the grace of God illustrious 
lig 
king of Scots" received an order from his overlord instructing him to 
see that the bailies of James the Steward collected the revenues of 
Kintyre, Jura and Dumbarton. Similar orders were given regarding the 
earldom of Fife, the sheriffdoms of Banff, Wigtown and Dumfries, and 
many other places in Scotland. 
30 
In the first few months of his 
reign, John had to accept that Edward, in his capacity of lord 
superior, was writing directly to the bailies and burgesses of many 
Scottish burghs instructing them regarding the payment of arrears of 
taxes due to Edward from the time when Scotland was in his hands. 
31 
On 13 December 1292 Edward announced that he had given to the bishop 
of Glasgow the marriage of the widow of the late Nicholas Biggar, who 
had held in chief of the crown of Scotland, and also the guardianship 
of the said Nicholas' two daughters and two-thirds of his, lands. 
32 
At the end of the same month he ordered the provost of Linlithgow to 
pay the town's arrears to Erik II of Norway, in settlement of the 
debt due to him which Erik had recovered in Edward's cour t. 
33 
Similar orders were given to other towns. On 4 January 1293 Edward, 
using, as always, his style superior dominus regni Scotiae, confirmed 
the custody given to Walter Logan by the erstwhile guardians of 
Scotland, of the goods and heirs of the late Henry de Wiston, who had 
34 
also held in chief of the crown of Scotland. 
These few examples show the extent to which Edward I involved 
himself in the administrative, judicial and financial affairs of 
Scottish government after his award of the kingdom to John Balliol. 
They are all taken from the early period of John's reign, and a few 
could therefore be explicable in terms of the overlap while power 
changed hands. Some of them were undoubtedly Edward's concern; he 
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had made it clear that the revenues of the crown in the interregnum 
were due to him. 35 and the arrears in payment were thus his to 
collect. Given Balliol's kingly status, however, it would have been 
more in order for Edward to have written to him regarding the money 
now due , rather than issuing his commands directly to the burghs. 
Other instances were of a different character, however. The money 
due to Erik II of Norway was a matter between the rulers of Scotland 
and Norway and , now that Scotland had a king, need not have involved 
Edward beyond,, perhaps, a letter saying that Erik had asked King 
Edward to use his influence to ensure payment. Edward's confirmation 
of the grant to a Scottish baron, given by Scottish elected 
guardians, of the wardship of a Scottish noble's goods and heirs, was 
obvious and provocative intervention in a purely internal 
i 
administrative affair. Such cases are frequent, though: in the 
Rotuli Scotiae alone there are records of almost one hundred examples 
which took place in 1293,1294 and 1295.36 T- hese cannot be explained 
away as administrative overlap. 
Having achieved recognition of his status as 'superior lord' of 
Scotland, Edward clearly intended to use it to the full, to involve 
himself as closely as possible in Scottish affairs. Balliol was 
constantly reminded that he was not the ultimate authority in 
Scotland: it was not to him that crown revenues would automatically 
be paid; it was not to him that grants of such pertinents of the 
crown as wardship and marriage necessarily pertained; he was even 
reminded that the entire kingdom was not his unless Edward I so 
desired . for on 5 January 1293 Edward issued a brieve to Walter de 
Huntercombe, his guardian of the Isle of Man, ordering him to give 
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sasine of the island to King John, since, 'by grace' , Edward had 
restored to John such possession of the island as Alexander III had 
had,, saving for himself and his heirs his own right, the fruits, 
wards, marriages, reliefs, escheats, fines, amerciamentsq arrearst 
fermes, returns, and the pleas and attachements of any of his bailies 
from the time when the sasine of the island pertained to him. 
37 Thus 
Edward I returned to King John a part of the Scottish kingdom . not 
because it was John's right to have it, as king of Scots, but because 
Edward wished to show 'grace' to his vassal in this way. 
John Balliol was, through his blood, his election and his 
inauguration, a king "by the grace of God". However, his contact 
with Edward I amply proved to him that his kingdom was in fact held 
and governed by him through I the grace of Edward Ball iol Is 
t 
treatment by Edward, in his ro"'le as an English noble,, in his 
establishment on the throne, and in the amount of interference which 
he suffered in the government of the kingdom, even in affairs of 
simple administration, proved to him beyond doubt that in Edward I he 
had an overlord who, despite all theories of kingly dignity and 
sovereignty, had the power and the will to dictate to him how to act. 
If Balliol was to retain the kingship, he must bow to the demands of 
this superior lord, whose dominion he had no option but to accept. 
Edward's motives in this intervention are difficult to 
establish. Having achieved a more complete overlordship than any of 
his predecessors . he was understandably keen to maintain his 
influence over Scottish affairs, and to make permanent his 
achievement. However, the minutiae of administration with which he 
involved himself seem unnecessarily provocative. Most accounts of 
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the downfall of King John tell only of the major court actions which 
led to his disobedience. But those cases were the culmination of a 
policy of interference and deliberate annoyance pursued by Edward I 
from the start of the reign,, and it does not seem unreasonable to 
suggest that Edward was attempting so to weaken the fabric of 
Scottish kingship that an eventual annexation could take place 
without great dislocation or protest. 
Edward I must have been aware of the ambiguity of his position 
when he wrote to John "by the grace of God,, king of Scots" . 
simultaneously styling himself "superior lord of Scotland". He 
undoubtedly had a perfectly good understanding of the implications of 
sovereignty, and of the duty of a king. He knew that Scotland was a 
kingdom in its own right (or at least that it regarded itself in that 
t 
light) . and that most of its kings had ruled without any meaningful 
subjection to the English crown. He knew that the Scots were 
suspicious of his intentions and objected to his assumption of 
superiority, and he can have had no doubts as to their reasons for so 
doing. However q Edward also knew that he was in a position to make a 
good attempt at subjecting the kingdom to his own crown, and to that 
end he was quite prepared to deny it its status, and to jeopardise 
and demean the status of the man whom he called its I king I. He knew 
that the people of Scotland wanted a king, and what they would expect 
of one . and was thus prepared to give them a ruler who would appear 
to hold the strings of government in his hands. The country would 
thus remain at peace and would, through his control, be governed in 
accordance with his wishes and in the interests of his own kingdom. 
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The concept of the sovereignty of the Scottish king was thus in 
severe danger, and so therefore was the dignity of the crown and the 
status of the kingdom. However, Balliol was trapped between Edward's 
lordship and the ideals of the Scottish community, led by the Comyns. 
He required the support of both to retain his position, and the best 
he could do was to attempt a compromise, to satisfy both parties and 
at least to make a show of ruling the country equitably. It was a 
situation which could be maintained if neither Edward nor the Scots 
made demands on him sufficient to perturb the other, and it must have 
been in that hope that King John began his reign. The only practical 
course for him was to attempt to maintain some sort of status quo 
through which he could satisfy both Edward I and the Scots community, 
and hope to avoid direct conflict,, retain his kingship, and possibly 
prevent further disruption to the government and life of the kingdom. 
During the reign of Alexander III, the Scottish community had 
undoubtedly grown in wealth and cohesion . and the years 1286 - 1290 
must have added a powerful sense of their role as defenders of the 
realm. The community's reaction to King John and his relationship 
with Edward I is therefore also of vital importance in establishing 
how he came to lose the kingdom. The comment on the year 1292 in the 
Historia Anglicana of Thomas Walsingham, that "the Scots were neither 
sad nor happy about the adoption of their new king,, 
38, is probably a 
remarkably good estimate of how the Scots felt about Balliol. They 
must have been pleased that at last the disputed succession was 
settled and that they had a king to whom they could look for justice 
and firm government. "What mattered most was to end the interregnum 
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and to inaugurate a lawful king .,, 
39 
So indeed, when, on St. Andrew's 
day 1292, the inauguration ceremony went ahead with traditional 
solemnity, those Scots who were concerned with the goverment of the 
kingdom cannot have been sad. But neither can they have been 
particularly happy, for the community of the realm, aware of their 
traditional role as advisers of the king, must have been equally 
aware of the other traditions of goverment which recognised the king 
as the embodiment of law in the kingdom, the supreme judge and 
administrator. They must have feared the consequences of the 
relationship between their king and Edward I. Here was a king who 
had not gained the throne in quite the traditional manner, by right 
of blood and by the approbation of the people only, but also through 
the judicial process of another king, with the backing and power 
primarily of one major Scottish family, neither of whom he could 
afford to alienate. The community's attitude to Balliol, happy as 
they were to call him tking' . must have been uneasy. Caught between 
two parties, in both of whose interest it was to control him, here 
was a king with little chance of ruling fairly and strongly in the 
interests of the kingdom and the majority of its inhabitants. Even in 
1292, with the relief of having a king perhaps uppermost in their 
minds, the fear of renewed civil strife and of increased foreign 
intervention in the kingdom, perhaps even of war . cannot have been 
far away. 
The early legislation of King John, regarding the highland 
sheriffdoms, may have raised the community's hopes: these were the 
acts of a king intent on following the policy of consolidation of 
royal power which had figured so prominently in the reigns of the 
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last two Alexanders. The community's concept of the king's r8le was 
doubtless similar to John's. and they too would seek to play their 
part in government in order to achieve the traditional goal of a just 
and well-ordered society. But several factors must have coloured 
their view of King John in this context. Sections of the community 
may well have felt threatened and alienated from government by the 
Comyn-predominated regime. Some of the Scottish governing class had 
little to gain, and much to lose, from such a government. An 
obvious, if extreme, example of this feeling is the case of the Bruce 
f amily. Despite the early recognition of Balliol's victory in the 
Great Cause, 
40 
Robert Bruce does not seem to have offered homage to 
King John . and the threat of English 
intervention in the rule of 
Scotland did not help to draw his family into the fold. M4ýy had 
more to gain by playing into King Edward's court, and later, when 
conflict aroseq were found on the English side of the struggle. 
There must have been other families who felt in a similar position. 
Still others, closer to the Comyns, would,, of course, be supportive 
of this administration, hoping to benefit from it. So, even within 
the community itself there must have been potentially troublesome 
division. Outweighing this, and probably, for the moment, pulling 
these opposing factions together, early in the reign, before events 
led to polarisation within the community, was the threat posed by 
King Edward. Many of the Scottish community were in a situation 
similar to Balliol's. being English feudatories as well as 
Scottish 
ones. Few, however, were so in any important capacity, and their 
major interests lay in Scotland, and that they counted 
themselves as 
part of the Scottish community implies that they shared a common view 
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of the 'rightful' status of the Scottish realm. It is difficult to 
believe that the majority of the community did not view Edward with 
some suspicion. The answer which they had given him at the beginning 
of the Great Cause,, when he had asked for recognition of his 
superiority, shows that they regarded the question of independence as 
a serious issue. They were not willing to bow to his assumed 
authority, and it was not the community, but the competitors, who had 
a vested interest, who led the movement to accede to Edward's 
demands. In the first instance, the community claimed that they knew 
nothing of this supposed 'right' of the English kings to 
overlordship, and that, in any case . they could not answer on such an 
issue without first consulting their leader, a king. 
41 
This answer 
shows that there was a corporate desire within the community to 
t 
fulfil its traditional r8le in the kingdom, to govern with the king 
in order 
. 
to protect the interests of the realm . One of those 
interests, clearly, was the kingdom's independence of foreign 
control. Rule from outwith the country was seen as tyranny,, and it 
was the community's duty to combat it. 
It has been fashionable to suggest that medieval nobility would 
have no such conceptual attitude to government, and that their 
actions were prompted entirely by short-sighted self-interest, ideas 
of the wellbeing of the realm and the traditional roles of king and 
community having no place in their motivation. To support such a 
view is surely greatly to underestimate medieval society, and in this 
case is inconsistent with the course of events, and with statements 
made by both king and nobility. For instance, at times it would have 
been more in the nobles' interest to give in to Edward than to 
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oppose him. Personally, what had they to lose in 1291, or later, by 
accepting Edward's claim to overlordship? There is no reason to 
suppose that their estates were threatened . and indeed to accede to 
his wishes may have been a safe route to more stable and firm 
government. It cannot have been in their personal interest 
deliberately to incur the wrath of a king such as Edward I. Their 
opposition to English overlordship was based on the conceptual view 
of the natural order of goverment and the traditional status of 
their kingdom. The 'Appeal of the Seven Earls' 
42 
complained that the 
guardians, who were there "to preserve and defend the established 
rights, liberties and customs of the realm". by attempting to promote 
Balliol to the kingship without the advice of the whole community 
were acting in prejudice of the 'Seven Earls of Scotland' and of the 
I 
community at large, since 
"by the laws and customs of the realm of Scotland, from 
time immemorial up till the present, it is one of the 
rights and privileges and liberties of the seven earls of 
the realm of Scotland, and of the community of the realm, 
to make a king". 
That document, of course, was Brucian propaganda. Nevertheless, its 
purpose was to oppose the actions of the guardians by appeal to their 
duty,, and to the traditional role of the earls and community in the 
government of the realm. These concepts were not unknown . and were 
not lightly regarded . Had they been so, then as a piece of 
propaganda the 'Appeal' would have been senseless. Similarly, John 
Balliol's statement of September 1293, when called to Edward Its 
court to account for his alleged lapse of judgement, that he could 
not answer any case regarding his kingdom without the counsel of the 
'wise men' of his realm 
43 
, cannot have been a mere formality,, or it 
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would have been of no effect even in gaining an adjournment. 
Balliol, too, was appealing to the accepted position of the king and 
community in the realm, and the appeal was in some measure 
successful. Later too, in the Declaration of Arbroath 
44 
. the pope 
was reminded of the Scottish nobles' belief in the independence of 
their kingdom, and of the r8le of the community in the establishment 
of a king and in his government, even to the point of removing him 
from power if he did not uphold what were seen as the fundamental 
duties of his position. Again, propaganda, but not purely so: it was 
an appeal in realistic terms to the theories of government of which 
they were aware . and which they followed in their function as the 
governing body of the kingdom. 
A -conceptual attitude to government was thus firmly embedded in 
I 
the minds of the community of late thirteenth-century Scotland. it 
had been applied to the situation in which they found themselves in 
1291, and was still applied after Balliol's accession to the throne. 
Edward I called himself an overlord, but their concept of the kingdom 
precluded this possibility. They had a king , who had been accepted 
by them and inaugurated in the proper manner, and as far as they were 
concerned, he, with their advice, had to rule the country. Their 
support was therefore put behind King John, in opposition to the 
claims of Edward I. despite the obvious drawbacks of Balliol's 
weakness in having to accept Comyn ascendancy, and in having to bow, 
to some extent, to Edward's demands. Of course, the Comyns were part 
of the community too, and so they regarded the situation in the same 
light: Balliol was the king of Scotland, and, with their I help' . it 
was his duty to govern the kingdom in accordance with the concepts,, 
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laws and customs laid down by the tradition of centuries. There was 
not , of course . total unanimity: those . such as the Bruces . who had 
particular axes to grind, did not lend their support. There is no 
evidence, however, which suggests that the community was divided 
during John's reign into two factions, pro-Bruce and pro-Balliol. On 
the contrary, some of those who who had supported Bruce in the Great 
Cause did give their homage to Balliol, and took their place in his 
council . 
45 
When it came , later . polarisation wa s pro- and 
anti-English, and, later still, pro- and anti-Bruce. 
The community of the realm, who represented I the Scots' , could 
afford to consider the conceptual side of the country's government. 
Indeed they had to, in order to protect their own position as the 
leaders of the people. It was their duty to guide and advise the 
king in the path which was most in keeping with the expectations of 
good government; it was their function to ensure that his government, 
hampered by the weakness of his position, did not run contrary to 
what they saw as the welfare of the realm. 
The various attitudes to Balliol's position in Scotland which 
have been described above were of great significance in shaping the 
course of his reign. He was inaugurated on 30 November 1292 
46 
. and it 
is from then that the Scots dated his regnal year. 
47 
As has been 
noted, the beginning of the reign seemed remarkably normal; a 
parliament was held almost immediately, in early February 1293 
48 
, and 
the business transacted was mostly of an ordinary nature. Edward Is 
persistent intervention in Scottish affairs, particularly in 
financial matters, must have been irksome, but initially was probably 
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not thought to be of too great consequence, since it involved matters 
which were individually of generally minor importance: it may have 
seemed that the finely balanced rule of the new king had a chance of 
survival. 
However, the situation was to change before long, for even 
before Balliol had performed homage to Edward I on 26 December 
1292 49 . the English king had heard in his court the plea of Roger 
Bartholomew, a burgess of Berwick, against the justice he had 
received in the Scottish courts. Having lost several cases brought 
against him before the guardians, he had appealed against their 
decisions in the court of Edward 1.50 The Scots were only too well 
aware of the difficulties of his case, and the bishop of St. Andrews, 
John Comyn, earl of Buchan, Patrick Graham, Thomas Randolph and other 
"magnates and nobles of the realm of Scotland, of the council of the 
magnificent prince, lord John, the illustrious king of Scots" 
protested to Edward that by hearing this case he failed to uphold the 
guarantee made in the treaty of Birgham that he would not hear 
Scottish pleas outwith Scotland. 
51 Already, less than one month after 
his inauguration, Balliol's advisers had come into direct conflict 
with Edward L, exposing the weakness of the Scottish king's position. 
The Comyns and other of the king's council had objected to what they 
regarded as Edward's unjustified assumption of Scottish judicial 
powers, and had protested to Edward in their own name. This action 
perhaps reflected the recent past, when, as guardians, some of the 
nobility had been used to dealing directly with King Edward. More 
normal practice in such a situation would have been for the community 
to have approached the Scottish king, who, as their head, would have 
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written to Edward. However, the community's attitude to Balliol (and 
perhaps Balliol's own reluctance to risk confrontation with his 
overlord) rendered it more profitable for them to make their own 
representations to Edward. His answer, however, had an unmistakeable 
air of finality and authority about it: only the king of England, he 
said, could hear appeals against those who deputised for him in 
Scotland when that throne was vacant, and he no longer intended to be 
bound by promises made under circumstances which no longer prevailed. 
He claimed that it was his right as overlord to hear appeals in this 
way: he had kept his promises, but they had now been rendered void, 
since the kingdom was no longer in a state of interregnum. 
52 A few 
days later Edward made a general declaration that 
"notwithstanding the promises, concessions, confirmations 
or ratifications which had previously been made by him... 
which seemed to restrain of bind him in pleas and other 
affairs relating in any way to the kingdom of Scotland 
which would be referred to him from that kingdom, he 
intended to admit and to hear them, and to show complete 
justice to the plaintiffs therein, in accordance with the 
superior and direct lordship which he had in the kingdom 
of Scotland, within the kingdom of England, where and 
when it pleased him to exercise justice; and furthermore, 
if necessary, he would call the king of Scotland 
thereupon 53 to 
his presence within the kingdom of 
England". 
According to a later account, when Balliol was awarded the kingdom he 
was warned that 
"he should govern and rule the said kingdom of Scotland 
and its people with such justice that no-one should have 
occasion to complain about his defaulting in the law, for 
which, in the future, the said king of England, as 
superior lord of the said kingdom 5Rf 
Scotland, would have 
to apply the hand of correction". 
Whether this warning was actually given, or whether it was a later 
justification of subsequent events, is a matter of some doubt. it 
appears from Edward's reaction to the Scottish protest in December 
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1292, however, that it was his intention to follow such a policY. On 
2 January 1293 Balliol gave in to Edward on this issue, giving 
letters patent declaring that he,, John, for himself and his heirs 
"and for those who will hold the kingdom of Scotland after us" . 
released Edward and his heirs of all obligations made to the 
guardians and leaders of Scotland whilst the realm had been in 
Edward's hands by reason of lordship, before its award to Balliol and 
Edward's subsequent surrender of its sasine. 
55 By this document 
Balliol effectively acquitted Edward from any obligation to obey, for 
instance . the terms of the treaty of Birgham, in which the Scots had 
so carefully attempted to safeguard the liberties of their kingdom; 
the document of 2 January gave Edward Ia carte blanche to intervene 
at will. f 
That intervention was not long in coming. In the following 
months other dissatisfied plaintiffs took their appeals to Edward. 
On 8 March King John received a summons to appear in England on 8 May 
to answer an appeal brought by John Mazun56 ,a Gascon merchant who 
was owed E2197 8s sterling for an outstanding wine and corn bill of 
Alexander III. It was alleged that, having applied to Balliol for 
redress, he had found no justice, and so had taken his plea to Edward 
I, as the superior lord of Scotland. Edward explained that he had no 
wish to deny a hearing to those seeking justice, and ordered 
Balliolls compearance before him. On 25 March Balliol was again 
ordered to attend Edward's court on 24 May to answer the case of 
MacDuff 
57 
. the son of the late earl of 
Fife, who claimed to have been 
unjustly deprived of the lands left to him by his father. When he 
had sought justice at Balliol's hands he had been unjustly imprisoned 
and, even after his release, had obtained no hearing. 
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Balliol did not attend the Easter parliament to which he had 
been summoned, and neither did he send a proxy. This act of 
defiance, probably prompted by the Scottish community. may have been 
expected by Edward I, who merely repeated the summons for 29 
September, and ordered Balliol to bring the written processes of the 
cases. 
58 He warned Balliol that when similar appeals regarding false 
processes came before him, he would do the same again, and laid down 
a strict set of rules for the procedures to be followed. 
59 If the 
king of Scots, having been summoned, did not appear on the specified 
day, he would be judged guilty of contumacy, and cognition of the 
case would fall entirely to the king of England as overlord. If a 
judgement given by the king of Scots was confirmed, it had to be 
according to the will of the king of England and the law and customs I 
of England, supported by good documentation. If the judgement went 
against the king of Scots, he was at the mercy of the king of 
England, and had to make restitution to the appellant who, under 
certain circumstances, would even owe homage for his lands to the 
king of England rather than to the king of Scots. The king of Scots 
would have,, in that case, no lordship or jurisdiction over their 
persons, lands or goods. Punishment of the king of Scots for false 
judgement would be at the discretion of the king of England. These 
rules were, of course, incompatible with Balliol's status as king of 
Scots. His council could not lightly allow him to accept such 
subjection, which could result in his losing even nominal control 
over Scottish subjects and lands, thus largely nullifying the dignity 
of the Scottish crown and the status of the kingdom. On the other 
hand,, Balliol was in no Position to argue: the conflict, already, was 
growing deeper. 
134 
Edward's concern over the quality of justice dispensed in 
Balliol's court, however, was matched in Scotland. For example, the 
bishop of St. Andrews wrote to Edward after the summons to Balliol to 
answer the Mazun case, explaining that the case had again come to 
court, and detailing the court process. 
60 
It is impossible to judge 
Edward's reaction to this, since the death of Mazun 
61 
was soon to 
invalidate the appeal. In the meantime, Balliol submitted suitably 
sycophantic supplications to Edward, who answered them in 
correspondingly superior manner. 
62 
The second date for Balliol's appearance in England saw him at 
King Edward's court. It was a peculiar affair, with Balliol vainly 
trying to appease both Edward I and the Scots. Initially, he held 
out against Edward's demands, refusing to answer without the advice 
I 
of the 'wise men' of his council, but also refusing to accept an 
adjournment to allow the necessary consultation. 
63 
The English king 
and his council rejected this insolent lack of co-operation, and 
declared Balliol to be acting in mockery and hindrance of his 
superior lord's jurisdiction, and in lesion of the kingly dignity and 
the crown; he had not acted properly and responsibly before the king, 
and had thus committed manifest contempt and express disobedience. 
For this transgression the three main castles and towns of Scotland 
were forfeit to the king of England until John made redress for his 
actions. 
64 
His duty to the Scots done by this gesture of defiance, 
Ball iol , afraid further to incur Edward's wrath, capitulated, 
reaffirmed his allegiance, and sought an adjournment to allow him to 
speak to "the greater people" of his realm, so as not to be charged 
with "default of counsel" . Edward agreed, and adjourned the hearing 
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65 
until June 1294. The difficulty of Balliol's situation had been 
well exposed in this episode: the interests of his two 'masters' had 
been in direct conflict. King John must have returned to Scotland 
with some measure of relief but, nevertheless, the outcome of the 
hearing, a complete recognition of the English king's jurisdiction 
over him, can hardly have cheered Balliol's Scottish advisers, nor 
encouraged them to think highly of their leader's potential. 
The appeals, although not over-abundant, continued. In 
September the monks of Reading lodged a complaint that they had been 
deprived of the priory of May, and had found no justice in John's 
court. 
66 
In November Edward heard a further plea of MacDuff 
67 
. and a 
new case from Simon of Restalrig 
68 
, for both of which Balliol was 
again summoned to appear in June 1294.69 In April 1294 a plea of the 
bishop of Durham was added to the list. 
70 The effect of this 
treatment, together with constant interference in Scottish affairs, 
must have been a source of great frustration to the Scots. The 
implication of these complaints, that Balliol was not and, in the 
present situation, could not be a true 'king' in his kingdom, must 
have been impressing itself upon his council, who, from their 
position, saw the problem in a less personal light than Balliol 
himself, and who may therefore have been more concerned with the 
conceptual difficulties and the continued firm government of the 
kingdom. 
The climax of the conflict was to be expected at the June 1294 
parliament. Again, it may have been with some relief that the Scots 
heard that due to the steadily worsening relations between England 
and Franceq and the impending war, that parliament would not hear the 
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Scottish cases, which were postponed until May 1295.71 For a time at 
least, Edward's attention was directed elsewhere, giving the Scots a 
breathing-space. In June, however, Balliol, as a vassal of the 
English crown . was summoned to appear in London on 1 September with 
an array of his magnates, to join the English army setting out for 
72 France. He was also forbidden to allow his ships to sail to the 
continent. 
73 
According to one English chronicler Balliol agreed to help 
Edward in this campaign, but either through his own disinclination, 
or through persuasion by his advisers, the aid was not given, and was 
replaced with "impotent and brief excuses". 
74 To add to Edward's 
problems, in June and July complaints were made to him firstly by 
"the mayor, reeves and community" of Berwick 
75 
and then again, later, 
by King John on their behalf 
76 
. regarding the dearth in Scotland and 
the oppression done to the Scots by English seizure of their grain 
ships. In September 1294 the Welsh rebelled against oppressive 
English rule, and soon thereafter events seem to have turned in a 
similar direction in Scotland. The French war had caused Edward to 
look the other way and,, consequently, his grip on Scottish affairs 
had loosened. 
It seems that awareness of Balliol's inability to combat 
Edward's claims upon him had been steadily growing in Scotland. The 
war with France and Edward I's other problems presented the Scots 
with an opportunity to assert their opposition to English 
superiority, and it is thus possible to see the reins of rule being 
removed from Balliol's grasp. He was neither able nor prepared to 
carry out fully the duties incumbent upon him, and so, when the 
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opportunity arose, those whose duty it was to support the proper 
goverment of the kingdom acted in what they saw as the interests of 
the realm, and removed him from power. Before he retired in December 
1294, Pope Celestine V, presumably in response to a supplication, 
gave the Scots absolution from the duty of obeying oaths which Edward 
I had extorted from their king by force. 77 Clearly, they were 
planning an attempt to remove the yoke of English overlordship. 
Balliol, judging from his past performance, was not likely to lead 
such a move and . having thus lost the support of the Scottish 
community, he was set aside. In particular . the Comyns must be held 
responsible for this move. Balliol depended upon them more than any 
other section of the ýcommunity; his failure to implement their 
policies had lost him their support, leading to a rapid waning of his , 
power. The Soots' actions after their abandonment of Balliol led to 
direct conflict with Edward I, and thus, no longer of use to either 
side, Balliol, a victim of circumstance, was ultimately stripped of 
power and dignity, and was cast out: the real protagonists in the 
struggle no longer needed him as their go-between. 
In July 1295 a Scottish parliament was held (of which no 
official record survives) at which a council of twelve, four each 
from the prelates, earls and barons, was elected,, "by the counsel and 
ordinance of which all of Scotland was henceforth to be ruled". 
78 
This step, the election of twelve peers to rule the land . like a 
council of regency in a minority or interregnum, was a new departure 
for the Scots. (To claim that it was "entirely in accordance with 
Scottish precedents,, 
79 is quite inaccurate. Never before had the 
scots imposed their will on a ruling king in this way. ) It is 
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noticeable that the composition of this governing body was again 
strongly Comyn-aligned. The Comyn connections of the bishops of St. 
Andrews and Aberdeen, the earls of Buchan and Strathearn, Geoffrey de 
Mowbray and John Comyn of Badenoch have already been adverted to. 
80 
Furthermore, two other members of the committee were related to the 
Comyns: Donald, earl of Mar, although one of Bruce's main supporters, 
was, nonetheless, a full cousin of the earl of Buchan8l , and 
Alexander Balliol toot cannot have been anti-Comyn in his 
sympathies. 
82 
This was no coup by an opposing faction: the group who took 
power from the king was composed of the same men who had been 
instrumental in giving him that power less than three years earlier. 
Balliol, through his willingness to accept Edward's overlordship, or 
q 
his inability to oppose it, had lost credibility, and with it his 
power and dignity as king. It is no surprise to find that when this 
group took over full power from the king Scottish policy changed 
dramatically. The first step was to send an embassy of four (the 
bishops of St. Andrews and Dunkeld, John de Soulis and Ingram 
d'Umphraville) to France, to negotiate a treaty of mutual aggression 
against their common enemy. 
83 It is quite possible that, as part of 
their policy of procuring a set of allies in their struggle against 
England, it was the French who, recognising the situation in 
Scotland, made the first moves towards opening negotiations with the 
Scots. Probably Balliol's reluctance to accept the French proposals, 
for fear of the repercussions, was one of the factors which prompted 
the unprecedented move in the July parliament. Certainly, the 
impression given by the chronicles is that it was the Scots, led by 
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the twelve peers, who drew Balliol into involvement in the 
treacherous plan, rather than vice versa. Walsingham says that 
Balliol was "led" into treaso n by his subjects 
84 
. and Lanercost 
comments that it was the Scots who sent the envoys. 
85 
Guisborough 
states that "they" (the Scots) held a parliament which elected the 
council of twelve and sen t the embassy 
86 
. from which it would appear 
that it was the Scots themselves, rather than their king, who entered 
the negotiations with the French. Lanercost further states that at 
the July parliament "by common assent it was decreed that their king 
could do no act by himself , and that he should have twelve peers. 
after the manner of the French, and these they then and there elected 
and constituted". 
87 
It is claimed that the Scots prevented Balliol 
from conducting state business, and from attending Edward's summons, t 
and that they expelled his courtiers. 
88 
It is impossible to escape 
the comparison between these events and the establishment of a 
baronial council to restrain the unpopular Henry III in 1258. The 
1295 episode also bears similarities to the appointment of a new 
regent for the incapable Robert III in 1399,, when the barons 
responsible claimed that "for sickness of his person, the king may 
not travail to govern the realm, nor restrain trespassours and 
rebels" . 
89 
Similarly, James III was imprisoned by dissatisfied 
nobles in 1482. The establishment of the council in 1295 appears to 
have been the first practical expression in Scotland of the idea that 
a king who would , or could. not rule the kingdom properly could be 
subjected to the enforced 'counselt of the community. 
The French treaty was accomplished with speed: on 23 October the 
envoys, in the name of King John, signed the agreement 
90 to "continue 
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and increase in the future the affection which our progenitors and 
the community of our kingdom had towards the most excellent kings and 
kingdom of France", by a marriage of the son of King John to a niece 
of the French king, and by a pact of mutual aggression against 
England. The king of France promised help to repress the "grave 
injuries, huge excesses, hostile attacks, and wicked aggressions" 
acted upon the Soots by Edward , in return for an undertaking that 
King John would 
"assist us effectively and powerfully... in the present 
war against the said king of England and his allies ... by 
the whole strength of himself and his kingdom". 
The Scots were to "begin and continue war" immediately. Interesting 
features of the treaty are the clauses which demand that as well as 
King John, the 
"prelates of Scotland, as far as it be lawful to them,, 
with the earls, barons and other nobles and also the 
whole communities of the towns of the kingdom of Scotland 
shall have themselves in the said war",, 
and that ratification of the treaty had to be made by "the prelates, 
earls, barons and other nobles, and also the whole community of the 
nobles" of the kingdom. This is surely a recognition by Pbilip of 
the situation in Scotland, an acknowledgement of the fact that while 
John was the nominal head of state, it was actually the community of 
the realm to which King Philip had to look for a lead in the policy 
and actions of the kingdom. 
The Scots host, in accordance with the treaty, was summoned to 
muster at Caddonlea. 
91 Those who showed themselves to be enemies of 
the community by disdaining to obey the summons were forfeited 
(among 
them the Bruces) , their lands being bestowed upon 
those who would use 
them in the interests of the national cause. 
92 The English host was 
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already mustering at Newcastle, obviously preparing for the invasion 
of Scotland. 93 War was at hand. 
The reasons for King Edward's invasion of Scotland are probably 
various. Professor Duncan would have us believe that the war was 
prompted purely by Balliol's default of justice, following his 
failure to attend the final hearing of the appeals brought by 
MacDuff. He was thus judged in contempt and fined three castles as 
not 
surety that he would eventually answer the case. The castles were / 
delivered up to Edward, who therefore prepared an invasion to take 
them by force. Edward, it is suggested, was ignorant of the 
Franco-Scottish treaty, and "it was the Scots who made the aims of 
the war broader, when the formal denunciation of King John's homage 
and fealty on the grounds of the English invasion was delivered from 
Jedburgh to Edward P. 94 
This argument cannot hold ground. It is difficult to believe 
that Edward did not make it his business to know of the activities of 
the Scottish parliament and the events of July 1295, and at least the 
start of the negotiations with France must have been known to him. 
He must have been aware that a treaty was a strong probability. That 
the castles demanded by Edward were surety for Ballioll s compearance 
at court, or that they were the reason for the invasion, must also be 
extremely doubtful. They were, according to a document enrolled in 
the Rotuli Scotiae, "security for us and our kingdom, and all the 
subjects of our land". until the end of the French war. 
95 The 
chronicles agree: 
"At this time the king of England, ignorant of their 
treason, sought immediate help for his war from the king 
of the Scots, but was always answered in the negative. 
Suspecting their business, he asked for three castles to 
be placed in his hands until the end of the war, for 
securityq qVich he would restore to them if they were 
faithful. " 
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The phrase "ignorant of their treason" in this document must, in the 
context, refer to the period when he sought the Scots' support, until 
the summer of 1295. Only after he had suspected their treason (note, 
earlier in October than the signing of the treaty of Paris) . did he 
demand the castles as security for the good behaviour of the Scots 
during the war. The invasion was intended not to take the castles - 
Edward's army was far too large for such a meagre task and, anyway, 
Edward had more urgent affairs with which to occupy his time and 
resources - but to punish the Scots for their treasonable activities 
in John's failure to answer the summons sent by Edward I and in the 
treaty of Paris. It was an invasion which was designed both to 
remove the crown from Balliol, who had already been labelled the man 
who "had been" king of Scots before either the invasion or his 
renunciation of homage 
97 
, and to secure England against invasion from 
a hostile northern kingdom. That the Scots "made the aims of the war 
broader" by their hostile acts in the north of England and by the 
renunciation of Balliol's homage is disproved by the early reference 
to Balliol as 'former' king. Clearly, by 25 March 1296,, the day 
before the Scots invaded England, and over a week before Balliol's 
renunciation of homage, his deposition had been decided. The sack of 
Berwick 98 . also before the renunciation of 
homage, on such a vast and 
outrageous scale, showed all too clearly how "broad" Edward's 
intentions were with regard to the deployment of his army in 
Scotland. 
Professor Duncan's theory does not satisfactorily explain the 
events of the last few months of Balliol's reign. The course of 
events can be more convincingly explained if one accepts that Edward 
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did know of the French treaty, and from the outset regarded the 
military enterprise of March - April 1296 as a full-scale invasion 
designed to recover the lost allegiance of Scotland and to ensure 
that there would be no northern threat to England's security during 
the French war. The root of the conflict lay not simply in Edward's 
treatment of appeals from Balliol's court and the Scottish king's 
unsatisfactory behaviour with regard to them, but in their conceptual 
implications. That such appeals were made at all was a challenge to 
the dignity of Balliol's kingship and kingdom, which, along with the 
other acts of minor provocation on Edward's part, caused those behind 
Balliol's rule in Scotland, the community, and in particular the 
Comyns, to put pressure on Balliol to resist the demands which 
English overlordship made on him. In effect, the two leads, pulling t 
Balliol in different directions, strangled him. Unable to satisfy 
both of his conflicting masters, he satisfied neither, and ultimately 
lost their support altogether. His pro-English leanings led his 
Scottish council to revolt and to remove him from power, replacing 
him with a council of twelve of their number. That council then 
pursued policies more in line with the traditional role of Scotland 
as an independent nation, so leading the kingdom, and Balliol as its 
nominal head . into what Edward 
I regarded as treasonable activities 
which were of great danger to the dignity of his crown and the 
security of England. As a test of their allegiance he demanded a 
'deposit' of three castles. The demand was ignored, and by February 
the Scots had seized the lands of Englishmen in Scotland. 
99 Thus 
sure of their treason, and doubtless by then also aware of the 
details of the French treaty, Edward took reciprocal action, such as 
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the forfeiture of the English lands of Scotsmen 
100 
, and prepared to 
invade Scotland, to remove his recusant and ineffectual puppet-king, 
and to re-assert his own government over the rebellious Scots. 
Balliol no longer had any control in Scotland . and Edward recognized 
this fact when, even before the renunciation of homage, he referred 
to Balliol as the 'former' king. In reality, the war was not against 
Balliol, but against the community of Scots. 
As Edward's army moved north, the Scots prepared to defend 
themselves . and . following the time-honoured pattern . launched a 
counter-raid in the north of England. 
101 The English army pressed 
on, however, and on 30 March 1296, in the sack of Berwick, committed 
one of the most ruthless and horrific acts of war in the annals of 
Anglo-Scottish relations. In reaction to this outrage, the Scots 
f 
'advised' Balliol to renounce his homage. Ibis he did on 5 April 
102 
styling himself "king of Scots by the grace of God". and justifying 
his act by quoting "naked force, grievous and intolerable injuries" 
used against him and his people, causing "harm beyond measure to the 
liberties of ourselves and of our kingdom, in a manner which offends 
against God and against justice". He quoted examples of unacceptable 
acts committed by Edward in his guise of self-appointed overlord: 
calling Balliol out of Scotland, unjustifiably persecuting him, 
seizing the castles, lands and possessions of Balliol and of his 
people within the realm of England, harassing merchants, and 
imprisoning Scottish subjects. All this was done "to disinherit us 
and the inhabitants of our realm" . Furthermore . Edward 
had now 
invaded in hostile fashiong forcing Balliol to withdraw his homage 
and fealty, "which, be it said, were extorted by extreme coercion on 
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your part" , and to take up arms "for our own defence and that of our 
realm, to whose defence and safe-keeping we are constrained by the 
bond of an oath". Here, at last, was overt reference to the duty of 
a king to protect his kingdom: in the last resort his council had 
forced Balliol to adopt the stance of a king in an attempt to 
preserve Scotland's status as a kingdom. 
Thereafter , Edward had no lack of cause to continue the 
invasion, which pressed on, through the battle of Dunbar and the 
taking of the main castles and towns of Scotlando to its climax in 
the ceremonial removal of King John from office on 2 July, and the 
submission of the community to Edward's power which followed. 
103 The 
stripping away of John's power and dignity was merely a formal 
recognition and ratification of what had already taken place in July I 
1295. The political act, the submission which mattered, was that of 
the nobles of Scotland, whose brief rule ended in July 1296, bringing 
Scotland back into the category of a dependent state, ruled from 
Engl and . 
This account of the events of July 1295 - July 1296 agrees both 
with Edward's own account 
104 
and with the picture which can be pieced 
together from the wide range of chronicle evidence. The final act , 
the ceremonial removal of the dignity of the crown from King John . 
must be seen as the culmination of the conflict between the Scottish 
nobility and Edward I. the conflict between the conceptual and the 
more straightforwardly political attitudes towards Scotland. 
Balliol's statement of submission again displays the conceptual 
element in the holding of the kingdom. He had offended Edward, 
having been led into treason through bad counsel, and so, having been 
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brought to justice by the just conquest of the country, he freely 
submitted botb bimself and bis kingdom to Edward's will. The 
reference to the king's council is double-edged, referring both to 
the necessity for a king to use counsel of his nobility - the right 
and duty of the community to share in the government of the kingdom - 
and to the particular situation in this instance, where that noble 
advice having overstepped the normal bounds of its power . the king 
had been drawn into a situation which, in Edward I's eyes, warranted 
the formal removal of his dignity. 
In July 1296, with his submission to Edward I,, John Balliol's 
reign formally ended. Despite later claims by the guardians who 
ruled in his name that the submission was extorted by force, and was 
thus invalid, or that it was a forgery 
105 
. there can rarely have been 
much honest hope that his personal rule could be resuscitated, The 
removal of real power in July 1295 by those who had given it to him, 
the noble community, led by the Comyns, had been ironically 
re-affirmed by their opponent, Edward I. who in July 1296 removed the 
nominal power and dignity which had been of his bestowal. Scotland 
was, in effect., once more in a state of interregnum. This time 
Edward had no intention of resolving that situation by instituting a 
vassal king. The events of the previous four years had shown that 
the dual loyalties that such a figure would necessarily hold would 
make stable and secure government an impossibility. The king would 
again become a tool with which the community would attempt to 
re-assert their independence. 
The reasons for those dual loyalties were, ultimately, the very 
concepts of 'king' and 'kingdom' which, far from being the surrealist 
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fantasies of theorists, were the actual foundations on which the 
government and rule of the kingdom were consciously built. The Scots 
in 1292 had been "neither happy nor sad about the adoption of their 
new king"; it is not difficult to imagine the same mixture of 
feelings at the same king's downfall in 1296. The invasion and 
impending foreign domination of the kingdom can have given them no 
cause for rejoicing, but on the other hand, they cannot have been too 
disappointed at the demise of the reign of such a king. Eventually 
Balliol had become a rex inutilis, a king who could or would not 
fulfil his duty to the kingdom. To the Scottish community, a kindom 
was indisputably a state which was independent of foreign control , 
ruled by a king who was supreme in his realm and who governed with 
sound advice from his nobles. The king had to protect the kingdom 
from tyranny, which could take the form of unjust rule or lawlessness 
within the kingdom, or the usurpation of government by a foreign 
power. John Balliol failed to fulfil his duties as king, and thus 
endangered the status of his kingdom, which led to open conflict 
between Edward I and the Scottish community. His reign brought about 
the direct confrontation of two different ideas of what Scotland was 
and should be. It was a confrontation which was to strengthen the 
Scots' resolve to fight for, and eventually to re-affirm, the 
independence of their kingdom. 
* **** * ** * ** *** ** ** ** 
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THE GUARDIANSHIPS OF 1286 - 1306 
1: PERSONALITIES AND ELECTIONS1 
"Vacant and without a head and torn to pieces, widowed so 
to speak, of a king of i? own, and ... lacking the 
protection of any defender". 
This brief description of Scotland in the year 1291 implied that 
the kingdom without a king was a weak, helpless and pathetic entity, 
unable to defend itself against the depredations of evil and 
ambitious neighbours. For propagandist purposes it suited the Scots 
to portray themselves at that time in the role of defenceless 
innocents, preyed upon by hungry predators. They shared . of course, 
the intuitive medieval belief that a kingdom must have a king, but in 
the supremely practical outlook which characterised their actions 
throughout the difficult period of 1286 - 1314 the Scots used and 
modelled that belief to suit different circumstances. In 1291, when 
asked to acknowledge Edward I's superiority over Scotland, the 
community of the realm answered that it could not commit itself upon 
such a weighty question without the consent of a king: 
"they have no power to reply to your statement, in 
default of a lord to whom the demand ought to be 
addr S ssed,, and who will have power to make answer about 
it". 
It appears that only a monarch could decide on the correct course of 
action in a matter so closely concerning the status of the realm. 
Noticeable, however, is the fact that King John also felt a duty to 
consult the community on such issues 
4. 
and that when he did appear to 
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be in danger of jeopardising the realm's status, the same community 
which in 1291 had found itself incompetent to deal with such affairs 
had no compunction in effectively removing their 'lord' from power, 
and attempting to settle the matter themselves. Apparently the 
degree of helplessness which affected the community of the realm 
depended very much upon the prevailing political circumstances. 
Nevertheless, after the death of Queen Margaret in 1290 Scotland 
was without an established heir to the throne, 'without a head'. The 
country had entered the constitutional twilight zone of the kingless 
kingdom. This was a new situation, and instability and uncertainty 
were thus inevitable. However, the the problem was at least 
partially resolved, with relatively little trouble, in a fairly short 
space of time. But the deposition of John Balliol in 1296 left 
Scotland without a king once more. On this second occasion the 
country was to remain in the same state for almost ten years, and 
much blood was to be shed before the kingdom re-attained any measure 
of constitutional normality. It is a sign of the great reverence 
attached to the ideas of 'king' and 'kingdom' that these interregna 
are extremely fruitful periods for the study of Scottish kingship; 
even without the physical presence of a king, the idea that because 
Scotland was a kingdom there was, ergo, a king, somewhere, was 
current in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries: 'royal 
dignity' never disappeared. 
This study of guardianship is made from the Scottish viewpoint, 
and is concerned with the government of Scotland by Scottish 
administrations. Those episodes during which Scotland was submerged 
under English administration are not, thereforeq subject to detailed 
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study; they should be examined rather by one whose topic is English 
imperial administration. The fact that during the second interregnum 
the Scottish administrations were seen by some as illegal and 
rebellious, may seem to draw a distinction between them and the 
guardianship of 1286 - 1291. The first guardianship was the logical 
and legal result of the death of the monarch, and, initially was not 
a government in interregnum, but was a regency for a minor and 
absentee monarch; the Scottish administrations of the second 
interregnum, on the other hand, were spontaneous assertions of 
independence, which had to be established and maintained by force of 
arms in the face of foreign opposition. However, when seen from the 
Scots' point of view, the divide diminishes; the guardians regarded 
the rebellious governments of 1297 - 1306 as continuations of the 
legal, de jure royal administration of Scotland. That they were from 
time to time suppressed was, to the Scots, an unfortunate and illegal 
result of the intermittent invasion of their land and the usurpation 
of their government by a powerful and ambitious neighbour. Just as 
in 1286 - 1291, the Scottish governments of 1297 - 1306 saw 
themselves as caretakers of the land for the rightful monarch to 
assume when he re-appeared. The comparative success of the at times 
rival governments of Scotland is therefore not part of this study: it 
would be interesting to assess their respective powers and 
achievements, and the reactions to them, but that is a subject which 
must be dealt with elsewhere. 
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On the death of Alexander III in 1286 a new type of government 
was adopted in Scotland, which was to be used in various forms at 
certain times throughout the following twenty years. The government 
chosen in 1286 continued after the death of Margaret in 1290, 
weathering the change from minority to interregnum with apparent 
ease: it came to power, and remained in power, with relatively little 
difficulty. The situation after the deposition of King John in 1296, 
however, was rather different. The country had been overrun and 
occupied by a foreign invading force which had established a largely 
foreign administration. It took some time before rebellion against 
this usurpation freed the country, to a considerable degree,, of 
foreign intervention, and re-established native government. In both 
cases, however, the government set up by the Scots was headed by 
, 
guardians (custodes) who normally claimed to have been elected by, 
and to govern with the authority of, the community of the realm. 
These credentials were specified in their official styles, often with 
the addition of the name of the king in whose place they claimed to 
rule. Thus the style used by William Fraser, bishop of St. Andrews, 
Robert Bruce, earl of Carrick and John Comyn 
5, 
writing to Edward I in 
November 1299, was 
"guardians of the kingdom of Scotland in the name of the 
most worthy prince, the lord John . by the grace of God 
illustrious ýing of Scotland, elected by the community of 
that realm". 
The people of the realm, through their natural leaders, those 
politically active members of the 'upper classes' in both secular and 
ecclesiastical society, had chosen the individuals from amongst them 
whom they considered to be the most suitable to defend the realm and 
the 'royal dignity' of Scotland during the absence of a monarch. 
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To investigate further how these men were chosen , according to 
what criteria, and to what extent the choice was a free one, it is 
necessary to examine each guardianship in turn. 
The chronicler Fordun says that the guardians of 1286 - 1291 
were elected by "the clergy and estates of the whole kingdom of 
7 Scotland, in a parliament held at Scone" . The Chronicle of 
Lanercost basically agrees with this: 
"After so evil a fate as the death of their king, the 
magnates of the realm of Scotland, adopting sound counsel 
for themselves, elected from the prelates as well as the 
nobles, guardians of the peace for the community... They 
governed the country ýor six years, transacting the 
affairs of the people". 
Quite clearly, the choice of guardians in 1286 was made in a 
comparatively democratic manner. The parliament met, and chose from 
its number six men who were esteemed to represent fairly the 
interests of the kingdom. Probably in a truer sense than any of the 
later guardians, they were elected by the community of the realm. 
This was a new pattern of events in Scotland, for in previous 
minorities power had gone to whichever faction or family could 
command most support. But in 1286 there was a mature and calculated 
attempt to establish rule which crossed factional barriers. The six 
men chosen, William Fraser, bishop of St. Andrews, Duncan, earl of 
Fife, Alexander Comyn, earl of Buchan, Robert Wishart, bishop of 
Glasgow,, John Comyn of Badenoch and James the Steward, were probably 
chosen to provide a balance in the government between those 
supporting each of the two main factions in the country at the time, 
the Bruces and the Balliols. Robert Bruce and John Balliol would be 
the strongest contenders for the throne should Margaret not survive, 
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and as early as the 1286 parliament they had both reminded the 
country in no uncertain terms of their families' claims. 
9 Fordun 
further states that three of these guardians (Fraser and the two 
earls) had responsibility for that part of Scotland north of the 
Forth, and that the others (Wishart, the Steward and Comyn of 
Badenoch) were to represent Scotland south of the Forth. 
10 
Perhaps 
more importantly, there was also an equal representation of the main 
social divisions of the kingdom: two bishops, two earls and two 
barons. Furthermore, the choice reflected the reverence given to 
well established and recognised families and offices: the Comyns were 
the most influential baronial family in the country, and had led the 
government during part of the minority of Alexander III; the 
bishoprics of St. Andrews and Glasgow were the most important in the 
I 
land , and in 1286 their incumbents both had backgrounds of 
considerable political and administrative experience; Fife was the 
foremost earldom, always accorded a special position close to the 
crown, and although the earl himself was young and inexperienced in 
1286, his family's reputation would be enough to secure him his 
position; finally, the Steward was the holder of that ancient and 
esteemed household office from which his family had taken its name. 
The choice of guardians in 1286 thus appears to have been a true 
election, wisely made. It took account of the main political and 
social interests of the country. If any government, in what promised 
to be a difficult period, could maintain stability, it was one such 
as that. As it turned out, it was remarkably successful in achieving 
its aim of guarding the peace of the kingdom. 
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When Margaret died in 1290, the four remaining guardians" 
continued to rule until the claimants to the throne accepted Edward 
I's claim to be overlord of Scotland in 1291. The guardians had no 
option but to follow suit, and resigned on 11 June. 
12 They were then 
re-appointed, their numbers being augmented by the inclusion of 
Edward's own nominee, Brian fitz Alan. 
13 Their new style showed that 
their authority was derived not from the Scottish community, but from 
the English king: 
"guardians of the kingdom of Scotland, constituted by the 
most serene prince, the lord lyward, 
by the grace of God 
illustrious king of England". 
The castles and kingdom of Scotland had been handed over to Edward 
and, by the guardians' resignation and re-appointment, the government 
was now his also. Entering , 
the category of an English 
t 
administration, it therefore passes outwith the scope of this study. 
The next guardianship had its foundations laid in a rather 
different manner. After John Balliol had earned his epithet 'Toom 
Tabard' in July 1296, Edward I made his lap of honour in Scotland, 
and retired to Berwick, "where the magnates of the kingdom of 
Scotland and Galloway came to him , and he received their homage and 
f eal ty" . 
15 He then ordained a new government for Scotland, 
appointing new officials, and establishing Berwick as his 
administrative headquarters for Scotland, after which, grasping the 
various spoils of war which he had taken "as a sign of a kingdom 
resigned and conquered" 
16 
. he turned southwards, probably prematurely 
congratulating himself, believing that 'there was an end of ane auld 
sang I. 
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Within a short time of his return to England in September, 
however, Edward's governors in Scotland were running into 
difficulties. Discontent was probably rife in various parts of the 
country throughout the winter of 1296 - 1297 
17 
but the first open 
admission of disturbance appears in the spring of 1297. In April . 
for instance, Edward ordered his men in Argyll and Ross to help 
Alexander of Islay to arrest and imprison 
"certain malefactors and perturbers of our peace, who 
wander and move about in divers places in those parts, 
not ceasing from daily perpetrating murders, spoliat 4 ns, 
burnings, and many other damages against our peace". 
This letter implies that such trouble had already been occurring for 
some time, and it is very unlikely that it was restricted to one 
area. 
19 By May, there was open revolt. Most of the chronicle 
accounts ascribe this rebellion to a sudden rising in May 1297, and 
some of them specifically state that the Scots took advantage of the 
departure of Edward I for Flanders to raise themselves in revolt. 
20 
Fordun, on the other hand, implies that they never had any thought of 
doing otherwise, claiming that as soon as Edward left Berwick in 
September 1296 the magnates summoned a parliament at Scone, where 
they appointed twelve guardians "to guard and defend the freedom of 
the kingdom". 
21 This statement is obviously inaccurate, perhaps 
referring properly to the council elected to govern Balliol in 1295. 
However, between the two extremes must lie the truth. The Scots were 
restless under their new rulers, and a certain amount of civil 
disobedience must have taken place throughout the winter and spring 
of 1296 - 1297. In two areas, the south-west and Moray, these 
disturbances grew in strengthq supported by at least some of the 
nobles of those areas. At first, in the South-west, noble support 
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was tacit. The attacks by Wallace, who had doubtless established his 
courageous reputation throughout the troubled winter months . on the 
English sheriff of Lanark and the justiciar Ormsby, were probably 
part of a planned insurrection carried out under Wallace's immediate 
leadership, but with the guiding force coming from men of 
considerably higher political and social standing. The Lanercost 
chronicler is probably fairly near the mark when he blames the bishop 
of Glasgow and the Steward for promoting Wallace's rebellion: 
"Robert Wishart, ever foremost in treason, conspired with 
the Steward of the realm, named James, for a new piece of 
insolence, yea, for a new chapter of ruin. Not daring 
openly to break their pledged faith to the king, they 
caused a certain bloody man, William Wallace, who had 
formerly been a chief of brigands in Scotland, to revolt 
against ýýe king and assemble the people in his 
support . 
The account in the Chronicle of Meaux, although less specific, seems 
broadly to agree with this: 
"the magnates of Scotland did not dare publicly to rise 
against King Edward, but attempted secretly to free 
themselves from royal servitude through the commons and 
this William [Wallacell'. 
23' 
Eventually,, men such as Robert Wishart,, the Steward, Robert 
Bruce and William Douglas did show themselves openly. Their part was 
short-lived, however, since in the face of an English army they gave 
a conditional surrender at Irvine in July. 
24 Although the terms for 
their reception into Edward's peace were not in fact fulfilled by 
either Bruce or Douglas, the latter of whom was 
imprisoned for his 
non-compliance 
25 
, their active part 
in the 1297 rising was over. It 
is nevertheless interesting that they carried on 
the negotiations 
concerning the surrender in the name of the community of the realm, 
complaining of the exactions which they 
feared Edward would make of 
163 
the Scots. 26 In this, they appear to have been taking it upon 
themselves to defend the interests of the realm thus threatened, 
which was the traditional role of the nobility in government, 
particularly when the king, for whatever reason, was unable to rule. 
In speaking for the whole community they were closely emulating the 
official style adopted by elected guardians, and whilst the only 
evidence that they might actually have been guardians is Fordun's 
rather implausible tale, it is not impossible that they saw 
themselves, de facto, in that r8le. 
As guardians, they would have had more to do than simply speak 
for the community: they would have had a goverment to run. That 
they did start to establish an independent Scottish administration in 
1297 is beyond doubt 
27 
, and, therefore, it is probably 
fair to regard 
these men, in the early months of 1297, as forming a sort of 
embryonic guardianship. 
28 That it was not themselves who actually 
reaped the benefit of their work and gained the title 'guardian' was 
due to their apparent re-acceptance of English overlordship. How 
real that acceptance was is open to question, but it was enough to 
prevent their taking charge of a Scottish administration , whether by 
election or self-appointment. 
While all this was happening in the south-west, another revolt 
was taking place in Morayt with more open baronial support. 
It wa s 
led by Andrew Moray, son of Andrew Moray of Petty who had supported 
Balliol in his quest for the throne. The Scots nobles who had been 
commissioned to help the English officials 
in the area quell the 
rising seem to have acted with singular 
lack of enthusiasm,, and 
revolt spread quickly in the summer months, most of 
the English 
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garrisons in the north having to surrender their castles to Moray and 
his following, who appear, like the forces raised by Wallace, to have 
been mostly commoners: ordinary townspeople, folk of the land, and at 
best burgesses, 29 
That these two risings happened at the same time and followed 
such similar patterns . with the reduction of castles and the removal 
of English officials as the primary aim, suggests that rather than 
being the spontaneous reaction to oppressive rule, which is still the 
most generally accepted view, the risings were both part of a 
concerted plan . masterminded perhaps by Wishart and the Steward, to 
replace the English administration of the kingdom with a native one, 
under their leadership. Further weight is added to this suggestion 
by the simultaneous occurence of yet another similar rising, which, 
I 
although unsuccessful . nevertheless supports the idea of a 
pre-arranged, carefully co-ordinated campaign. On 1 August the earl 
Warenne, Edward's lieutenant in Scotland, informed his master that 
MacDuff of Fife (a younger brother of the earl of Fife who had been 
murdered in 1289) had been caught, and would be treated "as one ought 
30 
to treat cheats and traitors" . In June, the same MacDuff had been 
forfeited because he was by then known to be a rebel. 
31 Clearly, 
Fife too had been involved earlier in the summer. Probably MacDuff, 
in the absence of an earl (who. a minor, was in ward in England) . had 
taken it upon himself to lead out the earldom's army, the 'men of 
Fife' . in 
defence of the realm. According to Guisborough, Bruce, 
when he declared himself, brought out his 'army of Carrick' . 
32 
Wallace's own force was probably made up of the Steward's following, 
of whom Wallace himself was one. Thus the forces led in these 
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risings of 1297 were not merely popular rabbles who adhered to 
adventurers on the strength of the reputation which they had gained 
through their daring exploits: they were the forces which the nobles 
of the country always brought out when summoned, whether by king or 
guardian. One particular summons, probably dating from 1286, 
specifies that the host was to be raised "for the tuition, 
conservation and defence of the realm and the kingly dignityq and the 
freedom thereof". 33 This is similar to the tone of the documents 
concerning the capitulation at Irvine in July 1297. On that occasion 
the 'rebels' had risen to protect their country from great damage and 
destruction. Fordun, too, said that in 1296 the purpose of the 
election of guardians was "to guard and defend the freedom of the 
kingdom"; when there was no king, the 
t 
work of defending the kingdom's 
interests fell upon the community led by the nobles, and the 
institution which in this period was used to that end was that of 
guardianship. In 1297 Wishart and the Steward were attempting to 
re-establisb their positions as the elected guardians of Scotland. 
It was their duty; they had previously been chosen to be guardians 
and, although that election had previously been annulled by the 
inauguration of a king, when, in 1296 - 1297, a guardianship was 
again required, they were clearly the most likely candidates. 
However, before the community could gather itself sufficiently to 
hold a parliament at which re-election of guardians could take place, 
leadership, to free the country at least partially from the hold of 
the English, was necessary. Wishart and the Steward attempted to 
provide that leadershipq setting themselves up as guardians, 
doubtless in the expectation that the formality of their election 
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would follow when possible. Those hopes were shattered by their loss 
of nerve in the face of the English army. Of the other two remaining 
guardians from 1286 - 1291 . John Comyn was restricted in his actions 
by the fact that he had been imprisoned in England after Edward's 
conquest in 1296. He was released in June 1297 in order to return to 
Scotland to settle his affairs, on condition that he accompanied 
34 Edward on the expedition to Flanders. Whilst on his journey 
northwards with his kinsman, the new earl of Buchan (who was in a 
similar position 
35 ), Comyn received fresh orders. He was to stay in 
Scotland to help crush the rebellion in Moray. 
36 
The Comyns appear 
to have carried out this task with little more than apathy 
37 
, but it 
is still fair to say that the ex-guardian was not free to join the 
patriots whilst subject to the close attention of Edward and his 
officials. Bishop Fraser, the fourth former guardian, had been sent 
to France in 1295 as one of the Scottish ambassadors, had not 
returned, and died at Auteuil near Paris in August 1297 
38 
. never 
having rendered his homage to Edward I. 
One of the documents regarding the surrender at Irvine39 seems 
to group Wishart, the Steward and the earl of Carrick together . set 
apart from Douglas and the others. In view of this, it is not 
unlikely that Bruce was himself staking a share in the guardianship. 
The bishop and the Steward were both Bruce supporters40 . and would 
thus probably have welcomed him as a colleague, especially since his 
inclusion would have brought to the guardianship the old social 
balance of one bishop, one earl, and one baron. Perhaps Bruce saw 
guardianship as a useful step on the way to the throne,, which 
he 
considered should have been awarded to his grandfather in 1290. Hi s 
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family had been excluded from the guardianship in 1286, a fact which 
had led Bruce the competitor to rebellion in that year4l, and so in 
this attempt to revive the Scottish administration after his family's 
rival, Balliol, had failed to maintain the authority of the crown,, 
Bruce was taking the opportunity to re-assert his family's position. 
(It must be remembered, however, that in 1297 Bruce could not claim 
the throne for himself. Until the death of his father, in 1304, the 
earl of Carrick had no personal right to the throne, and in 1297 he 
was simply asserting the right of his family. ) That he had not been 
elected to the guardianship was of little consequence. Had thi s 
triumvirate been successful in arms, in any future election process 
the community would probably be only too glad to elect these three 
men, two of whom had previously been guardians, the third of whom 
would in the future have a strong claim to the throne itself, and all 
of whom together had raised the country in arms to throw off the 
oppression of the occupying regime. 
The course of this rebellion in 1297 has been recounted in order 
to show the way in which a government of guardians might have been 
established by these three men. Doubtless, once their position had 
been constitutionally affirmed, they would have styled themselves 
I guardians elected by the community of the realm' , but in truth the 
election would have been more nominal than actual . based on their de 
facto leadership resulting from success in arms, rather than on any 
common feeling of political expediency. However, their aspirations 
appear to have exceeded their military leadership, which was inept, 
and collapsed at the first appearance of an opposing force, putting 
paid to their hopes of asserting Scottish independence in a 
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government headed by themselves. Instead, they appear to have 
reverted to the old method of working behind the 'front' of a popular 
rising. Their acceptance of Edward's peace terms was superficiall 
and they continued to plan and support the insurrection which reached 
its climax with the victory of Andrew Moray and William Wallace at 
Stirling Bridge on 11 September. 
42 
This battle, the culmination of almost a year's rebellion, 
enabled the Scots to put the finishing touches to their own 
independent government. Almost all of the castles fell to them 
43 
9 
the remaining English officials were removed, and the Scottish 
administration swung into full action. It is noticeable, however, 
that the final formality was somewhat delayed: there is a gap of some 
seven months after Stirling Bridge before Wallace is found using the 
style 'guardian'. 
44 
Long before that, however, in November 1297, he 
(along with Andrew Moray) claimed to act with the consent of the 
community of the realm. 
45 
The earliest known document issued by 
Wallace and Moray, the famous letter to the burgesses of Lu'beck and 
Hamburg 
46 
. merely styled them 
'leaders of the army of the realm of 
Scotland' . although it was 
issued in the name of the community of the 
realm as well as those of Wallace and Moray. They clearly spoke for 
the community, but, at that stage, not necessarily with its full 
consent. After Stirling Bridge there was no immediate parliament,, 
for more important business had to be attended to first; in order to 
strengthen the realm's defences against the English, the campaign 
against the remaining English-held castles continued 
47 
, and over the 
winter months a fairly large-scale invasion of northern England was 
undertaken 
48 
. which brought the Scots some spoils of war, some 
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propagandist advantage, and, in the short term, relative freedom from 
the danger of attack from the south. Thus, when Wallace and Moray 
styled themselves I leaders of the army' they were stating no more and 
no less than their true credentials. They had not been elected 
guardians, but did in fact lead the government and the community in 
virtue of their military achievement. Under their leadership the 
realm had been 'recovered by war from the power of the English' . The 
position which their military success accorded them made allowable 
their claim to speak for the community. In November, howev'er, they 
claimed to speak 'with the community's consent'. This may imply a 
change in their position. If a parliament had been held at which 
their position had been constitutionally regularised, it would 
probably have figured in some source, and they would have been styled 
'guardians' . It is more likely that they added the community's 
consent to their style because in the space of two months after the 
battle their leadership had not been challenged. Such acquiescence 
on the part of the community, probably with the active support of a 
section of it, comes close to the real consent which they claimed. 
Because of the pressing military business, their position (or, 
rather, Wallace's position, since Moray died in November, as a result 
of wounds sustained at Stirling Bridge 
49 ) does not appear to have 
been formally confirmed until March. It is possible that some delay 
was also caused by suspicion of Wallace on the part of some of the 
nobles. Traditionally it has been assumed that the nobles would not 
wish to bow in obedience to a goverment led by a man of lower social 
standingi who would not normally have been accorded such high 
political position. This idea has been supported by chronicle 
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accounts of his career, which picture him having to browbeat the 
nobles into submission. In particular, accounts of the battle of 
Falkirk have described a state of jealousy between Wallace and the 
nobles. 
50 
Perhaps more than any of these, Blind Hary's portrayal of 
Wallace as being most at home with common folk, and especially his 
story of Wallaces quarrel with the earl of Dunbar 
51 
, has fostered 
this belief. The nobles may indeed have been uneasy about Wallace. 
While certainly not an illiterate commoner, it cannot be denied that 
he was not of the rank with which they would normally associate such 
high position. Clearly, it had been no part of the plans of Wishart, 
the Steward and Bruce to proclaim Wallace guardian. Thus the delay 
in holding the parliament may have been connected with an element of 
uncertainty on the part of the community regarding the qualifications 
I 
of their new leader. A weightier consideration, however, must have 
been more practical in nature, and, in view of the military activity, 
it is doubtful whether the community could have been summoned to 
formalise the position much earlier than March. 
At a meeting of parliament at Torphichen on 29 March 
52 
, Wallace 
was formally elected guardian by the community of the realm, and 
decrees were then issued under the name of Wallace as guardian in the 
name of King John. Suspicion of him there may have been, but he had 
led the community in arms to victory, a feat not achieved by those of 
higher status . There is little doubt that in the early months of 
1298 most of the Scottish nobility supported Wallace; the old myth 
that the nobles were on the English side does not stand in the face 
of the evidence 
53 
. and even those nobles, we are told, who appeared 
to be on Edward's side, were with Wallace at heart. 
54 Nevertheless, 
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his power and recognition as leader rested on this sole qualification 
of victory in battle, a fact which is emphasised by his retention of 
the style 'leader of the army'. 
Just as Wallace's political status was gained by military 
success, it was lost by military failure. Edward I was not a king 
who would allow rebellion to go unpunished, and in March 1298 he 
returned from Flanders with the intention of leading an army 
northwards to punish the Scots for their insolence. The elaborate 
preparations made for the campaign and subsequent activities show 
that Edward had learnt the lesson that Scotland would not be won 
purely by invasion and occupation: careful, watchful administration 
would also be required. Thus . preparing for a long stay in the 
north, he moved the headquarters of hýs administration to York. The 
English army duly came north, and, meeting the Scots at Falkirk, 
inflicted a sound defeat on them on 22 July. Hary and Fordun both 
place the blame for the defeat on the divisiveness of the Scottish 
nobles, but in fact it was military strategy that decided the battle. 
The Scottish army was too small and of the wrong type to withstand 
the English cavalry and archers on such a field, and Wallace's 
previously unblemished military career thus became profoundly 
stained. All that had been won since the spring of 1297 could have 
been lost by that one defeat, and Wallace's power-base thus vanished. 
He then 
"chose rather to serve with the crowd . than to be set 
over them, to their ruin, and to the grievous wasting of 
the people. So, not long after the battle of Falkirk, at 
the water of Forth, he, of his own accord, rggigned the 
office and charge which be held, of guardian". 
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Whether Wallace did actually choose to resign, or was forced to, will 
never be known. If it was his own choice, then it was one which 
recognised the inevitable outcome of his loss of military prestige. 
He could no longer be the I leader of the army' , and so had no reason 
to be the leader of the community. 
Fortunately for the Scots, the battle of Falkirk did not have 
the severe repercussions which might have been expected. The English 
army was plagued by internal dissension which was aggravated by 
extreme shortage of food. In addition, Edward I was once again 
facing difficulties in his relations with the English nobility, and 
so,, after a short period in which he devastated parts of Lothian and 
Fife, he led his army back over the border. By early September he 
was in Carlisle 
ý6 
achieved very little in the way of 
re-conquering Scotland, which meant that the Scots did not find it 
necessary to fight a long campaign before re-establishing their own 
government and appointing new guardians. Only Lothian, parts of 
Fife, and some of the more southerly castles remained in English 
hands. 57 The existing administration, which retained control over 
most of the country, continued to function, and within a few months 
new guardians had been elected. By 5 December Robert Bruce styled 
himself "one of the guardians of the kingdom of Scotland". and spoke 
in the name of "John Comyn the son, our co-guardian". 
58 
This same 
letter, a confirmation of Wallace's grant to Alexander Scrymgeour of 
the constableship of Dundee, again implies that Bruce was elected to 
the guardianship; a phrase referring to the time before he was 
'admitted' to the guardianship must be a reference to election. 
59 
The choice of these two men to govern the realm was probably once 
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again an attempt to maintain a balance in the government between the 
main factions. Comyn already had experience of guardianship, and 
Bruce Is attempt to gain that experience in 1297 has already been 
discussed. Comyn was now free to take his part in Scottish affairs, 
since the threat of Edward I was more remote than it had been in 
1297. Bruce had never really gone over to the English side in 1297, 
having failed to fulfil the terms of the Irvine agreements. Although 
his military failure and feigned submission had hitherto prevented 
Bruce from taking a leading role, now that Wallace was no longer 
guardian, he was an obvious choice. So . in choosing Bruce and Comyn 
as guardians, the community once again recognised the practicalities 
of the situation; these were two experienced men who could bring some 
continuity to the government, both having previously been involved in 
it; they represented the two main political interests, and it was 
thus probably hoped that their election would prevent the type of 
internal conflict which could ensue were one of those families to be 
excluded. Both families had claims to the throne, but neither 
guardian could have any justifiable reason to press a personal claim 
at that time, and there is evidence that in some documents they added 
to their style that they governed in the name of King John. 
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The 
choice of Comyn and Bruce to govern the kingdom was, once again, made 
out of political expediency, in an attempt to maintain unity in the 
kingdom so that the common foe might be effectively resisted. 
The government of Bruce and Comyn appears to have followed that 
of Wallace without any significant break. The battle of Falkirk was 
fought towards the end of July, and Fordun states that it was soon 
after this that Wallace resigned his office. It is therefore safe to 
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assume that the resignation took place at a gathering of the 
community (or at least a representative sample of it) sometime during 
the month of August. It seems reasonable to believe that Bruce and 
Comyn were elected at the same gathering, as such a sequence of 
events would follow the pattern which the community seems to have 
been trying to establish. Continuity in goverment, and therefore 
haste in replacing guardians who left office, were important. 
Immediately after Alexander III's death guardians were elected; as 
soon as possible after the 1296 invasion, in May 1297, there was an 
attempt to establish a guardianship; in the autumn of 1297 there was, 
admittedly, a gap before the election was made, but at that time 
there were pressing military matters to be attended to, and the 
leadership was in any case in no doubt; in 1299, when a dispute 
between Comyn and Bruce destroyed the cohesion of their guardianship, 
a new grouping of guardians was established immediately; and in later 
changes, too, speed seems to have been an important consideration. 
Thus Bruce and Comyn were guardians in the name of King John,, 
duly elected by the community, probably before December 1298. The 
choice of two political opponents jointly to govern the country, 
however, whilst made in the interests of stability, did not take into 
account the tension and rivalry which inevitably existed between 
them. Government does seem to have carried on normally, as under 
other guardians, and military progress was made against the remaining 
English occupation forces, but, probably about a year after their 
election, the rivalry took its toll of the unity with which they 
could govern. On 19 August 1299 an English spy witnessed an argument 
at a council held in Peebles, and it is the good fortune of 
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historians that his report is still to be read in a letter sent by 
his master, the constable of Roxburgh, to Edward 1.61 The argument, 
concerning William Wallace's departure from the country, allegedly 
without the leave of the guardians, broke out between two knights, 
David Graham and Malcolm Wallace of Elderslie, the ex-guardian's 
elder brother. The nature of the argument may suggest that Wallace's 
resignation had not been entirely voluntary, and that he was not on 
good terms with a section of the community, but the crucial point is 
that Graham is described as being "of Sir John Comyn's following" and 
Wallace "of the earl of Carrick' s following", implying some 
polarisation of support within the community; that the argument 
flared up, apparently because the two men were of different retinues, 
must indicate considerable tension which, wi th ev en minor 
provocation . erupted into open contention. A brawl ensued, but, 
fortunately for the stability of the government, bad news was brought 
at that moment: havoc was being wreaked in the north of the country 
by supporters of the English king, and so in order to keep a united 
front with which to combat the threat, the argument was patched up 
, and 
the guardianship re-arranged. The bishop of St. Andrews, William 
Lamberton who had been appointed to that most important of sees 
under the administration led by Wallace 
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. was given custody of the 
castles of the country, which was tantamount to giving him sasine of 
the realm and was clearly meant to bestow upon him seniority in 
government, and was elected to be a guardian along with Bruce and 
Comyn. This move must have been intended to reduce the fears of both 
Bruce and Comyn that the other would attempt to seize total power. 
The bishop would be a strong balancing force, and, when necessary, an 
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arbiter between the other two. This arrangement having been made to 
ensure continuance of some unified oppostion to the enemy, the 
meeting broke up, the protagonists going their separate ways. 
This new guardianship grouping had come into being not through 
the disruption of the previous one by death or foreign interference, 
but by the inability of the existing guardians to resolve their 
differences and work together for the common cause. The political 
conditions which had led to the election of Bruce and Comyn still 
prevailed . and it would have been counter-productive to remove them 
at a time when disaffection, particularly on the part of one or both 
of these men, could greatly have impaired the progress of the 
national cause. Thus, an impartial but powerful third man had to be 
found; in Lamberton they found a staunch patriot with considerable 
I 
administrative experience gained in his previous post as chancellor 
of the church of Glasgow. 
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He had sound connections on both sides 
of the Forth, no particular associations with either of the 
guardians' families, and, moreover, as the incumbent of the most 
senior of the Scottish bishoprics . his presence in 
the guardianship 
not only brought to it the old social balance of one bishop, one earl 
and one baron, but it also symbolised the backing of the national 
church for the cause of independence. Once again, the community had 
chosen its guardians astutely, with penetrating insight 
into the 
needs of the moment. What was required in 1299 was as little change 
as possible, but enough to bring cohesion to the existing goverment. 
The election of Lamberton to govern with the others achieved that 
cohesion, re-introduced social balance into the guardianship, and 
once again pushed the powerful influence of the Scottish church into 
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the forefront of the struggle. Perhaps the bishop's election was 
less haphazard than the English spy's report would have us believe,, 
for it does not have the air of a spur-of-the-moment decision, and 
had very probably been considered in advance. 
For a while, the new guardianship was successful. Under the 
guidance of the bishop, Bruce and Comyn appear to have been able to 
govern together, and they took pains to continue the foreign 
diplomacy surrounding the Anglo-Scottish conflict. 
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They achieved 
some success in this field, and on 13 November they wrote to Edward 
from an assembly in the Torwood near Stirling, notifying him that 
they would accept the truce which had been brought about through the 
efforts of Philip IV of France. 
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For the moment, success could bind 
the Scots together; their military efforts were proving fruitful - t 
even Stirling castle fell to them - and this much sought-after truce 
won them a breathing space in which to consolidate their position. 
However, in less than a year that temporary reconciliation had come 
to an end , and with it the unity of the guardianship: by May 1300 
Bruce was no longer a guardian. A letter of that month from John 
Kingston, the English constable of Edinburgh, to Ralph Manton, Edward 
I's cofferer, tells of a parliament held by the Soots in Rutberglen 
in which 
"the bishop of St. Andrews and sir John Comyn were at 
discord, and the Steward of Scotland and the earl of 
Athol took the part of the bishop, and sir John Comyn 
said that he did not wish to be a guardian of the realm 
along with the bishop. But at length they were at accord, 
and they had elected sir Ingram d'Umphraville to be one 
of the gtffdians of the realm in place of the earl of 
Carrick". 
Clearly, by this date Bruce had left the guardianship. Indeed, the 
wording of the letter may suggest that Bruce did in fact resign at 
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that parliament. It has been stated that a probable reason for the 
quarrel in May 1300 was the choice of Umphraville to replace Bruce 
67 
9 
but it is more likely that the quarrel concerned the position of 
Bruce himself . If Comyn and Bruce had irreconcilable differences, 
Comyn may have demanded the resignation of his rival; the bishop may 
have defended Bruce, and the ensuing argument resulted in the forced 
resignation of Bruce, and the choice of Umphraville to replace him. 
This is, of course, pure surmise, but the point is again made that 
the guardianship depended entirely on the political realities of the 
day. If it was not possible for Bruce and Comyn to work together, 
then the make-up of the ruling group had to change. That it appears 
to have changed in favour of the Comyn faction is probably a 
reflection of the pol, icies which were being pursued at the time. The 
military effort in the spring of 1300 was directed mainly against the 
south-west of the country,, and indeed Kingston's letter states that 
during the parliament itself the earl of Buchan was in Galloway 
attempting to win the people of that land over to the patriots. This 
was doubtless done in the knowledge that Edward I had called a muster 
of his troops at Carlisle in June 
68 
. in preparation for an invasion 
which would enter Scotland through Galloway. Even before this, 
however, the policy had been to win over as much of the south-west as 
possible 
69 
, for by 1300 it was one of the few areas which was not 
under the sway of the guardians. This policy entailed military 
activity in Bruce's own land of Carrick, and to a greater degree in 
his father's lands of Annandale. Even if the allegiance of parts of 
those areas was uncertain, one can certainly understand a reluctance 
on the part of Bruce to participate in such activity. Furthermore, 
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the very success of the Scottish enterprise itself put pressure on 
Bruce: the return of King John was not a goal which he could 
reconcile with his own family's ambitions. He was willing to govern 
in the name of a purely nominal King John (to whom, be it noted, he 
had not rendered homage). but when it began to seem possible that 
John might actually return and make good his title, Bruce was forced 
to change direction. The Comyn's policies were thus more in tune 
with the objectives of the guardianship, and Bruce's opposition to 
them may have encouraged dissension, and made it seem that Comyn had 
more to of fer the national cause than had Bruce. The guardianship 
grouping was thus re-aligned with more emphasis on the Comyn side. 
Once again the election of the new guardians was carried out in 
response to the needs of the political scenario at that precise 
t 
moment. Bruce appeared to stand in the way of progress for the 
national cause, and so had to be replaced. 
It certainly seems that Bruce was aware that the cause for which 
the guardianship fought was not entirely served by, or in sympathy 
with, his own best interests. By October 1301 it was known that John 
Balliol had been returned to the kingdom of France 
70 
, which was 
regarded as a major step forward by the guardians, who then saw the 
return of King John to his kingdom as a perfectly feasible 
possibility. Bruce could not support such a move . and so between 
October 1301 and February 1302 he temporarily abandoned the cause of 
the patriots, and submitted to the peace of King Edward. 
71 Through 
its very success, the national cause had become opposed to his own 
ambitions. 
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It cannot be stated with any certainty how long the joint 
guardianship of Comyn, Lamberton and Umphraville lasted. It still 
existed in December 1300, when Pope Boniface VIII wrote to those 
three men as guardians 
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. but that is the only documentary reference 
to their guardianship after the letter of May 1300. Apparently not 
long after the turn of the year, the guardianship, which had been 
greatly weakened by internal dissension, fell apart. In the autumn 
of 1300 they had achieved some success in surviving a powerful 
invasion by Edward 739 and negotiating a truce with him, which he 
granted at Dumfries on 30 October, lasting until 21 May 1301,74 
Although Edward had re-asserted his hold on the south-west of the 
country 
75 
, he had not significantly reduced the area in which the 
guardians held sway, and the Scots were indeed, in accordance with 
the terms of the truce, able to "build, fortify, work or cultivate as 
they will, and go on the land or sea from one country to another as 
is normal in countries" . However, this success did not bind the 
guardianship together, and by the end of May 1301 the three guardians 
had apparently resigned . although exactly when, or under what 
circumstances, we do not know. The first piece of accurately 
dateable evidence that a change had taken place comes in late May 
1301 . when John de Soulis, as guardian of 
the kingdom, wrote to the 
pope giving authority to those who were to plead Scotland's case 
against the English at the papal curia. 
76 The change is likely to 
have happened early in the year, although the only piece of evidence 
for this is highly conjectural: Soulis appeared as guardian in a 
charter of King John dated at Rutherglen in the ninth year of his 
reign, that is, between 17x2O November 1300 and 16xl9 November 
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1301.77 That the place of issue was Rutherglen may indicate that the 
charter was made in the early part of the year, when military 
operations were still being concentrated in the south-west. In Ma y 
1300, as noted above, a parliament had been held in Rutherglen, which 
was clearly a centre of activity around that time, and throughout the 
autumn the activities of Edward's army had kept the emphasis firmly 
in the south-west. It is thus possible that the document was issued 
very soon after the earliest date of mid-December, although 
uncertainty must remain, since there was further military activity in 
this area in September 1301. At the later date, however . the Scots 
were facing two English armies, and events may have been rather too 
frenetic to allow for the granting of mere charters. Such affairs 
are perhaps more likely to have taken place earlier in the year, in 
time of truce. 
The extent of this change in the guardianship must also be a 
matter of some doubt. Generally it has been assumed that John de 
Soulis took over the guardianship in place of all three retiring 
guardians. Weight is given to this supposition by the several 
documents of the period May 1301 to June 1302 in which Soulis appears 
on his own without any reference to other guardians. 
However, there 
is evidence that John Comyn of Badenoch did not give up the 
guardianship in 1301. Fordun states that 
he remained in office until 
his submission to Edward I in 1304 
78 
. and whilst 
it seems unlikely 
that Soulis would write to Pope Boniface in 1301 with the consent of 
the communityq but without that of 
his fellow-guardian, as Fordun 
would have us believe 
799 it is not inconceivable, and there is other 
evidence which must be considered. 
The Scalachronica of Sir Thomas 
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Gray agrees with Fordun that Comyn remained in office until 1304. 
Wyntoun (although admittedly perhaps taking his material from Fordun) 
also states that 
"Jhon Cwmyn, that wes Jhon Cwmynys swn, 
Tuk the kepyng of Scotland: 
And that he held in till his hand, 
Qwhill efftyr the battayle of Roslyne 
This ilk yhowngare Jhon Cwmyne 
sjj. 
80 Come till the Kyng off Inglanis pe 
The Scalachronica further states that when the Scottish leaders 
submitted to Edward in 1304, only Soulis refused the terms and went 
into exile. 
81 That Soulis, who only appears to have been active on 
the political scene during his spell of guardianship, is specifically 
mentioned here as a 'leader' may well imply that in 1304 at least he 
should be connected with Comyn in a joint guardianship. Finally ,a 
letter from the Scots ambassadors in France (one of whom was John de 
Soulis) to John Comyn, guardian of the realm,, dated May 1303 
82 
9 
places Comyn firmly back in the political arena. 
It seems possible, therefore, that the guardianship which had 
dissolved in May 1301 was not entirely replaced by the appointment of 
John de Soulis. The absence of Comyn's name on the 'Soulis 
documents', however. must be explained. It should be remembered that 
it was not unknown for one guardian of a group to issue official 
documents on his own. Bruce did it, for example, in December 1298 
83 
9 
and although he made reference to his co-guardian within the 
document, one need not necessarily expect this of Soulis in some of 
his later documents. To five of the seven documents issued by him as 
guardian, he merely added his name as witness, the 
documents running 
not in his name, but in that of King John. 
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Four of these were 
simple charters, and one was a matter of minor justice. It is 
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doubtful if documents of this nature would, necessarily require the 
authority of two guardians and the community of the realm. The other 
two documents, that mentioned by Fordun and a letter to Philip IV of 
France 85 . are rather different. These are diplomatic documents, 
issued under Soulis' own name, as guardian, with the authority of the 
community of the realm. On these one would expect to find the names 
of both guardians. Fordun obviously felt that the absence of Comyn's 
name was surprising enough to mention, and one obvious conclusion is 
that he and other chroniclers were mistaken in saying that Comyn 
remained in power after May 1301. Another interpretation is 
possible, however, which, if correct, shows a recognition that the 
old type of guardianship had failed . and implies a new constitutional 
set-up. 
Fordun states that King John himself was responsible for the 
appointment of Soulis to the guardianship. 
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If Comyn had resigned 
with the othersq and Balliol had assigned Soulis t'o the guardianship, 
then for the first time the leader of the government did not rule by 
the election of , and with the authority of 
the community of the 
realm. Certainly, Balliol's position had improved with his transfer 
from papal custody to his own estates in Picardy, but it must be 
doubted whether he had yet gained that situation where his return was 
sufficiently certain for the community of the realm merely to accept 
without question his direct nominee as their governor, after years of 
self-rule and election. It would seem to be true . however. that 
Soulis was imposed on the Scots rather than having been elected by 
them. For every other guardianship there is some reference to 
election 9 or at 
least a statement which implies it. For Soulis, the 
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only clue as to his credentials is the reference to Balliol's 
appointment. The most satisfactory explanation of this conflicting 
evidence is that a new type of guardianship was established, on two 
levels. Soulis was indeed appointed by a hopeful Balliol,, as 
official guardian, his locum tenens in the realm, who had the power 
to issue documents under the style of King John, as no previous 
guardian had done. At the same time, the elected representative of 
the community of the realm, John Comyn, retained his position as at 
least a sort of adviser-in-chief to Soulis, maintaining the constant 
official part played in royal government by the community ever since 
the election of the council of twelve in 1295. The nobles had denied 
Balliol the right to organise his affairs then; there must have been 
far greater reason for doing so in 1301 when the king had been 
absent for the past four years. Perhaps Comyn retained his title, 
but he was subordinate to Soulis, who in effect had the full 
executive power of the king. If Soulis had governed alone in this 
capacity it is hardly likely that he would have joined the Scottish 
embassy to France in 1303,, and it is thus more than likely that 
Comyn, who was described as guardian during Soulis' absence,, was, in 
virtue of his position as 'under-guardian' elected by the community, 
standing in whilst Soulis was out of the kingdom. 
Had Comyn resigned 
or been ousted in 1301 v it must 
be doubted whether he would have been 
trusted by Soulis to keep total continuity of Policy if suddenly 
re-appointed in 1303. That Soulis may still 
have been guardian in 
November 1303 
87 
9 six months after 
Comyn is to be found with that 
style, further supports the idea of a joint guardianship. 
185 
So. the chronicle evidence and the appearance of Comyn as 
guardian in 1303 suggest that Comyn did not resign entirely in 
1300/01, and that in the intervening period Scotland was governed by 
a constitutional novelty, a two-tier guardianship, elected by both 
king and community. The reasons for the change can only be the 
subject of conjecture, since the events which led to the downfall of 
the joint guardianship of Comyn, Lamberton and Umphraville remain in 
obscurity. If Comyn was the only survivor of that triumvirate, then 
it perhaps adds weight to the possibility that "young John Comyn was 
an impossible man to get on with". 
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Certainly, he had quarrelled 
with Bruce, with Lamberton, and, if some chronicle accounts are to be 
believed, with Wallace. But an abrasive personality should not have 
been an insurmountable problem, and one can hazard a guess that 
I 
beyond the personal level lay some conflict over policy. In May 1301 
the truce given by Edward I was due to expire, and it is possible 
that the policy to be pursued thereafter was a matter of dispute. 
Perhaps Balliol had made it clear that he wished his own 
representative, Soulisq to be central in goverment, and this bone of 
contention led to the resignation of the bishop and Umphraville. 
Given the dearth of evidence it is impossible to draw any 
conclusions on this matter, but the nature of the change is more 
readily explicable. From Balliol's point of view, still in exile 
four years after his ignominious fall from power,, those who had 
governed Scotland in the intervening period had failed; they had 
failed to secure the freedom of Scotland from foreign intervention,, 
and , more 
importantly they had failed to restore the most 
fundamental symbol of Scottish independence, the monarchy. To 
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Balliol, his own return to the kingdom would be the most important 
step in re-asserting Scotland's rightful status. Thus, from his more 
promising position on his own ancestral estates, rather than in 
custody elsewhere, seeing the improved situation in Scotland,, where 
aid from the papacy and France was supporting the Scots in their war 
of diplomacy and propaganda, he appointed his own agent to take 
charge of the government, to ensure that policies were pursued which 
promoted his own personal advancement to the kingdom. His choice of 
Soulis was probably prompted by that man's age and experience, his 
secure noble family background, and the fact that, although constant 
in the patriotic cause, he had not been directly involved in any of 
the previous guardianship groupings, and could therefore retain a 
neutral stance, which was vital for stable government in an 
atmosphere where factional tensions were probably causing increasing 
difficulty. Soulis may indeed have been involved with pushing 
Balliolls personal cause from as early as February 1299, at which 
point he was in Paris 
89 
, and may have been connected with Philip IV's 
letter to the Scots guardians of April 1299 
90 
, which lays some stress 
on John's royal status. 
To some extent Balliol's feelings may have been shared by those 
in Scotland. It is interesting in this context that early in 1301 an 
official transcript was made of an undertaking made by John, before 
his deposition, regarding the payment of outstanding dowry to 
Marguerite of Flanders 
91 (Prince Alexander's widow). This implies 
that he was then regarded with some seriousness as one whose promises 
with regard to the revenues of Scotland were of value. It may be 
that there was, if only briefly,, some genuine expectation of his 
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eventual return. BY 13019 however, the Scots' style of 'guardians in 
the name of the illustrious King John' had a slightly empty ring to 
it, and they too may well have felt that the present system had 
failed; a new approach to the problem would perhaps have been 
welcomed. However, the community had been self-reliant for too long 
suddenly to give up the reins of government entirely to a man whom 
they had not elected . over whom they would have no direct power. 
Thus they insisted that their own representative must also remain in 
government. Perhaps the triple guardianship was intended to remain 
with Soulis, but was prevented from doing so by the mysterious events 
which led to the resignation of Lamberton and Umphraville. Perhaps 
it was an equable decision, that the present government should be 
dissolved in favour of a new system whereby one representative of the 
community would be elected to govern with Soulis. It is not 
impossible that Lamberton and Umphraville resigned for diplomatic 
reasons. Both of them went to France on the strong Scottish embassy 
of 1302, and it is far from inconceivable that the decision to remove 
them from the guardianship was made in order to make them more 
readily available for such a mission. Certainly, their inclusion in 
that embassy makes any major disagreement between them and Comyn or 
Soulis unlikely. Comyn, whose family was in the ascendant at the 
time, and who had much administrative experience, was the ideal 
choice as the nominee of the community. Whether by accident or 
design, the upshot was that by May 1301 Soulis was the guardian, 
appointed by the king, with Comyn his second- in-comm and 9 appointed by 
the community. He stood in as guardian in 1303 when SOulis left the 
country. In the diplomatic letters of Soulis the inclusion of the 
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community in the style and the description of the seal used as "the 
seal of the rule of the kingdom of Scotland deputed by the 
communi ty,, 
92, 
show Comyn's position: he was the representative of the 
community at the top level of King John's government. 
It must be stressed that this (or indeed, any other) 
description of the constitutional set-up in 1301 - 1303 is 
conjectural. It does, however, fit the evidence, and, unlike the 
more common suggestion that Comyn resigned along with Lamberton and 
Umphraville, marries the accounts given by Fordun, Gray and Wyntoun 
with the scanty documentary evidence. It also fits in with the 
earlier patterns of change. Always, when the political situation 
demanded , the guardianship changed to suit the new position. On thi s 
occasion the change was more radical than previously, prompted by an 
increasing awareness of the difficulties of maintaining unity within 
the traditional joint, elective guardianship, the fact that the time 
was near when an intensive effort to restore the monarchy and 
independence would have to be made if those aims were ever to be 
realised, and by an awareness on the part of King John that any delay 
or apathy on the part of the Scots could ruin his chances of 
regaining the kingdom. Once again, the new guardianship was 
established in direct response to the political situation. 
That was the last major change in the guardianship. Soulis 
apparently remained in power over the diplomatically and militarily 
93 
hectic years of 1301 and 1302. At some point between August and 
November 1302 Comyn was again placed in the driving seat when Soulis 
joined the embassy which went to France to attempt to avert the 
settlement of the Anglo-French dispute without Scottish inclusion. 
94 
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Comyn remained in control until the Scottish submission of 1304, 
Soulis perhaps not returning from France with the others in February 
of that year,, although a safe-conduct was issued for him along with 
nine others at that time. 
95 
However, his exile did not make 
necessary any further constitutional change, since Comyn held the 
position in virtue of his previous election by the community and his 
more recent attachment to Soulis in the guardianship. 
Through the vagaries of the international political scene, the 
brighter position which the Scots had enjoyed in early 1301 rapidly 
deteriorated into one of utter hopelessness. By 1304 their allies in 
the papacy and the French court had let them down . and King John 
himself appears to have lost the will to struggle on. 
96 In addition, 
after some military success for the Scots early in 1303 
97 
. Edward I I 
mounted a full-scale invasion in the summer of that year 
98 
. which the 
Scots were unable to resist effectively. Fighting continued until 
well into 1304, but many castles had fallen to the English by the 
turn of the year, and that he was able to winter on the north side of 
the Forth, at Dunfermline, must be significant. Comyn pursued 
negotiations with Edward I in the early months of 130499, and 
eventually a formula was agreed upon which allowed the 
Scots to 
submit on as favourable terms as they could 
have expected. 
100 
Apparently only Soulis (who seems to have remained in France) and 
Wallace refused to come to terms. 
101 Once again Scotland was placed 
under English rule. In 1305 an elaborate attempt was made 
by Edward 
I to find an acceptable administration for 
Scotland, through which he 
could keep his undertaking 
to uphold the Scots 
190 
"in all their laws, usages, customs and liberties in all 
ways, just as they were in the time of King Alexander, 
unless there are laws which have to be amended, which 
will be done with the counsel of the king qbS the assent 
and counsel of the bons gents of the land". 
It was this government which was just swinging into motion when it 
was disrupted by Bruce's rebellion of 1306. The submission of 1304 
marked the end of the period when Scotland was governed by her 
canmunity through their elected representatives, the guardians. 
191 
NOTES 
An abbreviated version of this chapter, with 
material from the two following, has been 
published as 'The Kingless Kingdom: the Scottish 
Guardianships of 1286-13061 in S. H. R. 61 (1982), 
pp. 105-29. 




Ibid., p. [661. 
i. e. John Comyn, the son of the competitor, not to 
be confused either with his father or his namesake 
the earl of Buchan. (See table facing p. 112. ) 
6) A. P. S. I, p. 454. 
7) Chron. Fordun It P-319 (II, P-313). 
8) Chron. Lanercostq P-117 (trans. Maxwell, p. 43). 
9) Chron. Bower II, P-138. See above, pp-55-58. 
10) Chron. Fordun It P-310 (119 P-305). 
11) See above, p. 66 (n. 42). 
12) Stones and Simpson, Edward I Ht PP-90-93. 
13) Ibid. 
14) Stevenson . Documents I, pp. 278-79. 
15) Chron. Guisborough, p. 281. 
16) Ibid. 
17) See E. M. Barron, The Scottish War of Independence, 
pp. 18-20. 
18) Rot. Scot. I. p. 40. 
19) Barron, op. cit. has a good, if overstated, account 
of the beginnings of the rising of 1297. 
20) E. g. Chron. Meaux II, p. 268. 
192 
21) Chron. Fordun I, P-328 (II, P-321). 
22) Chron. Lanercost, p. 190 (trans. Maxwello p. 163). 
23) Chron. Meaux II, p. 268. 
24) See Stevenson, Documents II, pp-197-220 passim; 
Palgrave, Does. Hist. Scot., PP-197-200- 
25) Stevenson, Documents II, pp. 204-205. See also 
Ibid. 9 pp. 225-27. 
26) Ibid. II,, PP-198-200. 
27) See below, pp. 218 - 223. 
28) There is a thorough discussion of the rising and 
its leaders in Barrow, 
_Robert 
Bruce, PP-117-23. 
29) Cal. Does. Scot. II, no. 922; Stevenson, Documents 
II, pp. 211-12; see also Barron, op. cit. 9 PP-32-67. 
30) Stevenson, Documents II, p. 217. 
31) Rot. Scot. I, p. 42. 
32) Chron. Guisboroughs p. 296. 
33) Formulary E. no. 89. 
34) Stevenson, Documents Il. P-175. 
35) Ibid.. See also Cal. Does. Scot. II, nos. 888,889. 
36) Stevenson, Documents II, p. 211; Rot. Scot. I, 
p. 41; Chron. Guisborough, p. 297- 
37) Stevenson, Documents II, pp. 226-27. 
38) Dowden, Bishops. 9 p. 21. 
39) Stevenson, Documents II, pp. 192-94. 
40) They had both been auditors for Bruce in the Great 
Cause (Stones and Simpson, Edward I II, pp. 80-85). 
41) See above, n. 9. 
42) Chron. Fordun Is P-329 (II, P-322). Cal. Close 
iFo-lls Edward 1.1296-1302, p. 63 shows Edward I to 
have been apparently unaware of the seriousness of 
the uprising. Dated 7 September, it is a calm and 
assured order to Warenne to stay in Scotland until 
the disturbance had been settled. By 24 September 
193 
he was rather more concerned about the Irumours' 
he had heard concerning the state of Scotland 
(Ibid. 
9 P-132). There is a detailed description 
of the battle in Chron. Guisborough, pp. 298-303. 
43) The possession of castles appears to have been of 
at least symbolic importance for the possession of 
the realm. Cf. Edward I's demand for the sasine 
of the kingdom and its castles at the start of the 
Great Cause (Stones and Simpson, Edward 1 119 
pp-73-75). 
44) The only document which styles Wallace 'guardian' 
comes from a council held at Torphichen on 29 
March 1298 (A. P. S. I, pp. 453-54). 
45) Stones, Documentsq Pp-177-781- 
46) Stevenson, Wallace Does., P. 159. 
47) See, e. g. the attack on Roxburgh (Cal. Docs. 
-Scot. II, no. 958. ) See also Chron. Guisborough, 
PP-313-15, for an Engli-sh counter-attacTin early 
1298. 
48) Cal. Close Rolls Edward 1.1296-1302, P-77; Cal. 
Docs. Scot. II, nos-954,956,978; Chron. Fordun 
It P-329 (II# PP-322-23); Chron. Guisborought 
pp-303-307. 
49) Chron. Fordun It P-329 (119 P-322). 
50) See, e. g. Ibid. 9 PP-3289 330 (11, PP-321-23); 
Chron. Langtoft II, pp. 298-99. 
51) Hary's Wallace. See especially Bk. VIII, 11.19-22. 
52) See above, n. 44. For this council's status as a 
parliament, see below, pp. 264-65. 
53) This evidence is discussed more fully in Barrow, 
Robert Brucet PP-137-399 and in Barron, op. cit., 
pp. 82-84. 
54) Chron. Guisborough, p. 299. 
55) Chron. Fordun It P-331 (II, P-324). 
56) Cal. Does. Scot. II, no. 1023. 
57) The English had Jedburgh castle under siege in 
October (Cal. Close Rolls Edward 1,1296-1302. 
P-357). 
194 
58) Highland Papers II, P-131. 
59) antequam custodiam dicti. rengni (sic) admissimus 
The use of admitto in the active voice suggests 
the meaning ? receive', but it nevertheless implies 
reception of the guardianship from some person or 
body. 
60) Cal. Does. Sc'ot. II, P-535 (misdatedl recte 6 
April 1299). The phrase nomine incliti principis 
Johannis Regis illustris may be an addition made 
by Philip IV, who at this time was using Balliol 
as a weapon against Edward I, but this is 
unlikely. It was customary to copy the address 
from the style used by the addressees. This style 
is closely comparable with that adopted by later 
groups of guardians. 
61) Nat. Mss. Scot. II, no-8. 
62) Watt, Fasti, p. 293. 
63) Ibid., p. 160. 
64) See below, pp. 239-40. 
65) A. P. S. I, p. 454. 
66) P. R. O. Ancient Correspondence, Vol-30, no. 114. 
This letter is discussed (and printed) in G. O. 
Sayles,, 'The Guardians of Scotland and a 
Parliament at Rutherglen in 1300' in S. H. R. 24 
(1927)1, pp. 245-50. 
67) Ibid., at pp. 249-50. 
68) Cal. Close Rolls Edward 1.1296-13029 PP-333-35- 
As early as 1 March 1300 a 'horde' of Scots was 
waiting for John de St. John's entry into 
Galloway. 
69) See, e. g., Scalachronica (Maxwell), p. 23: "great 
passage of arms between the marches" . Gray's 
chronology is confused at this point, but the 
comment seems to fit this period. 
70) Previously, he had been at Gevrey, within the 
boundaries of France, but on land directly subject 
to the papacy. 
71) The evidence for the dating of, and reasons for, 
Bruce's change of allegianceg is convincingly 
discussed in E. L. G. Stones 'The Submission of 
Robert Bruce to Edward I in S. H. R. 34 (1955), 
pp. 122-34. 
195 
72) Cal. Papal Letters It P-590; Vet. Mon., p. 169 (and 
see Sayles in S. H. R. 24, op. cit., for discussion). 
73) See place-dates in Cal. Close Rolls Edward Is 
1296-13029 P-361 eC -seq. 
74) Foedera I, p. 924. This truce was also arranged at 
the instance of Philip IV. 
75) See, e. g. Cal. 
, 
Close Rolls Edward 1.1296-1302, 
p. 421. 
76) Chron. Fordun I. P-332 (II, P325). Date in May 
from Chron. Pluscarden I. P. 205. 
77) This charter is now lost, but is mentioned in W. 
Scott, The Minstrelsy of the Scottish Border III, 
pp. 253-54. See also Appendix 2. 
78) Chron. Fordun I, P-331 (II, P-324). 
79) Ibid., P-332 (II, P-325). 
80) Chron. Wyntou (Laing) II, P-349. 
81) Scalachronica (Maxwell),, pp. 24-25. 
82) A. P. S. I, p. 454. 
83) Highland Papers II, P-131. 
84) W. Scott, op. cit. , loc. cit.; Standard-Bearer 
Case, pp. 408-09; Kelso Liber II, P-310; Coupar 
Angus Rental I, PP-345-46. 
85) A. P. S. It p. 454: Johannes de Soulys custos regni 
Scotie nee non prelati comites barones totaque 
ipsius regni communitas ... 
86) Chron. Fordun It P-321 (119 P-324). 
87) Cal. Does. Scot. IV, no. 1827, and see S. H. R. 619 
op. cit., pý-. 113-14, n-3- 
88) Barrow, Robert Bruce, p. 161. 
89) D. L. Galbraith, 'Scottish seals from the 
Continent' in S. H. R. 27 (1948), pp. 127-141, at 
P-139. 
90) Cal. Does. Scot. II, no. 1301 (misdated). 
196 
91) N. L. S. Chr. 4793.1 am grateful to Professor 
G. W. S. Barrow for this reference, and for his 
helpful comments regarding it. Although the 
transcript was made in Tours, such an attitude to 
Balliol in France probably reflects a similar 
feeling in Scotland. 
92) A. P. . I, p. 454: sigilim um regimini regni Scotie deputatum vice communitatis. 
93) Edward I mounted a further campaign in the summer 
and autumn of 1301, wintered at Linlithgow, and by 
February 1302 was talking confidently about "the 
final conclusion of the war in Scotland". with a 
campaign planned for 1303 (Cal. Close Rolls Edward 
1,1296-1302, pp. 456-73 passim, 576,611). 
94) The date comes from Foedera I, pp. 942-43, which is 
a safe-conduct of Edward I for six Scots, to be 
named by the French ambassadors, passing through 
England. It was valid from 15 August to 18 
November, but since another safe-conduct, for the 
French embassy going to, and returning from, 
Scotland, was issued on the same day (15 August), 
it is safe to assume, that the Scots did not reach 
France before late September or early October. 
The Scots embassy was more than six strong (A. P. S. 
I, p. 454, Cal. Docs. Scot. II, no. 1455). It is 
possible Chat s-ome Scottish representatives were 
already in Paris at this time. (See Barrow, Robert 
Bruce, P. 177, n. 2). Perhaps the less influential 
ambassadors were sent in advance, before the 
Bishop of Dunkeld and others. (See below, 
pp. 243-44). 
95) Cal. Does. Scot. II, no. 1455. 
96) In November 1302 Balliol wrote to Philip IV, 
agreeing to his negotiation with the English in 
any way whatsoever. This was a carte blanche for 
the French to make peace with Edward I with or 
without Scottish inclusion: Balliol, clearly, had 
given up the struggle. 
97) See, e. g., the references to Scottish success in 
Cal 
'. 
Close Rolls Edward 1,1302-1307, PP-71,91 
(January and June, 1303). 
98) See place-dates in Ibid., PP-32-649 112-169. 
99) Memoranda of these negotiations are printed in 
Palgrave,, Does. Hist. Scot., p. 287- 
197 
100) The actual terms of submission are calendared in 
Cal. Does. Scot. II, no. 1741, and printed in full 
in Rot. Parl. I, pp. 212-13. A later, modified, 
version is in Foedera I, pp-974-75. 
101) Soulis: see Barrow, Robert Bruce, p. 182 n. 5; 
Scalachronica (Maxwell), p. 25; Soulis had family 
estates in Normanville in France, to which he 
probably retired in 1304. (1 am grateful to Dr. 
G. Stell for this information). 
Wallace: see his indictment in Stevenson, Wallace 
Docs. 9 PP-191-93- 




THE GUARDIANSHIPS OF 1286 - 1306 
2: THE ADMINISTRATIONS 
To ascertain the true position of guardians in the political and 
social framework of the country it must be established how they saw 
the scope of their duties. Did they run the administration of the 
kingdom in all respects, or did they simply keep the wheels of 
government turning, seeing their main function as no more than merely 
to carry out the military and diplomatic measures needed to 
re-establish the status quo? 
The documentary evidence which survives from the earlier 
guardianships, at least, tends to indicate that the former option is 
correct. The records of the first guardianship give every indication 
that the government continued to function on all levels, with the 
added weight of diplomacy made necessary by the attempts to establish 
a reigning monarch in the kingdom. Internal affairs such as finance, 
justice, normal feudal wards, reliefs, fees, grants of land and so 
on, commerce, the settlement of political unrest, the state of the 
common people, and church affairs, show little to be distinguished 
from Alexander III's reign itself. The attitude of Edward I to the 
guardians seems to have been similar to his regard for Alexander: 
there is frequent intercourse between them in the normal affairs of 
their kingdoms, such as border justice and trading disputes. The 
only noticeable difference is that in the years of guardianship a 
sudden outburst of diplomacy is to be seen, caused by the 
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negotiations aimed at restoring Scotland's normal state of 
government, and at safeguarding the independence and sovereignty of 
the nation. Apart from this increase in diplomacy, the government of 
the country appears to have functioned in a very normal and 
remarkably efficient manner. 
There is every indication that the offices of government were as 
fully provided for under the guardianship of 1286 - 1291 as under 
Alexander III's personal rule. Of course, when the guardians assumed 
power in 1286 they were fortunate not to succeed to the goverment 
after a period of disruption, and they thus inherited a complete and 
functioning royal administration. Alexander's rule had apparently 
been efficient and well-respected, and so the guardians' task of 
continuing that trend should not have been too arduous. That the 
administrative system continued to function normally, even after the 
death of Queen Margaret, implies that the aim of the guardians was to 
sustain the entire government of the kingdom throughout the period in 
which they were Icaretaking' for a monarch. On the local level, the 
sheriff appears in the records of the first guardianship to have been 
as active as at any other time. In the extant exchequer records for 
1286 - 1290 accounts exist from sheriffs of Aberdeen, Auchterarder, 
Ayr, Banff, Berwick, Dumbarton, Dumfries, Edinburgh, Fife, Forfar, 
Jedburgh, Kincardine, Kinross, Lanark, Linlithgow,, Perth, Roxburgh, 
Selkirk, Stirling, Traquair and Wigtown. 
1 From another source we can 
add to that list the sheriffdoms of Cromarty, Dingwall, Dundee, 
Elgin, Forres, Inverness, Kirkudbright and Nairn 
2, 
leaving only one 
known sheriffdom unaccounted for, that of Clackmannan, which may for 
a time have been united with that of Stirling. Clearly, under the 
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guardians, the system of sheriffdoms was complete. There is also one 
reference from this period to the guardians making an appointment to 
a vacant sheriffdom: William de Soulis stated in June 1291 that be 
could not render up his castle of Inverness to Edward I. as it had 
been bestowed upon him not by Edward, but by the guardians of 
3 Scotland. Most of the sheriffs had been inherited by the guardians 
in 1286, but where this was not the case, or where a sheriffdom fell 
vacant, the guardians were obviously prepared to attend to the upkeep 
of this part of the administrative system. 
The other main non-centralised office of government, that of 
justiciar, is clearly in evidence under the rule of the first 
guardianship. William St. Clair rendered accounts for the year 1287 
in his capacity as justiciar of Galloway. 
4 
The other justiciarships 
are less easy to detail in this period, but in 1285 William de Soulis 
was justiciar of Lothian, and there is evidence that he retained the 
post until his death in 1292/93.5 Sir Andrew Moray of Petty may have 
been appointed to the justiciarship of Scotia in 1289, on the death 
of Alexander Comyn, earl of Buchan. 
6 The guardians thus inherited 
three justiciars from Alexander III, and when one died it seems that 
they took care to replace him. 
The other offices attached to the government were principally 
those attached to the royal household, for the incumbents of which 
there is ample evidence. The chancellor was Thomas of Charteris 
79 
who had been given the post near the end of Alexander III's reign, 
and remained in office until Edward I's re-organisation of Scottish 
affairs in June 1291. He was a typical incumbent: a churchman of 
rank, who had been archdeacon of Lothian in the 1260s, and who was 
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involved in government and diplomacy in the 1270s and 1280s. 
8 Hi s 
staff included the 'clerk of the rolls of the royal chapel19, or 
clerk register, who looked after the records of chanceryq a post 
which was held by William of Dumfries 
10 
during the reign of Margaret 
and the interregnum, until his appointment as chancellor. 
11 The 
chamberlain was Alexander Balliol, a kinsman of the unfortunate King 
John, who held the office throughout the guardianship and until the 
end of John's reign. It is fair to assume that his appointment was 
made by the guardians, since in the accounts rendered for the years 
1288 1290 he is described as "Alexander Balliol, now 
chamberlain" 
12 
. implying that the appointment was recent. Working 
for him were the auditors of the exchequer, the head of whom at one 
point was Thomas of Charteris, the chancellor. 
13 Even p-urely 
I 
household offices, such as the Steward and the Butler, were filled 
during the guardianship, but since these had long been hereditary 
posts, it is hardly surprising that they continued in interregnum. 
The Steward was one of the guardians, and the Butler was William de 
Soulis, the justiciar of Lothian. 
q^ 
... those men who were normally responsible 
for administering 
the king's government were in office during the first guardianship. 
Moreover, the records show that they carried out their duties with a 
degree of efficiency which, in view of the difficulty of the 
political situation, must be admired. Commercial, judicial, 
financial, diplomatic and military affairs all appear to have 
proceeded with an efficiency equal to that of any Scottish royal 
government of the period. 
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The basic purpose of government, whether by king or guardians, 
was the protection of the governed from injustice, whether local 
crime, rebellion on a large scale, oppression by superiors or foreign 
invaders, or material hardship. The matter of major foreign 
relations, involving diplomacy, will be discussed below. As for 
maintenance of internal peace and stability, this was a duty with 
which the guardians were clearly fully concerned. William St. Clair, 
in his capacity as justiciar of Galloway, rendered accounts to the 
exchequer of "funds acquired in his bailiary" 
14 
: the administration 
of justice gave rise to some profit. As sheriff of Edinburgh, the 
same man claimed expenses of 2s. as the cost of sending two 
malefactors from Haddington to Edinburgh and feeding them during 
their incarceration 
15 
: the administration of justice also drained 
I 
resources. Mention is also made of goods escheat to the crown by 
"felons of the king": because of their felonies "their goods pertain 
to the king" . 
16 William Perel, sheriff' of Traquair, included 
expenses concerned with "a gardener who took flight for the killing 
of his wife". 
17 One Thomas of Ravenser wrote on 28 July 1290 that he 
was forced to sell his land in Berwick in order to pay his debts, 
necessary because "he had been judically compelled by the bailies of 
our lord the king". 
18 
In the late 1280s there was an acrimonious 
dispute between the burghs of Montrose and Aberdeen over the alleged 
disruption of the fair of the latter town by the burgesses of 
Montrose, which caused "no little prejudice and injury to the 
foresaid burgh of Aberdeen"; in May 1287 the guardians took notice of 
this dispute,, ordering the abbots of Scone and Coupar-Angus and three 
burgesses of Perth to hold an enquiry into the affair on their 
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behalf . and to report the findings. 
19 Apparently, in this instance, 
the judicial process was not sufficiently effectivet since two and a 
half years later, in February 1290, the burgesses of Aberdeen were 
still complaining of the interference. 
20 From these few examples it 
can be seen that the guardians were concerned with matters of dispute 
in the realm, but, like any other medieval government, they were not 
always able fully to ensure obedience to their edict. 
The attempt to enforce law and order involved more than just the 
type of relatively minor judicial matters outlined above. In 1286 
and again in 1290 there was serious risk of civil war, and the realm 
suffered from a considerable amount of military disturbance. The 
concern of the guardians with these events is reflected strongly in 
the records. Their effects were still being felt two or three years 
I 
later,, when in the exchequer accounts references are found to land 
from which no money could be raised because of their devastation in 
time of war. More than one piece of land "lay uncultivated on 
account of the war moved after the death of the king". 
21 In 
attempting to hold the peace of the country, the guardians appear to 
have declared a sort of medieval 'red-alert' . Dumfries castle was 
subject to an expensive "major custody ... on account of the war" , 
22 
Other important castles were subject to the same maior custodia, as 
witnessed by accounts for Ayr, Jedburgh, and Edinburgh, where two 
extra watches were mounted "on account of the peril of war". 
23 
The 
guardians seem to have been kept well informed of the course of 
events, since the accounts for Jedburgh include an entry for 
"messengers sent to divers parts in time of war, for the wellbeing of 
the kingdom" 
24 
. and the sheriff of Lanark claimed expenses of 40 
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merks spent by the advice of William de Soulis, the justiciar, "for 
the defence of the country (patrie) after the death of the king". 
25 
Further, the guardians themselves apparently took positive military 
action in calling up the host, a step normally taken by the king only 
in times of emergency. The summons of the host which probably dates 
from this period demands that all service due to the 'kingly dignity' 
should be provided "for the tuition, conservation and defence of the 
realm and the kingly dignity and the freedom thereof". 
26 Further 
suggestion that the host was indeed called in 1286 is found in 
letters of Malise, earl of Strathearn and James the Steward to the 




respectively, in which the two 
men confirm that the aid given to them by those abbeys "for the 
I 
sustentation of the peace and tranquillity of the kingdom of Scotland 
after the death of the lord Alexander, king of Scots" was voluntary, 
and set no precedent for future demands. The Steward's letter is 
particularly specific; by the death of King Alexander the peace of 
the land had been disturbed and public dissension had been made 
imminent, on account of which the abbot and convent of Melrose had 
acceded to the Steward's request for arms, hosting and aid,, for the 
defence of the peace and land of the kingdom and its people. Had a 
rebellion taken place prior to 1286, Alexander III would have called 
out the host . and the magnates of the realm, such men as the earl of 
Strathearn and the Steward, would have raised the men of their lands 
to come to the host as their retinues. Clearly, the guardians 
approached the rebellion of 1286 in the traditional way, acting with 
full royal authority. Similar precautions were probably taken in 
1290, when, we are told, armies were gathered after rumours spread 
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that Margaret had died. 
29 
It may well be that an attempt by the 
guardians to quell a rising in the north is what is referred to as 
the guardians' allies destroying the land of Moray, in the 'Appeal of 
30 the Seven Earls of Scotland' . Perhaps this was one occasion on 
which the policy adopted by the guardians was not endorsed by the 
entire community: Bruce,, at least, seems to have thought that an 
attempt was being made unjustly to put Balliol on the throne, despite 
the guardians' promise "to preserve and defend the established laws 
and customs of the realm,, and to render to each person the right 
which should belong to him by law". Bruce Is formal statement of 
disgruntlement,, however, is in itself a clear indication of how the 
guardians were expected to act with regard to matters of law and 
'right' . 
The normality of their government is also demonstrated by the 
guardians' relationship with Edward I, which was very similar to that 
between Edward and Alexander III, particularly with regard to such 
matters as border justice. On 15 September 1286 Edward I wrote from 
Gascony to his lieutenant in England, the earl of Cornwall, ordering 
him to stay legal proceedings on a boundary dispute between the prior 
of Kirkham and a Scotsman named Ralph of Haudene, at the request of 
the guardians, until Edward I himself returned to England. 
31 
Settlement of this dispute had been impeded by the death of Alexander 
11132 . but,, after a short 
delay during which the kingdom's affairs 
were brought to some order, the guardians had turned their attention 
to such concerns as this. In November of the same year the guardians 
wrote to the earl of Cornwall demanding that amends be made regarding 
the unjust treatment of a Scots knight and his wife by the English 
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king's escheator north of the Trent. 
33 There was also full 
communication between Edward and the Scottish administration over the 
settlement of Alexander III's will, where its effects crossed the 
34 
national boundaries. Another case brought to Edward's attention by 
the guardians concerned the hindrance of John Wyscarde in presenting 
to the church of Knarsdale: approximately six weeks after their 
complaint, on 2 July 1288, Edward issued a letter complying with 
35 their request. Apparently the bishop of St. Andrews and some 
companions also had reason to seek Edward's justice when, early in 
1289, they were arrested in Doncaster whilst on their way, under his 
protection,, to meet Edward I himself: letters of complaint, sealed 
with the 'seal of Scotland'. were dispatched to Edward, who duly 
ordered an enquiry and appropriate remedy. 
36 Edward I. of course, 
also had occasion to raise issues with the guardians: he complained, 
for instance, about the extraordinary behaviour of William Douglas, 
who allegedly abducted an English widow, Eleanor de Ferrars, and took 
her to Scotland "in prejudice and contempt of us, and in manifest 
37 lesion of our crown and dignity" . When several "men of Scotland" 
found the sheriff of Northumberland contravening the "customs of the 
marches" by acting within Scotland on English judicial business, they 
made their complaints known to the guardians, who ordered the 
sheriff's arrest, so that he could answer the charges in their court 
at Edinburgh. The arrest was duly effected,, about which the sheriff, 
one Richard Knout,, bitterly complained to Edward I. who ordered that 
amends should be made. 
38 
Norman Bast, an English merchant, had his 
fleeces confiscated and was unjustly imprisoned in Aberdeen; on this 
occasion Edward I acted high-handedly, and, disregarding the 
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guardians, wrote directly to the burgesses ordering them to explain 
why they had not done justice 039 
The government in power from 1286 - 1291 seems to have been 
active in other legal aspects of the social and governmental system 
besides justice. The feudal system of society prevalent in Scotland 
was based on land, held by tenants of superiors who were, ultimately, 
tenants-in-chief of the crown. Thus, much of the daily business of 
government was concerned with the land and tenantry, and with the 
associated services and dues. Gifts and pensions granted for 
specific services, wardships, rents and the giving of charters all 
required govermental attention in both administrative and financial 
terms. To enumerate all the documentary references to such 
run-of-the-mill administrative business would be tedious and 
t 
unnecessary, but a few examples serve to show the government at work 
in maintaining the normal administrative machinery. The financial 
records once more prove to be a mine of information. There are 
references in the sheriffs' accounts, for example, to wardships given 
by the guardians: "Thomas of Charteris, now chancellor, responded for 
the ward of Amisfield, which ward he had from the guardians of the 
realm, by their letters patent". 
40 
The income of the government came 
from the rents and duties recorded in the accounts: the sheriffs 
collected the 'king's dues', and, subtracting their expenses from the 
total, sent the balance to the exchequer. The records show, of 
course, that much was paid in kind. There are profits from burgh 
fermes, and references to services and renders such as "grassum" , 
11cain" . "carriage" , "garrison" and 
Ilwayting". The necessity of 
reducing the rents to be paid from land damaged by war, or land that 
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had fallen uncultivatedg can be seen to have been recognised. 
Allowance was made for animals which had been killed, and for repairs 
to buildings. 
41 
That the government tried to keep in touch with the 
requirements of the people of the land, and recognised the importance 
of keeping the land productive, is witnessed in particular by one 
entry which says that remission of dues was given 
"to the fermers of the king's land of Liberton and 
Lauriston, whose animals, to the value of E10, d4ýd ... 
lest they should leave the king's land in poverty". 
Gifts and payments appear to have been given as frequently by the 
guardians as by a king: in particular, gifts were made to the church, 
and, closely following the casual nature of royal gifts, one Thomas 
Modersun, a packman, was paid one chalder of oatmeal for his year's 
work. 
43 
Craftsmen and other workmen who, carried out repairs were 
paid wages, and there are various references to payments made to 
royal servants, such as the clerks of the rolls. Overall, the 
Exchequer Rolls provide an impressive testimony to the normality of 
life and government in these politically difficult years. 
Closely related to the value of the land, and land-holding, was 
the system of inheritance and the traditional practice in Scotland of 
holding inquisitions regarding the rectitude of an heir's claim to 
inherit, or to settle any queries about boundaries, pertinents, or 
rights of tenancy. This system continued under the guardianship. As 
early as September 1286 the guardians had sufficient hold of the 
reins of government to be able to give attention to such affairs, for 
on 25 September they ordered the abbot of Arbroath, Robert Cameron of 
Baledgarno, sir David Beaton and master Ralph of Dundee, or two of 
them, to conduct an enquiry into pasture pertaining to lands in 
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Angus, and into the rights of the tenant of the land, one Christian 
de Maul, to hold it. The enquiry was duly held on 14 October 1286 by 
the abbot and Beaton, who accordingly reported back to the 
guardians. 
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The dispute mentioned above between the burghs of 
Aberdeen and Montrose also led to an enquiry being ordered by the 
guardians, and on 10 July 1289 another inquest was ordered with the 
aim of establishing whether William Heswelle was the true heir of his 
father, the late William Heswelle, and whether the latter had 
rightfully held the lands of Edilshede at the time of his death. 
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It may also have been in connection with some matter of inheritance 
or justice that the guardians required the presence of one Ela of 
Garioch, the widow of the late Andrew of Garioch, at Stirling in May 
1289.46 
One very plentiful type of document from this period is that 
which deals with the payment of knights' annual fees. In collections 
such as Stevenson's Documents Illustrative of the History of 
Scotland . many orders for the payment of 
fees and receipts for their 
payment are to be found. In one collection in the Scottish Record 
Office 47 there are thirty such warrants dating from the period 
December 1287 to May 1291. Of these thirty warrants, eighteen have 
corresponding receipts, showing that payment was in fact made. There 
are, furthermore, four receipts for which the warrants for payment 
have not survived - This shows a 
fair degree of efficiency on the 
part of the financial staff of the government. That these warrants 
were issued regularly, and apparently promptly followed up with 
payment, indicates that the goverment was well in control of the 
day-to-day affairs of the administration. 
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The financial side of government also involved trade and 
commerce. Much of the country's economic stability depended on 
successful and profitable commerce, and one would thus expect to find 
some measures taken to promote trading, both internal and 
international. The records are less forthcoming for this part of the 
study, but nevertheless some clues may be found. The Exchequer Rolls 
give the impression of a subsistence economy, but there are also 
references to goods being sent, for example, from the town of 
Haddington to be sold 
48 
. and to the sale of cattle, pigs, fowl, 
cheese, malt, barley, flour and "fodder". 
49 
Mention of goods such as 
peppers and wine (and, specifically, white wine) 
50 
, shows that 
foreign goods, too, were being imported: shipping passed regularly 
be, tween Scotland's eastern ports and northern Europe, trading 
Scotland's raw materials and animal produce for manufactured goods 
and finer foodstuffs. A dispute such as that between Aberdeen and 
Montrose, over the holding of a market, is of obvious relevance to 
trade; that the case came to court, and was so vehemently pursued 
over such a considerable length of time, tends to indicate that there 
was a fair amount at stake, presumably as regards both the profits 
made by individual burgesses and merchants on such occasions, and the 
customs dues which the town would gather from the passage of large 
quantities of goods. Other disputes give the impression that a 
considerable amount of trade was engaged in. The Plight of Norman 
Bast, who had his merchandise seized while trading in Aberdeen, is 
evidence for the activity of English merchants in Scotland , and that 
the Scots also went south with their own goods is borne out by 
similar complaints and by safe-conducts. For example, a burgess of 
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Perth named Walter Deacon was given a safe-conduct to trade in the 
ports of England as long as he paid the relevant customs on his goods 
and did no business with Flemish merchants. 
51 Immediately before the 
start of the Great Cause Edward I gave a burgess of Berwick a 
safe-conduct to go with his goods and merchandise to various parts of 
England "to carry out business" (causa negotiationis faciendae) . 
52 
The Gascon John Mazun, despite his oft-repeated complaint about his 
treatment in Scotland regarding his attempts to recover unpaid debts 
of Alexander III, nevertheless appears to have continued to trade in 
the realm, for he was given a safe-conduct for that purpose in May 
1286.53 In May 1290 King Edward gave privileges to Ralph Tendman and 
William of Duddingston, burgesses of Perth and Edinburgh 
respectively, that they would not be distrained for any debts in 
England for which they were not principals over a period of five 
years, indicating that they traded in England with some regularity. 
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Thus, while there is no direct evidence of positive encouragement of 
trade by the guardians, it is nevertheless clear that Scotland played 
its part in the network of world trade, and the attention given to 
such disputes as the Aberdeen-Montrose controversy shows that the 
guardians were not unaware of the necessity to establish and maintain 
favourable trading conditions. 
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The routine side of the country's government took a large 
proportion of the guardians' attention. The part of their duties, 
however, which tends to receive most airing is in the field of major 
international relations. Scotland under the first guardianship took 
a greater part in such affairs than had been the case for many years 
previously, for there were several issues concerning the country 
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which caused activity on the level of international negotiation. One 
such issue which continued throughout the period of their rule was 
the outstanding debt owed by the Scottish government to Margaret, 
daughter of the Count of Flanders. The debt was that portion of the 
dower assigned to her on her marriage to Alexander . son of Alexander 
which had never been paid after the death of the prince. 
Margaret had, subsequently, married the duke of Guelders, and both he 
and Margaret's parents persistently attempted, through application to 
both the Scottish government and the English crown, to obtain payment 
of this money. 
56 
Another concern was the payment of money to the 
king of Norway in settlement of the arrears of the annual sum which 
the Scots had undertaken to pay for the wedding gift of the daughter 
of Alexander III when she married Erik II in 1281. By 1290 this 
annual payment was four years in arrears, and Erik tried by all the 
means at his disposal to procure payment. 
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However, the main part of the international dealings with which 
the guardians were involved concerned the future of their young queen 
and the independence of the realm. One contemporary document stated 
that Fraser and the others were 'holding themselves as guardians of 
the realm of Scotland,, to preserve and defend the established rights 
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and liberties and customs of the realm' . Their wish to affirm the 
political and territorial integrity of the kingdom was a consistent 
part of the policy of the guardians from 1286 - 1291. It can be seen 
in various minor ways, such as the guardians' arrest of Richard 
Knout, mentioned above: in his capacity as an English official he had 
trespassed upon the guardians' authority. English officials could 
not be allowed thus to act freely within Scotland . and in order to 
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assert the sovereignty of the realm,, the guardians therefore took 
appropriate action. 
More importantly, the guardians' attitude to the church is 
relevant to the question of liberty. The Scottish church had for 
long been a major influence on the policy of the monarchy, staunchly 
resisting attempts to subject it to one or other of the English 
metropolitan sees over a period of some two centuries. The church 
leaders themselves usually gave healthy support to the cause of 
independence, since the subjection of the kingdom would imply also 
the subjection of the church. The secular government thus tended to 
support the church and ensure that those who held positions of 
influence within it (and who were therefore also normally prominent 
in the state, because of their education and experience) , would t 
follow the policies adopted by the administration. The guardians 
appear to have followed the normal line with regard to the church. 
Probably through their nomination, and certainly with their approval, 
Matthew Crambeth was elected and consecrated to the see of Dunkeld in 
1288 59 . which see had been vacant since the death of the previous 
bishop, William, sometime after 1285. Crambeth was a strong 
supporter of the patriotic cause throughout the guardianship, 
Balliol's reign, and thereafter; he played a full part in the 
negotiations with France in 1295, was probably one of the 'council of 
twelve' elected to govern Balliol, and appears to have been a 
permanent envoy in the French court for the Scots between 1295 and 
1303: the guardians were plainly concerned that those who occupied 
the high positions in the church should be of the right political 
persuasion. Apart from the individual efforts of many church 
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leaders, there is one hint that the policy of the church as a whole 
was in favour of a patriotic stance: on 1 April 1289 Pope Nicholas IV 
issued a bull to Scotland criticising the practice whereby only 
natives of the kingdom were admitted to religious houses or offices, 
which, he said, was not without danger to the soul, and to the 
detriment of the houses and offices concerned, since the most able 
men might be excluded in favour of those who were less fitted to the 
positions. 
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Such a policy could only have been pursued in response 
to political objectives in line with the diplomatic activities of the 
guardians. 
Far more space in the records, however . is given over to the 
affairs of the monarchy. The Scots government was overwhelmingly 
concerned with the business of bringing their queen to her kingdom, 
I 
finding support without jeopardising the realm's liberty, and, after 
Margaret's death, establishing who was the rightful successor to the 
throne. The course of the negotiations leading to the treaties of 
Birgham and Salisbury has already been discussed; these years saw a 
great deal of international negotiating, out of which the guardians 
came creditably, having done their duty to the queen,, the kingdom, 
and the community of the realm. The bargain made in the years 1286 - 
1290 might have been seen as a triumph for the guardians had it not 
been for the premature death of the queen, for, at a stroke, all the 
work of the previous three years was undone, and the guardians, now 
without a monarch in whose place to rule, had to start again from an 
even bleaker position than that of 1286. 
Their duty, however, remained the same. They had to continue to 
administer the kingdom, and to protect its sovereignty. The 
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administration, as shown above, continued in all the various avenues 
of its business. The question of sovereignty, however, was now more 
difficult: the concept of a kingdom with no king was an anomaly. 
Clearly, the first priority was to find a king who could, or in whose 
names the guardians could, firmly re-assert the status quo of the 
realm. There is evidence that this search for a king quickly 
polarised into two factions, pro-Bruce and pro-Balliol. The course 
of the political turmoils of these years has been recounted aboveg 
but it is worth stressing that, like the rest of the country,, the 
guardians appear to have taken sides: Wishart and the Steward , both 
of whom were to be auditors for Bruce in the Great Cause, objected to 
the attempts apparently made by Fraser and Comyn to make Balliol 
king. The result was a ýtale-mate which could only be resolved by 
some outside arbitration. Thus when Edward I invited the guardians 
and other chief men of Scotland to come to him at Norham for 
discussions regarding the succession, the guardians may have seen in 
this a way out of their predicament. The very fact that the Scots, 
led by the guardians, went to Norham in 1291 shows that they were 
aware of their responsibilities in guarding the realm's liberties, 
and were intent on fulfilling them. When Edward I made the request 
for acknowledgement of his overlordship, the Scots found themselves 
in an awkward position: they might find a king through obedience to 
Edward . but in so doing they would have to give away the liberty 
which it was their duty to preserve. Their plea of insufficient 
authority to answer Edward's demands may have been futile in effect, 
and it may have seemed as if they were merely playing for time, but 
it was in part a truthful representation of their situation, for they 
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did not have the power to sign away the independence of the realm. 
That does not imply any helplessness or weakness on their part, 
although it sometimes suited their propagandist purposes to represent 
themselves in that light: they were neither weaker nor stronger than 
any king would have been . for no-one had the right to give over the 
liberty of the kingdom, which belonged not to the king or guardians, 
but to the very concept of the kingdom, the royal dignity, an 
abstract and continuous entity which none of those who held its 
custody had the right to diminish in any way whatsoever. 
Edward, dismissing their reply as ineffective, then went 
directly to the competitors, one of whom was, after all , the 
legitimate king, and obtained the recognition of overlordship from 
each of them. Persuaded, perhaps partly by the military force which 
I 
Edward had assembled in preparation for this meeting, that this piece 
of legal side-stepping was the best way out of their quandary,, the 
guardians followed the only possible course of action, and resigned 
their office into Edward's hands. The legality of the affair, from 
the Scots' point of view, was at best dubious, but that may have been 
an advantage, since a suitably strong future king might be able to 
claim that the recognition of Edward as overlord was without effect, 
having been made under duress. For the moment, it was the best 
option which the Scottish guardians and community had . for only by 
these means were they likely to establish their rightful monarch on 
his throne without a great deal of bloodshed . 
That episode brought the first Scottish guardianship to a rather 
inauspicious end. The lengthy discussion which has been given to 
this guardianship is designed to give as complete as possible a 
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picture of the style and effect of their administration, so that it 
may be compared with those of later guardianships. The guardians 
looked upon their role as that of a substitute for the monarch; there 
was no part of the normal administration of the realm which they 
could forego, since by neglecting any detail of the government they 
would have failed truly to protect all the interests of the monarch, 
known or unknown, whom they represented. Above all, their duty was 
to keep intact for their monarch the foundations of sovereign rule, 
the independence of the kingdom. In the end, this guardianship 
failed in that task,, perhaps inevitably, given the tragic way in 
which well-laid plans were foiled by events over which they could 
have had no control. They did their utmost throughout their period 
of power to uphold all the duties incumbent upon them, and to a 
remarkable extent they were successful, despite the great adversity 
in which they had to work. 
Comparison of the later guardianships with the administrative 
style of the 1286 - 1291 group shows that their ideals in government 
were the same. The protection or re-establishment of justice and 
freedom, the restoration of native administration of all the 
kingdom's resources, and the control of the commercial and military 
assets of the crown were all displayed, although to varying degrees 
on account of the differing military and political situations in 
which the various governments found themselves. There may be some 
case for treating the council of twelve which was elected in 1295 as 
a type of guardianship. However, it differed from the other 
governments under discussion in that there was during its period of 
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power a king in the country who had been inaugurated, and who was in 
control of his faculties. The committee of twelve seems to have been 
to some extent an informal body: it finds no mention in any record 
source, and never, apparently, gave itself a formal style. The 
government which administered the affairs of the kingdom in 1295 - 
1296 was King John's, the committee of twelve fulfilling, nominally 
at least, an advisory rather than an executive r8le. The extent to 
which John may have been forced to accept their advice may not be 
open to very much doubt, but nevertheless in official terms it was 
still he who ruled the kingdom in his own name. 
The second guardianship to be discussed is therefore the one 
which Wishart, the Steward and Bruce attempted to set up in 1297. 
Their failure fully to seize the reins of government from the 
English occupation forces means that there is little material with 
which to work. That these men started to establish their own 
administration, however, is clear. A letter, probably from the 
English treasurer of Scotland, Cressingham,, to Edward I. written on 
24 July 1297 
61 
, states that the English administration was powerless 
to quell the rebellion. No money could be raised from the country; 
he was able to procure from the Scots "not a penny" until the Earl 
Warenne "shall enter into your land and compel the people of the 
country by force and sentences of law" . and . furthermore , it appears 
that the Scots were themselves gathering the revenues which should 
have been paying for the English administration: 
"And whereas, sire,, you order me that if any Scotchmen 
have paid to your enemies rents ... [which] ought to have 
been paid to you, I should cause them to be levied again 
to your use... ". 
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This letter lays open the inadequacies of the administration set up 
in 1296, revealing that many sheriffdoms were still unfilled,, and 
that other English-appointed sheriffs had been ousted by the Scots, 
so that they "neither will nor dare return". In such cases , 
apparently, these officers had been replaced by Scottish appointees: 
"in some counties the Scots have set up and placed bailies and 
officers". Clearly, the country was severely disrupted by a 
rebellion aimed directly at the machinery of government; the local 
officers of central government were displaced, and the revenues 
diverted; we know from other sources that castles, the tangible 
symbols of possession of the country, were being attacked and 
taken 
62 
. and it is well known that Wallace and his companions 
attacked the English justiciar Ormsby 
63 
9 and that Wallace was, 
responsible for at least one of the vacated sheriffdoms mentioned by 
Cressingham. 
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This was no random rebellion: it was a concerted 
effort to destroy the ruling administration by simultaneous attacks 
on the military, financial,, legal and judicial machinery. It is 
plain that the disruption caused great consternation; frequent 
reference to serious debilitation of communications makes it plain 
that central government could not have taken immediately effective 
action even if there had been adequate supplies of money and men, 
simply because it was not known what was happening in any given area 
at any given time. 
The assertion of independence was, of course, the raison dletre 
of the revolt, and it appears that this was seen in a national, 
almost quasi-racial light: various chronicles mention that the Scots 




references, coming as they do from English chronicles, may well be 
overstatements, but it cannot be open to doubt that Wishart,, the 
Steward . Bruce and the others did pursue a policy designed to rid 
Scotland of English interference: to expel Englishmen may well have 
been a logical first move. The reason for these actions lies far 
deeper than merely a stubborn refusal to accept changing 
circumstances; the nature of the kingdom as a political entity, and 
their position as leaders of it at that time, made it incumbent upon 
these men to assert the right of the Scots to govern themselves. 
just as the guardians of 1286 - 1291 had struggled to maintain the 
realm's independence whilst attempting to re-establish a strong 
monarchy, so these would-be guardians had to attempt to achieve a 
situation in which a king or his representatives could rule according 
I 
to the traditions laid down by his predecessors on the Scottish 
throne. 
The negotiations surrounding their submission at Irvine in July 
1297 amply demonstrate that they had risen against Edward I not 
through personal ambition or self-interest, but on behalf of the 
community of the realm. They claimed to speak not only for the 
nobility, but also for the 'middle folk' and the commons, and the 
settlement reached included assurances on the part of the English 
regarding the behaviour of the administration and its effect on the 
whole community. The Scots had started the negotiations saying that 
"they took counsel to assemble their forces to defend themselve s, 166 
when the English army appeared in 1297, because they had feared that 
the army would destroy their lands, and that King Edward would force 
the 'middle folk' to perform military service overseas. (This 
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question of performing military service for a foreign king was 
important: it was one of the issues specifically included in the 
treaty of Birgham in 1290. ) Therefore they came to meet the English 
army so that they could discuss these things and receive assurances 
that the people of the land would not be thus oppressed. They wished 
peace to be brought about by pardoning of those who had rebelled, and 
requested "letters of friendship" to be issued for that purpose. The 
English negotiators, Henry Percy and Robert Clifford, agreed to the 
basic outline of the terms and,, on 7 July, they wrote to Wishart, 
Bruce and the Steward 
67, 
confirming that they had received them and 
others to the king's peace, which was proclaimed for them "and for 
the whole community of the realm of Scotland". 
68 
It was accepted 
that no overseas military service would be demanded against the will 
i 
of the Scots . and promised that no harm would come to the three 
protagonists. Two days later the Scots made their official statement 
of capitulation. 
69 
Humbler in tone than their previous statement, it 
merely said that they and others, with the community, having 
committed various crimes against his peace, gave themselves up to 
King Edward unconditionally, except for those matters mentioned in 
the letter from Percy and Clifford. Thereafter, the English 
commanders rejoined their compatriots at Roxburgh, reaching them with 
the glad tidings of the Scots' submission on 17 July. 
70 
The most 
interesting feature of these negotiations is the stress laid by the 
Scottish leaders on the community as a whole, the protection of which 
was the basic duty of king or guardians. That the common people were 
amongst the most important objects of governmental attention is 
stressed by another document which must date from the same period: 
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"To our lord the king and to his council, pray his people 
of Scotland that it pleases him, for God's sake, to grant 
a general brieve to the chamberlain of Berwick to 
maintain and govern them in the laws which were used and 
accustomed in the time of King Alexander, as their 
conditions made by the lords the earl ofiAngus, Percy and 
Nevill, at Roxburgh, will and require". 
This document probably implies that Percy's negotiating was not 
completed at Irvine. When he returned to his fellows at Roxburgh 
another petition met him, to which, apparently, he acceded. Whether 
it came fr(xn the leaders who capitulated at Irvine is unknown, but it 
can hardly have been an effort of the 'common people' themselves. 
Whatever truth lies behind this document, it emphasises that the 
government of the realm, whether Scottish or English, had to act in 
the interests of the common people, and within the traditional 
framework established by the kings of centuries past. 
I 
A large part of the more firmly established guardians' success 
was based on diplomacy and communication with countries overseas. 
There is evidence that the same pattern would have been followed in 
the summer of 1297, had it been possible. At any rate, Edward I 
certainly feared that approaches would be made to foreign agencies 
which might prove prejudicial to his interests, for in January 1297 
he issued a letter 
72 forbidding his lieutenant in Scotland, the earl 
Warenne, to allow anyone to leave the country without permission, and 
instructing him to arrest anyone found carrying letters. A second 
ordinance 
73 
severely restricted the passage of merchants within 
Scotland and established a close watch on those ports which were 
allowed to export goods, in order that 
"no messenger carrying letters or message from abroad 
pass in any manner without especial warrant from the 
king, nor any other person carrying closed letters or 
other suspicious thing, but let such a person be taken 
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and kept in prison until the king shall have ordered his 
pleasure therein. And all the mariners who shall pass, 
every time that they set out, shall swear and be 
examined, and the merchants shall be free by their oath 
that they will carry no letters nor message whence 
mischief might arise to the king or the realm, and that 
they will bring nothing from abroad by deed or by word, 
by art or by fraud, which may be hurtful to the king or 
the realm. And the king wishes that the messengers be 
closely searched and examined... " 
The ordinance continues, further providing for the searching and 
detention of all who used the ports, betraying an almost paranoiac 
fear of the Scots managing to set up an effective line of 
communication with the continent. Clearly,, this was a course of 
action which Edward expected the Scots to follow, and the inference 
may readily be taken that they had already attempted to do so. The 
ordinance is, of course, also evidence that the trading activities of 
the Scots had far from ceased in this period; it appears that despite 
the war the commercial side of the country's life continued almost 
normally. 
The way in which Wishart, the Steward and Bruce organised their 
uprising in 1296 - 1297, the fact that they immediately started to 
establish their own administration, the way in which they went about 
their affairs in the closing stages of their part in the revolt, and 
their expressed motives for their actions, all bear unmistakeable 
parallels with the style of government adopted by the guardianship of 
1286 - 1291. Had these men withstood the English threat in July 
1297,, and continued a successful military campaign, in all likelihood 
their government would have outgrown its infancy, and theirs would 
have been the names which next appeared in documents bearing the 
official style custodes regni Scotiae. 
224 
In the event, it was the rather unlikely characters of Moray and 
Wallace who came to lead the goverment. The capitulation of the 
nobles at Irvine was not emulated by the rest of the community for 
whom they had claimed to speak, and the rising continued under the 
overt military leadership of Wallace and Moray, who, probably aided 
behind the scenes by those very nobles who had feigned submission to 
Percy and Clifford, built on the administrative progress which had 
already been made. By the autumn . when the Scots were in a position 
to fight an open battle and push the English power back over the 
border, the nascent system of administration seen - in the summer 
months of 1297 had grown into an apparently fully operative 
goverment. There is a great dearth of evidence for the Scottish 
government in this period; due to the war, formal communication and 
record-keeping were disrupted on the Scottish side, and the English 
records, whilst fuller, tend not to acknowledge the waning power of 
the occupation regime and its replacement with a native 
administration. It cannot be doubted, however, that the policies of 
the pre-Irvine leaders were continued: castles were taken and 
garrisoned by Scots; as English sheriffs were ousted, Scots 
appointees replaced them. The army was raised to fight the campaigns 
of Wallace and Moray, and the summoning of such a host could only 
have been done through the work of local officials. To f ight a war 
was an expensive affair, for which the revenues normally collected by 
the sheriffs was necessary, and a financial organisation was required 
to arrange the administration of these revenues: it is therefore 
probable that a chamberlain . or at least someone delegated to carry 
out his duties, was appointed in the autumn of 1297,, and that the 
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usual staff of the exchequer were employed. (Regarding the lower 
grades of staff, it is not impossible, of course, that, as in modern 
times, the same personnel remained in office throughout all changes 
in government. 
74 ) 
The policy of Wallaces guardianship is more easily established. 
Of the official documents issued between the battles of Stirling 
Bridge and Falkirk, only a few remain , but they nevertheless provide 
some useful information. The letter to the burgesses of Lu'beck and 
Hamburg 
75 
is particularly interesting. The style 'leaders of the 
army' shows the principally military outlook of the policy at that 
time; the warfare had by no means ended . even although Wallace and 
Moray claimed, somewhat optimistically, to have 'recovered Scotland 
from the power of the English? . The continued military operations f 
and the development of administrative machinery, discussed above,, 
were aimed at the re-establishment of normal rule. It was also 
important, however . to attempt to stimulate the economy through 
renewal of the wonted internal and continental commercial activity, 
which,, as noted above, had been severely restricted by legislation of 
Edward I. Thus the letter to Lýbeck and Hamburg, which was probably 
matched by similar letters to traditional Scottish trading haunts, 
was part of a policy designed to revivify the Scottish economy, in 
order to increase the income both of individuals (such as the 
merchants specifically mentioned in the letter, who, stationed abroad 
during the occupation, probably acted as unofficial ambassadors for 
the Scots when messages could be slipped through the English 
blockade) and of the government. Only through such a Policy could the 
government gain a sure footing and have the resources to govern for 
the common weal of all sections of the community. 
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In terms of judicial activity, there is very little which can be 
said of this guardianship. There are no records of justiciars or 
their courts, but one can nevertheless assume that the government 
paid attention to such a basic element of its normal work. The 
protection given by Wallace to the priory of Hexham76 may reflect 
some feeling for justice, and the chronicle account of their issue77 
certainly represents Wallace as a man who . although ruthless and 
uncompromising, was not prepared to accept flagrantly disobedient or 
unjust behaviour by his troops. If any of the wild fantasies of 
Wallace's eulogistic biographer Blind Hary are to be accepted, then 
Wallace was a man of staunch moral conscience who allowed no 
injustice to go unpunished . 
As for straightforward, routine administration., there is equally 
little evidence. As noted above, the war necessitated the collection 
of revenues at the local level, and if the machinery to administer 
that collection existed, then the likelihood of other routine affairs 
being carried out is high. Certainly, there is nothing outstanding 
about the charter of the constableship of Dundee given by Wallace to 
Alexander Scrymgeour. 
78 That donation is of standard type, issued to 
reward adherents of the ruler for their services faithfully rendered. 
The protections are also standard documents, and support the 
contention that this government was not merely military in its 
outlook. The two documents from this guardianship which survive in 
the original 
79 
are both written in a good professional hand, and all 
four documents of which there is full record follow standard clerical 
practice and form, indicating that Wallace's government was backed by 
a professional chancery such as any king would have had. It is 
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probable that a chancellor was appointedg and his office would have 
conducted the normal day-to-day business of the realm's 
administration. 
With regard to the questions of foreign diplomacy and the 
protection of the kingdom's independence, one cannot be sure of the 
extent to which the kingdom's interests were pursued in this period. 
Wallace obviously saw himself as the representative of King John in 
Scotland - his style made that clear - and that he still recognised 
Balliol as king implied that one of his aims was to bring him back to 
Scotland to rule in person. Wallace's plea when charged with treason 
after his eventual capture in 1305, was that he had never been a 
traitor to the king of England . since it was not possible to be a 
traitor to a king to whom one owed no allegiance. 
80 (A similar 
I 
argument had been used four years earlier, in the instructions given 
to the Scots embassy in Rome in 1301.81 ) Wallace's indictment 
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stated that after Edward had conquered Scotlandq taken the homage and 
fealty of the prelates, earls, barons "and many others", proclaimed 
his peace, and established his administration "for the keeping of his 
peace and doing of justice howsoever according to the laws and 
customs of that land", Wallace had seditiously risen up against the 
king with many followers, and had attacked the governors and 
ministers instituted by King Edward. Thereafter, 
"with an armed multitude which joined and adhered to him 
and his felons, he invaded towns, cities and castles of 
that land, and he proclaimed and issued his brieves over 
all Scotland. like the lord of the land . and he held and 
sat at his parliaments and gatherings, all the governors 
and ministers of the foresaid lord king in the land of 
Scotland having been overthrown by the said William". 
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Thus far, the indictment supports what has been stated above 
regarding Wallace's conduct of the normal judicial and administrative 
business of the realm. The next section, although undoubtedly 
overstated in this hysterical attempt to convict Wallace of almost 
every imaginable crime, gives some insigbt into bis conduct of 
foreign affairs: 
"he advised all the prelates, earls and barons of the 
land who adhered to his side that they should submit to 
the fealty and dominion of the king of France and give 
help to the destruction of the kingdom of England". 
As had been done before, by those who counselled Balliol, and as 
would be done time and again by rulers of Scotland attempting to 
avoid English domination, Wallace approached the French for help, 
trusting that the poor relations between France and England could be 
turned to th6 Scots' advantage. Just over a month before the battle 
of Falkirk the French and English negotiators were in the final round 
of talks leading to a truce 
83 
. in the negotiations for which an 
important point of discussion had been the status of the Scots. 
Philip IV had included as one of his terms that the truce was to 
extend to the Scots and to John Balliol, "whom the French envoys call 
'King of Scots'". 
84 
The English king gave lengthy reasons for 
refusing to accept the Scots' inclusion in the truce. and the French 
king accepted the agreement finally reached, reserving the Scottish 
question for further discussion. Ten days later, on 26 June, Philip 
wrote, confirming that the truce was in effect, and informing Edward 
that he had sent envoys to ensure that the Scots' inclusion was being 
observed. 
85 
These envoys may have had some connection with letters, 
no longer extant, sent to Edward by Philip, apparently by way of 
'certain Scots'. dated 12 July. 
86 
The emissaries of the Scots had 
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been hard at work presenting their case in the French court, 
apparently with some success. They had stressed two main points: the 
need for the release of Balliol and other Scots from English prisonsq 
and the cessation of English hostilities towards Scotland. In other 
words, when the Scots went to France to plead their case, they went 
with the intentions of securing, ultimately, the return of their 
king, and of freeing Scotland from the threat of the invasion which 
they knew must be mounted in revenge for the defeat of the English 
host at Stirling Bridge. If Balliol was to return . he would require 
a land free from warfare in which to establish his authority. In 
view of the battle of Falkirk, fought so soon after the signing of 
the Anglo-French truce, it seems that the kings of England and France 
gave somewhat different interpretations to the terms of the 
agreement. Nevertheless, the Scots had been successful in gaining 
the support of King Philip, even if . at this stage,, that support 
brought them little practical benefit. 
The Scottish foreign missions had also been further afield than 
the king of France's court. Doubtless partly as a response to 
Scottish pressure, Pope Boniface VIII wrote to Edward in July 12989 
saying how glad he was that a truce had been reached in the French 
war, and instructing him to desist from any disturbance or war in 
Scotland. 
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It can be no coincidence that this bull was written less 
than a month after the same pope had written to John, 'the 
illustrious king of Scotland' . confirming the election of William 
Lamberton to the see of St. Andrews 
88 
, vacant by the death, in August 
1297. of bishop Fraser. It is possible that the election of 
Lamberton was made on the instructions of Wallace: that he had forced 
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the chapter, against their will, into electing Lamberton, was alleged 
by the English in 1306 
89 
. but that document 
is probably an 
overstatement of the case. The claim that the chapter had already 
elected master William Comyn to the see, and was forced by Wallace to 
retract that election in favour of Lamberton, is probably without 
foundation, based on the complaint which Comyn had made about the 
election on totally different grounds. 
90 It is nonetheless probable 
that Wallace, as guardian, had some considerable say in the election; 
for many years the kings had exercised a right to present their 
nominations to vacant sees, and normally the chapters made their 
elections accordingly. The leadership of the church was too 
important for control over it to be relinquished by the rulers of the 
country. In virtue of his guardianship, Wallace's writ bore royal 
authority, and so in all likelihood Lamberton was Wallace's nominee, 
in the name of King John. At any rate . he was elected to the see on 
3 November 1297.91 It is perhaps noticeable in this context that in 
the same paragraph as he deals with Lamberton's election 
92 
. Ford un 
states that on 20 August "all the English - regular and beneficed 
clergy as well as laymen - were, by this same William [Wallace] , 
again cast out from the kingdom of Scotland". Clearly, Wallace was 
aware of the necessity of having the right people in ecclesiastical 
of f ice. 
After election, as was the custom with Scottish bishops, 
Lamberton had to go to the papal curia for confirmation and 
consecration, which probably took place on 1 June 1298.93 It does 
not seem rash to suggest that this journey, long and , in those days 
of war, not without some peril, was used by the Scots as a diplomatic 
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mission to the rulers of those lands through which Lamberton passed. 
The bishop-elect may well have been partly responsible for the Scots' 
representation in France, and was almost certainly responsible for 
the propaganda which must have been presented to the pope before the 
issue of the bull of 1298. 
It is also probable that Wallace had a hand in the election to 
the see of Brechin of John Kinninmund , who was consecrated at the 
curia, probably on the same day as Lamberton. 
94 This man had made 
his peace with King Edward by April 1304 
95 
, which implies that prior 
to that he had not been at peace. He was a consistent patriot, and 
later supported Bruce in his rebellion of 1306. The presence of two 
patriotic bishops-elect on a diplomatic mission must have been 
influential: Wallace's government was prepared to take any available 
opportunity to push for the attainment of its objectives. Indeed,, 
Wallace's awareness of the necessity of interesting other rulers in 
the plight of his country must be reflected in his own trips abroad 
after the end of his guardianship. The first time he went to France, 
before 20 August 1299 
96 
, he appears to have gone in opposition to the 
wishes of a section of the community. His travels did not, as Blind 
Hary would have us believe, terminate in France, where he supposedly 
agreed to fight for King Philip against the English; a safe-conduct 
issued by Philip IV 
97 
indicates that it was his intention to continue 
both to Norway and to Rome - 
The government led by Wallace was, then, a fully restored 
version of that which had led Scotland from 1286 to 1291. Although 
there is little evidence for some of its activities and its 
organisation. it can be shown that, starting with the attempt by 
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Wishart and his companions to establish their own government in the 
first half of 1297, the Scots gradually built up an 'alternative' 
administration which, as it gained ground in both the financial and 
territorial senses, replaced the English government piecemeal. The 
military success of 1297 secured the position of this new governemt 
which soon established itself more formally, and carried out the full 
business of government in normal fashion. There was a good measure 
of diplomatic activity which, along with the increased emphasis on 
military affairs, reflected the way in which this guardianship had 
been established. To some extent the kingdom had been "recovered by 
war from the power of the English" . and if the invaders were not 
immediately to regain the ground which had been won from them,, war 
and diplomacy had necessarily to continue hand in hand-. That this 
I 
government managed to establish itself . regain control of all the 
main administrative functions, and continue to fight a war, partly on 
foreign soil . must be a testimony to the organisation and experience 
not only of the public figureheads, but also of the lesser men, who 
faithfully carried out the orders given by their more universally 
acclaimed leaders. In difficult times it was easy to order an 
official to collect revenue from a specified area, but very much more 
difficult to ensure compliance. It was on the efficiency with which 
difficult orders were carried out that the successful establishment 
of the Scottish guardianship of 1297 - 1298 rested. 
Those who succeeded Wallace in the leadership of the community 
after the battle of Falkirk inherited an established administration 
as a fait accompli from their predecessors. The inability of the 
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English to build on their victory of July 1298 meant that the Scots 
lost very little of the advantage which they had gained in the 
previous year: apart from perhaps a few sheriffdoms their 
administration was left intact, and no threat was posed to their hold 
over most of the country. Thus, from 1297 until the surrender of 
1304, the Scottish government remained essentially the same,, with 
changes only in the leadership. The establishment of local officers 
and higher government officials only took place where made necessary 
by vacancy or conquest. There is a slight increase in the amount of 
Scottish record evidence available for this period, which makes it 
possible to confirm that over most of the country the Scottish 
goverment's writ ran in usual fashion. For example, sheriffs can be 
named for eleven Scottish sheriffdoms in this period. Some of these 
I 
(Edinburgh, Stirling, Lanark and Roxburgh, for instance) were at 
times in English hands, as the fortunes of the two sides fluctuated, 
but some were undoubtedly Scottish appointments. For instance, in 
the summer of 1297 the English sheriff of Aberdeen went over to the 
Scottish side of the struggle. 
98 He evidently retained the sheriffdom 
for some time, until, in February 1300, John, earl of Atholl is found 
in that position. 
99 A supporter of the national cause throughout 
most of the period, he is likely to have been the guardians' 
appointment. By 1304, however, Alexander Comyn, the brother of the 
earl of Buchan, was sheriff of Aberdeen. 
100 Presumably the change 
had taken place when the Scots surrendered to the English king in 
February 1304, a point which apparently rankled with the earl of 
Atholl . who had himself submitted. 
101 Comyn apparently did not hold 
the sheriffdom for long, since by 9 or 16 March 1305 it was in the 
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hands of Robert Keith, the hereditary marischal of Scotland. 
102 
Again,, this must have been Edward's appointment. 
Another sheriffdom which demonstrates the changing fortunes of 
the Scottish government is that of Roxburgh. In August 1299 Ingram 
d'Umphraville, who within a year would be joint guardian with Comyn 
and Lamberton, was made sheriff of Roxburgh in a Scottish offensive 
which ousted Robert Hastings, the English sheriff who had been placed 
there in September 1296.103 This same English appointee was back in 
possession of the sheriffdom in 1304.104 The sheriffdom of Lanark is 
another example: in 1301 it was held by a supporter of the guardians, 
Walter Logan of Hartside 
105 
. but by the end of 1303 it was apparently 
in the hands of his lord, Robert Bruce, earl of Carrick 
106 
. who by 
then had made his peace with king Edward,, and so would not have been 
f 
an appointee of the guardians. 
These few examples show how the sheriffdoms were one of the most 
essential elements of any government's ability to rule. In a 
situation such as obtained in the years 1297 - 1304 the sheriffdoms, 
like the castles, became a constant symbol of the struggle for 
mastery. They closely represented the fluctuations in comparative 
power of the two administrations: the Scottish one which in fact 
governed most of the country, and the nominal English one which,, 
until 1303, rarely achieved very much in practical terms. Clearly . 
as soon as either side felt it had power in any particular area, it 
replaced the existing officers of goverment with its own 
representatives. This must have caused some confusion, and it is 
remarkable that any plain picture can be drawn of Scotland in this 
period. Because most of the records are of English provenance it is 
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hardly surprising that there are references to named sheriffs in 
almost all the sheriffdoms from the year 1305,, but that no records 
exist relating to many of them for a considerable space of time 
before that. This should not lead us to conclude that sheriffdoms 
lay vacant from one period of English administration to the next, but 
rather that there are no records which tell us who most of the 
Scottish-appointed sheriffs were. That the Scots did recognise the 
importance of the sheriff. and made full use of his services, cannot 
be doubted. 
As regards other officials, the guardianships of 1298 - 1304 can 
be shown to follow the usual pattern. In 1300 John Comyn . earl of 
107 Buchan was justiciar of Scotia. Nicholas Balmyle , who for some 
years had been involved with the guardians,, having been entrusted 
with the administration of the diocese of St. Andrews during the 
vacancy preceding the election of bishop Lamberton, had been 
appointed chancellor by January 1301.108 That these men did fulfil 
their respective roles is easily proven. In February 1300 Comyn held 
his justiciar's court in Aberdeen, hearing a case which involved men 
of the abbot of Arbroath 
109 
, and in the records of a later case, we 
hear that I'sir John de Mowbray sued sir Malise, earl of Strathearn 
before sir John Comyn, guardian of Scotland, for ravaging his lands 
of Methven". 
110 One final point in the matter of justice concerns 
another judicial functionary who appears on record in this period,, 
the judex or brithem, a class of professional lawyers who were a 
throw-over from pre-feudal society. These lawmen acted as judges in 
the courts of noblemen, sheriffs, justiciars or the king, who would 
frequently have judices for particular areas of his kingdom. By the 
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close of the thirteenth century references to judices are infrequento 
but there were still some in employment in this period: one Cristinus 
judex is to be found in the witness list of the document recording 
the proceedings of the earl of Buchan's court mentioned above, 
obviously included there because his legal training and title gave to 
the document an added air of authority. Judices are also to be found 
in Moray, Angus and the Mearns, and Gowrie within the period of this 
guardianship 
ill 
.a clear sign that judicial business was being 
pursued. It must be stressed that these were not government 
officials in the normal sense: they were public officials of an 
archaic type who, by this period holding their positions almost 
hereditarily, would usually therefore survive changes in government 
and political circumstance. Nevertheless . their presence shows that 
there was an understanding of the necessity of the judicial process 
under the rule of guardians, as well as under more normal 
constitutional situations: there was no question of a break-down of 
law and order. 
As for chancery, its workings can once again be easily 
demonstrated. Official documents of the guardians are not numerous, 
but do exist. From the Bruce-Comyn period of guardianship there 
remains a brieve by Bruce on behalf of them both, ordering Alexander 
Scrymgeour to be maintained in the constableship of the castle of 
Dundee and the lands given to him by Wallace. 
112 Bruce, Comyn and 
Lamberton wrote to Edward I in November 1299, regarding a truce in 
the war . 
113 No official documents appear to remain from the 
guardianship of Comyn, Lamberton and Umphraville, but several are 
extant, and more noted, from the period of Soulis and Comyn's rule, 
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from May 1301 to February 13o4.114 These documents are varied in 
type . but many of them are routine, such as the brieve to the court 
at Aytoun, or the charter of confirmation to Scrymgeour. These 
documents are clearly the work of an established chancery. 
For a chamberlain's office in this period there is no evidence. 
However, the arguments propounded above 
115 for the financial affairs 
of Wallace's rule, stand also for this period: the fighting of a war, 
the payment of officials, the conduct of diplomacy, could only be 
accomplished given the support of an adequate financial organisation. 
There must therefore have been a 'chamber' . or 
+equer in Scotland 
between 1298 and 1304, and there must have been some official 
fulfilling the duties of chamberlain. 
The upholding of the policy towards the church and the conduct 
of foreign relations continued to be pursued under the various 
leaderships after July 1298. In June 1299 David de Moravia was 
consecrated at Anagni for the see of Moray, having been elected to 
the see, from his position as a canon of Moray, on the death of his 
predecessor. Archibald. 
116 Of the same family as the Morays of 
Petty, and an uncle of Andrew Moray, Wallace's co-leader of the army, 
his position in a notable patriotic family and his record of loyalty 
to King John must have been of relevance to his election. Li ke 
Lamberton and Kinninmund , he probably acted as a diplomat for the 
Scots when he attended the curia: it can be no coincidence that the 
bull Scimus Fili 
117 
was issued on the day preceding his consecration. 
Apparently his patriotic conscience prevented this bishop from 
submitting to the English king along with the others in 1304, as he 
was still an enemy of Edward I in June of that year. 
118 He also rose 
with Bruce in 1306. 
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The see of Argyll . vacant by the death of Laurence, which took 
place after 29 October 1299, was filled by Andrew, a dominican friar 
of whose background nothing is known , who was consecrated on 18 
December 1300. This bishopric was usually in the hands of, or 
controlled by, the staunchly pro-Balliol Macdougall family. Andrew's 
predecessor Laurence was probably of this family, and was also a 
dominican friar, and it is thus likely that Andrew was, at the very 
least, acceptable to that family. He must also have been acceptable 
to the guardians (Lamberton, Comyn and Umphraville) , to whom his 
letters of appointment were addressed. "His appointment must have 
symbolised resistance to Edward, whatever Andrew's origin and career 
had been to earn him such trust. " 
119 
When Alpin of Strathearn, bishop of Dunblane . died in 1301 9, 
Nicholas, abbot of Arbroath and canon of Dunblane was elected in his 
place, and was consecrated in Rome on 13 November 1301.120 Little is 
known of his career, but again it is unlikely that his election would 
have been allowed had he not been acceptable to the Balliol cause . 
particularly at that time when, under the leadership of Soulis, the 
king's cause appeared to be flourishing. Once again, his trip to the 
curia would probably have had diplomatic as well as ecclesiastical 
significance. As can be seen very plainly from these elections . 
especially that of David de Moravia, the church was of great concern 
to the guardians. To keep control of the church, or at any rate to 
retain its support, was to win a great source of educated . 
experienced counsel, financial and political aid, and the fount of 
much of the national feeling in the country. 
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The diplomatic activity of the Scots reached new heights in this 
period. Due to their efforts in 1297 and 1298, the Scots had achieved 
some success which gave an air of realism to their campaign to 
restore Balliol to his throne. The pope had written to Edward 
ordering him to release Balliol 
121 
, and in July 1299 this was 
actually done. Edward handed Balliol over into papal custody, 
"saving to our lord the king of England and his heirs, 
kings of England, the realm of Scotland,, the men,, the 
inhabitants, and all the appurtenances of the said 
kingdom. That is to say and understand that our lord the 
pope cannot ordain or decide respecting the aforesaid 
realm of Scotland, nor concerning the men, nor the 
inhabitants, nor the appurtenances of the same realm for 
the aforesaid John de Balliol, nor for his heirs, who are 
or who may ý52 nor for the appurtenances by any cause 
whatsoever". 
But the success of the Scottish propagandists at the curia had 
perhaps not been fully realised by the English. 'On 28 June 1299 the 
pope wrote from Anagni that the 
"excesses, molestations, disturbances, damages, injuries, 
and afflictions worked by our beloved son in Christ 
Edward, illustrious king of England and his officials and 
people,, against the realm of Scotland,, the prelates, 
clergy and people of the church, both clerical and 
secular, and the churches, monasteries, and other 
religious places, and against the people and inhabitants 
of the said kingdom, and their goods... " 
could not be supported by the holy see; if Edward held an honest 
belief in the justice of his actions, then he should go to the curia 
and plead his case before the pope, with whom judgement rested. 
123 
This letter was not, in fact, delivered until the following summer, 
but that it was issued in 1299 must be of some significance. 
As late as July or August 1299 Lamberton was still in France at 
the court of Philip IV, having gone there to join other Scots envoys 
and magnates after his consecration in the summer of 1298. In April 
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1299 Philip IV wrote to the Scots124 saying that he had received two 
new envoys "with sincere affection". and was "moved to his very 
marrow by the evils brought on their country". Their faithfulness to 
their king, he said . and their staunch defence of their realm, found 
his approval. His letter also reminds us that the diplomatic war was 
not without physical difficulties. To travel the sea and land routes 
to the continent was not always easy in time of peace, but in war . 
when enemy ships kept constant vigil at the crossings 
125 
. there must 
always have been considerable danger. Thus Philip answered certain 
Scottish requests by word of mouth, "bearing in mind the dangers of 
the road, and dreading the risks which sometimes chance to letters". 
One cannot but admire these men in their courageous missions to 
France, Rome and other countries. 
I 
The Scottish emissaries in France returned to Scotland in August 
1299. About the same time there must have been talks with the 
English, a fact which proves that the Scots were in a stronger 
position than previously. The English were at this stage prepared to 
bargain with them, a new development, and evidently an exchange of 
prisoners was arranged. 
126 Apart from the battle of Falkirk, which 
in the long tem was no great English success,, the Scots had fared 
well on both the diplomatic and military fronts. By the end of 1299 
0 
127 Stirling castle had fallen to them after a long siege. Again in 
JulY 1300 the Scots negotiated with Edward I for peace, and felt 
confident, or rash, enough to suggest that if Edward would allow 
Balliol to rule over them peacefully and allow the magnates to 
re-possess their forfeited lands, they would desist from warfare. 
Otherwise they would defend themselves to the last. It can hardly 
241 
have been a great shock to them when Edward I chose to reject these 
terms, and the upshot was a skirmish on the banks of the river Cree 
in Galloway, from which the Scots "fled to the hills and marshes,, 
like lepers". 128 Having achieved little except the capture of 
Caerlaverock castle, however,, Edward returned south in the autumn. 
Even an English chronicler though little of his king's achievement in 
this campaign: 
"A poor little castle, called Caerlaverock, 
King Edward takes, no soul found in it, 
11129 Except ribalds who hold it, vanquished at the entrance. 
The Scots, on the other hand, achieved some success. On 30 October, 
before Edward left the country, he granted a truce to last until the 
following May. 
130 The Scots' ability to negotiate with the king, and 
to take advantage of the pressure which their envoys had persuaded 
I 
Philip IV to exert on Edward I for a truce shows the success of their 
diplomatic activities. The documents recording the truce make it 
clear that it wa s given at the insistence of Philip IV. 
Nevertheless, it is remarkable to find a document dating from this 
period in which King Edward promises to 
"hold and guard the people of Scotland and their 
supporters and allies... and their goods ... so that in 
the truce they can build, fortify, work and cultivate as 
they will, and can go on the land and the sea from one 
land to another, as is normal". 
At about the same time delivery was made of the papal bull of June 
1299. Why this bull was held over for so long is unknown, but it 
must surely have been due to the activities of the Scottish envoys in 
Rome that it was now sent. 
When the triple guardianship came to an end in early 1301 , and 
Soulis and Comyn formed a new leadership, there was another upsurge 
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in the diplomacy carried on by the Scots on behalf of King John. 
Probably this reflects Soulis' position as John's personal nominee: 
part of the reason for his appointment may have been that Balliol, 
once living more freely in papal custody, was in a better position to 
direct affairs in the way seen by him as most likely to gain his 
re-instatement. Throughout the summer and autumn of 1301 English 
agents were busy at the curia presenting counter-arguments in 
response to the bull of June 1299.131 The Scots, too, were not idle: 
perhaps it is to this period that we should ascribe a safe-conduct 
for Wallace from the 'King of Scots' 
132 
. for it is certain that in 
the period 1300 - 1301 Wallace at least attempted to make his way to 
the curia . 
133 However, a more formal embassy, for which there is 
more straightforward evidence, was at work on the Scots' behalf by 
the summer of 1301. In May 1301 Soulis and the community of the 
realm sent a delegation to Rome to answer the case put forward in the 
letters of the English king and nobility. Of the three men who 
carried out the Scottish pleading, the leader and most famous was 
Baldred Bisset, whose Processus, along with the instructions given to 
the embassy 
134 
, still survives. The embassy's case concentrated on 
the age-old right of Scotland to freedom from any domination, and it 
gave its own account of Anglo-Scottish relations from fabulous times 
through to the contemporary period. The Scots were, in these years, 
successful in the pleading of their case, for by the autumn of 1300 
the papacy had acknowledged that Balliol's deposition had been 
unjust, calling him 'illustrious king of Scots' 
135 
. and, even 
earlier, the pope had released him from custody to live on his family 
estates in Picardy. His guardians now issued documents not only on 
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his behalf, but actually under his own name. Even King Edwards 
noting the flow of the tide, had to admit the possibility that either 
John or his son Edward would regain the , kottish throne for the 
Ball iols. 136 
Doubtless confident in the happier aspect which their affairs 
now bore, the Scots sent an embassy to England in the spring of 
1301 137 to treat for a final peace before the truce of October 1300 
expired. They returned in April having had no success, and an 
English army came north in the summer. It achieved little, but was 
sufficiently secure to winter in Linlithgow. In January 1302, once 
again through the efforts of French envoys, as a condition of the 
peace made between the English and the French at Asnieres, a truce 
was given to the Scots for nine months. 
138 
That Edward had not 
softened in his resolve towards the suppression of the Scottish 
rebellion, however, is evident from the addition to the treaty of a 
final clause which states that 
"the people of the king of France will always call John 
'king of Scots',, and say that he and the Scots are allies 
of the king of France, and the ambassadors of the king of 
England will always maintain the contrary and call him 
John Balliol and say that he is not king of Scots,, and 
neither is he, or are the Scots, allies of the king of 
France". 
There was no question of Edward's totally giving in to pressure, 
whether applied by the Scots, the French or the pope. The Scots 
continued to work at the French court, pressing for French insistence 
on a peace settlement for Scotland before any could be finalised 
between England and France. In May 1303 Lamberton, Matthew Crambeth, 
bishop of Dunkeld, John Comyn, earl of Buchan, James the Steward, 
John de Soulis, Ingram d'Umphraville, and William Balliol were still 
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in France139 , where most of them had been since the autumn of 
1302.140 
But by then the situation had changed. The great flurry of 
activity between 1300 and 1302, which had seemed to augur so well for 
the Scots, was foiled by events almost totally unrelated to the 
Scottish situation. The French were seriously weakened by a massive 
defeat of their forces at Courtrai in JulY 1302. Their main 
objective thereafter was to gain peace with Edward I; the 
high-powered Scottish commission of late 1302 could not prevent them 
from making a peace with the English which excluded the Scots, and 
they returned to Scotland in February 1304.141 Their letter of May 
1303 to the community of Scots 
142 
had been an admission of failure, 
but they had nevertheless encouraged the Scots to continue resistance , 
whilst they still attempted to win some concessions. However, their 
chances were never more than slender. The pope, too, was losing 
heart: Philip IV had quarelled with him, and he was thus less willing 
to support the Scots, Philip's allies. In particular,, now that the 
Anglo-French war appeared to be drawing to a close, the Scots, who 
had been a useful tool with which to put pressure on the English,, 
were less important on the international scene . and indeed they now 
stood in the way of peace. By August 1302, therefore, the pope's 
pro-Scottish fervour was, to say the least, abating. There is a sign 
that English propaganda was being more favourably received by that 
time in a letter of Pope Boniface to Robert Wishart, bishop of 
Glasgow, in which the pope expressed the concern which he had felt 
when he had heard that Wishart was "the leader and principal favourer 
of all the turbulencet dissension and discord which was and is 
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between... Edward king of England and the Scots". The pope Is 
displeasure was clear: "you thus render yourself obnoxious to God". 
In order to gain peace between the Scots and the English, Wishart and 
the other prelates were instructed to reform their ways. A similar 
letter was sent to the other bishops "constituted throughout the 
kingdom of Scotland" (. eRiscopis per regnum Scotiae constitutis) . 
143 
Militarily, the Scots were holding their ground. In January 
1303 they were still "invading the land, castles and towns" of 
Scotland, causing Edward I some concern 
144 
and in February they 
defeated an English force at Roslin,, a victory which apparently 
caused some stir on the continent. 
145 
However, the real battle for 
Balliol's restoration had always been fought with diplomatic 
weaponry. With the desertion of the pope and Philip IV, the Scots' 
fight was now hopeless. Balliol himself had realised this by 
November 1302, when he signified in a letter to Philip IV 
146 that he 
had given up hope. A large English invasion in the summer of 1303 
sealed the fate of this round of the national struggle, and early in 
1304 most of the Scottish leaders submitted. That phase of the war, 
in both miltary and diplomatic terms, had been won by the English. 
Through almost frenzied activity the Scots had improved their 
position enormously between 1297 and 1303. The successive 
guardianships had consistently waged war on both military and 
diplomatic fronts, with the intention of obtaining first the release, 
and then the restoration, of King John, the validity of whose 
deposition they refused to admit. In the first of their objectives 
they had succeeded, and had the course of international politics not 
turned against them, it is quite possible that the second would also 
have been achieved. 
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All the guardians were concerned to bring about the return of 
their king and the re-establishment of constitutional normality. The 
business of government, which they carried on as fully as their 
various circumstances allowed, involved them in many different 
activities concerned with the administration of the realm. Abov e 
all, however, it involved them in campaigning for recognition of the 
independent status of their kingdom. That campaign required them to 
undertake a far greater amount of international negotiation, at a 
higher level, than most of the kings of Scots who had preceded them. 
This pitching of Scotland into the melting-pot of European politics, 
and the amount of discussion thus brought about through negotiation 
and preparation of cases, must have been partly responsible for the 
admirable resolve of the Scots in this period. When there was no 
king to hold the crown, which was after all the ultimate symbol of 
sovereignty, the conviction that Scotland was an independent kingdom 
grew more strongly than during periods of normal royal rule. To put 
it another way, the idea of the 'nation' blossomed when the political 
entity, the 'kingdom'. was threatened. To justify his fight against 
the 'English' 147, a Scot had to be aware that the 'English' were 
different, and represented something apart: in effect, he had to 
believe in his own 'Scottishness' . and in all the theoretical and 
practical trappings of sovereignty which went with it. The war 
cannot have been seen in a straightforwardly racial light: racial 
diversity was well recognised, and at times troublesome, within both 
kingdoms. The question was, whatever his 'race', did a man associate 
himself with the abstract notion of 'Scotland'. or of 'England'? The 
distillation of such an idea comes close to a definition of the 
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concept of nationhood. The guardians, through their diplomatic and 
military struggle . did not achieve their practical aim, the 
re-assertion of Scottish sovereignty in the person of a restored 
king. What they did achieve, however, was the further development of 
the idea of the nation. It cannot be sensibly denied that such a 
notion existed in the late middle ages. After Bruce's coronation, in 
October 1306, even Edward I recognised that there were two 'nations' 
in the island of Britain, when he referred to the people of "the 
nations of England and Scotland" (Angliae et Scotiae nationum), 
148 
In their propaganda piece prepared for the 1321 peace negotiations,, 
the Scots claimed that their kings had always reigned in freedom,, 
"without subjection to any nation" (absque alicuius nacionis 
subjectione) 
149 Fordun says that after the ordinance of 1305, the 
"English nation" (Anglicana natione) lorded it over all Scotland,, and 
he further states that by his rebellion Bruce freed the "Scottish 
nation" (Scoticae nationis) from bondage. 
150 It must be accepted, of 
course, that the word natio may not have had precisely the same 
connotation then as now, but it must nevertheless have borne a 
meaning beyond that of the more commonly used terms, such as regnum, 
terra, and patria, implying at least a political and psychological 
unity which transcended racial division. The concept of the 'nation' 
gave the Scots the will and the motive to continue their fight; it 
inspired their magnificent propaganda; and it was to give Robert 
Bruce the chance to make good his claim to the throne in the next 
round of the contest . 
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE GUARDIANSHIPS OF 1286 - 1306 
_39. 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTIFICATION 
The emphasis laid by the guardians on the restoration of the 
monarchy, and the ideas mentioned above relating to constitutional " 
normality, sovereignty and nationhood, bring us to the last major 
issue regarding the rule of guardians: their constitutional position. 
The extent to which they claimed to wield sovereign authority, and 
the light in which their government was viewed both by themselves and 
by the community, bear broad implications for the position of the 
king in the Scottish constitutional set-up. 
One activity which is usually seen as a sign of sovereignty is 
the holding of parliaments. This, the guardians certainly did. 
There are records of parliaments held without the presence of a king 
at Scone in April 1286 
1. 
at Birgham in March and July 1290 
2. 
at 
Torphichen in March 1298 3. in the Torwood in November 1299 
4. 
at 
Rutherglen in May 1300 5, and at Scone in February 1301.6 There is a 
good case for supposing that the gathering at Norham in May 1291 is 
to be seen as a joint parliament of England and Scotland, and it is 
also likely that a parliament was held shortly after the battle of 
Falkirk, at which Bruce and Comyn were elected guardians. As a 
formal gathering of the community, the meeting in Selkirk forest in 
August 1299,, at which Lamberton was elected to the guardianship, is 
probably to be seen as a parliament. 
7 One of the charges made 
against Wallace in 1305 was that "he held and sat in his parliaments 
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and gatherings" in contempt of Edward I's appointed officials8i and 
we hear also of a colloVium of the guardians in the period 1298 - 
1301.9 The guardians clearly felt that they were in a sufficiently 
strong position to hold parliaments, make treaties, do royal justice, 
levy the I king Is dues I. and generally conduct all the af fairs of the 
realm in a manner similar to government under a king. 
Why they felt able to do this, and why it was acceptable to the 
rest of the community, can only be gleaned from the seals and styles 
used by them, and from occasional documentary references. Their 
styles do not appear to have varied very much throughout the period . 
The first group of guardians were usually called "guardians of the 
kingdom of Scotland, constituted by common counsel" (custodes regni 
Scotiae de communi consilio constituti). 
10 In March 1290 tPey appear 
as "guardians of Scotland elected by the community" (custodes Scocie 
de communitate electi) a title which closely parallels the earlier 
(1286) "guardians of the kingdom of Scotland, elected by the 
community of that realm" (custodes regni Scotiae per communitatem 
ejusdem regni electi) . 
12 The only other style to be found in the 
first period of guardianship is a simple abbreviated form: "guardians 
of the kingdom of Scotland" (-custodes regni Scotiae). 
13 Those styles 
show no significant variation. The statement that they were elected 
by the community is perhaps more specific than the other, which 
merely has them 'constituted through common counsel' , but it amounts 
to the same thing. The guardians were to govern the community, the 
wholeness, of the realm, in the absence of a suitably inaugurated 
monarch, and since it was the right of the community to give, (and, 
theoretically,, to take away) assent to a king, who governed only 
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through power given by the community, so it was their right to choose 
which of their number it was who ruled during the absence of a king. 
The community, particularly its leaders the nobility, had a duty to 
protect the realm, its justice and integrity. When there was no king 
through whose authority they could do that, they had to elect those 
of their number who could best fulfil this duty for them. 
Between the battle of Stirling Bridge and the election of the 
triple guardianship in July 1298, there are few official references 
to the guardian, Wallace. The style used by Moray and Wallacet 
"leaders of the army of the kingdom of Scotland", refers to the 
practical reality of their situation. They did at that point speak 
with the backing of the community, however 
14 
. showing that whilst 
their official election had not taken place, they were nevertheless 
the ones to whom authority had been delegated,, in virtue of their 
military achievements. A new dimension was added in the style used 
by Wallace and Moray in their letters of protection to Hexham 
abbey 
15 
: "Andrew Moray and William Wallace, leaders of the army of 
the kingdom of Scotland, in the name of the most worthy prince, the 
lord John . by the grace of God illustrious King of Scots . by the 
consent of the community of the realm" (duces exercitus regni Scocie, 
nomine preclari principis domini Johannis dei gracia regis Scocie 
illustris, de consensu communitatis regni eiusdem). In this style 
there appeared . as well as the part played by the community of the 
realm, the added complication of a king. Despite Ball iol Is 
humiliating surrender to Edward I, and his resignation from the 
kingship, Wallace, apparently with the formal backing of the 
community, still recognised him as king. The Scots consistently 
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maintained that Balliol's abdication was neither legal nor binding 
because it had been made under duress. 
16 The same basic style was 
used by Wallace after his formal election as guardian: "William 
Wallace, knight, guardian of the kingdom of Scotland and leader of 
its army, in the name of the most worthy prince, lord John, by the 
grace of God illustrious king of Scots with the consent of the 
community of that kingdom". 
17 
The same document stresses again the 
existence of the king and the tconsent and assent' of the magnates 
(who represented the community at large) with which the grant was 
made. This fuller style was also used by guardians after Wallace: in 
November 1299 Lamberton, Bruce and Comyn styled themselves 'guardians 
in King John's name, elected by the community'. 
18 Most of the other 
references to the guardians merely style them "guardians of the 
I 
kingdom of Scotland" or something similar. 
19 The full style, 
including the king's name, is significant, however. That the Scots 
refused to accept that there was no king is of fundamental importance 
to the status accorded the guardians. This is emphasised by the seal 
which Wallace attached to his charter to Scrymgeour, which is 
described as "the common seal ... of the kingdom of Scotland" 
(sigillum commune... regni Scocie) , presumably implying that it was 
a new Great Seal . cast to replace that broken by Edward I in 1296.20 
It is surprising that this seal is quite unlike that used by the 1286 
- 1291 guardians. Wallace's Great Seal bears the legend Johannes dei 
gracia Rex Scottorum around the image of the king equestrian . in 
armour bearing the royal insignia. On the other side , the same 
legend is found . with the image of the king enthroned in full royal 
regalia, heraldic shields on either side, one bearing the lion 
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rampant, the other his personal emblem. 
21 This seal is identical in 
almost all respects to the second Great Seal used by Alexander 111 
22 
t 
showing that in 1297 the chancery was poised to re-establish a full 
royal administration. That a finished seal could easily be produced, 
in direct line with the current fashion of seals used by the kings of 
Scots, shows an impressive degree of organisation. However, that the 
seal shows John himself is also important: it is a Great Seal of King 
John, being used to authorise the acts of his representative in the 
land, the guardian. The use of the full style and of the royal seal 
thus shows the guardian's position from the king's point of view. 
He, the king, was still in power, with full royal authority,, wielded 
through the guardian since the political situation precluded his own 
presence in the kingdom. As the political situation became more 
I 
hopeful, the styles of the guardians changed accordingly: it can be 
no coincidence that in 1297 the king' s name was merely added in to 
the style of the guardians, whereas by 1301 documents were actually 
issued under John's name, the guardian merely witnessing the act with 
the simple wording "witnessed by John de Soulis, knight, guardian of 
our kingdom". 
23 By 1301/02 hopes had risen for the restoration of 
the king, and the personal appointment of Soulis as John's direct 
representative may be indicative of a closer contact between the king 
and the community. With the new situation brought about by the 
appointment of Soulis, there may also have been a new seal. A 
description of the seal attached to Soulisv letter to Philip IV in 
February 1302 
24 
gives it on one side the seal of Soulis himself, as 
guardian, and on the other side the impression of King John, 
enthroned and bearing the regalia. The latter image is different in 
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style from that on the seal used by Wallace, perhaps indicating that 
Balliol was personally responsible for its manufacture, in France. 
It seems surprising that when the king was apparently closer to 
regaining his kingdom, his own Great Seal was replaced by a new one 
which stressed the place of the guardian; on the other hand . the 
naming of the guardian on the new seal may signify the closer 
relationship between king and guardian. 
25 Like that of the 1286 - 
1291 guardians, this seal was known as "the seal deputed for the 
government of of the kingdom of Scotland" (sigillum regimini regni 
Scotie deputatum). 26 
So, their styles, and the seals of the period 1297 - 1302, make 
two major points about the position of the guardians. Firstly, from 
the community's point of view, they were elected to fulfil the task 
of protection of the kingdom in the absence of a king to whom the 
community would normally give the necessary authority: the power of 
guardians, in that respect, was therefore equal to that of a king. 
Secondly, at no time did the Scots accept that there was no king: the 
guardians' style ran 'in the name of' the king, and their seal bore 
his image. Both from the community's point of view and from that of 
the king himself . the guardians were no more and no less than his 
representatives, bearing the authority to rule and carry on the 
realm's business on his behalf. Thus later kings recognised the acts 
of guardians as royal acts in their own right. 
27 
When the king's 
situation was strong enough to allow him to appoint his own 
representative, he did so, and the new situation was symbolised by a 
new seal and a new style. The royal authority carried by the 
guardians' documents is emphasised by the Wallace charter of March 
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1298, which granted land 'pertaining to the crown' (ad partem regiam 
spectare). Even the king could not fully alienate crown lands or any 
right pertaining to the kingdom itself, and thus a guardian, without 
the full authority of the king, could not have made such a grant. It 
was probably for this reason - for further assurance of his right to 
make the donation - that Wallace included in the document the extra 
"consent and assent of the magnates" with which the grant was made. 
The seal used by the guardians of 1286 - 1291 allows the 
discussion to be taken one step further. That seal truly reflected a 
new political situation by being totally unlike any other seal used 
for government in Scotland. It bore no monarch's name or image, but 
replaced it with a striking representation of St. Andrew on the 
cross, with the legend Andrea Scotis dux esto compatriotis. On the 
reverse, instead of the monarch equestrian, were simply the royal 
arms, the lion rampant, with the legend sigillum Scocie_ deputatum 
regimini regni. 
28 This seal is highly significant for the position 
accorded the guardians. As the only tangible symbol of their 
authority, its design must have been the subject of careful 
consideration. The lion rampant, which immediately brings to mind 
the captain of Stirling castle who told Edward I that he held his 
castle 'of the lion 129 . is the symbol of Scottish royalty. No 
monarch's image could be used, since in the period following 
Alexander III's death no monarch had sat upon the stone at Scone for 
inauguration. When the seal was made . it was not even certain who 
the monarch was. Thus, to represent 'the king whomsoever he may be',, 
the royal arms were used. The name of the seal made it plain that 
its use lent royal authority to those to whom the community had 
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deputed it. For the same reason, that no monarch had been 
inaugurated, none could be named, and the best that could be done was 
thus to symbolise an anonymous royal authority deputed to the bearers 
of the seal. The overt reference to the idea of nationalitY on the 
other side of the seal is also striking: St. Andrew's image was used 
to symbolise the community of the realm in its fulness; it was an 
appeal to the 'patriot Scots' to act in unity under their guiding 
Christian faith, in order to uphold their nation throughout political 
difficulty. In this image the theory of the 'community of the realm' 
reached its zenith. 
This, then, was a royal seal, but above all it was a seal of the 
community of Scotland: the authority which it bore was royal 
authority, but it was borne when there was no inaugurated monarch. 
f 
Within a short time of its having been made . the Scots knew who the 
monarch was, and had she been inaugurated a new seal would have been 
made accordingly: 
"the seal of the kingdom which at present is valid after 
the death of the king shall be held valid until the said 
queen shall have come into her kingdom and shall have 
performed to God and to the Church and to the Community 
of the realm, in the place specially ordained for the 
purpose, that which is to be done in accordance with the 
laws and customs of the said realm. And then there shall 
be made a new seal,, bearing th so customary arms and legend 
of the king of Scotland only". 
The new seal, of course, was never made, since by the end of 1290 
Margaret was dead and the Soots were again in the position of not 
knowing who was the rightful king. The guardians' seal therefore 
continued in use until the appointment of King John in 1292. It wa s 
used by King Edward and his ministers throughout 1291 and 1292 
31 
, and 
was finally broken on the day before Balliol did homage to Edward I 
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for his kingdom. 32 Again, there are two points of major significance 
to be drawn frcm this seal. Firstly, the position of the community 
was paramount: it was the community who assented to the wielding of 
royal power, whether by a king or by a guardian. The quotation from 
the treaty of Birgham emphasises this: only after performing "that 
which is to be done" before the community could Margaret have been 
issued with a seal of her own - her key to sovereign power. 
The community, in this context, could not in practical terms 
mean the entire community of 'patriot Scots?: the whole Scottish 
nation could not gather at Scone for an inauguration ceremony. The 
community, therefore . was represented by those at the top end of 
society: those barons , nobles and prelates into whose hands the 
organisation of the kingdom's business fe, 11. Even they, however, had 
to have a corporate body through which to decide on and make known 
their common will: that body was parliament. 
33 
Only in parliament 
could a decision be taken concerning such a vital matter as the rule 
of the kingdom. The delegation of that authority which stemmed from 
the very existence of the nation of Scotland could not be entrusted 
to a few men at an unofficial meeting. To elect a guardian, as to 
inaugurate a king, a properly constituted gathering of the leaders of 
the community had to be held. Thus the committee of six were elected 
in parliament at Scone in 1286, and resigned their authority in a 
parliament at Norham in 1291 ; Wallace was elected at a parliament on 
or before 29 March 1298; Bruce and Comyn were elected at a 
parliament, of which no record remains, probably in July 1298; the 
meeting in the forest of Selkirk, obviously pre-arranged, must be 
seen as a parliament; Umphraville replaced Bruce as guardian in a 
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parliament in May 1300; and Soulis was accepted as guardian at a 
parliament held between December 1300 and May 1301. The community's 
will , as expressed in parliament, decided to whom the royal authority 
of Scotland would be given. It was stated above that the holding of 
parliaments was a sign of sovereignty wielded by those who called 
them. That statement is not contradicted by the apparent ability of 
the community to hold parliaments when there was neither king nor 
guardian, for, in such a situation, the rule and sovereignty of the 
state lay directly with the community itself . which could therefore 
hold parlianents which bore as much authority as any held by a king. 
The precise nature of this care-taker authority must be 
examined. How was it possible for the community to delegate its 
authority, to be used on behalf of the king, when there was no king? 
I 
"The king is dead: long live the king" is an old adage, describing a 
much older idea. In Scotland as elsewhere, the idea of a kingdom 
without a king was unthinkable. Thus, when the king died,, some 
element of royalty survived him. To that extent,, there was always a 
king,, even although his identity may at times have been obscure, or 
he may not always have been inaugurated. The documents which refer 
to the 'King of Scotland, whomsoever he may be' emphasise this point. 
The royal power and authority, the crown, the throne, the regalia, 
which one king laid down at the end of his life, was still there to 
be taken up by his successor: the kingdom and all that pertained to 
it and its goverment did not in any sense belong to the king, but 
was entrusted to him to defend and maintain, so that it flourished 
and remained undiminished for its next keeper to inherit. It wa S 
this idea which inspired all the guardians in their attempts to 
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defend the independence of Scotland: the rights and liberties which 
it was their duty to guard were somehow embodied in the very idea of 
the kingdom and the kingship. This is the second point of importance 
about the 1286 - 1291 guardians' seal: the lion rampant symbolised 
the continuous aspect of the kingship, that element of royalty which 
never died. 
Such feeling of continuity found expression in the concept of 
the 'royal dignity'. The rights which a king claimed in ruling his 
land were not his own personal rights: they pertained to the royal 
dignity. The customs and laws of the kingdom were part of this royal 
dignity, and so when there was no king, just as under normal royal 
rule, they could not be removed or diminished. The throne, the 
crown, the sceptre, the royal coat of arms, were all mere symbols of 
f 
the royal dignity, and the revered inauguration ceremony itself was 
no more than the bestowal of the royal dignity on the person who had 
been accepted as king. Thus the guardians held their power . through 
election by the community, of the royal dignity of the realm. When 
there was no inaugurated king they held their authority directly of 
the royal dignity itself. If there was an inaugurated king, as in 
the years after 1296, then the guardians held their power,, through 
the election of the community, on behalf of the king who had been 
invested with the royal dignity. Never in this period did the Scots 
believe that their kingdom had died. The Scots governed themselves 
through bestowal of the royal dignity on those whom they considered 
most fit to bear it. They never accepted Balliolls deposition: he 
was their king, and so in his name the power of the royal dignity was 
wielded by successive guardians. 
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References to the royal dignity are not unusual . Prior to 1286 
there are few in the Scottish records, but thereafter, both in times 
of interregnum and when the throne was occupied . the concept is 
frequently referred to. The same idea also occurs regularly in 
English records, and in those of, for example, France34 the 
35 36 Empire and even the papacy. It was an idea common to all Europe 
at this time; it is too often assumed, with too little evidence, that 
Scotland, being far to the north of the centres of European affairs, 
was permanently backward in matters cultural, philosophical . 
political and ecclesiastical. With respect at least to the political 
concepts which were being developed at the end of the thirteenth 
century, Scotland was most certainly not behind the times. Indeed, 
perhaps because of the goading effect of dynastic and political 
f 
crisis, the concept of nationality appears to have been rather more 
advanced in Scotland than in most other states at that time. 
The idea of the royal dignity, or the wholeness of the political 
entity that was the state, is to be found under various names, the 
contexts in which they are found making it clear that they all refer 
to the same concept. Thus, whilst it was the "royal dignity" (regia 
dignitas) which was surrendered up to King Edward by John Balliol in 
129637 , John's charter of land to one Donald le fitz Kan had been in 
38 diminution of "the crown of Scotland". Particularly with regard to 
land, goods and rights, the idea of the tcrown' is very common. 
Robert I. in 1323 or 1324, stated that certain meal and money 
"pertains to our crown" (coronam nostram)39, and Regiam Majestatem 
refers to criminal cases which "pertain to the crown". 
40 
The English 
king could not submit "the rights of his crown" (jura corone sue) to 
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the pope for judgement 
41 
. and the dowry to be paid by the Scots for 
the marriage of Balliolls son to the French king's niece in the 
treaty of Paris was to be paid from lands not pertaining to the 
"royal crown" (coronam regiam). 
42 
However, similar references occur 
where the alternative word dignitas is used. There are many 
references to land being held of the royal dignity 
43, 
as opposed to 
the crown. When Simon Fraser did damage to the lands of Reres in 
Fife, MacDuff claimed that his action was "in prejudice of the royal 
dignity of the kingdom of Scotland" (in regie dignitatis regni Scotie 
prejudiCium 
44 
; probably from the period 1291 - 1292 there is a 
reference to a right of jurisdiction "which pertains to the royal 
dignity". and, from the reign of Balliol, a document states that the 
interference of church courts in civiý cases was "in prejudice of the 
royal dignity" . 
45 
The use of the phrase 'royal dignity' in a very 
broad sense is common, so that if an act is against the royal 
dignity, then it is prejudicial to everything that the idea of an 
independent and sovereign kingdom and kingship stands for: all that 
each king holds and protects in virtue of the power given to him by 
the community of the realm. A letter of Robert I or David II pardons 
an unknown man for his acts of war "against us and our royal dignity" 
(contra nos autregiam nostram dignitatem). 
46 
The 1286 brieve 
summoning the host calls for the provision of service owed to the 
royal dignity for the defence of the "kingdom, the royal dignity, and 
their freedom" . 
47 
When gaining the position of king, one succeeded 
to the honour of "the royal dignity and the rule of the realm" 
(regiae dignitatis et regni regimini) 
48 
. andq specifically, Macbeth 
was held by a four teenth-century historian to have taken up the 
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"kingly dignity" (regali dignitate). 
49 David I, through his good 
50 
rule, kept the "royal dignity" intact 9 and the treaty of Birgham 
made provision regarding the relies and charters concerning the 
51 "royal dignity" of Scotland. In similar vein, it was claimed by 
one of the competitors in 1291 - 1292 that one could not legally 
dismember the crown: "one must hold the crown entire" (en doit tenir 
la corone entiere). 
52 
The English nobles wrote in February 1301 that 
for their king to send procurators to the papal curia to plead his 
case concerning Scotland would be "in manifest disinheritance of his 
crown , 
53 
. and in the same month the English king summoned troops to 
meet him at Berwick to defend "the honour of the crown". 
54 Again in 
England , King Edward felt that the Charter of the Forests and Magna 
Carta were prej, udi'cial to the "crown and royalty of the king" 
(coronae et regaliae regiae) 
55 
, whereas the barons felt that the 
behaviour of the unpopular favourites of Edward II was "against the 
public good and in detriment of the crown" (contra utilitatem rei 
publicae et in detrimentum coronae) . When the same nobles despoiled 
the land and castles of one of those favourites, they claimed to do 
so "for the crown and right of the kingdom of England" (pro corona et 
jure regni Angliae) . In the year of his deposition . Edward II was 
called to a parliament "to perform and enact with the lieges for the 
crown of England what ought to be done" . and in that parliament he 
was removed from "all royal power and dignity" (. omni potestate regia 
et dignitate). 
56 
These examples serve to show that the terms regia dignitas and 
corona were largely interchangeable. If any distinction can be 
drawn,, it is probably that corona tends to be found more often in 
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reference to I the king with the realm' . whereas dignitas tends to be 
less personal, meaning the position, rights and duties which the king 
holds through the power accorded him, without specific reference to 
the king himself. The distinction cannot always be drawn, but it is 
nevertheless true that the idea of dignitas is more often to be found 
without reference to any particular king . or when the kingdom is in a 
state of interregnum. Despite these connotational differences, 
however, the two terms clearly refer to the same phenomenon, which is 
also to be found,, although less frequently, expressed in other ways, 
such as 'the royalty' 
57 
9 'the honour of the crown 
58 
9 'royal 
honourl 59 . 'regality' 
60 
. 'the honour of the kingdom' 
61 
, and , once. 
I 
I the lion 62 0 These all appear to carry the same meaning, again 
perhaps with slight connotational differences, very possibly 
dependent on the contexts in which they, coincidentally, are found. 
The constitutional position which we ascribe to the guardians of 
Scotland rests heavily upon the significance which we attach to the 
idea of the royal dignity of the realm: continuity in the monarchy 
was a particularly important ideal. 
63 
However, Fordun, whose 
comments on kingship and rule are usually fairly apt, specifically 
states that "no king was ever wont to reign in Scotland unless he had 
first, on receiving the name of king, sat upon this stone at 
Scone" 
64 
: the king could not bear rule or authority in or over the 
kingdom until he had been accepted to do so by the community, and had 
been given that right in the ceremony of inauguration on the Moot 
e 
Hill at Scone. His right to rule in Scotland was therýfore two-fold: 
his lineage gave him the right to offer himself as king, but the 
right actually to reign as king was given to him by the people whom 
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he would govern. In the inauguration ceremony the royal dignity of 
the realm was bestowed upon the king, which allowed him to use the 
fruits and pertinents of the kingdom and the power which the 
dignity's authority gave him, to further the interests of the people 
and the land. That dignity was not in any sense his personal 
possession: it was his only to use for the period of his reign, in 
order to protect the kingdom and its people, and it had to be 
preserved intact for inheritance by his successor. Normally, by the 
thirteenth century, that successor would be his eldest son or nearest 
personal heir, but the dignty itself was passed on not by 
inheritance, but through bestowal by the community of the realm. 
This distinction between the personal rights and possessions of 
the monarch and those of the kingdom which he ruled explains the 
position of the guardians. Unless the rule of the kingdom and the 
protection of the royal dignity could be temporarily delegated to one 
other than a monarch, then between the death of one king and the 
inauguration of his successor, there was, in effect, no government, 
no law. Normally, when this lapse was very short, such delegation 
was deemed unnecesssary, and the dignity was upheld, in theory, by 
the community itself. However, in 1286 it was clear that some length 
of time must elapse before the next monarch could be inaugurated, and 
the community therefore nominated a committee to whom it entrusted 
the use and care of the royal dignity. Royal government was in this 
way maintained . although there was no king present in person to 
supervise it. Thus the risings which took place in 1286 were not 
deemed to be against Margaret's authority, or against the peace of 
any king, because no 'king's peace' had been proclaimed. Those 
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A 65 
rebellions were akinst the regia dignitas. By the end of 1286 it 
was known that the monarch would be the I Maid of Norway' , but until 
she had been inaugurated the guardians could not actually reign in 
her name. She was the queen,, but did not yet bear the dignity, and 
therefore the rule, of the kingdom: the guardians' rule thus 
continued not specifically in her name,, but in that of the royal 
dignity. 
66 
Once Balliol had been inaugurated as King John . he held and 
wielded the dignity of the realm. Notwithstanding the fact that the 
arguments with which he, Bruce and the others had disputed the 
succession were principally based on the law of inheritance, the 
elective element in the succession was still present; the royal 
dignity was bestowed upon Balliol on 30 November 1292, but it was 
freely given, and , in theory at least, could be as freely taken away: 
it appears to have been at least partially removed in 1295, with the 
election of the twelve peers. In 1320 the Scots barons wrote to the 
pope, pleading for recognition of their king. In that letter they 
made two apparently contradictory statements, that Bruce gained the 
throne as his 'heritage' , through 'rightful succession', and that, 
having given their assent to his rule, if he chose to subject 
Scotland to the English the community of the realm would remove that 
assent and "strive to thrust him out forthwith as our enemy and the 
subverter of right". 
67 
This apparent mixture of hereditary 
succession and election need imply no contradiction. The hereditary 
part of the succession system is well documented . and its practical 
supremacy is made clear by the fact that since the twelfth century 
most Scottish kings had succeeded their fathers to the throne. The 
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conduct of the Great Cause itself provided a fine example of the 
predominance of the hereditary system. However, that this was not 
the only criterion involved in a Scottish king's accession must be 
recognised. Probably dating from pre-Norman times, when the king was 
chosen from the derb fine ("proven kindred"). the group of those who 
were sufficiently close in degree to a royal ancestor to be qualified 
to claim the throne for themselves 
68 
. there was a strong element of 
election in the Scottish kingship: a king had to be accepted by the 
community. By the thirteenth century this was to some extent 
nominal, in practice meaning that as a matter of course the 
community's assent was given to the one whom heredity named the 
rightful king. But nonetheless, the feeling that the dignity was 
freely bestowed by the community was still strong. Their elevation 
f 
of the man in the ceremony at Scone, in which they, in effect, put 
into his hands the reins of justice , wa s vital. The ir 
acknowledgement, and his promise, of his ability and willingness to 
fulfil the kingly duties were integral parts of his right to be a 
king. The power of the kingdom lay not only in the king, but also, 
and equally, in the community who assented to his rule. That some 
elective element in the succession system could effectively be 
re-asserted is made clear, for instance, by the passage referred to 
above from the Declaration of Arbroath, and by the 'Appeal of the 
Seven Earls'. which refers to the right of the I Seven Earls' and the 
community to Imakel the king, accusing Fraser and Comyn of attempting 
to elevate Balliol to the throne "and to confer on him the rights and 
honours which go with the rule of the kingdom". More strikingly, the 
declaration in favour of Robert I made at a supposed council of the 
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Scottish clergy in 1310 
69 
. states that the people of Scotland, 
oppressed by English tyranny, 
"agreed . by divine prompting, on Lord Robert who now is 
king, in whom reside and remain uncorrupted, in the 
general opinion, the rights of his father and grandfather 
to the kingdom; and with their knowledge and approval he 
was received as king ... By their authority he was set 
over the realm, and formally established as king of 
Scots, and with him the faithful people of the realm wish 
to live and die, as with one who, by right of birth and 
by endowment with other cardinal virtues, is fit to rule, 
and worthy of the name of king and of the honour of a 
realm ... ". 
This is a very clear statement of the ideas of mixed election and 
heredity which frequently appear in other similar documents of the 
period. 'These are all, it must be admitted, propaganda documents, 
which to a varying extent superimpose a highly subjective, not to say 
distorted, idealised view of events on historical truth. However, it 
is significant that the authors of these pieces felt that it would 
strengthen their case to include such ideas: if the ideas expressed 
in the documents had been remote from those currently accepted, then 
they would have had no propagandist value. That the idea of election 
is consistently used in Scottish propaganda from 1290 to 1321 must 
imply that it was a concept which was meaningful both to those who 
wrote the documents, and to those who were intended to read them. 
The Scottish succession system was a mixture of heredity and 
election: through the normal process of heredity it became clear to 
whom the dignity should, under normal circumstances, pass; the assent 
of the community was then given to that person, and could, if 
necessary, be removed and bestowed upon another, should the original 
holder fail to use and protect it properly. 
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After the conquest of 1296, the rising in the following year 
gave the Scots an opportunity to re-assert the dignity of Scotland. 
There was, however . an inaugurated king. To accept his deposition 
was to accept the right of the English crown to dictate the terms on 
which the Scottish crown was held - in effect, to admit English 
overlordship. If the royal dignity was indeed independent, then no 
foreign ruler could lawfully force a Scottish king to abdicate. King 
John's rule, irrespective of how it had been carried out, was still 
in being, because the community had not formally removed the dignity 
f rom him. He was, however, the prisoner of the English, and could 
not rule the land. Guardians had thus to be found to bear the royal 
dignity on his behalf. Wallace and his successors therefore ruled 
with the royal dignity in the name of. and on behalf of . King John. I 
The most accurate description of them is to be found in a document of 
1298 x 1302 
70 
, in which they are called custodes loco regis. They 
were guardians of the kingdom, of the royal dignity, 'in place of the 
king' . 
Thus the place of the guardians in the government of Scotland at 
the turn of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries is made clear. 
Their duty was to protect the kingdom, its royal dignity, and the 
rights and liberties of all its inhabitants. In order to do this 
they were invested with full royal power and authority, given to them 
through election and appointment by the community in its 
representative assembly, parliament. Their rule was as authoritative 
as that of any monarch, being based upon the royal dignity itself. 
The use of that authority can be seen for example, in their 
conducting negotiations on matters touching on the status of the 
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realm, in their holding of parliaments, and, latterly, in their 
issuing documents under John's own name. They were elected to bear 
the royal authority during the absence of the king, or during his 
incapacity: the guardians were the custodians of the royal dignity 
for the king . whomsoever or wheresoever he or she might be. 
The Scots were not without a head in 1291. Neither were they 
helpless and unable to defend themselves. Their self-portrait of a 
weak and defenceless people was sheer propaganda, designed to support 
the diplomatic policy of a wel l-establi shed goverment, a policy 
which was aimed at restoring normality in the Scottish constitutional 
set-up. However,, government in the name of an absent king, even with 
the firm theoretical basis of the royal dignity, cannot have been as 
I 
strong, as well-received, or as easy as the more normal rule of a 
king. It must, therefore, have been with some relief that those who 
had no personal or dynastic axe to grind heard the news of the 
inauguration of a king at Scone on 25 and 27 March 1306. 
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Alexander III, the Guardians and John (no-354) is 
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1302, and probably before May 1301, later than 
which date no other joint documents are extant. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
THE REIGN OF ROBERT I 
1: THE WAR WITH ENGLAND, 1306 - 1314 
Fordun wrote of Alexander III that "all the time he lived upon 
earth security reigned in steadfastness of peace and quiet". 
1 
Indeed,, all of those kings whom Fordun admired are given credit by 
him for promoting peace: Malcolm III "maintained the security of 
peace and fellowship"; David I brought about "a peace until then 
unknown"; William the Lion was "the friend of God, the lion of 
justice, the prince of peace"; Robert Bruce,, in turning down Edward 
I's offer of the kingdom in return for subjection, claimed that its 
previous kings had all kept it free from thralldom "in security of 
peace". On the other hand, Edward I of England is censured: "this 
king stirred up war as soon as he had become a knight . and lashed the 
English with awful scourgings; he troubled the whole world by his 
wickedness, and roused it by his cruelty". Fordun has little to say 
regarding the character of Robert I. of the effects of whose reign he 
clearly approved, merely stating that "he was, beyond all living men 
of his day, a valiant knight". Apparently, the protracted warfare of 
Bruce's reign did not completely commend the king to Fordun. 
2 
The valour, strength, and warlike ability of medieval kings was 
undoubtedly important: without these qualities they were not fit to 
rule. However . peace was an omnipresent ideal. To bring peace to 
his realm was probably the most fundamental duty of a king. Dante 
stated that 
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"it is in the quietude or tranquillity of peace that 
mankind finds the best conditions for fulfilling its 
proper task ... Hence it is clear that universal peace is 
the most excellent means of securing our happiness". 
He then comes to the conclusion that in order to achieve that end, 
3 "every kingdom ... needs to have a king to rule over and govern it". 
Aquinas also saw peace as the raison d19tre of all just goverment: 
"the most important task for the ruler of any community is the 
establishment of peaceful unity". 
4 
It was not only theorists and chroniclers who stressed the 
necessity of peace, however: kings and their subjects were as 
concerned with that ideal as any. Edward I came to Norham in 1291 in 
order to "restore settled peace to the kingdom of Scotland". 
5 The 
same king accused the Scots. in his letter to the pope in 1301 9 of 
being "foes of peace and sons of rebellionfl. 
6 
Those appointed to 
govern Scotland in 1305 had to swear to "advise what you think will 
7 be able to lead to the keeping of the peace and quiet of the land" . 
The Scots, in the Declaration of Arbroath, stated that their only 
desire was "to live at peace" 
8 
. and the Treaty of Birgham was made 
"after due consideration of the peace and tranquillity of both 
kingdoms". 9 Even in the every-day administration of the realm, the 
idea of peace was all-pervasive: how many times must a chancery clerk 
have written the words "the king's peace'19 
This obsession with peace was perhaps a consequence of the 
almost endemic warfare which afflicted medieval Europe. Few areas 
were unaffected by war, and certainly there was no question of real 
peace in the relations of England and Scotland between 1296 and 1328. 
That Scotland's best known and probably most universally acclaimed 
monarch should wage war for almost his entire reign, would not appear 
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to be consistent with the approved view that a 'good king' ruled in 
peace. The reign of Edward I, perhaps the zenith of medieval 
kingship in England, saw almost incessant warfare. Alexander III, 
who reigned in "steadfastness of peace" . went to war against Norway. 
Most, if not all, medieval kings,, good or bad,, went to war. This 
apparent inconsistency in the concept of how kingship worked - an 
acceptance, or even open approval of warfare in a time when 
peace-keeping purported to be the most fundamental ideal and duty of 
the king - is an important element in the study of the medieval 
kingdom. In order to understand the king's position,, and to 
establish the theoretical status both of his kingdom and of his 
monarchy, it is necessary to study the conduct and justification of 
warfare. 
Robert Bruce, when he emerged from his inauguration ceremonies 
at Scone on 25 and 27 March 1306 as King Robert I, was already at 
war. Not only was he at war with Edward I, the overlord of Scotland 
against whom he had rebelled, breaking his sworn fealty, but he also 
faced the opposition of a large proportion of his own people. More 
than an inauguration ceremony of arguable validity was required to 
persuade the aggrieved kin of the murdered John Comyn , and those who 
had for ten years kept alive the notion of John Balliol's rightful 
kingship, that Bruce was after all the legitimate king now making his 
stand for the common good of the realm. 
Even before his inauguration, probably in order to gather enough 
support to make it possible, Bruce had taken the castles of Dumfries, 
Ayr . Dalswinton and 
Tibbers, and held Loch Doon and probably 
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Dunaverty. His supporters also obtained for him the castle of 
Rothesay. 10 He had made war in Galloway, and had noble supporters 
active on his behalf in much of western Scotland. Even in the few 
weeks after Comyn's murder, it was clear that Bruce was attempting 
"to seize the realm of Scotland". The English were preparing to 
defend all their strongholds in southern Scotland, and already there 
was talk of Bruce "aiming to secure his heritage by all the means 
that he could". Apparently, he had sworn to defend himself against 
King Edward "with the longest stick that he had". 
11 
In this early phase of the new war . it is important to look at 
Bruce's tactics. He clearly regarded himself, even in the hours 
following Comyn's murder, as King of Scots 
12 
. and thus took upon 
himself the task of defending his realm against the hostile foreign 
incursion which would inevitably come from the south. To meet this 
threat, he needed a firm base, and manpower. By immediately taking 
control of some strongholds, he gained both. Some noble support must 
obviously have been agreed in advance: the plot to take the kingdom, 
whether in his or in Comyn's name, was bound to lead to war. 
However . the gentry of the land 
(and therefore the peasantry) would 
only follow a lord who appeared to have considerable standing in the 
realm. Thus the prestige of holding an area of the kingdom under his 
control was essential to Bruce's quest for mass support. It may be 
noted that the English in control of all parts of Scotland panicked 
at the news of the rebellion, but in its early weeks Bruce restricted 
his activities, and those of his supporters, to the relatively 
limited area of Galloway, Clydesdale and Kintyre. This was doubtless 
an attempt to consolidate his position in one area, in order that he 
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had a block of support upon which to depend, and from which to direct 
his campaigns. This particular area was probably chosen because of 
its long associations with the Bruce family: he could count on 
support here. However, there were also strategic considerations. To 
spread his power over Lothian, or even north of the Forth, would make 
defence of this base more difficult. The castles of Dumfries, Tibbers 
and Dalswinton were taken in order to guard against a landward 
approach,, and Dunaverty,, Ayr and Rothesay clearly defended the sea 
approaches. The attempts to gain control of both Dumbarton and 
Inverkip, though unsuccessful,, also show this need to gain security 
from the west, both to guard against English naval power, and to 
defend the trade and supply routes to Ireland and the Western Isles. 
In the short space 
I 
of time available to him after Comyn's 
murder, Bruce advanced a considerable way towards his goal of 
securing a safe area in south-west Scotland. However, if King 
13 - Edward's correspondent is to be believed, Bruce's success in 
gaining support was limited: the people of Galloway, at any rate, 
refused to rise with him. Their reluctance is perhaps less than 
surprising, since Galloway was Balliol land,, and the lords of 
Galloway would be more than a little suspicious of this Bruce king. 
Nevertheless, Edward I was sure enough of Bruce's power in Galloway 
to order his ships carrying victuals from Ireland for his expedition 
to Scotland to keep to the high seas, lest any go ashore in 
Galloway. 
14 
Speed was of the essence to Bruce , who was well aware of the 
significance of his actions, and of the response they would attract. 
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He was in contact with the English commanders in southern Scotland 
some time before his inauguration 
15 
. and doubtless knew of the urgent 
preparations for a campaign ordered by Edward I as early as 1 March, 
levying troops to be ready to go against Bruce from Berwick and 
Carlisle, and ships from Skinburness, by Ascension day (12 May). 
16 
To combat an English royal force, Bruce had to have support, and 
therefore also a substantial claim to be fighting for a just cause. 
His absolution from the crime committed in Dumfries, his oath to 
preserve the rights and liberties of the Scottish church 
17 (surely 
almost aI pre-inauguratAon oath I. to guarantee some vital 
ecclesiastical support), and the hurried inauguration ceremony itself 
were thus means of gaining credibility. Although it was a style he 
rarely used, Edward I regarded himself as the rightful king of 
Scots 
18 
. and if Bruce was to claim any justification of his position, 
and to combat the charges of rebellion and treason laid against him, 
he required a framework of legality upon which to base his case. 
Once elevated to the kingship by the community in as near the 
traditional manner as the extraordinary circumstances would allow, he 
could claim, as the true droiturel roi, to be fighting for the 
liberty of the realm against a usurper and tyrant. 
The inauguration itself caused little delay to the urgent 
military action, and Bruce carried on his initial policy of seeking 
support and winning castles, to give him a foothold in the kingdom. 
If he could overcome some of the opposition within Scotland itself 
before having to face the rapidly advancing English army, defence of 
the kingdom would be mcPre possible. He may have returned to the 
south-west to strengthen his hold there 
19 
. and he certainly sojourned 
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in central Scotland . attempting to bring reluctant or recalcitrant 
barons to heel. 20 Unfortunately, the most detailed description of 
Bruce's actions during the two months following the inauguration 
ceremony is Guisborough's. a surprisingly laudatory, but brief, 
comment that Bruce "took homages and wrought great wonders", gathered 
a copious army, and marched through the land until he came to 
Perth. 21 
By early June all the action was centred in the Perth area. The 
English king's forces, under Aymer de Valence, who had been made 
Edward's lieutenant in Scotland 
22 
, were secure in Perth. 
23 The se 
forces were persuasive enough to have compelled Bishop Lamberton, one 
of Bruce's most influential supporters, to sue for peace (although he 
apparently reneged on the agreement and continued to fight for Bruce 
until captured at Methven). 
24 The same force captured Bruce's other 
main clerical supporter, Bishop Wishart of Glasgow. Both bishops 




, even before King Edward had left England to join 
his expedition in Scotland, Valence and his force had put Bruce to 
flight. Hindsight might suggest that Bruce's decision to challenge 
Valence in open battle was foolhardy. However, given Bruce's 
situation, it was probably tactically sound. Although his army was 
small , so. at that stage, was the opposition. Guisborough gives 
Valence command over three hundred men . and states that Bruce had "a 
great multitude". 
27 The chronicle of Meaux states that seven 
thousand of Bruce's men died at Methven. 
28 
Undoubtedly a gross 
exaggeration . thi sf igure nevertheless supports Guisboroughl s 
contention that Bruce's forces outnumbered those of Valence. The 
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Scottish sources tell a different tale: Fordun does not specify the 
size of Bruce's army, but gives Valence "a great force". 
29 Barbour 
agrees with this: Bruce had a small number of men, whilst Valence had 
an army "with great chivalry". 
30 These opposing accounts, without 
doubt concocted in order to emphasise the achievement, or explain the 
failure, of the writers' respective heroes, probably in fact 
indicates that in this, the first skirmish of the war, the two sides 
had roughly equivalent forces. Neither could have been very large . 
and Bruce' s challenge to Valence may be seen as an attempt to weaken 
the English hold on Scotland , and thereby to gain himself more 
standing and support, before he had to face the might of Edward 1. A 
quick, incisive victory for the new king would in the short term have 
seriously weakened the English hold on central Scotland. Bruce would I 
have gained the town of Perth, and hence would have established a 
useful trading post on the east coast,, and deprived the English of 
one of their most heavily used supply ports, an important point when 
the devastation which still prevailed in southern Scotland is borne 
in mind. 
31 How long this advantage could have been held in the face 
of Edward I's army is a moot point (although Bruce, as he proved on 
many subsequent occasions, was under no compulsion to meet that army 
in a pitched battle). but nevertheless a victory at Methven would 
undoubtedly have given Bruce an advantage in terms of prestige and 
resources, which would in turn have made the English recapture of 
Scotland all the more difficult. 
However, no matter how sound Bruce's strategy in forcing the 
battle, he was outwitted by Valence, whose surprise attack on the 
Scottish camp won the day. After the battle, Bruce and his remaining 
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supporters headed for the safety of the mountains. Travelling 
westwards, he met his second defeat at the hands of John Macdougall 
of Argyll, for long a staunch supporter of the English king, at Dal 
32 Righ near Tyndrum. 
Why Bruce took this route from Methven is not altogether clear. 
A more obvious strategy might have been to fall back on the relative 
safety of the south-west, where he still held strongholds, and could 
have rebuilt his force in a state of some security. One explanation 
of his journey westwards is prompted by the fact that most 
chroniclers ignore the second battle, and merely state that Bruce 
fled from Methven to Kintyre. 33 This suggests that Bruce's journey 
to Strathfillan was in itself a flight to Kintyre, to Dunaverty. 
Having been shattered at Methven, his force was insufficient for him 
to continue the struggle, and so he fled west, to travel by way of 
Strathfillan, Glen Lochy and the head of Loch Awe into Kintyre and 
the safety of Dunaverty. 
34 
This explanation is completely unsatisfactory. If Methven had 
been such a disaster for Bruce, he would surely not have chosen such 
a long and difficult route to safety. Only if he went first to 
Aberdeen (as Barbour states, in conflict with the other evidence) 
would it have made sense for him to take the landward route to 
Dunaverty. This route also took him through fiercely hostile 
territory. Another problem with this explanation is in the timing of 
the battle at Dal Righ. If we accept Professor Barrow's contention 
that Fordun's date of 11 August is wrong, probably referring properly 
to 13 or 30 July 
35 
, then Bruce, in flight, took between four and six 
weeks, with a few men, to cover little more than sixty miles. Surely 
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if he had been in flight from Methven he would have travelled 
south-west,, to his own land of Carrick, or to Ayr, from whence he 
could escape the English by sea. This journey is fully fifty miles 
shorter than the northern route to Dunaverty, over easier terrain , 
and would not have taken him across the land of such inveterate 
enemies as John of Argyll. Even had the English pursuit forced Bruce 
to take the longer route, it seems strange that his westward retreat 
was so slow, and that Valence and his troops stayed in the east, 
rather than going in pursuit of the fleeing rabble. 
36 Barbour's 
account follows the defeat at Methven not with a westward flight, but 
with a time in the hills and a venture to Aberdeen, where Bruce was 
joined by his queen and the other ladies. The journey westwards and 
the battle at Dal Righ then, follow. This trip to Aberdeen 
contradicts the other chronicles, and the site of the battle at Dal 
Righ does not suggest a march to Kintyre from that direction. 
However, perhaps an explanation which compromises the two versions, 
and which does not necessarily demand that Fordun's dating is 
inaccurate, could more satisfactorily interpret the events of the 
summer of 1306. 
The battle of Methven was, by all accounts, a rout. However, 
Fordun states that Bruce lost few men. Is it not possible, 
therefore, that Bruce retreated, still with a sizeable body of men, 
to a safe distance from Perth, and, in the hills, continued his 
efforts to raise the land against the English occupation, and to 
gather more followers to his standard? It is feasible that in this 
period he ventured northwards (although scarcely so far as Aberdeen), 
and from there, to save them the rigours of the campaign, sent the 
ladies north to refuge at Kildrummy. If his activities in the two or 
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three weeks, after Methven were in the Aberfeldy - Loch Tay area, we 
have a reason for the earl of Strathearn's men being sent "beyond the 
mountain S,, 
37 
, and an explanation of the "engagement by Loch Ta Y,, 
38, 
neither of which fit comfortably into the picture of an immediate 
flight westwards. 
The events of the summer and autumn of 1306 may thus be 
summarised as follows. Bruce was put to flight from Methven, but 
still had forces enough to regroup quickly in the mountains and pose 
a sufficient threat to prevent Valence pursuing him away from home 
ground. Having regrouped, he then pursued an aggressive campaign in 
the Loch Tay area, in which he was opposed perhaps by some of 
Valence's force, and by the earl of Stratbearn's men. Before the 
next phase o, f the campaign,, he sent the ladies to Kildrummy, and 
Valence went north in search of them. Bruce then pushed westwards; 
having failed to establish himself over the English in the east, he 
now turned his attention against the internal opposition of the 
Macdougalls and their allies. Their subjection would provide for him 
command over an area of great military value which was almost 
impenetrable for an English army, and from which, if necesary, be 
could weather the impending invasion. These plans were foiled, 
however, by John of Argyll . who was waiting for Bruce when he reached 
the head of Strathf illan in early August (by which time the queen and 
the other ladies had probably been at Kildrummy for several weeks, 
the only point in which this interpretation of events differs from 
Fordun's narrative 
39 The sound defeat at Dal Righ was more 
damaging to Bruce than that sustained at Methven . and probably so 
severely reduced his army that he now had no option but to go into 
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hiding until he could gather more support. He fled with only a few 
followers by the fastest and safest route. through friendly Lennox . 
across the Clyde to Bute, where he held Rothesay castle, and thence 
to Kintyre and Dunaverty. We may assume that Bruce would be at 
Dunaverty within a few days of the conflict at Dal Righ. Perhaps the 
same messenger who carried the news of that victory to King Edward 
also told him of the direction of Bruce's flight: by mid-September 
Dunaverty was under siege 
40 
. and Bruce had gone from there to the 
Hebrides, Ireland or perhaps Orkney, where he sheltered until ready 
to make another attempt to win the kingdom. Barbour's tales of 
Bruce . alone in the wilds without food or succour . probably contain 
little in the way of truth, being folk legends which are applied to 
many heroes; but Fordun's picture of the king as a fugitive and the 
laughing-stock of his enemies cannot be too great an exaggeration. 
Certainly, references to "King Robin" indicate that he was no longer 
taken very seriously by the English. Langtoft, a near-contemporary 
chronicler, describes him thus: 
"King Robin.... 
... in the forest . mad and naked 41 
He fed with the cattle on the raw grass". 
His fortunes were at a very low ebb. There was now no panic in the 
measures taken by the English king to effect his capture. It wa s 
known that Bruce was "lurking" in the isles, being hunted by John of 
Menteith and others 
42 
. and only time was needed finally to end the 
rebellion. By the end of 1306 many of Bruce's most influential 
supporters were either in chains or dead. Those executed included 
his brother Neil . the earl of Atholl,, Simon Fraser, John of Cambo, 
David of Inchmartin 9 Christopher Seton . and Alexander Scrymgeour . 
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The queen, Bruce's two sisters, his daughter, and the countess of 
Bueban (wbo bad crowned Bruce at Scone) were imprisoned, as were the 
bishops of Glasgow and St. Andrews . the abbot of Scone and other 
clerics, the earl of Menteith, the infant heir of Mar, and a host of 
other, lesser men captured at Methven and elsewhere. 
43 Edward I had 
high hopes of Bruce's capture, and on 11 February he wrote to Aymer 
de Valence demanding to know why Bruce had not so far been taken, 
44 
This letter must surely refer to the search for Bruce in the isles: 
it is far too early for Edward, even if he knew of Bruce's return to 
Carrick, to have expected news of his capture there. Clearly, he had 
expected an end to the affair before this, and as early as 3 November 
1306, had planned a parliament, to be held at Carlisle on 20 January 
1307, "for the ordaining and establishment of Scotland". 
45 But the 
establishment for which Edward I hoped was not to come about so 
quickly. 
One of Bruce's main problems was lack of resources. Without 
money he could not have raised and held the force he required for his 
renewed attempt on the kingdom. In the later months of 1306, 
therefore, Bruce was not merely in hiding, but at work gathering 
support and resources. At the end of the year, he sent men to 
Carrick to gather his Martinmas rents 
46 
, an act of impudence which 
must have greatly infuriated King Edward. Fordun tells of the aid 
given to Bruce by "Christina of the Isles", Christina Macruarie,, who 
had close connections with the Bruce family through her husband 
Duncan of Mar. 
47 
This lady doubtless aided Bruce with shelter, funds 
and men. He may well also have employed his considerable connections 
with parts of Ireland . and visited there, using his Carrick rents and 
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money supplied by Hebridean supporters, to recruit men. Guisborough 
and the Lanercost chronicler agree that Bruce and his brothers 
invaded Carrick with Irish and Hebridean troops. 
48 
Bruce probably chose February to re-enter Scotland from the 
isles because, after having collected his Martimnas rents, he had had 
time to gather men. The weather would be to his advantage, making 
difficult both communications and the movement of large numbers of 
troops. It was in all likelihood the earliest possible occasion on 
which he could recommence the rebellion: any prolonged delay would 
merely blur the memory of the recent uprising and allow the English 
to re-pacify the land more thoroughly. 
In early February 
49 
Bruce sent an advance party to Galloway 
under the command of his brothers Thomas and Alexander, and shortly 
thereafter came himself, with Douglas and others, to Carrick. Thomas 
and Alexander Bruce were almost immediately overcome and captured by 
Dungal Macdouall , "a chief among the Gallovidians" . Macdouall sent 
the brothers Bruce to King Edward for judgement and execution; those 
whom he had captured with them, he took it upon himself to execute. 
50 
Bruce proved, however, that his presence in the kingdom, even with 
only a few supporters, was of more use to his cause than was his 
exile. 
"Notwithstanding the terrible vengeance inflicted upon 
the Scots who adhered to the party of the aforesaid 
Robert de Brus, the number of those willing ýq establish 
him in the realm increased from day to day. " 
Immediately after his arrival in Carrick, Bruce attacked his 
ancestral castle of Turnberry, held by Henry Percy, and took, 
according to Guisborough and Barbour, considerable toll of the 
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garrison and stores there, until English reinforcements arrived. 
52 
He remained in the Galloway/ Carrick area for some months, gradually 
winning the people of the land over to him, and amassing support. 
Barbour's picture of his stealthy, almost incognito movements in the 
area are given more than a hint of authenticity by a brieve of Edward 
I in which Valence was ordered to acquit "all who have been compelled 
by the abettors of Robert de Brus to rise against the king in war, or 
to reset Robert innocently by his sudden coming among them". 
53 Those 
who rose for Bruce without compulsion were treated less leniently. 
54 
By mid-March the effects of the rebellion were being felt in the 
land: on 17 March King Edward asked permission of the pope to endow 
Lanercost Priory with a church in his patronage, since the priory, 
being situated in the marches, was so much devastated by Scots 
raids. 
55 
By late April Bruce was in a position to take on English forces 
in the open field. An ambush on a body led by Valence which had made 
a foray into Glen Trool 
56 
was closely followed by a march northwards 
and a victory over Valence at Loudon Hill. 
57 
This was as far north 
as Bruce had ventured since his return from the isles, and in 
forsaking the cover of the Galloway mountains for the more open land 
of Ayrshire he showed a confidence which must have found him much 
support. His growing popularity may also be ascribed to the 
considerable antipathy felt towards the English in that area. 
Guisborough's comment that the Scots were frightened by the harshness 
of English law, and would rather die than be judged by it, is perhaps 
significant in this context 
58 
, and the reason for Edward's offer of 
acquittal to those who aided Bruce under compulsion was that his rule 
in Scotland had been deemed too cruel. 
59 
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Having defeated Valence, Bruce immediately attacked another 
English force led by the Earl of Gloucester, which he forced to 
retreat before him to Ayr . and he besieged that town until English 
reinforcements arrived, compelling him once again to take cover. 
60 
Edward I was disturbed by these events 
61 
: the last few months of his 
life were infuriating for him. He was "much enraged" by the news of 
these two defeats (which had reached him by 15 May) 
62 
. and frustrated 
at being unable to move north and take command personally of the 
campaign against this 'King Hobbel . who little over three months 
earlier had been lurking in semi-exile, and yet now led a force which 
could turn Edward's own armies to flight. To be so helpless against 
this adversary, on his death bed . was a bitter failure. 
The knowledge that Edward was 
, 
dying must have given Bruce new 
hope. He , like others, would be aware of the weaker nature of the 
king's heir, and just as the English prayed for Edward I's continued 
63 
life, because the English cause would be lost when he died . Bruce 
and his supporters must have been impatient for his death. The Scots 
propagandists were making full use of the king's illness, quoting 
prophecies of Scottish and Welsh resurgence after his death 
64 
. and 
showing that Bruce's rising was no impulsive,, superficial armed 
revolt, but a well orchestrated and ordered campaign . as yet in its 
infancy, but nonetheless with all the hallmarks of the 'royal war' 
which had been carried on by the guardians for most of the previous 
decade. 
Bruce's tactics in this stage of the war were very sound: the 
I false preachers' from his army were exploiting every propagandist 
advantage, and his military strategy was aimed both at weakening the 
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English power, and gaining maximum support. He was not pursuing the 
hit-and-run guerilla tactics which he frequently used so effectively, 
but in this period was campaigning openly, taking on the English in 
the open field. This was to be the hallmark of Bruce's military 
leadership: he was not hidebound by any single military policy. When 
he had sufficient confidence in his ability to win, he was willing to 
fight, and when he was not in that positiong he harassed and subtly 
eroded the enemy's power. His brilliance as a commander lay in his 
judgement of when , and when not, to fight. 
King Robert's power to force an English retreat - to appear the 
victor - must have won him more support than all his propagandists' 
work. Like the lord of Douglas, who, on the brink of surrender, was 
persuaded to remain loyal to Bruce by the sight of the retiring 
English army 
65 
. many must have been encouraged to join Bruce in these 
weeks by the allure of being on the side which looked ripe for 
victory. Even the English and those Scots who supported them 
recognised this: 
"Brus never had the goodwill of his own followers or the 
people at large or even half of them so much with him as 
now; and it now first appears that he has the right, and 
God is openly for him, as he has destroyed all the 
King's power both among the English and the Scots,, and 
the English force is in retreat to its own country not 
to return". 
It was feared that if Bruce went north of the Mounth, all there would 
be for him; the king must send help, or the people "must be at the 
enemies' will through default of the King and his Council". 
66 
Even 
the will of the English themselves to stay loyal to King Edward was 
failing: "there are rumours of treasonable dealings between some of 
the English and the enemy" . and the complete confusion of the English 
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attempts to contain the rebellion is summed up by the admission that 
they did not know what was happening, "for what they hear to be true 
one day is contradicted the next". 
67 
Edward I died on Friday 7 July 
68 
, at a time when his forces in 
south-west Scotland could attempt no more than to uphold their 
garrisons, keep communications open, and maintain supplies in their 
castles. They had so far prevented Bruce from leaving the confines 
of the south-west: provisions for naval cover to prevent him leaving 
by sea were made in mid-June 
69 
, and whilst there was still a real 
threat of a major English force coming north, Bruce would not wish to 
expose himself by leaving the comparative safety of the south-west 
and spreading his forces out in an attempt to widen his sphere of 
influence. However,, as expected the death of Edward I greatly 
I 
strengthened Bruce's hand. Guisborough states that having taken the 
homage of his English magnates, the new Edward II went to Scotland 
only for long enough to take homages from Scottish magnates, and 
confirm the appointments of his guardians there. 
70 The Lanercost 
chronicle states that he took his army, already assembled at Carlisle 
for the planned expedition, into Scotland, in order to take homages. 
Having failed to find Bruce, he "returned empty-handed to England 
after certain guardians had been appointed "0 
71 
It seems that only a sense of honour persuaded Edward II to 
continue his father's great expedition to Scotland, which reached 
Dumfries by 6 August. By 21 August Edward had got as far as Cumnock, 
where he stayed for only a week before starting southwards once more. 
On 30 August he was at Dalgarnock and Tinwald near Dumfries, where he 
re-appointed Aymer de Valence as guardian in Scotland. He had 
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returned to Carlisle by 4 September , and was at Westminster by late 
72 
to follow his October. Edward' s disinclination father's wishes 
that he should not hurry to take up the crown, but continue the 
expedition, and carry the old king's bones against the Scots 
73 
, was 
without doubt of great value to Bruce. The apprehension expressed in 
the letter of May 1307 
74 
was to be justified: when Edward I died, all 
fortune swung towards Bruce' s cause. Edward II did indeed hand 
Scotland to King Robert by default. 
As soon as Edward II and his army were out of range, Bruce 
appears to have stepped up his action in the south-west. On 30 
September the new guardian of Scotland, John of Brittany, the earl of 
Richmond (who had been appointed to replace Valence on 30 
September) 75 , was ordered to march to Galloway to put down Bruce . as 
King Edward had heard from John of St. John, Dungal Macdouall and 
others, that Bruce and his men were plundering Galloway, and inciting 
the inhabitants to rebel and invade neighbouring areas. 
76 So 
ferocious was Bruce' s attack on Galloway that many of the inhabitants 
fled southwards with their animals "through fear of Robert de Brus" 
and sought shelter in the forest of Inglewood in Cumberland. 
77 
Perhaps even before Brittany had received his order to go 
against Bruce's harrying of Galloway, King Robert had broken out of 
the south-west, doubtless taking advantage of the temporary lack of 
English leadership, as Valence prepared to go south. He left a part 
of his army, which by this stage must have been a considerable size, 
under Douglas, to continue the southern campaign, and took his own 
force northwards. He had now sufficiently reduced the power of the 
English to attempt once again to quell some of his more important 
Scottish opposition. 
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Already there were signs that Edward II regarded the hostilities 
not as a rebellion by some of his Scottish subjects (although this 
remained the I received view' in most documents). but rather as a war 
between England and Scotland. 
78 This, clearly, was what Bruce 
wanted: it gave him, by implication, a national backing for the 
struggle. But in order to make good his kingship, and to give him 
any hope of winning such a war, he required the undivided support of 
the Scots community. He therefore moved north against John of Argyll 
and John Comyn of Badenoch. He went initially up the west side of 
the country through Lennox and Menteith, where he would swell his 
army,, and across the mountains to Inverlochy. The presence of 
Bruce's army, and the fleet of galleys which had moved up Loch Linnhe 
simultaneously with the landward approach,, was enough to force John 
of Argyll to accept a truce. 
79 
John of Argyll's claim that Bruce 
had brought between ten and fifteen thousand men over the mountains 
must certainly be inflated , but it nonetheless shows Bruce to have 
had a sizeable army. Having, temporarily at least, removed this 
obstacle to his further progress, Bruce besieged Inverlochy castle at 
the head of Loch Linnhe, which fell during October, and moved on, 
through the Great Glen,, to Inverness. 
80 
The castles of Urquhart and 
Inverness were destroyed, Nairn was burnt, and the steadily growing, 
and seemingly unstoppable army continued eastwards towards hostile 
Buchan. The passage was not unopposed, however. The earl of Ross 
wrote to Edward 11 
81 
, describing his stance against Bruce, with three 
thousand men , and his defence of the earldoms of Sutherland and 
Caithness, which Bruce had apparently threatened to ravage. Unable 
to oppose Bruce's force, he made a truce with him until the following 
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June, so saving the far north from devastation. It appeared that the 
prophecy in the letter written before Edward I's death, that if Bruce 
came north all would go his way, was being fulfilled. Two of the 
English king's most loyal supporters,, although still at great pains 
to profess loyalty, had been forced to submit to Bruce, and several 
important castles had been destroyed. Support for Bruce was 
increasing in this northern area, and the men of Moray refused to 
rise against him, without specific orders from their lord, Reginald 
Cheyne, the warden of Moray. 
82 
The difficulties which the pro-English party experienced in 
defending Scotland may well have been largely financial. Both John 
of Argyll and the earl of Ross stressed that their troops were 
maintained at their own expense 
83 
,a considerable burden, which not 
all nobles would be willing to tolerate. A document of 1309 states 
that no money had been provided for the payment of the garrison of 
84 Perth during the terms of office of either Valence or Brittany. 
Probably in 1308 the burgesses of the same town complained of the 
financial penalties which had unjustly befallen them under the 
English administration. 
85 Such complaints must be indicative not 
only of financial difficulties, but also of a dissatisfaction with 
the English king's handling of the situation, which goes some way 
towards explaining John of Argyll's distrust of his neighbours, the 
reluctance of the men of Moray to resist Bruce, and the overall 
failure of the English administration successfully to defend 
Scotland. Both the letters cited above 
86 
beg Edward II to provide 
aid, but no campaign was planned until the summer of 1308, and even 
that was cancelled. 
87 Edward II's failure to send urgently required 
money and reinforcements cost him dearly. 
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Bruce' s campaign in the north shows an accurate assessment of 
the mood of the country. It was a hazardous undertaking so late in 
the year, and demonstrates a confidence in his ability to cover 
ground quickly with little setback or opposition. He took full 
advantage of the complete lack of organisation in the opposition to 
him. Three factors, however, prevented a quick and decisive end to 
this campaign. It was a great misfortune for Bruce that he fell ill; 
the weather was worsening; and his army was, without doubt, severely 
fatigued after the rigorous efforts of the previous months. Bruce 
attacked Elgin, but failed to win the town, and marched eastwards 
before retiring to a defensive position near Huntly. 
88 
Here he wa s 
somewhat dispiritedly attacked on Christmas day by a force which 
eventually had been assembled by the prýncipal defenders of the area, 
Duncan of Frendraught sheriff of Banff, the earls of Buchan and 
Atholl . and John de Mowbray. There was little 
fighting, though, 
since Bruce's force was too strong to risk a battle. Soon after 
this,, however, probably in January or early February, John de Mowbray 
was "in flight across the mountains" , possibly as a result of the 
battle of Inverurie, in which Bruce won a significant victory over 
the earl of Buchan and his supporters. 
89 
W)wbray, however, returned 
to further harass Bruce' s supporters in the area, but around the 
beginning of March 
90 he was forced to accept a truce, probably due to 
the severity of the actions of Bruce after Inverurie, as he "ravaged 
the earldom of Buchan with fire". 
91 This left Bruce in a Position of 
relative safety, which allowed him to turn his attention northwards 
once more. He returned to the Inverness area . going via Balvenie .a 
castle belonging to Reginald Cheyne, which he fired. He then crossed 
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to the Black Isle . where he reduced Tarradale castle near Muir of 
Ord. One of his supporters took Skelbo castle near Dornoch. Turning 
eastwards again, he made another attack on Elgin, only to be foiled 
once more by a relieving force led by Mowbray. A few weeks later 
Elgin, it must be presumed,, fell to a third attack by Bruce. He now 
had control of the area. Buchan had been savagely won, the main 
castles of the north had been destroyed, and the magnates of the area 
had been forced to submit. Other than Aberdeen itself . there was 
little foothold remaining for the English party. A letter of Edward 
II which must be dated around May, makes it clear that the English 
king realised that the north was lost. 
92 
The winning of the north, and in particular the harrying of 
Buchan, was of vital importance to Bruce. The merciless destruction 
I 
of Buchan was more than just a spiteful act of vengeance against 
Bruce's main rivals, the Comyns, with whom since January 1306 he had 
been involved not only in a political struggle, but also in a blood 
feud. It was the deliberate act of a king, quelling a rebellious 
part of his kingdom, destroying the lands of his disobedient subject, 
and forcing the dissident into exile. Bruce ensured,, in military 
terms, that the north was now under his sway; he obliterated the 
power of one of his principal opponents in his quest for the throne; 
but perhaps most importantly, he asserted his kingship in a way that 
no opponent could ignore. Within a year of this action, King Robert 
was sufficiently strong to hold the first parliament of his reign. 
That strength was largely due to the military victory in the north, 
but also to the demonstration of kingship which that victory made 
possible. 
304 
Victory in the north-east was important for another reason. We 
have already noted Bruce's efforts to maintain communications with 
Ireland, both as an escape route, and as a source of essential 
provisions. The trade which traditionally Scotland carried on with 
the Low Countries and Norway was also essential to any potential 
ruler of Scotland. One of the first acts of Wallace and Moray after 
their victory over the English in 1297 was symbolically to announce 
I the re-opening of trade links, in their letter to Lýbeck and Hamburg. 
Part of Bruce' s intention in the northern campaign must have been to 
gain control of this vital part of the eastern seaboard, with its 
crucial ports. Aberdeen castle did not fall to Bruce immediately,, 
but the town was under his control by the middle of the summer of 
13G8. By then, the frequent complaints of piracy against English 
I 
ships by the merchants of Flanders, Zeeland, Hainault and Frisia had 
begun, and from about this time there are also references to 
commercial unease between England and Norway. 
93 Already the support 
for the Scots from these countries, which was to be a constant factor 
in the Scots' favour thoughout the war, had begun to be felt. For 
the next two decades Edward II tried in vain to impose his will on 
the merchants of these countries, who, tempted by Scotland's 
lucrative wool trade, ran the gauntlet of the English blockade to 
supply the Scots with provisions and weaponry. Bruce's total 
subjugation of the north-east must have provided a safe home for the 
foreign trade which it was his policy to promote. Aberdeen was to be 
the centre of a flourishing trade between Scotland and the Low 
Countries. The war was composed not only of military action: it also 
had to be seen in terms of the economy and commerce. 
305 
Having achieved his objectives in the north-eastt Bruce had now 
to turn his attention to the other major area of opposition to him 
from within the kingdom , in the west. He had forced John of ArgYll 
to accept a truce in October 1307, which had apparently been renewed 
for an unspecified time, but that can only have been a temporary 
measure, and by May 1308 John of Argyll was looking for 
reinforcements from the south to help stave off the inevitable 
invasion. 94 In June or July Bruce marched south-westwardst probably 
by way of Strathspey, Glen Truim, Rannoch Moor and Glen Orchy, to the 
head of Loch Awe, on which John of Argyll held three castles for 
Edward 11.95 In mid-August, in the Pass of Brander, the men of 
Argyll - the forces of John of Argyll and his father Alexander - 
ambushed Bruce's army. They were outwitted by Bruce, who 
counter-ambushed, and quickly put them to flight. 
96 Alexander 
Macdougall fled to Dunstaffnage, which Bruce captured after a short 
siege 
97, 
whilst John of Argyll went down Loch Awe to his castle of 
Inchconnell, which, by October, was apparently the only castle in the 
area still held by him for King Edward. 
98 
The course of Bruce's campaign in Argyll is sadly obscure. It 
may be assumed that he spent some time in those parts, subduing the 
land, taking the castles (at least) of Dunstaffnage, Fraoch Eilean 
and Fincharn. Alexander of Argyll came to his peace before March 
1309 99, most probably during the period of military action which 
followed his defeat at Brander. The other nobles of the west who 
attended the parliament in March 1309 (who had already been of 
dubious faith to Edward II in May 1308 100 ). are likely to have 
submitted to Bruce (who, it is to be remembered , also had a fleet 
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active in the area 
101 ). at the same time. John of Argyll , who 
refused to submit, had apparently escaped to England by June 13099 
when he is reported as having given counsel to Edward 11.102 He and 
his father, whose submission to Bruce was shortlived, were active in 
Edward II's service in the west in 1310, when money was granted to 
support them with their men in Ireland103, where an expedition was 
being prepared against Scotland 
104 
. at least part of which was to be 
105 directed against Argyll. Alexander of Argyll had died, still in 
English pay, by 18 January 1311.106 His son John continued unabated 
in his opposition to Bruce, and never returned to reclaim his 
Scottish lands. 
Bruce Is movements from the late summer of 1308 until March 1309 
are only sketchily known. By September he had moved back eastwards, 
issuing documents in Inchmahome (28 September) and Dunkeld (5 
October) 107 , and was probably present at the fall of Forfar castle, 
which took place on Christmas day 1308.108 It is also likely that 
Bruce returned to the north at the end of October, where, realising 
the complete hopelessness of his position as an English supporter in 
the north, the earl of Ross finally submitted to Bruce at Auldearn on 
31 October. He did homage to the king, who granted him his lands. 
109 
Ross remained faithful to Bruce, and while this may well have been 
due to principle 
110 
9 it is probable that the safety of his lands was 
as important a motive. Should the earl break faith with King Robert, 
and thereby lose his lands, it was well beyond King Edward's power to 
restore them to him. This episode is tYPical of Bruce's attitude to 
the pro-English nobility. If he could win them over to his cause by 




if successful, would treat them in such a way as would win him loyal 
supporters. If persuasion failed, as it did, for example, with John 
of Argyll and the earl of Buchan, they were punished like any 
recalcitrant baron. 
While Bruce had been active in the north, his supporters in 
southern Scotland were far from inactive. When he left the 
south-west in September 1307, Bruce had been powerful enough to split 
his forces in two, taking with him his brother Edwards Gilbert Hays 
the earl of Lennox, and others, and leaving a section under the earl 
of Douglas to move eastwards to attack the English presence well into 
the eastern border area. 
112 
Barbour claims that "in a little while" 
Douglas brought all of Douglasdale, Selkirk forest and Jedburgh 
forest to King Robert's peace. 
113 
This claim must be exaggerated: 
I 
much work had to be done before so large a territory, so near the 
English border, could truly be said to be at Bruce's peace. However, 
114 
Douglas did take and destroy Douglas castle . and Aymer de 
Valence's lands in Selkirk, Tweeddale and the forest of Selkirk had 
been seized into Edward II's hands before 12 December 1307, "because 
the men and tenants of the same had of late traitorously adhered to 
Robert de Brus, the king's enemy and rebel". 
115 Whether or not 
Douglas's campaign was the "brilliant success" which has been 
claimed 
116 
, there is not enough evidence to say, but clearly he was 
to a degree successful in bringing some of the people of the land 
round to Bruce, and in creating enough disturbance to force others to 
flee to England. 
117 The summer of 1308 also saw a further campaign 
in Galloway, under the leadership of Edward Bruce 
118 
. who probably 
came south to join Douglas after the completion of the north-eastern 
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campaign. Edward Bruce's force (made up, according to the Lanercost 
Chronicle, of islesmen 
119 ),, harried Gallowayt forcing many of its 
nobles into English exile. They fought a battle on the river Dee 
near Buittle castle, against an English force 
120 
,a force brought in 
by Donald of Islay from the western isles 
121 
, or the men of Galloway 
themselves. 122 In all likelihood, the army defeated at the Dee was 
composed of Galwegians and English. Certainly Dungal Macdouall, the 
chief lord of Galloway,, had to go south for safety. 
123 Af ter this 
successful Galloway campaign, which seriously weakened the English 
hold on the south-west, Edward Bruce remained in the march area. In 
September it was known that the Scots were "nearing the marches,, 
124 
9 
and arrangements were made for the defence of the border in the 
Wooler area, as well as in the western marches. 
125 
On 4 October 
I 
orders were given for the defence of Berwick and adjacent parts 
"against hostile incursion of the Scots". 
126 By this time, of course, 
probably in July, on completion of the Galloway campaign, Douglas had 
left Edward Bruce, and gone north to join King Robert, then engaged 
against the men of Argyll. Barbour tells of the part he played in 
the battle at the Pass of Brander. 
127 
So, by the end of 1308 Bruce had control over Argyll . Galloway, 
the northern earldoms, Buchan and the Mearns . and the large central 
expanse of Lennox, Strathearn and Menteith. He had ousted the 
English or their allies from the castles of Aberdeen q Forfar . 
Inverness,, Urquhart, Balveniel, Elgin,, Tarradale,, Skelbo, Inverlochy, 
Dunstaffnage,, Turnberry and Douglas, amongst others, and his forces 
had Rutherglen under siege. 
128 The eastern march was under constant 
threat, and repeatedly the English had been compelled to retreat 
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before the Scots. Bruce's policy of dividing his army and using 
relatively small, highly mobile units, signifies his confidence that 
nowhere in Scotland would he find well-organised . coherent 
resistance. 
The Lanercost chronicler makes an astute comment in saying that 
Bruce was "taking advantage of the dispute between the King of 
England and the barons". 
129 The abandonment of the Scottish campaign 
of 1307 had caused some opposition to Edward II amongst his nobles . 
many of whom had benefited from Edward's bestowal of Scottish lands 
upon them. As the likelihood of a renewed campaign receded, and 
Bruce made headway at the expense of English landholding in Scotland,, 
those English nobles who had Scottish lands to lose became 
increasingly opposed to Edward's policies. The failure to hold 
I 
Scotland in 1307 - 1308 must be one of the major reasons, alongside 
the Gaveston affair, why Edward II encountered so much difficulty 
130 
with his baronage. The ordinances produced by the English 
opposition party in April 1308 propounded the belief that the earls 
were bound to support the 'estate of the crown' as distinct from the 
person of the king. 
131 Bearing in mind the king's sworn obligation 
to prevent diminution of the kingdom, these ordinances probably bear 
relevance to Edward's 'abandonment' of Scotland. Bruce' s use of the 
English situation is clear. Almost immediately after Edward II left 
Scotland in 1307 Bruce stepped up his action in Galloway. When 
baronial opposition to Edward II began to appear in early 1308, Bruce 
was in the course of his north-eastern campaign, taking full 
advantage of the inadequate back-up given to the defenders of 
Scotland. By the time the opposition to Edward was open . and there 
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was no chance of an English invasion, Bruce's rebellion was rampant. 
He was exploiting the English inaction with regard to Scotland to 
pursue relentlessly the campaign against his Scottish opposition. 
Bruce's policy in 1307 - 1308 was, quite simply, to win the land 
- to overrun the country and become dominant in the kingdom at large. 
In striving to achieve this goal . he could to some extent ignore 
castles, where they did not pose a direct threat to him. Thus the 
campaign in Galloway left unscathed the important chain of 
English-held castles. Although several important castles fell to the 
Scots in the north, others which did not, such as Banff, were left 
alone. In the Argyll campaign Bruce, having taken two of the Loch 
Awe castles, was content to return eastwards leaving John of Argyll 
still in possession of the third. What mattered to Bruce in the i 
short term was gaining sway over the land, and therefore over its 
people and its revenues. The presence of increasingly isolated 
communities of English, restricted to strongholds, was of little 
consequence to Bruce, if he controlled the land. Bruce' s earliest 
extant acts of government, dating from September and October 1308, 
are significant in this respect: previously he had attempted to 
assert his kingship in specific royal actions, such as the securing 
of the election of Nicholas of Balmyle as bishop of Dunblane132 and 
the harrying of Buchan. However, having increased his influence over 
the kingdom,, he could now begin to develop his own administration, 
and thus claim actually to govern Scotland. As with the guardians, it 
is impossible to say when the English administration ceased to govern 
Scotland,, and Bruce's began. There was inevitably a period, when the 
records of both are scanty, during which the two rival governments 
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struggled for mastery. Certainly, Edward II atempted to maintain his 
Scottish administration: an order regarding the collection of custom 
from merchants' goods, of June 1308 
133; the presentation of priests 
to Scottish churches134 ; the administration of the financial affairs 
of those towns still un 
I 
der his control135 ; his appointment of 
136. 
sheriffs, and orders to them regarding land and revenue disputes I 
and his receipt of appeals and pleas from faithful Scots 
137 
. all 
demonstrate Edward II's attempt to continue the business of Scottish 
goverment. Indeed, the upkeep of the posts of chancellor . 
chamberlain and lieutenant of Scotland is in itself a sign that 
Edward had not abandoned the principle of English hegemony over 
Scotland. But without military enforcement of this government, the 
administration was doomed to extinction, and the Anglo-Scottish 
household inevitably became largely nominal. 
By the end of 1308, therefore, Bruce had to a great extent won 
Scotland. He held sway over much of the land and its resources, and 
although there was still a considerable English presence in many 
castles and towns throughout the kingdom, that presence was so 
fragmented and restricted, that in terms of the actual administration 
of the kingdom, apart from the economic difficulty of burghs and 
ports being denied to him, Bruce had relatively little to fear from 
the English occupation. 
Edward II realised that he had lost Scotland by the end of 1308. 
When, in October, Philip IV of France requested Edward to grant a 
truce to the Scots 
138 
, Edward's readiness to concur with the proposal 
reveals an appreciation of the hopelessness of the English cause in 
Scotland. Edward was aware that a new phase of the war was 
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beginning. From February 1306 until the end of 1308, Bruce was on 
the offensive, challenging the English government of Scotland. 
Initially, Edward I had the upper hand, and was defending Scotland 
against this threatened usurpation, as he saw it. By 1309, however, 
the tables had turned. In order to recover Scotland, Edward II would 
have to wage an offensive war, and Bruce was in the position of 
defending his hold over the kingdom, against a foreign aggressor. He 
could claim sovereignty over his land now, and could claim arguably 
the most influential king in Europe as his ally. 
139 
Edward II, not yet at ease in his relations with the English 
nobility, and deeply embroiled in economic difficulties, was probably 
glad to gain a respite from the constant pressures of the war . and on 
14 November appointed envoys to treat with the Scots. 
140 A fortnight 
later, again at the request of Philip the Fair, Edward granted 
conducts to Scots envoys coming to Berwick "or elsewhere in Scotland" 
for negotiations, and protections were issued to Philip's own envoys, 
going to treat with Bruce. 
141 
It appears that a truce was 
successfully negotiated, although its terms are obscure. The 
Lanercost Chronicle gives us most detail . stating that it was to last 
from February 1309 until 1 November . and that its chief condition was 
that both sides should accept the status quo as at July 1308.142 The 
truce was shortlived . however. By early June 1309,, Edward II was 
complaining that the Scots had disregarded it 143 . and was planning a 
punitive expedition to Scotland. 
144 
Both kings, however, had used the short truce profitably. 
Edward had been able to victual and provision his Scottish castles, 
but had spent more time on his internal English affairs, working 
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towards the recall of Gaveston, who had been banished since June 
1308. King Robert used the breathing space further to assert, and 
publish abroad . his kingship. On 16 March 1309, a gathering of at 
least a substantial part of the Scottish community met in King 
Robert's parliament at St. Andrews. Their business was, primarily, 
openly to proclaim King Robert as the sovereign lord of Scotland. 
Philip IV of France, who had been in negotiation with Bruce since 
November 1308 145 . had written to a section of the community 
146 
9 
making reference to King Robert in the most pleasing terms 
147 
9 
suggesting that he give aid to a French crusade. The Scots' 
reply 
148 
, which ran in the name of the pro-Brucian earls, the 
'communities' of those earldoms whose heirs were in ward, and many 
well-known noble supporters of the king, was a formal statement of 
t 
their position. Their first commitment was to Robert dei gratia King 
of Scots, and although they were greatly impressed by the French 
king's favourable regard, they felt that, whilst certainly devoted to 
the cause of Christendom, they could not direct their energies 
towards a crusade until the king and kingdom had been restored to 
"pristine liberty" (in pristinam libertatem), the war over, and peace 
re-established. For the moment, their minds were full of the damages 
and oppressions which they still suffered. 
This letter tells us much about the state of Bruce's cause in 
early 1309. He had some formidable support at his disposal, and was 
accumulating the trappings of Christian kingship: the formal title, 
the rhetorical , flowing chancery writing style, and the fashionable 
avowed desire to aid the Holy Land. Support for the crusading ideal 
was starkly echoed in the Declaration of Arbroath, which fact 
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demonstrates with great clarity the consistency of Scottish tactical 
foreign policy throughout the reign. Philip IV's letter to the 
baronage gave them a good opportunity to reaffirm their belief in 
Robert I as their rightful king, and publicly to place their trust in 
him as their leader who would, with God's grace, relieve the realm of 
the burden of oppression. 
To re-open formal relations with France was a great step forward 
for Bruce. This was not merely the first stride in international 
recognition of his status (and that of his kingdom)t carrying immense 
advantages in diplomatic and propagandist terms, but it also paved 
the way for a strengthening of the financial position of the new 
administration. Although French merchants do not greatly figure in 
the English king's constant complaints about, piracy and pro-Scottish 
I trading' , there can be no doubt that open relations with France 
brought the Scots important benefits in supplies of arms and other 
necessary war-time provisions, as well as the normal pecuniary and 
material profits of foreign trade. It has been stated that 
mercantile contacts between France and Scotland were few during the 
war . 
149 The same author, however, cites certain references to the 
French supplying Scotland. It must also be remembered that in time 
of peace the most natural trade route would be through England. The 
certainty that English-based merchants were in collusion with the 
Scots during the war 
150 
makes it probable that French trade continued 
by that less documented route. At any rate, it seems inconceivable 
that the French, prepared to give King Robert formal recognition and 
to support his cause diplornatically, would baulk at conducting trade 
with his kingdom. Such mercantile association must have been a major 
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factor in the Scots' pursuit of the French connection, along with the 
less tangible benefits in diplomacy, propaganda and prestige. 
Soon after the issue of this letter to the French king, the 
clergy in parliament, claiming to speak for "the bishops, abbots, 
priors and other clergy in Scotland" . issued an even more overt 
declaration of support for King Robert and for the cause of Scottish 
sovereignty. 
151 
The importance of this document lies in the unity 
which it claimed in support of the king. It is the earliest formal 
declaration of his de jure kingship, directed to no specific 
personage,, but "to all the faithful in Christ to whom the present 
document shall come" , proclaiming to the world that Bruce was the 
rightful king of an independent kingdom, and that the Scots were 
fighting a just war, in accordance with the divine will. That it was 
t 
the clergy who propounded this view is no surprise: the declaration 
was a retort to English propaganda which constantly played on the 
Scots' estrangement from the papacy. Only two months later Bruce was 
again denounced as excommunicate by Pope Clement V, because of his 
lack of concern regarding previous censures, "at great cost to the 
realms of England and Scotland . and to the prejudice of the Holy 
Land" . 
152 The clear expression of support by the national church 
which thi s declaration provided gave Bruce the spiritual 
respectability and the aura of Christian kingship which he required 
and reduced the papal opposition to the level of a Scotto-papal 
dispute, which many Christian princes would understand from 
first-hand experience. 
Bruce did not have undivided support from the people or 
community of Scotland. But he did have sufficient control over the 
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land , and could truthfully claim enough support to enable him 
to 
declare his de facto as well as his de jure kingship, to open 
political relations with other monarchs, and perhaps most 
significantly of all, to gather "all his faithful subjects" together 
in parliament. Militarily, King Robert could now afford to fight a 
defensive war; in terms of government, diplomacy and propaganda, 
however, he was most certainly on the attack. 
A marked feature of the new phase of the war which began in 
early 1309, is that it occupied less of the king's time. He had to a 
great extent won his land . and was no longer required to conduct 
every campaign in person. He could now leave much of the campaigning 
to his able commanders such as Douglas, Moray and his brother Edward . 
and, as demonstrated by the St. Andrews parliament and the issuing of 
I 
acts of government, devote more of his time to administrative 
pffairs. The consequent decrease in detailed evidence concerned with 
military activity does not signify that the land was at peace. In 
May 1309 the truce with England was apparently still in force153 . but 
by June hostilities had recommenced,, and Edward II was planning an 
expedition to curb the rebellion. 
154 The truce, he said . had not 
been observed by the Scots, who "in fraudulent and hostile fashion 
have invaded and daily attack castles, towns, manors, lands and 
tenements, belonging both to ourselves and our faithful subjects" 
155 
Bruce, then, was continuing his campaign against the remaining 
English presence in Scotland. In June, Edward wrote of the danger to 
his castle of Ayr from "the incursions of the rebels1t. 
156 
Letters of 
Edward II also imply that during 1309 the castles and towns of Perth, 
Dundee and Banff were under similar threat,, the warden of Scotland 
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(now John de Segrave157) being ordered to take any truce which would 
save the castles until June 1310, when Edward hoped to be able to 
relieve them. 
158 Roxburgh, Edinburgh, Linlithgow,, Stirling and 
Kirkintilloch castles were to be garrisoned and provisioned urgently, 
in order that they might be saved from the enemy "without any truce 
159 
or suffrance" . Other castles mentioned in similar letters are 
Caerlaverock, Dumfries, Dalswinton, Tibbers, Lochmaben, Buittleg 
Jedburgh, Dunbar, Dirleton, Selkirk and Bothwell. 
160 
Whilst it is unlikely that all these castles came under direct 
assault by the Scots during 1309, there can be no doubt that the 
reduction of strongholds was one of Bruce's main aims in this period, 
and thus all English-held castles were deemed to be under threat, 
even the apparently secure Lothian group. Unfortunately, Barbour's 
narrative is of little help in unravelling the course of events, 
since, although it is the most detailed account we have, and 
remarkably accurate in many passages, its self-avowed romantic 
structure led Barbour to choose the events most suited to his tale, 
and to have a somewhat liberal attitude to chronology. It would be 
unfair to accuse Barbour's work of being flawed in this respect: it 
did not set out to be a complete chronicle of the events of Bruce's 
reign, and should not be judged as such. 
The success of Bruce's efforts in 1309 is thus difficult to 
assess. Rutherglen and Dumbarton 
161 both fell into Scots hands early 
in the year, but of other Soots successes there is no record. Bruce 
spent some time in the north in the summer and autumn . and indeed 
appears to have made a royal progress round much of the kingdom 
between April and November 
162 
, but nevertheless, his forces appear to 
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have caused enough anxiety. even before this, to push Edward II into 
negotiations for a further truce, or even for peace. Richard de 
th. 
Burghq earl of Ulster, was given a commission to treat in the king's 
name with Bruce or his assignees "for peace and concord" on 21 
August. 
163 On the same day a safe-conduct was issued to John of 
Menteith and Neil Campbell , who had been sent 
by Bruce for the 
negotiations. 
164 What, if anything, came of these negotiationsq is 
un kno wn . The Scots were later accused of refusing 
to uphold any of 
the truces 'granted' by Edward II prior to July 1310 
165 
, and so even 
if a truce was agreed upon in June 1309, it probably made little 
difference. Certainly, Edward II continued the preparations for his 
intended campaign to curb the disobedience of the Scots, issuing 
orders to large numbers of men from England and Wales to meet at 
Berwick in early October 1309.166 Perhaps it was the realisation, 
that this expedition was not going to be ready to set off for 
Scotland before winter 
167 that encouraged Edward to enter new 
negotiations in the autumn of 1309. Conversely, it may be that the 
negotiations were timed to coincide with the expedition, in order 
that Bruce would feel under pressure to avert an invasion and reach 
an easy and favourable settlement. If so, the plan failed, and in 
October Edward II eventually cancelled the planned muster "on account 
of the winter". leaving instead a force under Robert Clifford and 
Henry Beaumont to guard and hold the border against Scottish 
incursion. 
168 
The great invasion plans were now rescheduled for June 
1310 169 . and a further truce was sought. 
170 
Perhaps because of the 
English threat, apart from an early visit to Dumbarton, Bruce appears 




war continued much as it had done in the previous year: in February 
Edward II gave power to William Lamberton, bishop of St. Andrews (who 
was still in I open I custody) , Robert de Umphraville . earl of 
Angus . 
John fitz-Marmaduke, John Wischard, William Bevercote (Edward's 
chancellor of Scotland) . John Weston (the chamberlain) and Alexander 
le Convers to treat with les gentz d'Escoce for a truce. 
172 
Apparently such truces could not be procured without "great expense", 
but Edward, working on the advice of his faithful supporters in 
Scotland, was prepared to pay the price. 
173 These truces were 
presumably intended to prevent any further losses to the English 
until Edward could mount the invasion which he hoped would end the 
war. 
174 
It is a sign of Bruce's strength in this period, that although 
I 
there was still a considerable English presence in his realm, and 
although there was still a functioning English administration over 
part of it 
175 
, he was nevertheless able to demand either large 
concessions or high prices (more probably the latter) for these 
truces which he felt (if we believe English accounts) he could break 
at will. 
176 He was also in a position to begin negotiations for the 
release of his sister Mary, who had been imprisoned in Roxburgh since 
1306.177 He continued, despite periodic English royal blusterings, 
to sustain his lines of supply from the continent, Ireland, and 
indeed England itself. 
178 The military action which Bruce maintained 
in Scotland was outwith the control of the English garrisons, and 
those Scots faithful to the English king made it clear to him that in 
no way could he give sufficient counsel in his affairs in those parts 
179 
unless he went there in person. 
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Throughout the early summer, Edward II was once again mustering 
a sizeable army, with all the necessary logistical preparations, for 
a large-scale invasion of Scotland. 
180 The troops were supposed to 
gather at Berwick in mid-August, and a parallel expedition from 
Ireland was planned, to be led by the earl of Ulster and John of 
Argyll. There were high hopes that this western expedition would be 
successful; in July, Edward II made a grant of the lands of Knapdale 
in Argyll to John Maesween of Argyll, "Terrealnanogh" and 
"Muirquocgh" , brothers of John of Menteith, and others who had 
forsaken Bruce to come back into Edward's faith. The grant was, 
however,, conditional upon the land being recovered from the enemy' s 
clutches. 
181 
They did not receive their lands. As early as 2 August 
the departure of some of the Irish troops was cancelled, supposedly 
I 
because of the approaching winter. The force was put on stand-by, 
however,, to be ready to sail when the order was given. 
182 
Early in September,, Edward's army set off for Scotland, although 
depleted by the refusal of some of his earls to co-operate with him, 
due once again to the disruptive influence of his favourite . Piers de 
Gaveston. 183 Immediately, the expedition ran into problems. On 8 
September, even before crossing the border, Edward complained 
bitterly that already he was experiencing difficulty in finding food 
for his army, and was displeased with the lacheste (? laxity) of his 
ministers. 
184 Such complaints continued over the following six 
weeks,, and should probably be taken as an early sign of the chronic 
maladministration which afflicted the north of England in the years 
after Bannockburn. Sir Thomas Gray, in his Scalachronicat blames 
administrative inefficiency for the loss of Scotland: Bruce' s 
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success was "chiefly the result of bad government by the king's 
officials, who administered [Scotland] too harshly in their own 
interest". 
185 
Eventually the army ground its way over the border in 
mid-September. English royal acts are dated from the border area 
from 20 to 28 September, from Biggar, Lanark and Renfrew from early 
to mid-October,, and from Linlithgow from 23 to 25 October. That was 
the limit of the expedition to win back Scotland. Acts show Edward 
at Glasgow on 1 November, and back in Berwick by 6 November. 
186 His 
favourite Gaveston remained with a royal force in Roxburgh. 
187 Bruce 
had been prepared, however, for any attempt by Edward II to push 
further north. In early October he was reported to be "on a moor 
near Stirling with his forces". 
188 Had Edward been able to proceed 
further than Linlithgow, the battle of Bannockburn might have been 
fought in 1310, with what effect is impossible to tell. Thi s 
reference again brings into doubt Bruce's complete devotion to 
guerilla warfare. When the occasion demanded,, as at Methven, Loudon 
Hill,, and in 1310, he was prepared to encounter his enemy in the 
field. Lanercost's comment that the Scots fled before the English in 
1310, not daring to meet them 
189 
. is based on a misconception of 
Bruce Is tactics. Like any good commander, as he did at Bannockburn . 
he chose his defensive site carefully, on a moor near Stirling - the 
obvious (and usual) place to try to stop an invading army. But the 
English did not venture any further, and this first phase of the 
expedition achieved nothing for Edward apart from the reinforcing of 
a few castles. The western effort, if indeed it took place at all, 
was equally unsuccessful. It certainly did not cow the Scots, since 
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Bruce was reported to be intending to use "the whole fleet of the 
western isles" to attack Man during the winter, and recover it for 
the Scottish crown in order to use its resources for his own war 
effort. 
190 It was also mentioned that many Manx malefactors, 
adherents of Bruce. had been causing trouble in England , and were to 
be arrested. 
191 
Perhaps Bruce had some support in Man, but it was 
not sufficient to allow this expedition, if it took place, to win the 
island, which remained in English hands for a further two and a half 
years. 
Edward wintered in Berwick, still embroiled in his incessant 
quarrels with his baronage, who were "much disturbed and enraged" at 
the king's decision to stay in the north and move his administration 
to York. There were fears of uprising, and the earl of Lincoln, 
appointed Edward's lieutenant in England during the king's 
absence 
192 
. refused to act any longer in that capacity, or to keep 
the king's peace. 
193 
Edward's problems with the English baronage, his inability to 
make effective the ban on supplying the Scots with food and other 
necessaries 
194 
. and the inefficiency of his Scottish administration, 
made the failure of the second phase of the Scottish campaign 
inevitable. Lanercost states that no sooner had the English returned 
to Berwick from Linlithgow in December 1310, than Bruce invaded 
Lothian, causing Edward to retrace his steps northwards with a small 
force'95, and Guisborough backs this up to some extent with a 
statement that Edward rode into Scotland again in March. 
196 
Both 
accounts agree that he found no opposition (and Guisborough further 
states that he found no food either). and returned to Berwick. In 
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February or earlier, the earl of Cornwall (Gaveston) was sent north 
to Perth "in case Robert de Brus, who was then marching towards 
Galloway, should go beyond the said sea [the Forth] to collect 
troops". 
197 Also in February and March, the earls of Gloucester and 
Warenne were in action on the king' s behalf in the eastern border 
area . 
198 
Gaveston in fact spent time in Dundee and Perth "as warden 
and lieutenant north of the Forth" 
199 
. and was appointed to keep that 
area until three weeks after Easter (which in 1311 fell on 11 April) . 
after which Henry Percy and the earl of Angus were to take over. 
200 
Lanercost's claims that Gaveston received to Edward II's peace all 
between the Forth and the Mounth, and that Gloucester and Warenne did 
the same in Selkirk forest . must be treated, at best, with 
scepticism. 
Once again, in late 1310 and early 1311, the English hoped to 
achieve a ceasefire. Robert Clifford and Robert fitz-Payn parleyed 
with Bruce at Selkirk before Christmas, and Gloucester and Cornwall 
would have met him again early in 1311, had he not been warned off by 
rumours of treachery. 
201 Through the spring and sý=er, further 
preparations were made for another great expedition to Scotland, to 
gather at Roxburgh on 24 June and 1 August. 
202 
The previously 
postponed Irish plans were resuscitated, and Edward had hopes that it 
might be "one of the greatest exploits of our Scottish war" . 
203 He 
even raised money, to the tune of four thousand merks, for this 
expedition, by requisitioning the estate of the recently deceased 
earl of Lincoln. 
204 
But, although the Irish fleet did eventually go 
to work on the west coast 
205 
, the rest of the 'great exploit' never 
got off the ground. 
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Edward II's efforts against the Scots were bearing little fruit. 
He still failed to control both English and Irish merchants who 
traded with,, and supplied the Scots 
206 
, and Flemish piracy against 
English ships in the North Sea was becoming more serious, more 
frequent, and more overtly pro-Scottish. 
207 His diplomatic and 
propagandist campaign was also faring badly, as the pope, perhaps 
influenced by the apparent strengthening of the ecclesiastical 
support for Bruce in Scotland 
208 
. seemed increasingly inclined to 
receive the Scots' petitions on behalf of the recalcitrant Bishop of 
Glasgow. 209 Most importantly, however, Edward's problems with his 
baronage were continually deepening. 
210 During the first half of 
1311, the Ordinances for the good rule of the English kingdom, drawn 
up by those appointed for the purpose in the previous year, were 
produced. Amongst other terms, they limited the king' s power to make 
war without parliamentary consent, prohibited his dismemberment of 
the crown through royal patronage, restricted his right to choose his 
own councillors, blamed his poor government for the near loss of 
Gascony, Ireland and Scotland, and specifically outlawed Gaveston 
once more. 
211 Edward had no choice but to go south to have these 
Ordinances confirmed in parliament, and returned to London in early 
August, once more abandoning the Scottish campaign. The failure of 
his expensive preparations for war to hold or re-conquer Scotland was 
a major source of opposition to Edward II. It was his misfortune 
that that opposition was in itself a significant factor in the 
ineffectiveness of his military operations. The rest of the year was 
taken up with purely defensive action on the part of the English. 
Castles were reinforced and provisioned, their keepers were exhorted 
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to remain stalwart in their defence , encouraged by the promise of 
future assistance, and troops were sent to defend the border. ' 
212 By 
early in 1312 Edward had once again appointed envoys to treat for a 
truce or ceasefire with the Scots. 
213 
If 1311 was a bad year for Edward II, it was a correspondingly 
good one for Robert I. He had been largely taken up with the English 
invasion, a fact which perhaps explains why no major castles are 
known to have fallen to the Scots in 1311. They did, however, put 
considerable pressure on, for instance, Dumfries, Perth, Edinburgh,, 
Linlithgow and Dundee. 
214 Lochmaben had also been under siege, but 
had been relieved by the efforts of the earl of Atholl. 
215 
uce was 
sufficiently confident to meet English envoys in person, near the 
border,, to treat for truces, and although an anonymous correspondent 
of Edward II's claimed that the Scots were "daily coming to the will 
and peace of the king" 
216 
. this can hardly have been true. The 
document dated 20 February 1312 
217 
, which lists some of those who had 
left Edward I's peace between 1308 and 1311 to go over to the Scots, 
tells a different tale. It names seven men , of whom six were 
landowners of middle standing (the seventh being Sir Robert Keith, 
marischal of Scotland). These men were all from Lothian , the last 
bastion of English authority in Scotland. For such men to desert 
Edward II indicates that even in Lothian Bruce was gaining the upper 
hand . By this time, Bruce had to a great extent won over the Scots, 
and the Lanercost chronicler is probably right in saying that 
11 all those who were with the English were merely 
feigning, either because it was the stronger party, or 
in order to save the lands they possessed in England; 
for their hearts were always with the H own people 
although their persons might 
8 
not be so. " 
326 
The tactics with which Bruce tackled the invasions of 1310 and 
1311 were consistent with those of the earlier years. He made sure 
there was no sustenance for the English army in southern Scotland, in 
order to make its progress as slow and difficult as possible. He was 
prepared to meet the army in the open field, given the right site and 
circumstances. This situation had not previously arisen; no 
full-scale royal army had entered Scotland since 1307, when Bruce had 
had no forces with which to meet it. He had, throughout the war, 
shown his readiness to fight when the time was ripe. Thus he was 
prepared to meet Edward II at Stirling in October 1310 
219 
. and was 
again prepared to meet Piers de Gaveston around Perth in 1311.220 
The first challenge was averted by the withdrawal of the enemy, and 
Bruce did not take on the earl of Cornwall's forces because he did 
t 
not find a situation for the conflict in which he could be sure of 
victory. Both of these episodes, and particularly the earlier, show 
0' 
Bruce playing with confidence the part of a king defending his realm 
against hostile incursion by an enemy. 
When Edward II returned to London in August, he once again left 
the north to its own devices. Immediately Bruce, as previously, took 
full advantage of the internecine strife in England to bring a new 
element into the war, which was to become the predominant feature of 
the conflict after Bannockburn. In the autumn of 1311 . for the first 
time, Bruce carried the war into England. With the sole exception of 
the Bannockburn campaign, all the major campaigns between 1311 and 
the peace treaty of 1328 were fought on English (or Irish) soil. The 
third phase of the war thus shows Bruce on the offensive again: no 
longer against Scots opposed to him, but against a neighbouring, 
enemy nation. Edward II was now in a defensive posture, fighting not 
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to maintain his authority in Scotland,, but to defend his realm of 
England. 
Bruce's invasions of northern England in August and September 
1311 221 . were the opening flourish in this new phase. Around 12 
August, only a matter of days after Edward's return to Londong Bruce 
invaded by the Solway route, and ravaged the western marchesv 
returning north after eight days with "a very large booty in cattle" 
and a number of captives, whose ransoms would prove lucrative. 
222 
Barely four weeks later, on 16 September 
223, King Robert invaded 
again, this time by the eastern march, to go south to the area around 
Corbridge. After two weeks of looting, which the paltry forces 
assigned to the keepers of the marches were inadequate to prevent, 
'Bruce retraced his steps, having first granted a truce for a year, 
f 
for which the recipients were "heavily taxed" . On his way north he 
took a similar payment for a truce given to the 'county of Dunbar' - 
Lothian, the last English enclave in Scotland. The bishop of Durham, 
excusing his absence from a papal General Council, asserted that 
Bruce,, not content with his devastation of Scotland, and "claiming to 
be the King of Scots" (a claim which undoubtedly would be recognised 
in the truce) , was responsible for great bloodshed and destruction. 
King Edward being ten days distant, the bishop was responsible for 
defence, without which, according to Edward II, the damage would have 
been far worse. 
224 
These raids must have come as a profound shock to the English 
king, and, of course, to the people of the north. It is typical . 
however, of the northerners' cynicism regarding this war . that the 
chronicle of Lanercost is as disparaging about the English forces 
'defending' the march as about the Scots. The English did not kill 
328 
men, or burn houses, but,, notwithstanding. they were responsible 
for 
as much damage as the Scots: "they destroyed all the goods 
in the 
land" . 
225 Perhaps Fordun' s picture of these raids is overplayed, 
with Bruce "carrying off untold booty, and making huge havoc with 
fire and sword". acting as the instrument of divine vengeance on "the 
faithless English nation",, which was now "made to undergo awful 
scourgings" and "sank vanquished and groaning". 
226 Nevertheless* the 
significance of the raids should not be underestimated: they prove 
that Bruce had thrown off the r8le of the underdog, and could impose 
his royal will on the English kingdom. 
In the following year Robert I again invaded the north 
227 
. at a 
time when England was undergoing the turmoil which led to the death 
of Piers de Gaveston. In persuading the English marcher peoples to 
pay tribute,, the Scots burnt Norham "because the castle did them 
great injurylit and carried off cattle and men. Later in the summer 
the towns of Hexham and Corbridge were burnt, and a section of 
Bruce's army attacked the market at Durham, and razed a large part of 
the town. 
228 The "people of the community of the bishopric of Durham 
between the Tyne and the Tees" again bought a truce with "Robert by 
the grace of God King of Scotland" for ten months' duration,, which 
was to remain effective only if the people of the bishopric refrained 
from rising against King Robert or his supporters. 
229 These raids 
into northern England became almost annual events, against which, 
given its weakness, the English government was practically 
powerless. 
230 The money which the Scots gained in this way must have 
been to their advantage both in the continuing and increasing trade 
with the Low Countries, and in the ransoming of the many Scots who 
had been in English prisons for some years. The corresponding effect 
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on England was a significant reduction in royal revenue, since these 
northern lands soon became devastated and drained of cash. As a 
result of the consequent fall in population, fewer men could be 
relied upon to defend the border against the Scots. Defence and 
administration became weaker, leading to near-anarchy and gross 
dissatisfaction and unwillingness to co-operate with English royal 
rule. Bruce thus benefited not only financially, but also from the 
increased security of his own land, and from the better bargaining 
position which his hold on northern England gave him in negotiations 
for truces or peace. The propagandist advantages of a large tract of 
England dancing to his tune and (albeit under duress) recognising his 
claim to be King of Scots, in contradiction of English royal policy, 
cannot have been lost on him either. The importance of the north to 
Bruce is demonstrated by the English report of a parliament held by 
Robert I at Ayr in July 1312, at which he ordered the greater part of 
his troops to go with his brother Edward to England, while he himself 
remained to besiege the castles of Dumfries . Buittle and 
Caerlaverock. The force in England was to 'plunder the north for 
support'. 
231 Later in the war it was claimed that Bruce intended to 
subjugate England entirely. 
232 Such a claim was probably apocryphal, 
most likely Scottish, or even English, propaganda. Nevertheless . 
Bruce did issue charters of lands in northern England. 
233 
He did 
seize much of its revenue for his own exchequer, at the expense of 
the English crown, and he did build some peels and seize and hold 
some strongholds of the area. 
234 The later carrying of the war to 
Ireland and Wales (perhaps with the intention of thence gaining entry 
to southern England), so diverting attention from the northern 
counties, could signify that Bruce was prepared to annex at least 
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Northumberland and Cumberland to his own crown. Such a policy may 
have been introduced in order to exert pressure on the English king 
to come to peace, rather than out of a wish for mere territorial 
aggrandizement, but this early reference to gaining 'support' in the 
north of England tends to give credence to the view that a gradual 
wearing down of English power , and eventual annexation may 
have been 
the aim of King Robert's policy. 
During 1312 and 1313, Robert I had considerable success in his 
attempts to reduce the number of English-held castles in Scotland. 
In January an attack was made on Berwick, although unsuccessfully. 
In April Dundee fell to the Scots 
235 
, who thus deprived the English 
of an important supply point, and gained for themselves an excellent 
port for the lucrative east coast trade. Attacks were alsq made on 
Perth, Dumfries, Buittle and Caerlaverock, all of which, along with 
others, fell early in 1313.236 By the summer of 1313, the only major 
castles remaining in English hands were Berwick, Edinburgh, Stirling, 
Roxburgh and Jedburgh. By this time, the threat of capture had even 
been felt in Carlisle castle. 
237 Roxburgh fell in February 1314, and 
Edinburgh succumbed in the following month. It is probable that 
Jedburgh also fell in this period, as did Linlithgow, Dalswinton, and 
doubtless other smaller fortresses. By early in 1314, of the major 
Scottish fortresses only Berwick and Stirling had eluded King Robert, 
and since the summer of 1313 Stirling had been the subject of a pact 
by which if it was not relieved by midsummer 1314, it would 
voluntarily surrender. 
238 The king also led an attack on Man in the 
early summer of 1313, which recovered the island for the Scots. 239 
In 1313 again the Scots raided South of the border . extorting 
tribute in return for truce. It was estimated that between King 
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Edward's departure for the south in August 1311, and late 13139 the 
people of Scotland (meaning, in context,, the communities of the 
Roxburgh and Berwick areas) had suffered losses to the value of 
E209000 by the activities of King Robert. It was considered that 
"matters are daily getting worse" . The conduct of the garrisons of 
the two towns was as harsh as that of the Scots, in carrying off 
goods and people, ransoming and killing inhabitants of the area, and 
ruthlessly harassing them for goods and money. 
240 Similar complaints 
had been heard against the garrisons of Edinburgh, Linlithgow, 
Roxburgh, Jedburgh and Berwick in 1312, and must have made allegiance 
to Bruce an attractive proposition to many. 
Truces were made with royal authority in the winter of 1312/13 
and in the summer of 1313, the latter wýth the aid of King Philip IV 
of France and the pope 
241 
. but appear to have had little effect. In 
July the Scots were threatening to invade the north again 
242 
. and 
even in early 1314, when Edward II was preparing his expedition to 
relieve Stirling, the Scots again entered England. 
243 
Edward II still held hopes of recovering Scotland. 
244 
He still 
tried to keep a Scottish administration functioning, as is 
demonstrated by his continued role in the as yet unconfirmed election 
to the bishopric of Dunkeld . vacant since 1309 
245 
. and by his 
judicial process with regard to inheritance in Scotland , which 
clearly assumes the continuation of the status quo, as established by 
the conditions on which John Comyn and others submitted to Edward I 
in 1304.246 But the offices of his Scottish household carried no 
authority, and he had no control even over the actions of his own 
garrisons in southern Scotland. His instructions to these garrisons 
were ineffectual, and in themselves demonstrate the hopelessness of 
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his situation: in November 1313, in a reversal of previous policy, he 
acknowledged the authority of locally-won truces, and ordered his 
garrisons to respect them. 
247 
In the diplomatic arena, Bruce was still faring well. His 
agreement with Hakon V of Norway, made in October 1312 
248 
9 is 
evidence of the flourishing diplomatic relations between the two 
kingdoms. The French king had again been pressing Edward II to sue 
for peace, and even the pope had softened his attitude towards the 
Scots. Clement V had not seen fit to allow the bishop of Glasgow to 
return to Scotland . but neither had he accepted the English case, 
that he should be removed from the see. 
249 The pope had also sent 
nuncios to assist in peace negotiations. 
250 
Despite Edward II's protestations, the Scots continued their 
I 
trade with the Low Countries and the Baltic 
251 
. while piracy against 
English ships remained a difficult problem. On several occasions, 
English ships were captured and taken to Aberdeen, where the sailors 
were disposed of, and the goods either sold or re-shipped to 
Flanders. 252 Edward was still unable to prevent English merchants 
from trading with Scotland, or his subjects from aiding the enemy in 
other ways. Nine Scots were even captured in the house of the Mayor 
of London's macer. 
253 
Perhaps the most significant of the signs that Edward II was 
finally losing his grip on the Scottish war was Bruce's continued 
success in the conflict of propaganda. The English king' s complaints 
that the Preaching Friars had persuaded many Scots to leave his 
fealty 254 , is indicative of both Bruce's methods and his success in 
winning over his own people. 
I 
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The greatest measure of Bruce's success, however, comes in a 
letter 255 from Ralph fitz-William to the archbishop of Canterbury, in 
which he describes the danger which afflicted Berwick. He tells of 
the 'grievous menace' of treason 
256 
, but declares that nevertheless, 
if his men remain loyal the town can be held against the King of 
France and the King of Scotland257 until succour arrives. 
Previously,, English recognition of Bruce's status is to be seen only 
where it had been extorted by force. But this is a private letter . 
written by one of the English leaders of the defence against the 
t rebel I. That a letter such as this should accept Bruce's claim to 
the throne of Scotland implies a very great victory for Bruce,, in 
that the English themselves, directly contrary to official policy, 
, 
saw-'the struggle as a war between two kings and their respective 
kingdoms. This letter shows that Bruce had largely won his war 
before Bannockburn: that battle was merely a final decisive military 
'rubber stamp' on the psychological and diplomatic victory which 
preceded it. It is noticeable how the English records, as the years 
pass, refer more frequently to 'the Scots' and less often to 'Robert 
Bruce and his adherents' . 
258 These are signs that the war was not 
about a rebellion by one self-important baron of Edward's tland of 
Scotland', but was rather the latest phase in the old struggle for 
mastery of the 'nation of Scots' . which, because of the peculiar 
constitutional pitfall into which Scotland had fallen in the 1280s 
and 1290s, now wore a personal veneer which in reality was largely 
irrelevant to the causes of conflict. 
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movements during the second half of the year. 
172) Rot. Scot. I, p. 80. Cf. Chron. Lanercost, p. 214, 
-ý-h-ich states that the truce until March was 
extended until the following summer. Chron. 
Guisborough, PP-384-85, says that it was to last 
until the eve of St. Hilary (12 January), 
presumably 1311, but that it was broken by the 
Scots, who multa mala fecissent. 
173) Rot. Scot. I, p. 80- 
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174) Chron. Lanercost, p. 214: the extension of the 
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fight in Scotland before the summer, as they would 
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175) Scottish petitions continued to go before the 
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Scottish patent seaf was in use by Edward II as 
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prisoners (Rot. Scot. I. p. 87). Perhaps Bruce 
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the terms of her release (Cal. Close Rolls Edward 
119 1307-1313,, P-399). 
178) Foedera II, 
Close Rolls 
II, p. 120. 




pp. 118-9; Rot. Scot. I, p. 86; Cal. 
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191) Ibid. 
192) Ibid., p. 116. 
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210) See Maddicott's excellent discussion of this 
period, Lancaster, pp. 106-20. 
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232) Rot. Scot. I. pp. 221-2 (30 September 1327). A 
similar claim was made,, however, in 1314: contra 
dictum dominum nostrum regem arma sumpserint,, et 
ad demolitionem ipsius et regni sui unanimi 
nequitia seductore conspirarint (Rainel Letters 
from the Northern Registers, no. 143). 
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256) Treason was a constant fear in Berwick in the 
period after 1312, when the town was under 
incessant threat from the Soots (e. g. Rot. Soot. 
19 P-113). That is hardly surprising, given the 
nature of the complaints about the English 
administration. See, e. g. Cal. Does. Scot. III, 
nos-384,553, which describeý`sthe -situation in 
Berwick after Bannockburn. They had suffered less 
from the Scots than from the people of 
Northumberland, who were enraged about the 
execution of men who had been convicted of 
plotting to betray the town to the Scots. In 1316 
the situation was even more desperate. Food 
supplies were intercepted by the Scots, who would 
endeavour to take the town "by treason or 
otherwise" (Cal. Does. Soot. III, no. 486). Cal. 
Does. Scot. ! -II, no-ý97, shows the tension of the 
situation: two small boys who were looking outside 
the town for a lost 'rudiment song book' were 
imprisoned on suspicion of Itraficking with the 
Scots rebels'. 
257) le roy de Escoce. Are we to understand that the 
French king was giving actual military or naval 
aid to the Scots? The employment of the 
exerienced and aggressive French naval captain, 
Sir Odard de Maubuisson, to deliver the 
Declaration of Arbroath to Avignon in 1320 adds 
some weight to the possibility. (Vet. Mon. no. 437. 
I am grateful to Professor G. W. S. Barrow for this 
reference, and for information regarding 
Maubuisson). 
258) A few examples from one source serve to illustrate 
the point. Rot. Scot. I, p. 56 (16 August 1308): 
Edward II plans his expedition against "Robert 
Bruce and his accomplices... who rise against us 
in Scotland"; Ibid. (20 August 1308): Robert 
Clifford's appointment as guardian was to "resist 
Robert Bruce". As early as autumn 1308, 
references to 'the Scots' are found, especially in 
trading prohibitions, but by January 1312, nuncios 
coming to treat for a truce were described as 
"those of the Scots ... 11 (Ibid. 9 P-108). Whilst 
references to 'Bruce and his adherents' do 
continue, they are not, as previously, in the 
majority. Cf. also abovev P-300 (n. 78). 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
THE REIGN OF ROBERT I 
2: THE WAR WITH ENGLAND, 1314 - 1328 
Edward II's expedition to Scotland in the summer of 1314 was far 
more than the promised aid for Berwick, Stirling and the few other 
beleaguered English-held castles, and more than a point of honour,, 
upholding the agreement made with Edward Bruce in 1313. It was an 
attempt to win back credibility for his Scottish policy amongst his 
own barons and people, who were becoming increasingly reluctant to 
pay such enormous sums for little or no return. 
1 It was also a 
last-ditch attempt to win the war by military means. The second-rate 
defensive measures taken since 1307 had failed utterly, resulting in 
the complete loss of Scotland, and of credible English claims to 
rightful sovereignty. Edward's only hope was to put all the might of 
England into an attempt to crush Scotland in one swift and victorious 
campaign, such as his father had carried out in 1296, which would 
remove Bruce from the scene, and thus deprive Scotland of her king, 
whose existence as a political and conceptual (as opposed to 
personal) force had been responsible for the loss of English control . 
Edward therefore planned a campaign which would outstrip any 
which had previously been mounted. Men were commissioned to come 
from all over Edward II's domains to Berwick for the muster in early 
June . Fleets were to work on both coasts , and vast provision was 
made for victualling and supplying the army. 
2 
Fordun describes this 
expedition as an act of vengeance against Scotland. Totally ignoring 
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the Stirling castle pact, he states that Edward set out to seek 
retribution for the defeat he had suffered in Scotland: 
"Edward II, king of England, hearing of these glorious 
doings of King Robert's, and seeing the countless losses 
and endless evils brought upon him and his by that king, 
gathered together, in revenge for the foregoing, a very 
strong army both of well-armed horsemen and of foot - 
crossbowmen and archers, well skilled in war-craft. At 
the head of this body of men . and trusting in 
the g ory 
of man's might, he entered Scotland in hostile wise. " 
This interpretation of events is probably very close to the mark. 
Edward Bruce had invited an English army to come north, but Edward II 
used the invitation to try to put aright all the failures of the 
previous seven years. With lack of both forethought and hindsight, 
he trusted in sheer might to end the war . and marched into 
Scotland 
in June 1314 at the head of the greatest army ever to cross the 
border. King Robert,, in line with his policy throughout the war,, 
recognised that this army had to be stopped from reaching the 
heartlands of Scotland, and, as he had done in 1310, prepared to meet 
it at Stirling on a site which (like that which he had chosen at 
Loudon Hill in 1308) restricted the enemy's movements, and thus gave 
Bruce the advantage of being able to plan the way in which the battle 
would be fought. Bruce was doubtless aware of the importance of this 
engagement, if it should take place. If he failed to stop the 
English army, it would march throughout his kingdom and undo many, if 
not all, of the achievements of his reign. He was not f ighting to 
gain Stirling castle, nor just to defend his kingdom against an 
aggressor,, but to uphold his own royal status and power,, and indeed 
the very concept of Scottish sovereignty. The size and intent of 
Edward's expedition gave this engagement enormous significance. 
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Edward's army left Berwick only a few days before the deadline 
for relieving Stirling castle (24 June) , and made a forced march, 
arriving within sight of Bruce's waiting army on 23 June, tired,, 
hungry, and ill-prepared for battle. The conflict which followed has 
been described in great detail by several authors, and little would 
be gained by repeating such a description here. 
4 
The important 
point. for the present purpose , is the outcome. Before the end of 
the month King Edward was back in Berwick, nursing his damaged pride, 
with what remained of his great army straggling home as best they 
could. Bannockburn was a major disaster for Edward II. Not only 
did it put paid to his hopes of regaining Scotland , in the short term 
at least, but it cemented opposition to him, causing the fall of his 
government, and forcing him into dependence on his greatest rival . 
the earl of Lancaster .5 The large number of high-ranking prisoners 
taken by the Scots (quite apart from the spoil to which they fell 
heir) was both a financial and a diplomatic blow to the English. 
Few sources are kind to Edward II regarding Bannockburn. Fordun 
assigns his defeat to Bruce's reliance on God, rather than on men. 
6 
The Lanercost Chronicle states that the English army might have fared 
well "if only they had had the Lord as ally". but Edward's ungodly 
attitude and actions brought "confusion and everlasting shame" upon 
him and his army. He and his advisers fled the field "like miserable 
wretches ... leaving all the others to their fate". 
7 Sir Thomas 
Gray's Scalachronica likewise draws the comparison between the 
Scots' piety and contrition, and the English pride and arrogance. 
From the Scottish point of view, however , the importance of 
f 
Bannockburn has perhaps been overestimated. Had Bruce lost the 
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battle, the consequences would have been far greater. It was, 
undeniably, a notable victory, which was a testimony to Bruce's 
abilities as a military leader. But its ef feet was less to do with 
military affairs than with English politics. It did not signify the 
end of the war . which continued along very much the same lines as in 
the previous few years. It did not mark Bruce's winning of Scotland, 
which had already been achieved by 1311. It was a successful defence 
of the realm against invasion, and apart from the surrender of 
Stirling castle, in military terms the Scots gained little long-term 
advantage by the battle. Had the English expedition of 1314 merely 
fizzled out, like that of 1310, or never taken place, like that 
planned for 1309, the effect would have been remarkably similar,, the 
major difference being in the pecuniary benefit dpriv'ed from the 
battle, and doubtless also the less tangible advantages of propaganda 
and prestige. 
The significance of Bannockburn lies not in the battle itself, 
but in the fact of English failure,, no matter how it occurred. The 
collapse of this great expedition destroyed the credibility of Edward 
II's military policy. Although the recapture of Scotland was . in 
theory, a constant aim of his government, the continuation of his 
Scottish administration was largely fictional, and there was little 
support for the expenditure of the vast sums which would be required 
to mount any further attempts to recover the country. The period 
after the failure of the Bannockburn campaign is distinguished by a 
total withdrawal of the English from Scotland. Bruce's camapigns 
were now fought not in order to secure his hold on Scotland, which 
was now unassailable, but to gain money, and the final goal - 
356 
recognition by the English crown of his status as King of Scots. 
This phase of the war had been evolving since mid-1311 
9, 
and whilst 
Bannockburn stands out as the sole defensive action by Bruce against 
the English between 1312 and the peace treaty of 1328, in itself it 
had little effect except to emphasise the situation which had already 
prevailed for upwards of two years. As noted above, Bruce in person 
took less part in military affairs after 1309.10 His personal 
appearances, when they did occur, were often spectacular . and boosted 
his charisma as a leader 
11 
, but the fact nevertheless remains that 
between 1312 and 1329,, the records tell us more about Bruce as a 
ruler than as a warrior. The war continued unabated, and was fierce 
and bitter at times, but its character had changed: no longer was it 
the desperate, bloody struggle of earlier years. Now the military 
t 
action took second place to the political and diplomatic ends which 
it was intended to promote. 
Apart from the continued reduction of English-held castles (the 
last of which, Berwick, fell in 1318, leaving Edward II's so-called 
'Scottish administration' without even a base in Scotland), the main 
aim of the war after 1311 was to exert political pressure on the 
English throne through constant attacks on the northern counties, 
and, for a time, through the threatened seizure of Ireland. It wa s 
hoped that by these means the weak English government, as long as it 
had no hope of military recovery in Scotland, would eventually be 
forced to recognise Bruce's position, and sue for peace on Bruce's 
terms. That it took so long for this policy to work was largely the 
result of Edward II's apparent lack of Political realism. 
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Within a month, the Scots followed up their victory at 
Bannockburn with a swift raid on northern England, penetrating as far 
as Yorkshire. 
12 Early in January 1315 they were preparing another 
large invasion 
13, for which cause various barons were excused 
attendance at the English parliament at Westminster in that month. 
14 
The summer saw yet another invasion . which, with its siege of 
Carlisle, was a source of severe worry to the English king. 
15 And so 
it continued. The swiftness and effectiveness of these raids foiled 
Edward's plans to invade Scotland again, and almost his entire war 
effort had to be channelled into the defence of the north. 
Repeatedly orders were given to muster all able-bodied men for 
defence, nobles were commissioned to stay in the north to organise 
forces, and garrisons were supplied and reinforced. The only other 
warlike activity which Edward II continued was the attempt at naval 
blockade on both east and west coasts. Fleets were constantly 
renewed and enlarged in a vain attempt to hinder the Scots' trading 
activities on the continent and in Ireland. 
16 For Edward II, the 
only successful exploit of this phase of the war was the re-capture 
of the Isle of Man, effected in late 1314 by John of Argyll, with his 
fleet based in Dublin. 17 
The Scottish raids on the north became a standard feature of 
life in those parts. Except in times of truce, hardly a year passed 
but Scottish armies swept into England at least once, penetrating far 
south to the rich lands of Yorkshire . exacting heavy tribute and 
wreaking vengeance on those who would, or could . not pay. It has 
been estimated that over E20,000 was taken by the Scots in tribute 
between 1311 and 1329, quite apart from the considerable value of 
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goods,, livestock and foodstuffs taken as booty. 
18 The damage to the 
northern counties was, of course, far greater than mere financial 
loss. They suffered devastation the likes of which had never 
previously been known . even, in places, becoming incapable of 
supporting any inhabitants. 
19 The failure of the English government 
to provide the financial and military resources required for 
effective defence gave some barons and speculators of the north a 
free hand, causing a collapse of law and a state of anarchy in the 
area. 7be lack of central control . leading to a complex network of 
local truce arrangements,, left the financial organisation in chaos. 
Little or no money could be raised for the exchequer 
20 
, leading to 
further impoverishment of the crown, which was thus less able to 
provide defence. It was little wonder that Bruce found himself able 
to subjugate the north, and to at least contemplate its eventual 
annexation. 
21 The greater effectiveness in the area of his royal 
presence than of the English king's won him some support, as did the 
integrity of his armies' conduct. Where a truce was bought, it was 
honoured; Edward II's guarantees of succour were less trustworthy. 
Over the years, as the raids continued, English control of the north 
waned. Edward II, realising that he could not hold the north 
himself, even contracted out the defence of Berwick to its mayor, 
bailiffs and community 
22 
_ the 'privatisation' of national defence. 
The experiment was a spectacular failure: in under a year, the town 
fell to the Scots. 
23 
Even by mid-1315 the north was of very mixed loyalty. The fears 
of treason, and the unwillingness of the Northumbrians to co-operate 
with English defence, finds expression in a letter of June 1315: 
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"Sir Robert de Bryus is in the park of Duns collecting 
his host either to attack the country towards York about 
the quinzaine of St. John or lay siege to Berwick, and as 
some of the people of the country are very supine in his 
service they [the writers] pray him [Edward III to order 
a levy for its defence so tha ý4 they may be forced to act 
if they do not of good will". 
The oppression of the people by the castle garrisons was partly 
responsible for this lack of loyalty: the 'poor people' of Bamburgh 
complained of extortion on the part of the constable of the castle . 
who demanded an equal sum as the Scots required for a truce . charged 
them exorbitant fees for the right to protection in the castle, and 
robbed them of provisions: "they are between the enemy on one side 
and the constable on the otherit. 
25 The desperation of the situation 
in the north, and the relative indifference of Edward II towards it, 
caused disloyalty amongst its inhabitants. That disloyalty was 
"the product of the abeyance of Edward's government which 
permitted the king of Scotland to wield more power in, 
and draw more revenue 26 
from, the north of England than 
did the English king". 
But Robert I's hold on the north did not only affect the allegiance 
of the inhabitants of that area. Edward II's relations with his own 
nobility were no easier in the last thirteen years of his reign than 
they had been in the first seven, and the failure of Edward and his 
advisers to find any solution to the humiliating situation with 
regard to the Scottish war was a major factor in the disaffection 
which continued to plague the reign. 
27 
Lancaster, who rose to the 
zenith of his power largely as a result of the king' s defeat at 
Bannockburn, was no more successful in controlling the situation than 
his predecessors, which was one reason for the waning of his power 
from 1316. Those who followed, although more determined to fight the 
Scots,, also failed, and the open breach between the parties in 1321, 
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which was sparked off by the elevation of the king's new favourites, 
the Despensers, was closely tied up with the situation in the north. 
Even earlier, the disquiet which emerged in England, with the seizure 
of Knaresborough castle and the attack on two papal legates, both in 
1318, had involved close contacts with the Scots. 
28 
The rebellion of Lancaster in 1321/22 received much support in 
the north, and the situation there made the Scots obvious allies of 
the insurgent barons. As early as 1319 secret negotiations were 
conducted with the Scots, presumably by disaffected English lords29 9 
and late in 1321 the earl of Lancaster was accused of plotting to 
bring "aliens and rebels from Scotland" into the realm. 
30 
Communications certainly did pass between Lancaster and the Scots . 
although the extant records place them later than this accusation. 
I 
Letters of Moray "supplying the place of the King of Scotland" . dated 
at Corbridge in January 1322 gave leave to one "Sir Richard le 
Chapeleyn of Toppecliff" and a companion to come to speak with him. 
A similar letter of Douglas dated December 1321 allowed them to go to 
Jedburgh for talks. On 16 February 1322 Moray issued a further 
safe-conduct for Sir John de Mowbray and Sir Roger de Clifford, with 
forty men, to come to him in Scotland, which is similar in tenor to 
another document, probably dating from this period, allowing a party 
of English, with thirty horse, to come to the King Of Scots at 
Edinburgh or elsewhere. A record of the actual pact made survives, 
and states that the Scots agreed "to come to our aid and go with us 
in England and Wales ... and live and die with us in our quarrel". 
31 
Even Andrew de Harcla, the loyal supporter of Edward II who was 
rewarded with the earldom of Carlisle for his part in the quelling of 
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Lancaster's rebellion, saw within a year that the only hope for the 
future lay in peace with the Scots on King Robert's terms, a 
conclusion for which he lost his life. 
32 
After 1323, when a thirteen-year truce was made with the 
Scots33,, the north played a less prominent part in English politics. 
Other affairs were more responsible for the final d9bacle which led 
to Edward II's deposition. But at the end, the north became involved 
again; it was a problem which would not' disappear with the making of 
a truce, and which had left an indelible mark on the English 
political scene. Before looking at the events which led to the 
making of peace, however, it is necessary to go back to Robert I's 
other military venture, in Ireland. 
f 
The Scottish invasion of Ireland in 1316 
34 has been variously 
described as "a diversion of manpower and resources which King Robert 
could ill afford , 
35 
. an ambitious ego-trip on the part of Edward 
Bruce, who found Scotland too small for both himself and his 
brother36 . and "an answer to the military stalemate" in the marches 
of England and Scotland. 
37 The invasion, as it turned out, may have 
been an expensive waste of manpower and resources - all unsuccessful 
military operations can justly be described thus - but King Robert's 
support for it, with the services of many men, his best commanders, 
and his own presence, are a certain indication of his assurance that 
this was a venture worthy of the expenditure of these resources, 
Clearly, the Irish expedition was a matter not only Of military 
priority, but also of political importance. Bruce's letter to the 
Kings of Ireland in 1315 
38 
stressed the common ancestry of the two 
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peoples and referred to negotiations aimed at upholding the good 
relations between them. This letter, in conjunction with Bruce's 
continued interest in Ireland even after the failure of the attempt 
to make it a Scottish kingdom, show that this was no mere diversion 
of policy,, but an important and consistent element of Bruce's tactics 
in the war. 
As Dr. Frame has pointed out, the suggestion that the invasion 
was prompted merely by Edward Bruce's ambition is completely 
unacceptable. His newly confirmed position as heir-apparent in 
Scotland39 made him a central figure in Scottish politics,, in whom 
King Robert must have had trust. Robert I was not a man to squander 
resources on the flight of fancy of a restless adventurer. 
It is very possible that those native Irish who were opposed to 
English rule invited a Scottish invasion in the course of the 
negotiations referred to by Robert I in his letter of 1315. They may 
even have promised to support Edward Bruce' s attempt to win the 
kingship. 
40 
J. F. Lydon's thesis that the Scots' main aim was to 
disrupt English use of Ireland as a base for supplies and men 
undoubtedly carries some truth. The Irish contribution to all the 
major English campaigns had been considerable, and now, after 
Bannockburn, from his position of military superiority, King Robert 
could take action to destroy this constant threat. Furthermore, 
there had been unceasing English naval activity on the west coast, 
based on Ireland, since the war began. The removal of this nuisance 
would give the Scots more security in their trade across the Irish 
sea. The attacks on Man in 1310 
41 
, in 1313 
42 
. and, finally, in 
1317 43 . are indications of the consistency of Bruce's policy towards 
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the west. The control of the western sea approaches was of vital 
importance. The assertion that the attempts to take Man were partly 
in order to use its resources for the Scots in the war 
44 
. is also an 
indication of Scottish policy in Ireland. If Bruce could control the 
sea, and rule Ireland and Man through his lieutenants, he could also 
use these lands to bolster Scotland's resources, thus reducing the 
disparity of wealth and power between the contestants in the war. 
Even after Scottish attempts to rule Ireland had collapsed, near the 
end of his reign, Bruce still recognised the importance of 
controlling the sea, minimising English gain from Ireland, and 
maximising trade and co-operation between the two lands. 
45 
However, 
these aims did not require a complete subjection of Ireland, which 
most of the chronicle accounts agree was Robert I's intention in 
sending his brother there. 
46 There can be little doubt that this 
action was designed to increase the military and political pressure 
on Edward II, who, fresh from the defeat at Bannockburn, was in 
severe difficulties in England. The increase in Scottish west-coast 
naval activity, with the capture of Man and attacks on Anglesey, as 
well as an outburst of piracy in those parts 
47 
. shows a desire to 
divert English attention from the border counties and divide English 
resources, forcing them to fight on two . or even on three fronts. if 
Bruce did intend to annex northern England , or even merely to 
continue exacting tribute from it, it was in his interest to decrease 
the amount of military activity from which it suffered. If the 
subjugation of Ireland had succeeded, Bruce would have used the 
island, like Man, as a base from which to carry the war into Wales 
and central England. Certainly, the English expected Bruce to make 
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this use of Ireland . As early as June 1315, arrangements were made 
to defend the west coast against invasion from Ireland 
48 
.a fear 
which continued throughout that year and well into the next* 
49 
Scottish spies and propagandists were also constantly at work in 
Wales: arrangements were made in 1316 to arrest the Welshmen who 
adhered to the king's Scottish enemies 
50 
. in July 1323 Soots were 
captured in Anglesey 
51 
. and as late as 1327 some Welshmen apparently 
joined the Scots under Donald of Mar, who went over to Bruce on the 
deposition of Edward 11.52 Even in 1319, well after the battle of 
Dundalk, which ended the Scots' bid to subjugate Ireland . the English 
felt that defence of the island against the Scots was still 
necessary 
53 
: there must have been some fear of a renewed attempt. 
This English concern about Ireland and Wales belies the opinion that 
the Scottish invasion of Ireland was a short-lived part of Robert I's 
policy, inspired by unrealistic ambition. 
Bruce did, undeniably, attempt to conquer Ireland . The English 
reaction to this, and the parallel Scottish activity in the Irish Sea 
and on the Welsh coast,, along with the consistent Scottish policy 
with regard to trade and control of the western waters . makes clear 
his intentions in so doing. He wished to benefitq militarily and 
economically, from Irish resources, which would thus be denied to 
Edward II; he wished to control the western approaches to his 
kingdom, for reasons of trade and security, and to allow him to carry 
the war to Wales and central or even southern England; finally, a 
Scottish-ruled Ireland would provide the base and the manpower for 
this activity in England, without the necessity of arduous and 
dangerous marches from the north. The carrying of the war into the 
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south would increase the pressure on Edward II, who seemed to be 
largely unaffected by the plight of the northern counties, and would 
to some extent relieve the north of the undivided military attention 
which it had so far received. 
The Scottish invasion of Ireland was thus an important part of 
Bruce's policy, taken seriously both by himself and by the English. 
The events of 1317 - 1318 persuaded King Robert that subjugation of 
Ireland was not in fact feasible, and the plans to carry out an 
Irish-based attack on southern England therefore never came to 
fruition. The fact remains, however, that Robert I's Irish policy 
wa s consistent throughout his reign, and when his military 
superiority and the political situation made it expedient, that 
policy led to the ultimately futile invasion. I 
The first serious overtures for a negotiated end to the war were 
54 
made by King Robert as early as September 1314. Presumably, as was 
to be his custom in later days, he was endeavouring to use his 
military superiority in the aftermath of Bannockburn to persuade the 
English king that to give in to Bruce's demands was the only option 
open to him. Bruce wrote to Edward II,, "saying that what he wishes 
most in the world is complete accord and amity" , and asking for 
safe-conducts for four envoys (Neil Campbell, Roger Kirkpatrick, 
Robert Keith and Gilbert Hay) to enter England 55 for negotiations 0 
The necessary conducts were duly given, and Edward II, 
"knowing of the peril to the soul and body, and the 
damage to good done by war, and of the profit which is 
brought by peace and accord between Christians". 
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appointed his own envoys to meet the Scots . with power to 
treat for 
either a truce or a final peace. 
56 Edward's action had been 
encouraged, like earlier truce negotiations, by pressure from King 
Philip IV of France. 
57 Thus, while the profitable business of 
exchange of prisoners was being carried out in the last quarter of 
131458 It the first negotiations for a permanent peace were 
undertaken. 
59 These negotiations may have taken place in two stages, 
the first in Durham and the second in Dumfries 
60 
. but they were in 
any case abortive. By 26 November the English envoys had returned 
empty-handed,, and there were reports that the Scots were again 
preparing to invade the north. 
61 
It is not inconceivable that the 
discontinuance of the talks was connected with the death of Philip 
IV, news of which reached England by 15 Decenlber'. 
62 
By early January 
all talk of peace vanishes from the records, and preparations for 
defence continued. No details of the course of these negotiations 
are extant, other than the bare fact of their failure, but it is safe 
to assume that they, like all those that followed, foundered on the 
issue of recognition of Bruce' s status as a king, and of his land as 
an independent kingdom. Perhaps the collapse of these talks is 
indicative of the fact that although Edward II was in a very weak 
position,, the situation was not such as would persuade him to make an 
unfavourable peace. Unlike 1327/28, the military situation in late 
1314 was not as hopeless as one might have expected. There was some 
feeling that the English position could still be regained by military 
means: in contrast with the opinions expressed by many modern 
historians, Bannockburn was not regarded by either side as an end to 
the war. 
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The next attempt at negotiation (other than for short truces, 
which were signed and broken fairly frequently). was in the spring of 
1316, when conducts were given for a Scottish embassy to come to 
I.... ancaster for negotiations for a truce or peace. The commission to 
the English envoys explicitly recognises the national nature of the 
war, and implicitly acknowledges Bruce's de facto leadership of the 
Scots: the quarrel was "between us [Edward III and our subjects,, and 
Robert and the men of Scotland and his other adherents". 
63 
It should 
be noted that these negotiations took place during the Scottish 
attack on Ireland . and at a time when an assault on Berwick and a 
large-scale invasion of England were planned. 
64 
A truce was 
signed 
65 
, but it had expired or been broken by August. 
66 
It is 
unlikely that there were, any serious peace negotiations at this time, 
in view of the low-key nature of Edward II's negotiating team. 
In the late summer of 1317, two cardinals were sent to England 
in order to proclaim a truce announced by the pope , and to conduct 
talks for "perpetual and solid peace and concord". 
67 
Pope John XXII 
continued in his relentless vituperations against Bruce, although 
perhaps his willingness to acknowledge that Bruce did 'govern 
Scotland at present' marks a slight softening of his attitude. 
68 
The 
cardinals never actually reached Scotland themselves. Having been 
attacked and robbed on the way, in an ambush in which Scots, English 
'dissidents'. and the earl of Lancaster were all in collusion 
69 
. they 
sent envoys to Bruce, who received them 
70 
, and re-affirmed his 
position as stated in 1314 that he Wished above all to establish a 
firm and permanent peace. But he would not negotiate with the 
cardinals whilst they refused to address him as king,, a title which 
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he was accorded by other kings, as well as by his own people. These 
nuncios, facing this firm answer, were unable to negotiate further 
with Bruce (whom, in their letters, they described as 'lord king'), 
and claimed that they did not know what his terms would be if 
negotiations could take place. The cardinals eventually left England 
in August 1318, having achieved little or nothing. 
71 Clearly, unless 
it was to his diplomatic advantage, Bruce was not prepared to accept 
any intervention by third parties. 
In March 1318, perhaps in connection with the papal initiative, 
Edward appointed envoys, and gave safe-conducts for a Scottish 
embassy to treat for truce or final peace in Berwick. 
72 
This set of 
negotiations also followed and coincided with vigorous Scottish 
actýon in the field. In the summer and autumn of 1317 serious damage 
had been inflicted upon the northern counties,, and Randolph had been 
preparing his attacks on Man and Anglesey. 
73 Within a month of the 
start of the negotiations in March 1318, Berwick was taken . and in 
the early summer Durham and Yorkshire were again subject to heavy 
raids. 
74 No comment remains regarding the progress made in these 
talks, if they ever actually took place. 
Further negotiations for a truce or final peace were held at the 
end of 1319, resulting in a two-year truce being agreed upon., 
75 
Although no permanent peace was established, it is possible that 
these were at least intended to be more meaningful discussions. The 
envoys were of higher rank than some previous (the bishop of Ely, 
Edward II's chancellorg the earl of Pembroke, Hugh Despenser the 
younger, and Bartholomew Badlesmere on the English side, and William 
de Soulis, Robert Keith, Roger Kirkpatrick, Alexander Setong William 
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Montfichet, William of Yetholm, John Mandeville and other clerks for 
the Scots) . and the talks may have continued even after the truce 
agreement was reached. Immediately prior to this set of 
negotiations, Edward II had made an abortive attempt to conduct a 
campaign in Scotland, first laying siege to Berwick. The Scots had 
contemptuously retorted with a counter-invasion, compelling another 
English force under the archbishop of York and the bishop of Ely to 
strive to defend the north, a task in which they miserably failed, 
76 being routed in the celebrated 'Chapter of Myton' . Even after the 
first safe-conduct for Scots negotiators was issued on 24 October, 
there was a devastating raid on northern England77 . which caused 
Edward to lift the siege of Berwick and retire to York. Once more,, 
negotiations for peace came at a time of extreme military inferiority 
for Edward II. 
The two-year truce signed in 1319 included a clause that further 
peace negotiations would take place. Accordingly, in September 1320 
English envoys were sent to the marches, and arranged a meeting with 
the Scots for early February 1321.78 Again, there was both French 
and papal involvement in these negotiations 
79 
. and the English 
embassy was very impressive, the thirteen-man team including one 
archbishop, three bishops, two earls, and several other prominent 
barons and clerics. 
80 
The Scots also sent a not inconsiderable 
embassy, numbering up to fifty persons. 
81 
reat hope appears to have 
been pinned on these talks, which took place at Bamburgh in March and 
April, perhaps because, for the first time, they were not conducted 
under the immediate threat of military action. The 1319 - 1321 
ceasefire appears to have been held reasonably well; the English 
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records suggest that Edward II wished at all costs to keep the truce, 
and on several occasions he ordered observance of its terms. 
82 
The 
remarkable series of letters between Edward and his negotiators which 
have survived from these talks 
83 
. give an idea of how they proceeded. 
Apparently one of their difficulties was English disorganisation. 
Several of the English deputation were delayed or unable to attend . 
the papal and French envoys were late in arriving, and the 
information upon which the English case was based, the Great Roll of 
Andrew de Tange, was not available to the English negotiators until 
the earl of Richmond (an eleventh-hour replacement in the English 
camp) arrived with it. He did not leave London until 26 February, 
eight days after the talks should have started. The tone of Edward 
II's letters is of near-desperation. The talks had to achieve at 
least a lengthening of the truce: the English situation . deep in the 
civil strife which finally erupted later in the year with Lancaster's 
rebellion, did not allow Edward II to risk a re-commencement of 
hostilities. The Scots, however, appear to have been intractable. 
After causing "long delays". they displayed little to substantiate 
their avowed desire for peace, and would agree only to a lengthy 
truce. The English ambassadors wished to consult Edward II before 
agreeing to this, and the talks were thus postponed until September. 
The prospect of only an extended truce, with no guarantee of peace to 
follow, must have dismayed Edward II, whose crown was weak and lacked 
support, whose exchequer was dry, and whose military resources were 
sadly depleted. The Scots had apparently played on this weakness to 
push for too favourable a settlement, causing dead-lock in the 
negotiations. The English envoys must also have felt frustrated by 
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this failure. Much time had been wasted, and some at least of the 
embassy did not even receive reimbursement of the expenses which they 
had incurred on the mission. 
84 
The planned resumption of talks in September 1321 finds no place 
in written record, perhaps having been forced into second place by 
the heightening civil tension in England . The talks which were held 
between the Scots and the earl of Lancaster in late 1321 and early 
1322 were treasonable political talks . aimed in the first instance at 
procuring military aid against Edward II. It is not known what terms 
Lancaster offered Bruce in return for his help, but in any event, 
these did not purport to be peace negotiations with the primary 
purpose of ending the war, and as such do not merit discussion here. 
At Christmas 1321 the existing truce expired, and almost I 
immediately the Scots, in accordance with their agreement with 
Lancaster, crossed the border. 
85 
Probably as a result of this 
invasion a commission was given (at the same time as Lancaster was 
holding discussions with the Scots) to Andrew de Harcla to treat with 
Bruce for final peace and concord, or for a truce, and to certify the 
king of what was discussed. It is noteworthy, in the light of future 
events, that the commission included no date of expiry. 
86 
In the 
mean time, after Lancaster's rebellion ended, preparations went ahead 
for another large expedition against the Scots 
87 
, by which Edward II 
yet again hoped "to acquire a final peace". 
88 
War continued 
throughout 1322. Harcla was ordered to defend the march against a 
renewed Scottish invasion in June 
89 
, and there was an abortive 
English invasion of Scotland in August. It reached Edinburgh,, but 
then retreated, starving, to be followed by a Scottish force which 
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routed the English in a skirmish at Byland in Yorkshire , forcing 
Edward II to flee for safety from Rievaulx, abandoning his baggage 
train as spoil for the enemy. 
90 Perhaps as a result of this 
embarrassing incident, Harcla began to lose patience with his king. 
It is not known whether Harcla carried out any negotiations with 
the Scots under the terms of his commission , but the complete 
incompetence of Edward II's rule in the north caused no little 
frustration. Even loyal supporters of the English king could see no 
profit, and considerable loss, in the futile policy of continuing the 
war in the same fashion as had been so patently unsuccessful for many 
years. Before the end of 1322, therefore, Harcla conducted 
negotiations for peace with Robert I. "on behalf of all those in 
England who wish to be spared and saved from war 'with Robert Bruce 
I 
and all his followers". 
91 For this deed, Harcla was attainted for 
treason and executed, an act of manifest injustice which was reversed 
(as far as it could be) under Edward 111.92 Harcla 
'did hold a royal 
commission to treat with Bruce, despite Edward II's protestations to 
the contrary 
93 
. and although the treaty undoubtedly overstepped the 
bounds of that commission,, he did not in the treaty withdraw his 
allegiance to Edward . but rather indicated his intention to persuade 
his king of the profit for both realms to be obtained by it. Its 
treasonable nature lay in the fact that it was made in Harclal s own 
name. Had it run in the king's name, then it could have been regarded 
as a form of draft treaty which, under the terms of Harclal s 
commission,, could have been presented to Edward II for acceptance or 
rejection . Harcla's treaty was to remain in effect, however,, even if 
Edward II did not accept it: therein lay both the treason, and the 
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broadest hint that Edward could hope to receive that many of his most 
loyal supporters were at odds with his totally unproductive Scottish 
policy. The terms of Harcla's treaty were remarkably similar to 
those of the final peace made in 1328, and Harcla claimed, 
undoubtedly sincerely, that his treaty was in the best interests of 
both kingdoms. That he lost his life for this action is more than 
just an example of Angevin wrath: it is a sign of the insecurity and 
desperation of Edward's situation. Harcla's fate is also probably 
indicative of the nature of politics in northern England. It is very 
possible that Harcla's downfall was at least partly the work of an 
opposing faction of northern magnates, who resented his insertion 
into their midst in a rank above that to which his background, in 
their view, entitled him. If that is the case, the national struggle 
I 
was not the true cause of his disgrace, but merely a convenient 
backdrop for his carefully stage-managed removal. 
Within a few months Edward II again bowed to the Scots' 
undeniable military superiority, and acceded to Bruce's request for 
further peace negotiations. 
94 
He somewhat high-handedly began the 
negotiations by granting a truce to "the Scots" , and not to Bruce, 
much to the Scottish king's annoyance. 
95 
Bruce retaliated by 
demanding that Edward change the wording, and grant his envoys 





9 and although he continued 
anti-Scottish diplomatic activity in Flanders98 . and prepared to 
defend his realm against the invasion which, in typical fashion, the 
Scots were preparing to mount if the negotiations failed 99 , he 
nevertheless arranged talks at Newcastle for a final peace. Again . 
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peace, eluded them. but on 30 May at Bishopthorpe . they agreed on a 
truce to last thirteen years from the end of the existing truce (13 
June) . It is noteworthy that Edward II no longer claimed any 
authority in Scotland: the truce was between 
flus [Edward III and the people of England, Wales Gascony 
and Ireland on one side, and the nuncios of Scotlanqooand 
the land and people of Scotland on the other side". 
This implies a unity among the Scots,, and acknowledges Bruce's power 
to represent them. It accords to Bruce the same relationship with 
the Scots as Edward II had with the English - all that is lacking is 
the title 'king' . 
In its fairly complex terms, this truce clearly paved the way 
for a final treaty. It restored remarkably normal relations with 
regard to : trade and commerce, border law,, and non-aggression, and 
I 
dealt with some of the issues covered by the 1328 peace. There seems 
to have been real hope that this truce could turn into a permanent 
peace. It was,, initially at least, upheld, and there are many 
references in the English records to actions taken "according to the 
terms of the truce". 
101 Even after the signing of the truce 
negotiations continued for a final peace, and Edward (following the 
truce agreement) asked the pope that the Scots should receive 
absolution during the negotiations. 
102 Conducts for a further Scots 
embassy were issued in July, August, September and November 1324, in 
which month the bishop of St. Andrews, the earl of Moray and six 
others went south. The English negotiating team (up to twelve in 
number) was high-poweredg closely resembling that which concluded the 
final peace in 1328.103 
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Edward II's enthusiasm for peace at this stage can be largely 
explained by other influences. He was embarking on a war against 
France in Gascony, for which an army was being raised throughout the 
second half of 1324. In connection with this, he sought treaties and 
good relations with many countries, including Spain and Norway 
104 
It 
and the last thing he wanted was a renewal of hostilities in the 
north. A reference from March 1324 to actions which took place 
"lately, during the time of the war between the king and the Scotch 
rebels" 
105 
, indicates that Bishopthorpe was regarded as more than 
merely another ceasefire: Edward II seems genuinely to have believed 
that a secure peace could grow out of it. 
A similar attitude seems to have prevailed in the Scottish camp. 
Robert I's willingness to send further embassies to Edward II, and 
renewed Scottish activity in the papal curia, betray a sense of hope. 
The Bishopthorpe truce allowed the Scots to seek relief from the 
penalties imposed on them by the papacy, without English hindrance. 
Ibis was a major step forward, and almost immediately Moray went to 
the curia on this mission 
106 
, which met with a considerable degree of 
success. Moray apparently put it to the pope that it would be in the 
best interests of peace to address Bruce as King of Scots, an 
argument which was accepted. Because he wished fervently to find 
peace, and in order that negotiations should suffer no hindrance, the 
pope agreed to accord Bruce the kingly title, which neither increased 
his right and honour, nor decreased Edward II's. 
107 
The English king 
was of course furious that the pope had thus acceded to Bruce' s most 
fundamental demand 
108 
. but was nonetheless willing to continue with 
the 1324 negotiations. They were, however, a failure. Again, the 
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Scots would not shift from their demand for recognition of 
sovereignty. This can be surmised from Edward II's account of the 
negotiations, which he says failed because the Scots offered nothing 
new, and stuck to the demands to which he would not accede,, since 
they involved "manifest disinheritance of our royal crown" . The 
Scots had, furthermore, refused to submit to papal arbitration, and 
had voluntarily abandoned the talks. 
109 Their intransigence must 
have been based on certain knowledge that their position was the 
stronger, that they had increasing support, and that eventually 
Edward II, who could not afford a continuing war, would have to 
submit. 
Edward's hopes for peace thus suffered a set-back in early 1325. 
They suffered again in the autumn when the Scots,, doubtless wishing 
to stress their superiority, in frustration at the deadlocked 
negotiations . broke the truce and invaded in the north-east. 
110 In 
the spring of 1326 the Scots were again threatening castles in the 
marches, having apparently attempted to take Carlisle, Norham, 
Alnwick, Dunstanburgh, Wark and Totness. 
ill Edward II professed to 
believe that the rulers of Scotland were ignorant of these incidents, 
and continued to uphold the truce, but it can hardly have been beyond 
his imagination to see a connection between these furtive attacks and 
the Franco-Scottish diplomatic activity which led in April 1326 to 
the renewal of a mutual aid alliance, signed at Corbeil. 
112 This was 
a new diplomatic and military lever for Robert I in his quest for a 
settlement of the English war. Edward II now had powerful allies 
opposed to him both to the north and to the south. He may well have 
intended to start negotiations with the Scots again . but events 
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overtook him, and the nearest he came to doing so was a plan, never 
fulfilled, to accede to Bruce's demands in return for help against 
Isabella and Mortimer113, who invaded England in September. Before 
long Edward II was a prisoner, and early in 1327 he was deposed and 
his son, Edward II, was crowned king in his place. 
Edward II's deposition papers included the charges that he had 
"lost the realm of Scotland through default of good governance" , and 
that he "gave up his land", causing great harm to befall the realm 
and its people. 
114 
The most basic faults in a king . that he had not 
upheld the rights and status of his crown, nor defended his realm 
against enemies, proved the downfall of Edward II. The Scots war had 
played a more than significant part in that downfall. 
Some of the first actions of Edward III and his 'counsellors' , 
Isabella and Mortimer continued Edward II's policy of upholding the 
Bishopthorpe truce. 
115 
Before long, however, bowing to the pressing 
need for security, they also started further negotiations for 
peace. 
116 These negotiations started with Edward III's own 
ratification of Bishopthorpe 
117 
, and later in the spring (30 April) a 
more high-powered embassy was appointed, very similar in its 
personnel to that which conducted the final talks in 1328, to treat 
for "the reformation of peace and concord between us and our faithful 
subjects on one part and Robert Brus and others of Scotland on the 
other" . 
118 These commissions were returned to chancery, apparently 
unused, but nevertheless indicate a willingness to treat seriously 
for peace as late as the end of May 1327, when "twelve persons of 
Scotland of whatever status or condition" were to come to Bamburgh 
for negotiations, under a safe-conduct (also returned to chancery) 
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lasting until mid-June. 
119 These arrangements for the negotiations 
aimed at finding a final peace had originally been made under Edward 
II's name 
120 
. but during the period of his arrest, before Edward 
III's coronation. This probably indicates the policy of those who 
deposed him. They blamed him for losing Scotland, but nevertheless 
wished to put an end to the war which, in the short term at least, 
they recognised could not be won, and was therefore little more than 
a colossal waste of resources. 
These early negotiations by the new administration could be seen 
merely as nominal adherence to the principle of peace. However, the 
appointment of the influential negotiating team in April 1327 gives 
the new goverment a more sincere appearance: one membrane on the 
unprinted membrane of Rotuli Scotiae 
121 
. ordering the -leaders of the 
English fleet to put no obstacle in the way of the negotiators, 
indicates a genuine desire to find a suitable settlement. Even 
later,, in mid-June, another attempt was made: a yet larger embassy 




Bruce, however, following what had been his consistent policy 
since 1314, used the weakness of the English political situation to 
try to force a peace settlement. Banking upon the fact that "one 
reason why the nation had fallen completely away from support of 
Edward [III was that it was weary of political strife " 
123 
. Bruce 
gathered a large army and threatened invasion should the talks 
fail. 124 The sincerity of the threat had been emphasised early in 
February by a provocative attack on Norham. 
125 The original talks 
had been set for 24 May, but as early as 5 April the English 
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government knew that Bruce had ordered "all the power of Scotland" to 
gather on the march on the day of the talks, so that if peace could 
not be obtained quickly, on his terms, he could mount an immediate 
invasion. 126 Clearly, Bruce hoped that the threat of invasion, and 
perhaps even of Scottish annexation of the north 
127 
. so near the 
beginning of the new reign, would force the English to capitulate, 
and give him peace on his own terms. But the new English government, 
wary of its reputation, was unwilling to risk criticism by being so 
obviously humiliated at the hands a long-standing enemy. The y 
therefore raised a large counter- invasion force, and prepared to show 
strength against the Scots. The obvious military preparations on 
either side of the border created such a mood of suspicion in the 
talks, that they disintegrated, as soon as they began, and by 17 June 
the Scots had invaded, 
128 
In early July the English king came north from York, and the 
armies dodged around each other in Northumberland for a month. They 
came face to face in the early days of August . but apart from a 
daring raid on the English camp which almost resulted in the capture 
of Edward III,, there was no engagement,, and the Scots disappeared by 
night, much to the annoyance of the English king, who had hoped for a 
decisive battle. 
129 This raid was a complete humiliation for Edward 
III's goverment. The English amy had been totally outmanoeuvered 
by the Scots, to the extent that a handsome reward was offered for 
any who could lead the English force to within sight of the enemy. 
130 
Unable to do more, the English army was disbanded. 
131 Edward III 
moved his administration to York, until the Scots war was settled132 I 
and called a parliament to discuss the issue. 
133 Before it met, 
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however, Bruce, newly arrived back from a further campaign in 
Ireland134 , personally led another invasion of Northumberland, during 
which he made a successful assault on Norham and granted Northumbrian 
lands. 135 An effort was made to raise another army to combat this 
new invasion, but it was futile. The continuation of the hopeless 
Scottish war could only further weaken the English government, and in 
early October this fact was recognised by the appointment of 
ambassadors to treat for peace. 
136 After an initial acceptance by 
Edward III of the Scots' suggested basis upon which the discussions 
would proceed 
137 
9 several rounds of negotiations took place, 
resulting in March 1328 in a formal quitclaim by Edward III, for 
himself and his heirs and successors, of all rights in Scotland 
sought by him, or his predecessors. Just over two weeks later .a 
far-reaching peace treaty was signed at Edinburgh. 
138 The war , for 
the meantime, was over. 
The foregoing description of the war of Robert I's reign has 
shown how the unity of the state was vital in such a struggle, and 
how confidence in the leader and belief in the justice of his policy 
and his position were necessary in order to bring about this unity. 
The Scots' success was dependent on a belief that the right of the 
nation to be self-reliant and free from exterior domination was at 
the core of the struggle. Once Bruce had achieved the end of winning 
majority, and eventually almost universal, support in Scotland, he, 
as king,, became a symbol of that belief. That this was truly a 
national struggle,, rather than a personal or dynastic affair, is 
emphasised by the threat of the community, expressed in the 
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Declaration of Arbroath . to remove Bruce from power should he fail in 
his duty to maintain the realm's sovereignty. The Declaration of 
Arbroath is propaganda, and as such may be subject to suspicion. The 
description of the interview between Bruce and the envoys of the 
papal legates in 1318 
139 
. however, reinforces the idea that the war 
was founded upon the policy of the community, rather than merely that 
of the king: it is stated that when Bruce wished to speak to the 
envoys, he was dissuaded from doing so by his council, because they 
saw communally that the lack of a royal title was the result of 
English propaganda. 
140 
The strength of resistance put up by the guardians and the 
removal of John Balliol from direct power in 1296 were manifestations 
of the same phenomenon: the protection of the kingdom and its rights 
were not the duty or prerogative of one man, but the function of the 
community. Defeated in war, that community had been eclipsed, or had 
at least lost its direction in 1304. However, with the clear policy 
expressed by Bruce, and his rooting out of those of the Scottish 
community who stood against it, the idea of the nation became the 
focal point of the community's concerted policy. Using Bruce and his 
charismatic leadership as their spearhead, they eventually forced the 
disunited,, and therefore largely ineffective, English opposition to 
bow to their demands. Military ineptitude, financial and 
administrative disorder and chronic civil disunity deprived the 
English of both effective leadership and the concept of a 'national 
cause' . so vital in the quest for domination. 
A deeper insight into the nature of the war can best be gained 
by a study of the justifications given for it. The perpetual 
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medieval quest for peace and Robert I's claim to desire peace above 
all things have already been mentioned. How then, did he justify 
waging war for twenty-two years, earning for himself and his 
followers repeated censure and excommunication. and subjecting his 
kingdom and its people to the grievous devastation of prolonged 
warfare? Brucels, and the community of Scots' own justification for 
this conduct is to be found only in the propaganda which they issued , 
and to some extent in the terms which they demanded for peace. The 
propaganda, albeit frequently a gross distortion of the truth, 
nevertheless reveals the Scots' own concept of their cause, and of 
their situation. It reflects the way in which they decided to 
promote their policy and to justify their actions and view of events. 
Looking firstly at the Declaration of the Clergy issued in 
1309 141 . we find a blatantly propagandist attempt to express clerical 
support for King Robert. On more than one occasion, Edward II was 
prepared to receive to his peace those Scots who wished to withhold 
allegiance to Bruce because of the fear of excommunication. 
142 Any 
victory in medieval times was regarded as 'God-given'; the victory at 
Bannockburn, as has been noted above, was described in these terms 
even by English chroniclers. Thus, to persuade would-be adherents 
that the cause enjoyed the support of God, and of his representative 
on earth, the church, was essential in the creation of the 
all-important national unity and in the diplomatic activity aimed at 
securing foreign aid. If Bruce could claim the backing of the 
church, it would give his rule and his cause a status and a prestige 
far higher than that of the usurper and rebel Edward II would name 
him. 
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The document is fairly short, displaying none of the ancient 
history, rhetorical logic and legal reasoning of, for instance, the 
Processus of Baldred Bisset. It takes up the story from the disputed 
succession, claiming that through the power of evil Balliol was 
chosen to be king in 1292 in the face of the belief, held by all, 
that Bruce had the better claim. Much ham thus befell the kingdom, 
with Balliol's downfall, the reasons for which are not specified. He 
had failed in his role as king, and had left his people exposed to 
oppression and ruin. A divine remedy was required, which was found 
in the form of the grandson of the Bruce claimant, whom, guided by 
God . the people of Scotland chose to be elevated to the throne. He 
was made king by their authority, and held all qualities required of 
a king. He won the land from its oppressors, and was in the true 
tradition of the older kings. The document rejects any alternative 
version of the story, claiming that the submissions quoted by the 
English were void because they had been extorted by force. It ends 
with a re-affirmation of Bruce's rightful kingship and of the clergy 
of Scotland's support for him. 
The underlying theme, and the most basic explanation and 
justification of the conflict, is obviously that English domination 
of Scotland is unjust, and has no rightful basis. This much had been 
a constant thread in all such writings since the reign of Alexander 
III. However . the declaration bears a particular relevance to the 
period in which it was written, and relates its story in a way 
specifically suited to countering the weaknesses of King Robert's 
situation in 1310. The greatest problem which he faced in proving 
his right to rule was the embarrassment posed by the existence of 
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John Balliol . In 1301,, the Scots' cause had been that of Balliol, 
upon whose restoration the kingdom's independence rested. No 
objection was raised as to his legitimacy. In 1310, however, the 
situation was different, with Bruce at the head of a new and fairly 
insecure regime, in a land where doubtless some still believed in 
Balliol's right to rule, and others followed the temporarily dominant 
political trend of subjection to England . To justify Bruce's 
position at the head of this warring nation, the Balliol episode had 
to be explained away. Thus, in contrast to earlier propaganda,, the 
emphasis on Edward I as the only villain of the piece shifts to 
include Balliol. Edward I's evil unjustly promoted Balliol to the 
throne, but Balliol's own failure is blamed equally for the 
oppression of the realm. By thus discrediting Balliol, the Soots 
t 
justify their new version of the story, claiming that earlier ones 
were inspired by the misguided desire to re-establish Balliol's rule. 
This is the first reference to the idea that Balliol was unjustly 
chosen to be king by Edward I, who knew that Bruce was the rightful 
king. It is also, and hardly co-incidentally, the earliest surviving 
justification Of Bruce's position. The need in 1309/10 was not 
primarily to obtain military help against Edward II, since in that 
sense Bruce was in a comparatively strong position - certainly 
stronger than the guardians had been in 1301 when Bisset took his 
Processus to the pope. What Bruce sought above all in 1309/10 was 
recognition. This declaration is thus pitched more specifically in 
favour of Bruce and his position than it is against Edward II. The 
justification of the war itself is completely entwined with Bruce's 
kingship. The divine guidance which led the people to choose him 
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also led his arm in war, whiph was thus not only just, but also 
divinely inspired. 
The Declaration of Arbroath 
143 
was produced ten years later, in 
1320, when Bruce was almost universally recognised as king, and was 
in undeniable control of his kingdom. He had, in effect, won the 
military war against England, being able, as we have seen, to force 
Edward II to the negotiating table through military domination. it 
could only be a matter of time before the recognition which the Scots 
sought was wrested from the English. The papacy, however, in the 
figure of John XXII, was in vehemently anti-Scottish mood. Four 
Scottish bishops were ordered to answer charges at the curia. They 
refused to attend, and in June 1320 they and the king were 
excommunicated again. 
144 But even before this, in April, the 
I 
community of Scots had written to the pope in support of the king, 
and in justification of their actions of the past quarter century. 
In so doing, they behaved exactly as the English king and barons had 
done when faced with similar papal opposition in 1300/01. Papal 
support implied a spiritual content in kingship, and lent greater 
religious authority to a regime. It was difficult, even given the 
backing of the national church, to claim divine leadership and 
God-given right, when faced with consistent and fierce opposition 
from the religious leader of Christendom. The Declaration of 
Arbroath, like Bisset's Processus, is thus directed specifically at 
the pope, and is couched in terms calculated to win his support. The 
two documents are different in approach, of course, because of the 
different contemporary situations. Now, instead of claiming to be a 
papal fief, which had been Bisset's way of eliciting support against 
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English overlordship, the Scots were strong enough in 1320 to offer 
the pope aid in the planned crusade in return for his support, and 
were even confident enough to lay down as his responsibility the 
bloodshed which would ensue if he did not command the English to put 
an end to the war. This document is written from a viewpoint of 
strength and confidence: it is far from the portrait of the weak, 
helpless and defenceless people to be found in earlier propaganda. 
The Declaration of Arbroath stresses the origins of the Scots. 
It is noteworthy that the origin myth used is different from that 
propounded in 1301 . the 1320 version placing more emphasis on the 
prowess, glory and power of the Scots,, who are pictured almost as a 
chosen race. The lineage of one hundred and thirteen kings, "the 
line unbroken, by a single foreigner" is included to highlight the 
legitimacy of the ruling dynasty, a new feature in Scottish 
propaganda. Never before had the concept of an unbroken line of 
kings been so explicitly stated, except in the inauguration ceremony 
itself. The passage which deals with the events of the 1280s and 
1290s is very short. It makes no specific mention of Balliol,, who 
was by now an irrelevance to Bruce; John had died by May 1315 
145 
. and 
the military weakness of England left his son in no position to make 
a bid for Scotland, even if that had been consistent with English 
policy. There is a brief reference to Edward I coming in the guise 
of a friend, to act like an enemy. The tone of this passage is again 
different from earlier works, in that it presents Edward not as the 
cruel oppressor of a weak nation, but as a barbaric enemy whose lust 
for blood and power the Scots encountered righteously and manfully. 
The Scots, according to the declaration, assented to Bruce's rightful 
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kingship, who bore stoically the hardships of the struggle. It is to 
him that the salvation of the land is due . and for that reason , as 
well as the divine providence which gave him the right to be king . 
the Scots must stand by him, as long as he continues to fulfil his 
kingly functions. Should he fail to do so, he would be cast out. 
This document places remarkably little emphasis on justifying 
Bruce's kingship. His right is taken for granted: the lineage, and 
the divine providence are obvious. The attitude to Balliol is 
interesting. As a candidate for the throne, he is ignored: Bruce Is 
rule was under no threat from him. The community, however, had to 
justify their change in stance. Only twenty years previously, they 
had sought restoration of, and had sworn undying loyalty to, quite 
another supposedly legitimate king, apparently now abandoned. Thus 
reflecting the increased awareness of a theoretical basis for the 
monarchy which was one of the effects of the war, they stated that 
should the king refuse to do his duty (by implication, as King John 
had done). they would depose him and choose another. 
In the Declaration of Arbroath,, therefore, the Scots clearly 
reflect the change in their position from 1310. By 1320 they had 
stepped forward into a confident situation where Bruce could ignore 
Balliol, and the community could explain their policy with regard to 
the monarchy clearly and concisely. The reference to Edward's 
oppression is brief, and the Scots could threaten the papacy with 
retaliation. They paint the picture of a 'just war' , and blame the 
bloodshed on the pope's inaction. The message is that Scotland is 
independent, and will remain so. The idea of the papal fief was now 
totally unnecessary: in 1320 the Scots sought not relief . but 
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recognition, respectability and peace, so that trade could flourish, 
and money and lives no longer be wasted in a futile war, in order 
that the country could be re-established in the strong and prosperous 
condition of the 1280s. The justification of the war is the same as 
previously: English domination is unjust, tyrannical and ungodly, 
removing the liberty "which no good man would give up,, unless with 
his life". 
The Scots case used at the futile negotiations held at Bamburgh 
in 1321 
146 
. whilst far longer and more rhetorical than the 
Declaration of Arbroath, nevertheless bears the same salient 
features. Perhaps largely based on Bisset's Processus 
147 
9 it follows 
the style of that document . including drawn-out rhetorical passages 
on earlier history, and long-winded legal arguments. Although more 
detailed, this document' s version of the events of 1286 to date is 
entirely consistent with that of the Declaration of Arbroath. it 
contains less in the way of justification of the community's stance, 
since this is not their declaration of support for Bruce, but the 
royal case, in use directly against Edward II's. 
These propaganda documents can be seen to fit very closely their 
own time and circumstance. Each one closely represents the 
requirements which led to its composition. The rhetoric, the 
partiosanship, and the sheer untruth of some of their assertions . do 
not discredit them as historical sources. They were written as 
propaganda, in an attempt to achieve a political purpose which, in 
effect, remained constant between 1296 and 1328. The best means of 
achieving that purpose varied according to when and how it was under 
discussion. Thus propaganda documents of different dates are widely 
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at variance with each other. They tell us, therefore, how the Scots 
viewed their own political situation at any given time. It is only 
in these documents that we find the Scots writing about themselveso 
and thus only through them can we find out what they thought. For 
example, by comparing the propaganda of 1320/21 with that of 1301,, 
one finds a greater emphasis on the election of kings by the people, 
and on the unity of the people behind their leader, who, it is 
stressed, is divinely inspired and upheld. This demonstrates that 
throughout the war there was a strengthening in the community of the 
feeling of political and causal oneness. The Scots became, in their 
own minds, a single people, fighting a single enemy. In other words, 
a major result of the war was a resurgence and intensification of the 
concept of nationhood. These documents contain practical expression 
of political theory, and one can see in them the growing 
self-awareness which was so large a part in the development of 
political identity in the medieval realm. 
The political pressure which the protracted war exerted on 
Scotland forced the Scots into explicit articulation of 
constitutional theories. As Bruce's position had to be justified and 
clarified, so the expression of political ideas became more distinct, 
and the ideas themselves developed and became more lucid. Thus, for 
example, by the end of the period,, the need for a monarch to have the 
consent of his people as well as dynastic right, and the idea of 
unity behind the king, are much more clearly expressed than at the 
beginning. 
In justifying their war and their support for their king, 
therefore,, the Scots defined the basis of their realm's political 
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structure: the relationship of king and community. They also . for 
the first time, drew a clear distinction between patriotism and 
support for a dynasty or personality, and although a sense of 
nationhood can rightly be said to have existed in Scotland for some 
time before 1320, the first practical expression of that idea dates 
from that year . and it is thus to this period that we must assign the 
Scots' own ascription of that status to themselves. 
One of the Scots' major justifications of the war was, 
ironically, their desire for peace. In the Declaration of Arbroath 
they asked the pope to command Edward II to "suffer them to live at 
peace" . They could not do so in freedom because of his aggression . 
and so had to fight a self-defensive war. In 1301 Bisset had pleaded 
with the pope to help put an end to the English aggrespion so that 
"the men of Scotland might continue in their accustomed manner, in 
devotion to God, to you, and to the Roman church, and to be strong to 
148 fight for peace". Until persecution stopped, there could be no 
peace. Therefore they fought for recognition of their king, in order 
to put an end to the persecution. Bruce himself, as is noted above, 
claimed to wish for peace above all other things. A study of the 
terms sought in peace negotiations might help to ascertain the 
sincerity of this claim, and may also back up what the propaganda 
tells us regarding the justification of the war. 
The first of the sets of negotiations for which more than very 
vague details remain is that which resulted in the two-year truce 
signed in 1319.149 The truce evidently included clauses, at the 
request of the Scots, that further negotiations, aimed at peace, 
should be carried out , and that the castle of Harbottle on the border 
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should be either handed over to the Scots or destroyed , if no 
permanent peace was made. This indicates that Bruce did have a 
genuine desire for peace, but also that he saw its achievement only 
through military pressure. The upsurge of military activity which 
seems to have heralded and followed almost every set of negotiations 
for peace has been alluded to above, and the arrangement regarding 
Harbottle is consistent with this. Bruce wished to have peace, but 
was realistic enough to seek some military gain, should his hope 
prove unfounded. 
The 1321 negotiations have left few records,, other than the 
propaganda cited above, and the letters between the English king and 
his envoys, which complain about Scottish intransigence. 
150 Onc e 
again, the only certainty is that the Scots insisted upon the 
sovereignty of their realm and king - probably the only demand to 
which Edward II was not prepared to accede. 
The treaty made between Andrew de Harcla. and Bruce in 13231 
51 is 
interesting because of the similarity of its terms to those of the 
final treaty made in 1328: peace, independence of both kingdoms, 
recognition of Bruce and his successors, payment by Bruce of forty 
thousand merks 
152 
. and marriage of the heir-male of Scotland. 
Bruce's only major demands were for the recognition of Scotland's 
independence and of his crown's royal authority. The other terms 
were fairly generous, again reflecting a real wish to establish 
peace, and indicating that it was not straightforward malice which 
prolonged the war. Bruce was prepared to back up his military 
pressure with payment, if his demands would be met,, and this fact 
corroborates the propagandist statements regarding the justification 
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of the war. Lasting peace could only be found through an end to 
English claims of dominion over Scotland . 
In the same year, the official truce made at BishopthorPe 
153 
was 
undoubtedly intended to clear the path for a final peace. Again, the 
process was initiated by Bruce at a time when Edward II was under 
severe pressure. Its terms included non-aggression, cessation of 
castle-building in the marches, safe-conduct to Scotland for Scottish 
ships forced into English ports, free passage of merchants and 
envoys . and freedom for Bruce to seek absolution from the papacy. 
These terms do not touch on the underlying causes of the war , and 
ignore the one really contentious issue. However, they show what 
both kings wished to obtain from peace: advantages in trade, 
communication, international relations, and security. In this truce, 
t 
many of the more mundane points at issue between the countries were 
ironed out, so leaving space for disscussion of the remaining 
problems. It is noticeable that the terms of this truce were much 
more favourable to Bruce than were those of the final peace. For 
peace,, he was prepared to pay heavily. For a truce . which he could 
force on the English through military action, he could afford to be 
more unbending. It is probably fair to say that whereas Robert I. in 
the end . bought peace from Edward III, at Bishopthorpe Edward II paid 
dearly for a truce from the Scots. This reflects the needs of the 
two kings: Edward II required military security, whilst Bruce 
required final settlement of the basic issues in dispute. 
By January 1324 the pope clearly recognised that the way to find 
peace was through compliance with Bruce's demands for recognition 
154 
9 
and even as early as 1320, in his response to the Declaration of 
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Arbroath 155, he indicated that only through mature negotiation and 
settlement of the main issue could peace be found. In his letters to 
the English king at the same time 
156 
. he exhorted Edward 
II to think 
of the benefits of peace, not only for England and Scotland, but also 
for the whole world. In a phrase which shows a clear understanding 
of the situation . he urges Edward to make peace "between your kingdom 
and the kingdom of Scotland" 
157 
. and made reference to Bruce as "the 
ruler of Scotland". 
158 It seems possible that even before the 
Declaration of Arbroath the pope was tiring of Edward IIIS 
head- in-the- sand approach, and realised that only through formal 
approval of Bruce's situation would peace be found. 
The disaster of Weardale persuaded Edward III and his government 
that no military victory was possible. It also persuaded them of the 
futility of truces, which, it seemed, merely existed in order to be 
broken. In effect, they at last acknowledged that peace could only 
be achieved through the settlement of the root causes of the war - 
the point which the Scots had been making for many years. The Scots' 
keenness for peace (and their hurry, given the severe illness of 
Robert I) made them give generous terms to the English king in return 
for recognition of Scotland's independence and of Bruce's status as 
king, and for a quittance of all claims to dominion over Scotland. 
That the English at last gave in on this point was realistic, and a 
sign that they too genuinely wished to secure peace. The quitclaim 
was given, and the other demands (including a mutual striving to lift 
papal censure) were met. In return, Bruce paid f2O, OOO, and agreed 
to a marriage between his son, David, and Edward III's sister, Joan, 
with a suitable dower for Joan in Scotland. Only the matter of those 
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of both realms who had been disinherited in one or other of the 
kingdoms because of their war-time allegiance was left unsettled. 
159 
But this was not sufficient to disrupt the proceedings. Both kings 
gained what they wanted in 1328: for Edward III it was security and 
peace; for Robert I it was recognition. 
The end of the war,, for Robert I. was its justification. The 
recognition which he gained from Edward III was a testimonial to the 
strength and validity of his kingship. For Bruce, once he had become 
king, could not relinquish the concept of his total authority over 
Scotland. To accept any higher secular authority would be to negate 
his kingship. The Declaration of Arbroath, which,, although in the 
name of the community, must have been at least approved by the king, 
was most specific on the point. The king who did not uphold the 
fundamental liberty of the kingdom would be cast out. Ball iol , who 
failed in this task, was removed from power, the community subjecting 
him to their dictate. The notion of a vassal kingdom, whilst it 
cannot have been unknown in Scotland, certainly played no part in the 
Scots' own constitutional self-analysis. The most basic duty of the 
king was to protect the kingdom and its people from oppression or 
subjection. Alienation of any part of the possessions or rights of 
the crown were regarded in the same light. To fight against English 
domination was thus Brucels duty as a king. Once the community had 
accepted his kingship, it was equally their duty to support him, and 
direct him in the struggle. The Scots' belief in the status of their 
kingdom was their justification for the war. 
The conflict arose because England and Scotland held the same 
theories in this respect. In 1320, notaries public who claimed 
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imperial authority were declared inadmissible in England: "our 
kingdom of England is immune from all imperial subjection, and from 
the beginnings of the earth has been separate". 
160 
Notaries who 
acted by imperial authority, implying that it was a higher authority 
than the crown, were thus acting to the disinheritance of the crown, 
and were a danger to the kingdom. Edward II, as has been noted 
above, was charged with having lost Scotland. He had allowed the 
alienation of rights and possessions of the crown. The two sides 
thus fought from the same standpoint, both claiming the immutable 
rights of their crowns as their justification for the dispute . The 
eventual Scottish victory was the result not of the any greater 
success by the Scots in proving their right, but of their strength, 
as against the English kingdom's weakness. 
That strength, however, was not only military. In a manner of 
speaking, the war was won by the Scots because of the effect it had 
on them. When Bruce made himself king in 1306 his motives may well 
have been little more than those of an adventurer - personal 
ambition, and the desperate need to justify his act of sacrilege in 
the Greyfriars church of Dumfries. Having become king, however, he 
had to make good his claim and fulfil his responsibilities to those 
who accepted him as their lord. To do so . he required to be master 
of all Scotland . He could not carry out the duties of a king if he 
did not rule the land. The first years of his struggle were thus 
spent in fighting to win over the community of Scots. By 1310 he had 
largely done so: most Scots who opposed him were by then in exile . 
and no longer a part of the community. The years after 1310, 
encompassing the great victory at Bannockburn and the beginnings of 
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his domination over the north of England . made firmer his hold on the 
community and their increasingly unified support for him. Hi s 
success increased not only his personal power and prestige, but also 
that of the 'crown' as an abstract entity. The role of the monarchy 
in war was to lead. The more successful the lead, the greater the 
unity behind the leader; the king thus had more power to wield . and a 
following which was ever more ready to accede to his wishes. The 
result was a strengthening of the status of the crown in the realm - 
the exaltation of kingship. This is demonstrated by the way in which 
Bruce's somewhat awkward constitutional position was so succinctly 
justified in the later years of his reign. In 1306, Bruce received a 
luke-warm reception from the community. His claim to be king, when 
John, in whose name he had been a guardian only a few years before, 
t 
was still alive, was a little shaky. By 1310, however , and even more 
strikingly in 1320, the community was prepared to defend King 
Robert's rigbt to the tbrone against any gainsayers, even going to 
the extent of re-writing recent history in order to do so. This was 
not merely personal support for Bruce, the charismatic leader: it 
reflects the status of the kingship which he represented. His right, 
which stemmed from both heredity and the community's assent,, was of 
fundamental importance to the status of the realm, to the protection 
of which the community was dedicated, even to the point of war. 
The community itself also increased in strength throughout the 
war. The realm' s reliance on the community for stable rule in the 
periods of guardianship had done much to strengthen the concept and 
role of the community. It had been largely eclipsed, however, in 
1304, and in 1306 was weak and hopelessly divided. Once Bruce had 
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worked to re-create the community in the early years of the war, it 
was able to regain the status which it had enjoyed at the end of the 
previous century. The precedents for rule by the community could not 
be ignored, and gave that body a prominence and status higher than it 
had in many European countries. As the war required a strong king, 
it also required a strong community, and so the increasing power of 
the king was matched by a corresponding growth in the part played by 
the community. Their role as advisers of the king, and the control 
which they could exercise over him, have already been noted. This 
strengthening of the central government helped to rebuild the nation 
out of the depths of the war. The economy revived, and as the war 
progressed successfully, the nation became more determined, as well 
as stronger, leading it eventually to victory. 
This picture may be contrasted with that of England in the same 
period, where weak royal rule and factionalism amongst the community 
seriously reduced the status and effectiveness of both. Div id ed 
loyalties destroyed any unity of purpose, and any chance of military 
success. Goverment, justice and economy all failed. The victory of 
the Scots was not only military: it was the victory of a strong 
ideology over a weak, of a powerful sense of national unity over 
internecine strife and demoralisation. 
This is not to say that Scottish nationhood was itself a new 
product of the years 1306 to 1328. It had been developing for many 
years. The confident, assertive kingship of Alexander II and 
Alexander III, whose reigns were remembered as a 'golden age' . had 
bolstered the strength of the crown. Their work in defining the 
boundaries of the kingdom, particularly in the west, had helped to 
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create an increasingly cohesive unit, with a strong central 
goverment. Alexander III's refusal to do homage to Edward I for his 
kingdom in 1278 emphasised this sense of cohesion . and the separate 
identity which is the hallmark of nationhood. The ease with which 
the guardianship was established at a time of constitutional crisis 
in 1286 is another testimonial to the unity of spirit which had grown 
in Scotland during the previous generations. 
Thus Bruce, as he made his bid for kingship, had a strong 
tradition on which to build. After a period of weakness in 
1286-1306, the monarchy could again re-assert itself as in the 
thirteenth century. The community had the strengths of guardianship 
upon which to build. The exaltation of these two elements, and their 
coalescing to uphold and reinforce the nation can be most clearly 
seen in the propaganda. The Declaration of Arbroath encapsulates the 
height and power of both king and community. Both were then at the 
peak of their power, and working together with a unity of purpose and 
a self-awareness which brings to light the concept of the medieval 
realm at its most powerful. The war did not end until 1328. The 
Scots had emerged from it long before that. Certainly by 1320, and 
perhaps even by 1310, the exaltation of both king and community which 
had been largely the result of the war had intensified the sense of 
nationhood, creating a unity which gave the kingdom a new 
effectiveness in its quest for independence. 
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THE REIGN OF ROBERT I 
300 THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE REALM 
Many commentators of the reign of Robert I have concentrated 
solely on his successful defence of the kingdom's independence his 
fame seems to rest entirely upon his military acumen. However, the 
ability to defend the realm, although of undeniable importance, was 
not the only ingredient of successful kingship. The preface to 
Regiam Majestatem names 
"two things necessary for a king,, arms to overcome his 
enemies, and laws to rule his peaceful subjects .... The 
king's majesty should not only bp made glorious by 
military power ... but should also be strengthened by 
laws... so that, alike in peace and in war, our 
illustrious king, who rules over this realm and who has 
no superior but God ... may with such felicity conduct 
himself and govern the realm committed to his charge by 
God that by the might of his strong right hand he may 
crush the insolence of the violent and unruly and with 
the sceptre of equity may moderate justice to all humble 
and obedient folk, and may thus all the days of his life 
be victorious in subduing his foes and be recognised 2 as a 
just and impartial judge in governing his subjects. " 
This was, of course, the picture of an ideal world - the dream of a 
constitutional theorist. But it had its roots in the facts of 
political life. In reality a king could not rule by the sword alone. 
The contract which existed between a king and his people forced him 
to uphold certain elements of the realm's dignity. One, as has been 
amply demonstrated, was the freedom from foreign domination. Another 
was equity of justice, and the right of each man to live freely and 
cmfortably, according to his station. The Great Seal of the kingdom 
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exemplifies this point: one side shows the king on horsebacki 
wielding sword and Shield; the other shows the king enthronedq 
bearing the sceptreq embodying authority and justice. Fordun 
displays the same attitude in his judgemental comments about kings : 
those who gained his praise ruled equitably and justly, as well as 
victoriously, and brought profit to the realm. This was no mere 
theoretical fantasy; it was reflected in the expectations of the 
governed. In 1309 the "community of Scotland" (or at least a 
pro-English section of it) supplicated Edward II that the conditions 
of the peace granted in 1304 should be observed. 
3 That peace,, and 
the ordinance for the government of Scotland which followed it, were 
concerned with the administration of the kingdom, not just its 
defence. In 1312 the men of various Scottish sheriffdoms complained I 
of , and pleaded with the English king to remedy,, the tyrannical 
behaviour of their local officers, who acted against "the common law 
4 
of the land" .A case which came to Edward II's court in July 1312 
regarding the inheritance of those who were under age in 1304, which 
clearly accepted the settlement of 1304 as the status quo,, referred 
to women who were "born and baptised in Scotland, as proved before 
the chancellor of Scotland by its laws and customs,,. 
5 
To these 
people, as their lord and ruler, Edward II was bound to do justice. 
In peace and war he had an obligation to administer the realm justly, 
for the profit of all. 
This fair administration did not merely extend to the settlement 
of disputes between his subjects: the making of laws to govern their 
future actions, his tutelage of the realm's economy, his support for 
the church and its teachings, and his willingness to rely on good 
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counsel were all essential elements in the basis of the king's power 
within his realm. If the king's administration was seen to benefit 
the realm as a whole, then justice could take its part naturally in 
the maintenance of peace. If obedience to the king was in the 
interests of all, then those who acted against his peace were the 
enemies of all, and would receive their just deserts with the 
approbation of the people at large. Without the support of the 
community, which had to be won by good goverment, as well as by 
warlike achievement, a king, no matter how good his intentions,, had 
no means of establishing his authority. Thus, in Alexander III's 
reign the unrighteous would "put a rope round their necks, ready for 
hanging, were that his will and pleasure, and bow themselves under 
his rule" That king based his leadership not on the sword . but on I 
firm and prosperous rule, on the equal "fear and love" with which he 
was viewed, and on the "security in steadfastness of peace and quiet" 
which his reign achieved. 
6 
Robert I claimed Alexander III as his last royal predecessor 
79 
and had thus to model his own government on the worthy example of 
that much eulogised king. A study of the peaceful rule of Robert I 
will show how the king's position in the realm had changed in the 
eventful course of the forty years since Alexander III's death. 
That Robert I began the establishment of his administration at 
the earliest possible moment can hardly be doubted. The evidence, 
however,, is scanty; we know much more about his warlike exploits than 
about his appointment of officials. Certainly by October 1308 
8. 
and 
probably a good deal earlier. Bernard de Linton had been appointed 
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chancellor, and the issuing of acta as early as May 1307 implies that 
within a few months of his return to Carrick Bruce had established a 
functioning chancery. The chamberlain was appointed before March 
1309.9 The extreme paucity of Scottish record material for the early 
years of the reign make it impossible to tell exactly how the 
sheriffs were treated, but there is no doubt that he continued to be 
the most important local official. It seems likely that as Bruce 
gained control over an area, any sheriff who did not come to the 
king's peace was replaced. The early signs of Bruce's awareness that 
he must control the land and its revenues if he was to gain the 
kingdom, make it inconceivable that the establishment of a loyal 
network of local officers was not a matter of the utmost priority. 
Certainly, by 1317-18, reference to the sheriffs of the kingdom was 
commonplace 
10 
, amply demonstrating that they were taken for granted 
as the indispensable local tier of goverment. Not enough sheriffs' 
names survive from the early part of the reign to allow any 
assessment of how many continued in office from the days of Edward 
I's rule, but if other aspects of Robert I's policy are to be used as 
a model, it seems probable that those who readily came to his peace 
would retain their positions. 
Evidence for the effectiveness of any part of Bruce Is 
administration in the early part of his reign is scarce. Only by 
examining the king's few 'acts of government' in these years, and 
occasionally by reading between the lines of the English 
documentation can any gauge be made of the efficiency of his rule. 
For example, the king's granting of charters in May 1307 and in 
March, August and November of 1309 
12 
, implies more than merely the 
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existence of a functioning chancery. It also indicates that there 
was an administration capable of making effective the grant of lands, 
and that the king had gained control, military, fiscal, and 
admiýstrative. When the English lost their hold of an area , as they 
did , for instance,, in the north-east in 1308, they lost its revenue. 
That revenue was then gathered by the Scottish administration which 
was the means of holding the land once gained. Bruce's control over 
the kingdom rested more on his holding the land and its revenue than 
its castles, and so it was an essential feature of his attempt to 
take the realm that he had an organisation capable of administering 
the land as soon as it fell under his sway. 
Bruce's authority in the kingdom also involved the granting 
of land which had been forfeited by enemies to his own faithful 
supporters. The ReEister of the Great Seal contains many charters of 
land in most parts of the country which was granted in this way. 
Thus when Bruce became militarily dominant in an area, within a 
relatively short time he could be assured of the active support of 
those who held the land . which was thus more receptive to his rule, 
allowing the speedy establishment of an effective royal 
administration. 
Similarly, Bruce's attempts to keep open trade routes, and his 
encouragement of, for instance, the French connection, implies a 
financial organisation capable of channelling the revenue thus gained 
to the needs of government. The war was expensive: references later 
in the reign 
13 
make it clear that the crown had been severely 
impoverished during the last few decades. What revenue by way of 
trade came into the kingdom (and also what goods left it) must have 
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been subject to strict regulation. Thus, far from there being little 
or no central control over the kingdom, a state which one might 
expect to have prevailed at such a time, it is probable that there 
was in this period a great degree of centralisation in goverment. 
It is impossible to prove this on the strength of the available 
material . but a sign of it may be found in the increased royal 
control over the western seaboard of the kingdom. Alexander III was 
largely responsible for bringing this area to recognise Scottish 
sovereignty. King John made an attempt to convert this nominal rule 
into actual control by introducing royal officers into the area. 
14 
Robert I created a new sheriffdom of Argyll 
15 
, and even established, 
in the later years of his reign, a royal castle at Tarbert on the 
Kintyre peninsula. 
16 His firm dealings with the lords of Argyl, l in 
the war ensured his control over the area,, and whilst details are 
few,, it seems probable that Robert I was the first Scottish king to 
make good his authority over the west coast of the kingdom. 
The exchequer records from the end of the reign, and the other 
surviving documentation, show the administration of the realm, both 
in terms of fiscal activity and inheritance of land . to have 
proceeded as fully as in previous reigns, and in a manner which shows 
great continuity with the past. 
The fundamental importance of justice in the role of the 
medieval king makes an examination of Robert I's judicial 
organisation and activity basic to any study of his government. At 
least Robert Keith had been appointed justiciar between the Forth and 
the Mounth by 1310 
17 
, and although the names of other justiciars do 
not appear to have survived, it can hardly be doubted that, when 
414 
possible, others were appointed. The earl of Moray's position as 
'king's lieutenant' north of the Forth 
18 
may also have been an 
interim arrangement until more permanent provision could be made. 
19 
These few references give us only a hint of the judicial organisation 
under Robert I, but it is enough to reveal that, as with the other 
instruments of government, the system was established early in the 
reign, and followed much the same pattern as had previously existed - 
The justice dealt out by these royal officers was also little 
different from times past: the war had scarcely any effect on the 
complaints of one man against his neighbour or lord. Inquests were 
heard to assess the legality of claims to land 
20 
and other rights, 
and their results were retoured to chancery, in order that 
appropriate action could be taken by the king. 
21 Appeals against 
t 
miscarriage of justice found their way through the system to receive 
royal attention: justiciars were ordered to bring the parties and the 
court process to the royal court for a hearing to re-examine the 
false judgement given by Henry, serjeant of Colliston, in a case 
regarding land-holding in the north-east. 
22 Although specific cases 
do not survive in written record, there can be no doubt that criminal 
justice - theft, murder and the like - figured just as largely in the 
courts of Robert I's reign as under any other king. His 
legislation 23 makes this clear, referring to theft, debt, and 
generally to both civil and criminal actions. 
The second of King Robert's statutes (after the confirmation of 
the rights and liberties of the church) ordered that justice was to 
be carried out equally to poor and rich alike "according to the 




two acts state that "no-one be a conspirator nor inventor of tales or 
rumours through which matter of discord may spring between the lord 
king and his people" , and that if any noble or I great man of the 
kingdom' has a complaint against another, he shall not raise discord 
between them (as had been done after the death of Alexander III) , but 
should conduct his case "according to the laws of the land". 
25 The 
latter statute was made in order to "promote good will among the 
nobles and maintain peace among them and the people". Any who dA 
not adhere to it would be punished as "a breaker of the king's 
peace". These acts remind us that the judicial system was geared, as 
well as to every-day affairs, to the control of the nobility by the 
crown. Mention has been made of the crucial role of the community 
(largely composed, in effect, of the nobility) in the maintenance of f 
Scottish sovereignty throughout the war. The self-importance which 
must have accompanied this elevation in status during the absence of 
a king, had to be tempered by Robert I in order to create the unity 
necessary to win the war. That the nobles should live by the law, 
and at peace . was important for the independence of the realm as well 
as the well-being of its inhabitants. 
Most of the dealings between Robert I and his nobility of which 
we have record were concerned with his treatment of those who were . 
or had been, opposed to him in the war. As has been mentioned above, 
he was willing to make terms with them, to cajole them into his 
favour: such was his attitude to the earl of Strathearn 
26 
, the earl 
of Ross (who retained his lands after eventually coming to peace) 
27 
, 
probably Alexander of Argyll 
28 
, and even Thomas Randolph, who was to 
be one of Bruce' s right-hand men, and yet was on the English side of 
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the struggle from after Methven until late in 1308.29 Many other 
names, mostly of lesser men, could be added to the list, and many 
charters enrolled under the Great Seal confirm their lands, or reward 
them for their service with those forfeited by less accommodating 
adversaries. 
30 
A pardon survives, of a rebel who fought against King 
Robert (or perhaps David II) in a castle garrison, and who later came 
to peace and had all his lands restored to him. 
31 
Those, such as the earl of Buchan and John of Argyll , who 
refused to accept peaceful persuasion, suffered, as well as military 
action against them, the full judicial consequences of their 
recalcitrance. Roderick of Islay, for instance, was forfeited in 
parliament as late as 1325 
32 
. and there are many references in the 
Great Seal records and elsewhere to lands forfeited by rebels. Those 
I 
who died against the king's peace were 
"perpetually disinherited of all estates, lands and 
tenements in the kingdom of Scotland, and ... removed from 
all hey, ýditary rights ... for themselves and their 
heirs". -)j 
Anyone who refused to aid the king in the defence of the kingdom was 
"deemed to be a traitor to the realm, and to have committed the crime 
34 
of lease-majesty" . 
Not all judicial business concerning the nobles was related to 
their allegiance in the war, however. A dispute between the abbot of 
Dunfermline and John Campbell regarding lands in Perthshire was 
settled in parliament in 1323 
35 
. and other similar processes are also 
extant. The most notable example, however, of the king in judgement 
over his subjects is from 1320. In August of that year a plot was 
hatched to dispose of Robert I and enthrone in his place Sir William 
de Soulis,, the son of the Nicholas de SouliS36 who had lodged a claim 
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37 for the throne in 1290. The motive for the plot is obscure, 
although one might conjecture that in Scotland, as in England, there 
was growing frustration with the seemingly endless warfare. The 
treason was unearthed and reported to the king by Murdoch of 
Menteith 
38 
, and never came near to fruition. Apparently, however, a 
reasonable number of prominent members of the community were involved 
in the affair. Fordun mentions the countess of Strathearn, Sir David 
de Brechin, Sir Gilbert de Malherbe, Sir John de Logie, Eustace de 
Maxwell, Walter de Barclay, sheriff of Aberdeen, Patrick de Graham, 
Roger de Mowbray, and other lesquires' . The seriousness of the 
threat to establish Soulis as king must be very doubtful, but 
nevertheless the conspiracy prompted in King Robert the most 
vitriolic response. His severity must partly have been a means of 
signifying that such disloyalty would in no way be allowed to weaken 
the hard-won unity of the Scottish realm, but -it may equally have 
been an understandable reaction to a perhaps unexpected and 
undoubtedly disturbing threat to the king's authority. The justice 
meted out to the conspirators was harsh . but fair. Soulis, who 
confessed, and the countess of Strathearn, were sentenced to life 
imprisonment; Brechin, Malherbe and Logie were executed, having first 
been drawn through the streets of Perth behind horses. The body of 
Mowbray,, who had died before trial, was brought to parliament to have 
judgement passed; his sentence (for drawing and hanging) was not 
carried out, however, due to the king's distaste for desecrating the 
bod y. Maxwell, Barclay and Graham were found not guilty, and were 
released. It is unfortunate that no formal record survives of these 
proceedings. The chronicle accounts are fairly consistent, however, 
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and Barbour's description of the disgust with which Ingram 
d'Umphraville viewed the execution of Brechin is tempered by Fordun's 
statement that some of the conspirators were released 0 and bY the 
reverence shown for Mowbray's corpse. Here is a picture of a king in 
judgement, using his position to exert undisputed authorityq and Yet 
doing so within the framework of 'the laws and customs of the land'. 
As befitted the 'good king'. Bruce was firm and severe, but 
nonetheless fair, in his administration of justice. 
The main corpus of legislation by Robert I is to be found in the 
record of the parliament which met at Scone in December 1318.39 
There are some twenty-eight acts (plus one addition, which does not 
appear to belong with the rest 
40 ), which are preceded by a general 
brieve for their proclamation . and a preamble stating that the acts 
were made 
"with the common counsel and express consent of the 
prelates, earls, barons and freeholders... and the whole 
community" 
about affairs relating. to the king and kingdom, 
"and which might in future touch upon the honour of God 
and the church, and the amending of his land and the 
defence of his people, for the maintenance of the peace 
of his land". 
Some of these acts - those providing for the maintenance of the 
rights and liberties of the church (which is described as sancta 
ecclesia Scoticana) , and for the administration of justice to rich 
and poor alike 
41 
, for example - are commonplace, and bear little 
specific significance for this reign. A large number relate to civil 
or criminal justice: no respite was to be given to those convicted of 
pleas pertaining to the crown, unless by special privilege granted by 
the king or his predecessors; those indicted to appear before a 
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justiciar were to be excused only by proven illness or absence in the 
king's service; those hindering the pursuit of evil-doers were to be 
indicted; no poinding for debt was to be carried out unless in the 
presence of a royal officer, and controls were set on the amount of 
such distraint and the circumstances in which it could be excercised; 
heavy penalties were imposed for harbouring thieves; and a number of 
procedural points were laid down 
42 
. all with the aim of making the 
courts more effective and fairer. Fully half of the legislation is 
concerned with the equitable administration of justice, a far higher 
proportion than is contained in, for instance . the famous legislation 
of James I of 1424. The reason for this may well be that over a 
period of some thirty years of intermittent civil strife and warfare, 
judicial practice had been neglected and was, by the time Bruce was 
I 
able properly to attend to such affairs,, in a poor state of repair. 
In such a situation it is likely that the officers of the crown, or 
even of the royal household, would be accustomed to using their 
influence in the judicial process. The two acts forbidding such 
behaviour 
43 
thus fit neatly into the scenario. Without going into 
great detail about the particular provisions made, it seems clear 
from this legislation that Bruce regarded the restoration of an 
efficient judicial system as a priority, which shows that the 
much-stated position of the king as the I fount of justice' was no 
mere rhetorical fantasy. The king had a duty to protect his subjects 
from injustice, and if the legal system was in a state of decay, as 
it very probably was in early four teenth-century Scotland , then the 
king was obliged to attempt to reform it. 
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Other acts equally reflected the nature of the period which had 
preceded this legislation,, and the state of warfare which was to 
continue for a further decade: trespasses committed by those in the 
king's host were to be punished in accordance with the common lawl 
and those in the host were to be given the necessary sustentation and 
deterred from theft of provisions and other supplies; nobles were 
ordered to bring complaints against each other to court, rather than 
settle them by civil disturbance, as had been done after the death of 
Alexander III; no conspiracies were to be made, nor malicious rumours 
spread "through which discord may spring up between the lord king and 
his people". 
44 
The armour and weaponry required to be possessed by 
the king's subjects was laid down, and the sheriffs and lords of the 
kingdom were ordered to hold wapinschaws to ensure that each man 
could provide his quota. 
45 
The confusion created by the war in the inheritance of land. and 
the many changes in its possession, are also reflected in the 
legislation. Several acts deal with unjust loss of fees, 
inheritance, and infeftment. 
46 
It is noticeable that whereas 
hitherto the brieve of recognition had been valid only for 
inheritance from the mother, father, brother, sister, uncle and aunt, 
it was henceforth to be valid also for inheritance from the 
grandparents. 
47 
This was probably a recognition that many sons had 
died in the war,, and inheritance direct from grandparents would 
become common in the oncoming generation. Some cases of confusion 
over rights and possession caused by the long lapse in strong 
government came before King Robert himself 
48 
, and these acts must be 
seen as an attempt to update the common law, or the 'customs of the 
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realm' . to cope with the situation brought about by the drastic 
constitutional and governmental difficulties, which were, after all, 
unprecedented in 'modern' times. 
49. Only two of the acts touched on financial affairs . churchmen 
were forbidden from sending money or goods outwith the realm without 
the king's permission, because of the poverty of the kingdom on 
account of the war . and strict control was to be exercised over 
salmon fishing, presumably in order to safeguard the salmon, a 
valuable export commodity. These two measures re-emphasise the point 
that the legislation of 1318 was aimed at restoring the land to a 
stable and prosperous condition, by repairing the damage done by the 
years of strife. In this respect King Robert's 'peaceful rule' was 
part and parcel of his war effort. By fair, firm and stable 
I 
government, and by improving the economic situation, he would 
increase both the nation's unity and the crown's resources, both of 
which contributed to the likelihood of eventual victory. 
The wealth of the realm, and specifically of the crown, was 
vital to the maintenance both of a strong war effort and of royal 
authority. Parliament, as the forum for the community's approval of 
the royal will, was thus to a great extent a 'fund-raiser' for the 
crown,, and spent much of its time on matters economic. 
Robert I's consistent attempts to maintain trading links with 
lands overseas, and also with England . have already been adverted to. 
The economic support given to the Scots by trade with the Low 
Countries, France,, Ireland and Scandinavia cannot have been without 
influence in the outcome of the war. King Robert's awareness of the 
importance of this aspect of his rule is emphasised by his capture of 
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sea-ports such as Aberdeen . and his careful relationships with other 
kings. The letter to the French king of March 1309 must have had 
commercial implications, and the agreement made with Hakon V of 
Norway in October 1312 50 , as well as confirming the Treaty of Perth, 
sought to reduce the tension which had caused men of both countries 
to be imprisoned and their goods confiscated. King Robert wished to 
have peaceful trading relationships with all realms. It is 
noteworthy that in times of truce Bruce took every opportunity to 
trade in England . and the later truces between the countries contain 
measures specifically designed to ease Scotland's commercial 
situation. 
51 The success of the Scots in maintaining economic links 
with other countries in spite of the difficulties imposed by the war 
cannot have been due to any noble belief on the part of her allies in 
t 
the justice of Scotland's cause. It must have been due to the fact 
that to trade with Scotland . even with all the risks involved, was 
still a profitable exercise. True, the repeated complaints by Edward 
II about Flemish piracy show clearly enough that that particular 
trade gave profit to more than just the Scots: frequently, when the 
Flemish 'merchants' captured an English ship, the crew were 
off-loaded in Aberdeen, and the goods taken to Flanders for sale. 
52 
Even when the goods were disposed of in Aberdeen, the merchants who 
procured them would almost certainly be expatriate Flemings. The 
piracy against English ships was thus an obvious source of profit. 
But it would have been equally profitable, and probably less 
dangerous, for the Flemings to have allied with the English to 
exercise piracy against Scottish ships. The support for Scotland 
implies that there was a greater profit at stake than just the piracy 
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itself. The principal commodities sought by these merchants were 
wool and hides, in return for which arms, amour and victuals were 
supplied to the Scots. 
53 It seems likely that Scotland was a large 
producer of these sought-after items, even outstripping England, many 
of whose own merchants, as has been demonstrated, were equally keen 
to partake in the Scottish trade . at the risk of incurring the wrath 
of their king. Bruce's capture of the north-east early in the war 
assumes a new significance when the value of sheep is considered, for 
at a time when the borders and Lothian were subject to constant 
plundering and burning, the fertile lands of Moray and Buchan must 
have been of utmost importance in the production of export material. 
Scotland also exported fish, although probably on a lesser scale, and 
the act regarding salmon fishing was presumably intended to aid this 
industry. 
The problem, of course, was not merely to bring food, arms and 
armour into the country. In a period when royal power had been 
severely restri6ted, the revenue of the crown was at a low ebb. To 
maintain the royal household and run the administration,, let alone 
fight the war . was expensive, and measures had therefore to be taken 
to supply the crown with the necessary f unds. The crown gained 
substantially from an improvement in the realm's economy. Customs 
were raised from import and export, and from trade carried on in the 
burghs. If money was plentiful in the kingdom, then commerce was 
stimulated, and more custom was raised. This was the reason for the 
act (which was of a type not uncommon in Scotland and other 
countries) prohibiting the export of cash or valuables by clerics: it 
was intended to hinder the drain of money from Scotland to the papal 
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curia, which could contribute to a dearth of money and consequent 
commercial stagnation. 
The crown also gained money from justice, which was a further 
good reason to restore the judicial system to proper working order, 
and from rents and fermes payable from lands and rights held in 
chief . This last source of income undoubtedly increased throughout 
the period of Bruce's rule, as more land fell under the king's 
control, and was granted to his faithful subjects. He no doubt also 
gained considerably from wards, marriages and reliefs. However, 
especially in the earlier years of the reign, these sources of income 
can have been no match for the severe drain on the coffers imposed by 
the war. Not only the constant feeding and equipping of a host, but 
the cost of repairs to defences and buildings, of embassies sent 
abroad, and of compensation and ransom for injured or captured 
parties, impoverished the crown. Certainly, some alleviation was 
found through the tribute raised in northern England, and the booty 
and ransoms gained after battles such as Bannockburn and Myton. 
Nonetheless, by 1326 the revenue of the crown had been so diminished 
that the king "could not sustain his estate without intolerable 
burden and hardship on the common people". 
54 The community of the 
realm, gathered in parliament, was thus asked, and agreed, to provide 
additional revenue in the form of a tenth of income from all land . 
for the king's lifetime. 
55 That such a provision could be made, 
apparently without serious opposition, is a sign of the widespread 
support which Robert I had gained amongst the merchant and burgess 
class, as well as the nobility and clergy. In 1328 this allowance 
was increased 
56 
. in order to raise money towards the E20,000 required 
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by the terms of the treaty of Edinburgh. King Robert's nurturing of 
the economy and of commerce had earned him the backing of the moneyed 
sections of the community,, without whom he could not have won the 
war. It contrasts starkly with the severe opposition which the 
English kings met in the later years of the war, in their attempts to 
raise money from their overtaxed community. Robert I's reign did not 
see the first entrance of the Scottish burgesses into parliament 
57 
9 
but it certainly saw them reinforce their position in that body as an 
important element in the king's rule of the land. 
Part and parcel of the king's estate for which this extra money 
was required was the cosmetic side of royalty: to maintain the 
dignity of the crown, the king had to live in a style suited to his 
rank. Only thus would he gain the awe and respect of his subjects 
and of other princes. The Exchequer Rolls thus contain a great deal 
to do with the king's new residence at Cardross 
58 
, and the luxurious 
fittings, such as pictura for the king's chamber, provided for it. 
Mention is made of the king's goldsmith59 , and of such sundries as a 
coat of arms for the king's palfrey. 
60 Cloth was specially dyed for 
the king's ship, royal sergeants in Berwick were provided with new 
tunics by the king's order, and robes were given to messengers and 
clerks. 
61 
Many gifts are recorded: to religious houses, and to 
individuals, such as 'James the apothecary' 
62 
, who gave service to 
the king in some way. Events such as the wedding of Prince David to 
Joan, sister of Edward III, in 1328, also figure in the accounts. 
63 
As well as giving an idea of the life-style of the king, the 
Exchequer Rolls provide useful information regarding the way in which 
his affairs were conducted. The local officials - constables, 
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sheriffs, custumars and the like - gathered all the revenue from 
fermes, customs, justice and other sources, according to their sphere 
of activity. They also dealt with the necessary expenditure, 
including building works, gifts of the king and fees, and each year 
they submitted their accounts to the chamberlain who assessed their 
veracity and ascertained what sum was outstanding on either side. 
The system rested on the efficiency with which the king's household 
and local officers were able to carry out their duties, rendering the 
peaceful . stable and acquiescent kingdom a potential source of royal 
profit. The efficiency of the system, however, did not apparently 
deny the king a personal part in fiscal government. As in judicial 
matters,, there was still room for an element of personal rule in 
fiscal affairs: the provosts of Stirling, in the qccounts which they 
submitted in January 1328, made reference to the subtraction of an 
amount of multure "on which the king was consulted". 
64 This was 
important: the accessibility of the king was influential in gaining 
him support. He had to be available to his people, to settle 
disputes in person, and to demonstrate, in an age of difficult 
communication, that he did in fact,, and not just in name, bear the 
authority of the crown. 
A common complaint against unpopular kings was that they did not 
hold enough parliaments. Parliament was the forum for airing 
grievances of any sort before the king. It was the meeting place of 
the king and community, in which their contract for the rule of the 
kingdom was worked out . The list of parliaments and similar 
assemblies printed in The Acts of the Parliaments of Scotland65 
assigns to Robert I (excluding his inaugurations) twenty-one public 
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meetings of at least king and council between March 1309 and the end 
of the reign. Thirteen of these are described specifically as 
parliaments, and a further two 
66 
. on the basis of their composition, 
may fairly be consigned to that category. This total of at least 
fifteen parliaments and six other public assemblies in a twenty-three 
year reign compares very favourably with the total of seventeen such 
gatherings held during the thirty-seven years of Alexander III's 
reign. In Alexander's reign, all these gatherings took place in 
Scone, Edinburgh, Stirling, Roxburgh, Perth or Cupar, a remarkably 
limited area exclusive to the eastern lowlands. By contrast, Robert 
I carried his government to such places as Inverness, Ayr and 
Arbroath, as well as the more 'normal' centres in the east. Indeed, 
even discounting his warlike, expeditions, Robert I travelled more 
within his kingdom than most Scottish kings. His Presence at 
Arbroath, Cromarty, Loch Broom, Dunstaffnage and Brechin during 1309, 
at Dumbarton,, Inchmahome and Stirling in 1310, Ayr in 1311, Dundee,, 
Inverness and Elgin in 1312, and his constant roving between centres 
such as Ayr, Arbroath (repeatedly - his chancery appears to have been 
centred there), Inverness, Dumfries, Dumbarton, Strathord, 
Coupar-Angus, Kilwinning, Melrose, Aberdeen, Berwick, Lochmaben and 
Whithorn throughout the reign 
67 
. give a sound impression of Bruce as 
a much travelled king. It seems that Robert I, in his attempt to 
create a unified kingdom, went to great pains to become known to his 
people, and to rule the whole country as thoroughly as possible. 
The increase in the status of the Scottish king which became 
evident in the later years of Bruce's reign was largely consequent 
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upon the strength with which he had held the office. As in the reign 
of Alexander III, and in sharp contrast to that of the unfortunate 
King John, the strength of character shown by the monarch, and his 
unswerving adherence to wel l-establi shed policy, earned Robert I 
widespread respect and obedience. The reigns of Alexander III and 
Robert I were also similar in that they began with the monarchy in a 
weak state; in Alexander's case that weakness was the result of his 
minority, and in Robert I's it was the outcome of years of 
constitutional and political turmoil . Both kings, perhaps due to the 
inauspicious beginnings of their reigns, took great pains to ensure 
the stability of the realm after their death: the only obvious 
failure of both of these much-esteemed monarchs was their inability 
to leave the -kingdom a successor capable of continuing the firm rule 
which they had laboured to establish. 
It was a duty of the medieval monarch to provide a suitable 
successor capable of maintaining stability. Perhaps especially in 
Scotland . where the system of primogeniture had already demonstrated 
its flaws in several minorities and in the trauma of 1290, and where 
elements of the old celtic system still found their place in the 
succession to both the monarchy and some earldoms 
68 
9 it was incumbent 
upon the monarch to have the succession firmly settled, in the eyes 
of the community, well before his death. 
Robert I thus made two separate entails of the crown, to attempt 
to ensure an untroubled succession after his death. The first was 
made in April 1315, in a full parliament at Ayr. 
69 
The timing of 
this provision was probably very deliberate. Made only shortly 
before Edward Bruce left for his Irish expedition, it affirmed his 
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continued involvement in the Scottish kingdom (and . incidentally, 
demonstrated that the Irish venture was itself a product of Scottish 
royal policy). The marriage of Marjory Bruce to Walter the Steward 
had in all probability been arranged by the time of this entail, and 
her inclusion in its terms was likely to have been made in the 
knowledge of that impending union, which would provide no conflict of 
Anglo-Scottish loyalties. (It is noteworthy that the terms of the 
tailzie specified that she must marry only with the consent of the 
king or "the greater part of the community of the realm" .) Finally,, 
although his actions at Bannockburn proved that he was far from an 
invalid, it was by then six years since the first onset of the 
illness from which the king was to die in 1329, and it should also be 
remembered that Scotland was still at war. At a time when Edward 
Bruce, his chosen successor, was about to leave the kingdom, it was 
politically expedient to have the succession publicly approved and 
affirmed,, so that if the king should die in Edward's absence, there 
should be no internal wrangling between the magnates. The clear 
indication that Moray was to be regent was also an attempt to ensure 
stability in the short-term. 
Alexander III's settlement of the succession had failed because 
it had not gone far enough, making no provision beyond the immediate 
heir apparent. The lesson had been well learnt by 1315: the problems 
faced by the kingdom in the interim had been the result not of 
Alexander's death - the succession was obvious, and largely 
undisputed in 1286 - but of Margaret's. The damage had been done by 
the Great Cause and the consequent division of the community and 
exposure to Plantaganet imperialism. Thus, for the first time in 
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Scotland, in 1315 the inheritance of the crown was settled providing 
for the deaths of the ruling king, his recognised heir, and the next 
in line, and also making provision for regency should it be 
necessary. The terms of the 1315 tailzie were nothing if not 
thorough. If the king should die without a male child . the heir was 
to be Edward Bruce, his brother. This was not "a drastic and 
possibly unjust reversal of the succession policy laid down by 
70 Alexander III in 1284" . It was a recognition that the needs of the 
kingdom were more important than the sem i-establ i shed system of 
primogeniture. Alexander III had no other living heir in 1284. Had 
a brother been alive, it is very likely that he would have succeeded 
to the throne in preference to Margaret. Provided no male heirs were 
available there was no objection to female rule, but it was 
undoubtedly a second choice. Scotland's crown had for many 
generations been taken by the nearest male to the king who was able 
in body and mind. The female succession was adopted in 1286 because 
it was the only option. In 1315 the choice between succession by a 
(so far childless) female, or a man who was "strong and expert in 
acts of war for the defence of the rights and liberties of the 
kingdom" cannot have been difficult to make. The same choice would 
have been made had the option existed in 1284, and indeed the entail 
of that year did allow for Margaret's supersession by any male heir. 
Scotland was not committed to the principles of primogeniture. As 
was to be made clear even in the Declaration of Arbroath, the 
community always reserved the right to choose the 'rightful' and most 
appropriate king. A minor heir-male of King Robert would have been 
(and indeed was) acceptable, because the community could envisage 
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weathering the difficulties of a minority with the prospect of strong 
independent rule ahead. But in female rule lay dangers which 
rendered it acceptable only as a last resort. 
Failing Edward (the only surviving male of any direct line 
within three generations of a past king, coincidentally in precise 
accordance with the old celtic system). the hereditary rights of the 
king's daughter were recognised, followed by those of her children, 
failing whom, "the nearest lawful heir of the body of the king" was 
to be given the crown. The earl of Moray was to be guardian should 
the new monarch be a minor, and if judgement had to be made regarding 
the succession, then Moray was again to have custody of the realm 
until a decision had been reached. It is also noteworthy that in 
such a case the succession was to be decided by "the prelates, earls, I 
barons, and others of the community". In effect, then,, the 1315 
settlement surpassed that of 1284 not merely by providing more 
securely for the succession, but also by taking into account the fact 
that the tailzie might fail, and by pre-empting the kind of action by 
power-hungry nobles which had led to the disastrous constitutional 
collapse of 1290. 
This entail is interesting,, furthermore . as a symbol of the 
balance of power which existed between the king and the community of 
the realm. The king was not willing to trust the ad hoe, type of 
arrangement which had worked in 1286. His own nominee was appointed 
to carry the government in almost any contingency. In this respect 
the power of the king appears to have been complete. However, the 
place of the community was recognised: they were required to give 
assent to the tailzie's terms, and to seal it. More importantly, to 
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them was assigned the task of electing the heir to , the throne should 
the terms of the tailzie prove insufficient. A meeting "to ordain 
and discuss the legitimate succession and government of the kingdom" 
- in effect, a parliament without the king - was to be held, thus 
avoiding the necessity for outside interference along the lines of 
1290. The responsibility for choosing the rightful king lay entirely 
with the community, as an integral part of the contract between it 
and the crown for the rule of the realm. Although the personal power 
of the king, the status of his crown, and the central authority of 
his appointed administration apparently increased in the reign of 
Robert I, there was no denial of the governmental rights and duties 
of the community. 
The entail of 1315 was thus more than a bid, to ensure the 
unopposed continuance of the Bruce royal dynasty: it was an attempt 
to avoid the constitutional pitfalls which had been encountered in 
1290, both by exerting royal policy (given force by the community's 
pledged support) for almost any contingency, and by laying down the 
course of action to be followed by the community should the royal 
policy fail. The entail was therefore, in a manner of speaking, an 
act of constitutional legislation which bore relevance to issues 
wider than merely the question of succession to Robert I. 
Three and a half years later . in October 1318, the Scottish 
attempt to conquer Ireland collapsed, with the death of Edward Bruce 
in the battle at Dundalk. King Robert and his queen, Elizabeth de 
Burgh, were still without male heirs, and the death of the heir 
apparent, the marriage of the king's daughter Marjory, her bearing of 
a son , and her death, had so changed the situation which had 
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prevailed in 1315 that an updated version of the previous tailzie was 
now required. The succession and related problems can thus be shown 
to have been constantly in the thoughts of Robert I. They were too 
important to be dealt with once, and then forgotten. 
In December 1318, therefore, in parliament at Scone, a further 
entail was made bestowing the crown, failing male progeny of the 
king, upon Robert, the son of Marjory Bruce and Walter the Steward. 
Again, the tutelage of the realm, should Robert succeed as a minor, 
was to be in the hands of the earl of Moray, failing whom, James 
Douglas,, until "the community of the realm, or the greater and wiser 
part of it should consider the said Robert or other heir of the king 
71 
capable of ruling the kingdom and its people" . This entail was 
re-issued, including the name of the king's son David, and probably 
t 
placing more stress on his succession, in 1326.72 Once again, the 
king exerted his own authority, in appointing even an 'heir-apparent' 
to the guardianship, but the community's role was as carefully 
maintained as previously. Moray and Douglas took their parts upon 
them with the community's consent, and the community was to decide 
when any minority should end. The future guardians swore an oath to 
carry out their duties to the benefit of the kingdom, its clergy and 
people, and to uphold its laws and customs,, another reminder that 
these settlements were made primarily in the interests of the crown 
and kingdom, rather than in those of the Bruce family. 
It is interesting also to note that any who acted against the 
1318 entail were to be held as guilty of lease-majesty and treason. 
The distinction between the two crimes is fine: the former would 
appear to have been an offence specifically against the crown, 
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whereas the latter was against the kingdom itself. Presumably, in 
this case,, the crimes would be committed between the death of Robert 
I and the election of his successor . That lease-majesty could be 
deemed to have been committed during an interregnum is a further 
indication of the concept that the authority of the crown never died, 
even when there was no personal upholder of it. The royal authority 
was vested in the community and its appointed leadersq be they kings 
or guardians. 
This second entail made the constitutional legislation even more 
explicit than that of 1315, laying down the laws by which the 
comnunity should be governed in any discussion of the succession. As 
had been the custom in times past with regard to the crown (as 
opposed to lepser fees) , so the entail stated. the nearest heir-male 
in direct line was to succeed,, failing whom the nearest female in 
direct line. The direct line failing completely, the nearest male in 
a collateral line bearing the right to rule through the blood of the 
dead king was to gain the throne without any impediment. 
73 This law 
is remarkable in that, despite its somewhat oblique reference to 
former custom, it does not represent the traditional succession 
system of Scotland, by which an able male of a close collateral line 
(for example, the king's brother) would always have succeeded in 
preference to a female of direct line. Even more startling, however, 
is its marked contrast with the arrangement made in 1315, by which 
Edward Bruce would have taken precedence over Marjory. The 
settlements both of 1315 and 1318 attempted to ensure male succession 
to Robert I. In 1318 the approacb tbrougb the direct line was the 
only way of achieving that end, and no harm was done by extending the 
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law further to fulfil a secondary purpose - the legitimising of the 
Bruce line of kings in terms of the much revered appeal to ancient 
custom. A glance at the table of the claimants to the crown in 
129074 shows that the direct line of Alexander III having failed, the 
nearest male in collateral line was Robert Bruce, the grandfather of 
King Robert I. In the guise of guidance for the future, Robert I 
produced an apologia for his family's claim to the throne. According 
to this law, John Balliol had never been the rightful king of Scots, 
and Bruce was thus justified in claiming Alexander III as his 
immediate predecessor. The Balliol episode, as far as the king was 
concerned, was over: any who attempted to press a Balliol claim to 
the throne was, by the terms of this very statute .a traitor to the 
t 
realm and guilty of lease-majesty. 
This opens a new perspective on custom and the succession 
system. Accepting absolutely the primary desire of the kings of 
Scots to achieve stability within the realm, and the common weal of 
the whole community, it nevertheless remains true that by appeal to a 
custom of at best doubtful authenticity, Bruce affirmed his dynasty's 
hold on the crown. His contrasting settlement of 1315 was made 
partly with the same aim. Edward I's settlement of the Scottish 
succession in 1292, although made in accordance with custom, gave him 
a good opportunity to gain at least a large measure of control over 
the Scottish crown. Alexander III's entail of 1284 also ensured that 
descendants of his blood would succeed to his crown. Indeed . the 
gradual divergence from the old celtic system, which was indicated 
by, for example, the accession of Malcolm IV in 1153 
75 
and the 
accession of Alexander III as a minor in 1249, was in itself an 
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attempt on the part of the ruling line to restrict the succession, 
excluding other dynasties. At times (as in 1315) this desire 
required appeal to one custom, and at other times (as in 1318) 
another custom was more efficacious. The fact is that the succession 
system was vague and open to debate. Primogeniture had not been 
fully established in Scotland, and neither had the old system been 
completely ousted. The succession appears to have wavered between 
the two, according to the needs of the moment, and the two radically 
different statements of 1315 and 1318 are a striking demonstration of 
the fact. 
The settlement of the succession was a fundamental duty of the 
king, and Bruce, like his predecessors, made his arrangements with 
the good of the realm at heart: stability and prosperity could not be 
upheld if the kingdom was plunged into another constitutional crisis. 
It was natural that Bruce saw the good of the realm in terms of the 
strong continuance of his policies under the guidance of his family. 
His was the first attempt to set down in writing an explicit 
statement of the law of succession to the Scottish crown. That it is 
a statement of the system of primogeniture can be no surprise: it 
reflected his concept of the needs of both the nation and his own 
dynasty. In that, he was indeed in the true tradition of his royal 
predecessors of the past two centuries. 
The king, as the 'father' of his people, was responsible for 
their welfare in all areas of life: their freedom from injustice, the 
peace and stability of the land, and their material prosperity. He 
was also responsible for their spiritual wellbeing: his position as a 
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religious leader was fundamental to the nature of his crown. King 
Robert's propaganda stressed the divine part in his assumption of the 
throne; his seal emphasised that he ruled "under the governance of 
God,, 76 ; he claimed, as had his predecessors, to hold Scotland of no 
superior but God alone, and his propaganda avowed that his policy was 
aimed at establishing that situation wherein the Scots could live at 
peace in devotion to God, with the church unscathed. 
A king achieved the ideals of Christian rule by supporting and 
increasing the church, by receiving its support (which gave his rule 
divine authority), and by acts of personal devotion and piety. 
Throughout his reign, the question of spiritual respectability must 
have been one of Bruce's most constant weaknesses. Excommunicated at 
the start for Comyn's murder, and repeatedly thereafter for his 
I 
defiance of English and papal edicts, his claim to rule in accordance 
with the divine will necessitated a particular attention to the 
national church. Only through conspicuous piety, and through his 
support for the church, could he divert to the national cause its 
considerable spiritual , economic and political strength. He had to 
prove to Christendom that his conflict with the papacy was merely a 
political matter which cast no doubts on his status as a Christian 
king. To some extent this end was achieved through propaganda: the 
declarations of 1310 and 1320 were botb very carefully worded in 
order to stress the devotion both of the Scots and of the king 
himself. 
The support of the church, however, had to exist in more than 
just the minds of other rulers: it had to be a reality in Scotland, 
for without it King Robert could not have won the allegiance of his 
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own people, who required their king to be a spiritual leader. 
Throughout his reign, therefore, King Robert vigorously pursued a 
policy aimed at ranging the national church behind his quest for an 
independent Scotland. One of his earliest royal acts was to seek the 
77 election of Nicholas Balmyle to the bishopric of Dunblane . He 
inherited from the guardians a number of bishops who readily lent 
support to the national cause78 . without doubt at least partly 
because of the long-standing struggle of the Scottish church to 
resist the attempts at domination by the metropolitan sees of York 
and Canterbury. Bishops Lamberton and Wishart were, of course . two 
of his best-known supporters. Lamberton attended his inauguration, 
and Wishart gave him absolution from the crime at Dumfries, and 
received his assurance that he would uphold the church and govern in 
I 
accordance with its desires. 
79 Unfortunately, both Wishart and 
Lamberton spent part of the reign in English prisons. Wishart was in 
exile between 1306 and 1314, and although the see and its wealth were 
in royal hands,, the absence of the bishop himself was a sore loss. 
Wishart returned to Scotland in 1314, but died in 1316 
80 
. and despite 
strenuous efforts, Bruce did not succeed in having his own nominee 
consecrated to the see until 1323.81 
St. Andrews was without its bishop for a shorter time. 
Lamberton was not viewed by Edward II with quite the same hostility 
as Wishart, and was able to play some part in Scottish affairs 
between 1308 and 131210 by which date he can be shown to be firmly on 
the Scottish side of the struggle. 
82 He remained loyal to Bruce and 
staunch in his support of tthe cause' until his death in 1328. 
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Bruce's dealings with the other dioceses show more clearly his 
desire to win them over to his cause. In Dunkeld he succeeded in 
gaining the appointment of William Sinclair (1311); in Moray, John 
Pilmure (1326); in Galloway, Simon Wedale (1321); in Dunblanet 
Maurice, formerly abbot of Inchaffray (1320); and in the Islest 
Bernard de Linton (1328), all of whom appear to have been candidates 
who at least met with royal approval. 
83 Of those bishops who were in 
post, and hostile, at the start of Bruce's reign, most appear to have 
given in to his attempt 
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. and perhaps also Alan of 
Isles 
87 
, had come to his peace by the end of 
1314, and if the re-issue of the '13101 declaration of the clergy is 
indeed genuine, and to be dated not later than 1316 
88 
. then for the 
last twelve years of his reign, Bruce had the active support of all 
twelve Scottish bishops. Even by 1314 it appears that only Galloway, 
and perhaps the Isles . may still have held out against him. 
89 
The 
outstanding support of other clerics such as Bernard de Linton, the 
chancellor (who did not become a bishop until 1328), must also have 
been of considerable help to King Robert, who could thus quite 
justifiably claim to be fulfilling the spiritual aspect of his 
kingship. Having succeeded in winning the national church over to 
his cause, to his own people he had no lack of divine authority, and 
had largely managed to reduce papal opposition to the political 
level . 
Undoubtedly, much of Bruce's clerical supportg like his lay 
support, was gained through his political policy, and through his 
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increasing power: there was a limit to how long he could sensibly be 
resisted. Nonetheless . his practical support of the church and its 
rights and liberties was also of vital importance in maintaining its 
assistance. The church could remain in the king's peace, without 
necessarily co-operating with him in the fashion which Bruce 
required. 
90 
The oath which Bruce made before Bishop Wishart in the days 
leading up to his coronation was therefore an early undertaking to 
support the church in the realm. The letter which tells us of this 
oath 
91 
should not be taken too literally when it says that Bruce 
swore "to abide under the direction of the clergy". In all 
probability it was an oath to secure and uphold the freedom of the 
church and to rule according to the tenets of its teachings. 
As was normal , the first act of the legislation of Robert I 
provided that the Scottish church should be maintained in peace with 
its rights and liberties, and that the church and religion should be 
protected from all oppressions, burdens and injuries which had 
previously afflicted it. This, a standard act, could be taken as 
mere form - ? custom used and wont' . However, a study of other 
sources shows that Bruce in no way neglected the rights and welfare 
of the church. Charters are recorded to the abbeys of Melrose, 
Newbattle, Kilwinning, Lesmahagow, Kelso, Crossraguel, Dunfermline, 
Culross, Lindores, Scone and Jedburgh, the priories of Coldingham, 
Whithorn and Restennet, friaries in Edinburgh, Banff and Glasgow, and 
to the cathedral church of St. Magnus in Orkney. 
92 
Some of these 
were merely confirmations of charters by his predecessors or 
tenants-in-chief. Many, however, restored lost lands and privileges, 
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or bestowed new ones. The abbot and convent of Kilwinning, for 
example, were granted new lands, and were also perpetually 
quitclaimed of a reddendo formerly paid by them to John Balliol or 
his heirs for the lands of Kilmarnock. 
93 Several grants were made in 
order to help in the construction of new churches or the repair of 
war-damaged buildings. Melrose, for example, received the gift of the 
wards, marriages and reliefs of the courts in the sheriffdoms of 
Roxburgh to the amount of E2,000, to assist in the cost of a new 
abbey church, and a teind of all pleas of the crown was granted to 
Whithorn priory for the same purpose. 
94 Allowances were given to 
help with lighting and other running costs 
95 
. to provide clergy 
96 
9 
for veneration of saints 
97 
, or to help the poor. 
98 There are some 
straightforward gifts to increase the wealth and power of the 
institutions. Most notable in this class is the grant to Dunfermline 
abbey of the right to use their own cocket seal , which gave them 
considerable trading advantages throughout the realm. 
99 The stated 
motives for the gifts vary: many are for the welfare of the king's 
ancestors, predecessors and successors; some are out of simple piety; 
others are in recognition of hardship caused by the war; and one 
100 
is in memory of Christopher Seton, one of the king's supporters who 
died at the hands of Edward I's judiciary in the early days of the 
conflict. 
These major grants to the church are augmented by a host of 
other gifts,, recorded in the Exchquer Rolls. 
101 'One-off' gifts, 
annual grants, salaries of the king's chaplains and the cost of a 
chapel in his new residence, gifts for the repair of buildings,, 
annual fees and second teinds granted to various churchmen . and alms 
442 
and special grants for specific purposes, again give the impression 
of a constant stream of royal munificence towards the church. The 
king's piety also took him on a pilgrimage to Whithorn near the end 
of his life 
102 
.a final reminder, if any were needed . that his long 
conflict with the religious head of Christendom bore no relevance to 
his personal relationship with the God in whose name he ruled . and to 
whorn he gave the credit for his successful re-establishment of the 
Scottish realm and crown. 
In his patronage of the church and outward displays of devotion, 
Bruce was little different from his predecessors and other 
contemporary kings. A zealous attitude to the church was part and 
parcel of the king's duty towards his people, was expected, and was 
I 
given with undoubted sincerity. In this, as in his administration of 
justice,, his care of the economy, his legislation, and indeed his 
relations with other countries, Robert I showed great continuity with 
his predecessors of at least the previous century. There was little 
to distinguish his style of government from that of Alexanders II and 
III, and although his tenacity in the face of adversity, and the 
extreme length and unequivocal result of the war he fought with 
England marks him out as a king of very great stature, his basic 
policy was no different from that pursued by previous kings and 
guardians. 
A further sign of the king's conservatism in government was to 
be found in bis treatment of the realm's earls and earldoms. As 
William I had found more than a century before, when he tried, 
unsuccessfully, to instal his brother David in the earldom of Lennox, 
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ousting the native family of earls, a king had to be careful how he 
treated the earldoms of Scotland: his authority did not generally 
extend so far as to disrupt the succession to the earldoms. In 1306 
the earls of Atholl, Carrick (who was of course the king himself) , 
Lennox and Menteith came out against the English. Lennox was 
faithful throughout the war, but Atholl and Menteith both died after 
a short time. David, the heir to the ear ldom of Atholl , supported 
the English until 1312, and again from 1314 onwards. Menteith 
remained in ward (in King Robert's hands) until granted to Murdoch, a 
member of the old earl's family. 
103 The earldom of Caithness was in 
ward in 1306 . and nothing is known of the allegiance of the earl 
until he appears as a signatory to the Declaration of Arbroath in 
1320. Thus, for part of the reign at least, the earldoms of Angus, 
f 
Atholl, Buchan, Dunbar, Fife, Mar, Ross, Strathearn and Sutherland 
were opposed to the king. Some (for example Ross, in 1308) came to 
his peace early in the war. Others (Strathearn and Mar, in 1313 and 
1327 respectively, for example) remained pro-English until much 
later. What is remarkable is that only the earldoms of Angus, Atholl 
and Buchan, whose earls never gave Bruce their constant allegiance, 
were lost to the families which traditionally held them. Buchan was 
dismembered, and although a co-heir of the forfeited earl inherited 
half the lands, the title lapsed. Angus was finally forfeited from 
the English Umphraville family in 1326/27, and was given to a branch 
of the Stewarts. Atholl was forfeited and given to the Campbells in 
1314. All the other earldoms, even those whose earls were against 
the king's faith for many years, were eventually retained by those 
who had held them in 1306 or by the relevant heirs. In this, King 
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Robert showed great concern for the traditions of Scottish rule. The 
only innovations were the dismemberment of Buchan, the re-institution 
of the ancient earldom of Moray as a reward for Thomas Randolph, and 
the forfeiture and regranting of Angus and Atholl. 
The most striking example of King Robert's care to maintain the 
status quo with regard to the earldoms is to be found in the case of 
the earldom of Fife. Earl Duncan, a minor, was in ward in England in 
1306, and remained there, at the peace of the English king, until 
after Bannockburn. When this earl gave his allegiance to King Robert 
in 1315, the king . with an eye to maintaining the old custom that the 
kings of Scots were placed on 'the stone' by the earl of Fife, made 
an indenture 
104 
with the earl, providing that should the earl die 
without, heirs, the earldom would revert (as would normally be the 
I 
custom) to the king and his heirs. However, since the part played by 
the earl in the inauguration ceremony demanded that the earldom 
remained separate from the crown,, it was further agreed that in the 
event of the earl leaving no heirs, the king would assign to the 
earldom a lord separate from the crown, and should the king die 
without assigning a holder to the earldom, it should pass to Alan, 
son of Alan of Menteith, Earl Duncan's cousin. This provision is a 
salient reminder of the conservatism of the Scottish realm, and of 
the king. He himself had not been placed on the stone by the earl of 
Fife, but some act symbolic of enthronement had been performed by the 
earl's sister. 
105 No-one appears to have questioned the validity of 
Robert I's rule on that basis, but, nonetheless, it was an omission 
which the king wished to prevent from recurring, and this indenture 
was thus made in order to safeguard the traditional role of the 
earldom of Fife from the dynastic problems which might affect it. 
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Only where ultimate reconciliation was impossible was Robert I 
willing to exercise his authority to remove the family of an earl 
from its inheritance. That he could do so at all is itself 
significant of the weight of royal authority in Robert I's reign. 
That he chose not to take this course of action, however, even in 
such cases as the long-delinquent earl of Mar, displays a deep-seated 
conservatism and regard for custom which is most apparent in his 
dealings with Fife, but nevertheless permeates the whole of King 
Robert's administration of the realm. 
The king's work,, then, was primarily of restorative character. 
That he could carry out the restoration so thoroughly within the 
course of a twenty-three year reign is a remarkable testament to his 
abilities as a leader, politician, and administrator. To have 
re-established Scotland in as secure a financial and political 
position as she had been in under Alexander III was a great feat, 
and . had the outcome of his attempts to settle the succession been 
happier, Robert I's reign might well have heralded the beginning of a 
new I Golden Age' . 
True,, there were administrative innovations in the reign: the 
use of the inspeximus 
106 
, and the dependence on the burgesses in 
parliament for royal revenue, for example. However, in these too 
there was continuity, for all kings introduced new practices and 
legislation in order to increase efficiency and cope with the 
particular conditions of their reigns. There are documents, such as 
the Declaration of Arbroath, which find their like in no other 
Scottish king's records; but these were individual responses to 
specific situations, and the fact that others similar were not 
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produced in, say, Alexander III's reign is indicative not of any 
technical backwardness, or lack of capability, but merely of the fact 
that such documents were not required. 
The style of government adopted by Bruce did show absolute 
consistency with that of his predecessors. That is not to say that 
it was static: like all governments, it grew and developed in order 
to meet fresh requirements , and this trend had its own profound 
effect on the kingdom. The fundamental change which Bruce's reign 
did see in governmental terms is linked not to any specific 
administrative practices, but to the general growth in the strength 
and status of the crown. In this respect governmental development is 
linked to the development of national identity and the elevation of 
the monarchy, which were the results of the war. It appears that 
Robert I. because of the strength of his crown and the unity of the 
kingdom under his rule,, was able to extend his government to areas, 
both geographical and administrative, which had previously shown only 
scant respect for the Scottish crown. The people of the western 
seaboard, for example,, played a far greater part in Scottish affairs 
in this reign than formerly, and acknowledged the power and 
leadership of the king of Scots to an extent unknown in previous 
reigns. The hitherto troublesome and separatist area of Galloway was 
quiet, and accepted peacefully the legislation which the king 
produced specifically for it. 
107 This king dealt with judicial 
matters as far north as Orkney (although those islands still belonged 
to Norway) and spent more time in more remote areas than had any 
recent king. His successful raising of revenue from the whole 
community to help in the re-establishment of the status quo also 
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showed an ability to carry traditional powers further than 
previously. In effect, then, the reign of Robert I saw an increase 
in the centralization of government. More power was wielded by the 
king because of the higher status accorded him. He was thus able to 
increase his authority, and wield it more effectively. His control 
over the land had also increased partly because he,, to a greater 
extent than any of his predecessors, had chosen who held it. A large 
amount of land had changed hands in the first quarter of the 
fourteenth century through forfeiture and reward, resulting in a very 
solid core of support for the king and his goverment throughout the 
country. This support, and the strong-willed nature of King Robert's 
government,, enabled him to restore to Scotland an administration 
which, although on the same model as in former times, was m9re 
thorough. His success in war and peace alike brought to Scotland an 
expanding economy and an internal peace and stability which allowed 
her to emerge from war and constitutional despair as a strong, 
prosperous and unified nation. 
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p. 102). In 1305 a court of Edward I judged that 
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The war which Bruce, and the guardians before him, had fought so 
strenuously, was justified at the time by appeal to the right of a 
kingdom to liberty. That liberty meant the freedom to live 
independently and , most importantly, at peace. Thus, the whole of 
Robert I's policy was aimed at establishing peaceful, universally 
accepted royal rule in Scotland which, in a manner of speaking, 
re-instated the halcyon days of the later thirteenth century. The 
conservatism, too, of Bruce's government tends to associate him with 
Alexander III, and there may therefore be a case for supposing that 
the traumatic events of 1286 - 1328 had merely seen the wheel turning 
full circle, and that, although the disaster of subjection had 
t 
ultimately,, been averted, progress in any real sense had been very 
limited. 
However,, such a view is misleading, for in fact the decades 
between the deaths of Alexander III and Robert I saw a major change 
in the Scottish constitutional set-upq a change which was an 
acceleration of a gradual process of development which had been 
taking place since at least the early thirteenth century. 
The dynasty which had ruled Scotland from the close of the 
eleventh century had been, by and large, remarkably successful. 
There had been, inevitably, certain internal political difficulties, 
to a great extent associated with the process of 'Normanisation' , and 
occasional temporary problems such as the subjection of King William 
to Henry II of England . Nevertheless, 
the line had generally been 
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able to put their policy into effect with relatively little 
disruption to the life of the kingdom. The process of 
'Normanisation' was primarily aimed at increasing the centralised 
power of the monarchy. This policy, which by its nature involved 
centralised control of revenues, played a great part in the 
development of an outward-looking trading economy which, in alliance 
with the more modern aspect of Scotland's twelfth-century monarchy 
and society, had the effect of hoisting Scotland out of its 
previously more insular character into the wider European setting. 
The movement is surely demonstrated by the fact that from the twelfth 
century it became customary for the Scottish kings to take their 
queens from the noble or royal familes of England and the continent. 
These political, social and economic developments led to a greater 
dependence ofthe realm on the monarch,, whose position as the focal 
point of the life of the entire community grew accordingly, and with 
it the prestige and strength of the monarchy in the kingdom. 
In the thirteenth century Alexanders II and III were able to 
build on this development. Their policy of geographical unification 
of the kingdom, in particular their efforts to assimilate the western 
seaboard, when combined with the generally peaceful and prosperous 
aspect of the period in which they ruled, greatly enhanced the 
position of the monarchy in the realm. In a movement closely related 
to this strengthening of the monarchy, there was fostered a spirit of 
unity within the kingdom which may be seen as the development of a 
sense of nationhood. 
Alexander III's reign especially saw this development. The 
beginning of the reign, marked by division and factionalism amongst 
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the nobility in a time of weakened monarchy, contrasts sharply with 
later events. Alexander's assumption of personal power showed a 
strong rejection of the interference of the English king in Scottish 
affairs, a rejection which was later emphasised by the refusal to 
render homage for the kingdom to Edward I in 1278. The peace and 
prosperity of the reign, coming as it did at the end of almost two 
centuries of an exceptional dynasty, saw even greater elevation of 
the place of the monarch in Scottish society. 
The progress of the kingdom . and the increased notion of 
national unity which accompanied it, led to an association of the 
kingship with the kingdom, and gradually the kingship became 
a national monarchy of the type which was developing in most parts of 
Europe in this period. A threat to the kingship, or to its power or 
standing, became associated with a threat to the realm itself. This 
in turn gave rise to a unity of purpose amongst the community of 
Scots which is markedly demonstrated by the way in which the 
community established government after the unexpected demise of 
Alexander III in 1286. The strength created by the good rule of 
Alexanders II and III was too great to allow the community to accept 
subjection to another realm in the period after 1286. 
If the kings of the thirteenth century, and particularly 
Alexander III, had brought about steady development, the rule of 
guardians, and the events which accompanied it, were to accelerate 
that progress. The desire of the guardians to safeguard the 
independence of the realm . and the concerted attack launched at that 
policy by Edward I, especially after the death of Margaret in 1290, 
greatly boosted the confidence of the governing community, and made 
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it increasingly aware of the part which it had to play in the 
government of the realm. The assumption by guardians of the complete 
royal administrative function brought about an exaltation of the 
community similar in character to the exaltation of the monarchy seen 
under the previous two kings. 
The reign of King John caused difficulty because Balliol, as a 
vassal of Edward I, a status of which he and the community were 
constantly and unsubtly reminded, fitted the images neither of the 
monarchy nor of the nation which had been fostered in the previous 
half-century. Newly aware of its own power and role, the community 
attempted to dictate to the king, which resulted in a breakdown of 
the Scottish monarchical system, in further foreign intervention, the 
removal of the king, and the re-subjection of the realm. 
Released from the arduous task of ruling the kingdom in 
opposition to the policies both of the community and of Edward I, 
King John became a much more effective figurehead, and in the periods 
of guardianship which followed, the idea of the exalted national 
monarchy was used by the governing community to produce an 
unprecedented unity of purpose in the kingdom, which sustained it in 
the face of tremendous political difficulty for little short of a 
decade. True . there was not complete unanimity in the community: 
certain individuals found themselves at various times on the English 
side of the struggle. However, they tended to have particular 
personal motives for their allegiance, and it is true to say that the 
period is characterised by a sharp distinction between England and 
Scotland which gives the war an overtly national flavour . 
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The inevitable weaknesses of guardianship, however, eventually 
left the Scots in a situation which, politically, was without a great 
deal of hope for the reconstitution of an effective monarchy. It was 
becoming increasingly apparent that although the guardians had all 
the theoretical implements with which to rule the land , and although 
they could at times conduct an effective war and administration, the 
success of their fight in the name of King John was dependent almost 
entirely on political events which had little or no direct connection 
with the Scottish situation, and over which the guardians could 
exercise no control. 
Thus, when there seemed an opportunity, with Robert Bruce's 
usurpation of the kingdom in 1306, to replace fictional with actual 
monarchy, it seems that King John was quietly forgottep, and those of 
the community who had no personal or dynastic objection to Robert I, 
ranged themselves behind him. After an initial period of hardhsip, 
caused by military failure, the attempt by Bruce to rebuild the 
Scottish kingdom became spectacularly successful. Within a fairly 
short space of time he was able to win over, quell or exile the 
majority of those who opposed his rule in Scotland, and thereafter he 
was able to use the strong sense of 'community' which had developed 
during the periods of guardianship, to achieve once again the unity 
of purpose which had characterised the persistence of the earlier 
, struggle. 
Continuing and increasing military success, largely made 
possible by the internal turmoil which beset England under Edward II, 
enabled Robert I to make good his kingship, steadily to rebuild the 
realm's economy, and, within a decade of his assumption of power, to 
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re-assert the strength of the monarchy which had so aided Scotland's 
prosperity in the reign of Alexander III. Bruce, unlike Balliol, was 
able to wield his kingship, which was fully in the tradition of 
Scottish monarchy established in the thirteenth century, in tandem 
with the newly self-assertive community, to exalt further both 
kingship and community together. United perseverence by all sections 
of the realm thus created in Scotland an atmosphere in which 
political victory, given military success, was inevitable against 
divided and ill-organised opposition such as was to be found in 
England under Edward II. 
Under Alexanders II and III, then, Scotland had started its 
development into a nation, largely prompted by a strong and exalted 
f 
monarchy. The parallel exaltation of the community under the 
guardians was allied by Robert I with the tradition of strong 
monarchy, and under his rule both elements grew together to create a 
fully self-aware and assertive nation. Thus, whilst the latter years 
of Robert I's reign show unmistakable similarities with the reign of 
Alexander III, the conservatism of society being a powerful force, in 
the most fundamental way the fabric of Scottish society had changed. 
The king was no longer the one who ruled the community with a 
customary, but ill-defined, tconsent'. dictated policy, and attempted 
to draw the realm's disparate elements together into a unified state. 
He had become a symbol of political identity, who actually shared the 
government of the kingdom with the community, thus creating in the 
realm a national unity of which he was the recognised figurehead. 
Throughout the period under discussion the monarchy was the 
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institution and idea which had become identified, and was eventually 
almost synonymous, with the royal dignity of the realm, and 
symbolised in every sense the I nation of Scots' . 
The self-awareness which is so crucial to the idea of nationhood 
was expressed in the symbols of royal authority and, above all . in 
the propaganda which was necessitated by the diplomatic warfare which 
raged from 1297 onwards. The magnificent seal of guardianship which 
was used from 1286 until 1291 is an extraordinary display of the 
contemporary attitude to the realm; the figure of St. Andrew with its 
accompanying legendq and the royal arms, confidently declare the 
nationhood of the Scottish community. But it is in the propaganda 
that the theoretical advances which were the consequences of accepted 
I 
nationhood are most clearly stated. The Processus of Baldred Bisset, 
the Declaration of the Clergy of 1310, the 1321 negotiators' text, 
and others, all make their contribution, but it is in the Declaration 
of Arbroath that the association of the ideas of kingship and 
nationhood, the role of the community in government, the political 
and moral right to freedom, and the contract between king and 
community find most brilliant and succinct expression. The 
introversion of adversity brought about self-examination which led 
the Scots to discover and express how far they had travelled along 
the road of national development. 
Between 1249 and 1329 strong royal rule and adversity and war 
had exalted both king and community. Robert I's unique achievement 
was to use and further that exaltation, and weld the two elements 
together,, to complete the formation of the nation. The concept of 
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the Scottish monarchy, the royal dignity, the honour of the realm - 
the lion - was the key to the whole process. When there was no 
reigning king, the fictitious monarchy of John Balliol became the 
focal point of the community's policy and aspiration, and became, in 
every sense, the concept of the realm itself. After 1306, Bruce's 
attempt to resuscitate the realm was synonymous with his attempt to 
assert the kingship. Without a recognised,, sovereign king, there 
could be no kingdom of Scots. His propaganda, like that in favour of 
Balliol, was thus framed in terminology which largely appeared to 
give support to a personal monarchy. But the Declaration of Arbroath 
went further: if one king refused to perform his duty to the realm, 
the community would cast him out and choose another. The man, 
although much eulogised, was not important. The crucial factor was 
his kingship, and the sovereignty and freedom which it implied. The 
Declaration of Arbroath makes the ultimate political r'O"le of the 
monarchy in Scotland clear: the monarchy was the kingdom. The 
community, even the nation,, could exist without a king, but the 
political entity which was the 'kingdom of Scots' was entirely 




THE CONNECTIONS WITH THE COMYNS OF BALLIOLIS 
AUDITORS IN THE GREAT CAUSE 
This appendix details the relationships of many of the Balliol 
auditors in 1291 to the Canyn family, demonstrating the remarkable 
extent to which the Scottish support for Balliol must be regarded as 
aI Comyn party' . The information is drawn principally from the Scots 
Peerage. It should be noted that a few of those mentioned in the 
list of the 'Durward party' of the 1250S (Stones, Documents, 
PP-130-311 now appear in this list of Balliol's auditors. Of tho se 
men, Malise earl of Strathearn, Andrew Moray, Geoffrey de Mowbray and 
Nicholas Hay had all become allied to the Comyns through marriage 
(either of themselves or another member of their family) since the 
mid-thirteenth century. The only other names common to both lists 
are those of clerics, the abbots of Dunfermline, Kelso and Newbattle, 
none of which abbacies were held by the same incumbents in both 1255 
and 1291. The names of Balliol's auditors are underlined. 
William Fraser, bishop of St. Andrews. 
Chancellor of Scotland under Alexander III and a guardian in the 
1286-1291 government, which was accused of trying to put Balliol on 
the throne . There seems to have been some 
Comyn influence in St. 
Andrews, since in 1235 Gamelin, bishop-elect,, was one of the Comyn 
party which was ousted from government. After Balliolls deposition, 
when Fraser died, William Comyn, provost of St. Andrews (a brother of 
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the earl of Buchan) was involved in a dispute over the election of 
Fraser's successor, William Lambertong a supporter of 
Bruce. The 
family was also represented in Balliol's auditors by William 
Fraser's 
brothers, Simon and Andrew, and by one Richard Fraser. Simon Fraser 
was sheriff of Traqua ir/ Peebles, and a justice in Tynedale, in both 
of which areas were important Comyn estates. 
St. Andrews was also represented by its prior, John of Haddington. 
Henry Cheyne, bishop of Aberdeen. 
Boece claims that Henry Cheyne was the son of a sister of John Comyn 
of Badenoch, the claimant's father. There appears to be no evidence 
to corroborate this . but the staunch support which he gave to John 
Balliol until the bishop's surrender to Robert I (by 1312) makes it 
at least plausible that there was some bond of kinship between them. 
The family is also represented by Reginald Cheyne (jun. ) , who, in the 
1260s, married Mary Moray (of the Duffus line). for which family see 
below. 
William, bisbop of Dunblane. 
It is noteworthy that the patronage of the see of Dunblane lay with 
the family of Strathearn, which was closely related to the Comyns, 
and that Clement, the previous incumbent, had been removed from power 
with the Comyns in 1255. The see is also represented by the 
archdeacon of Dunblane. 
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John,, abbot of Cambuskenneth. 
Support for the Comyns from the abbacy of Cambuskenneth is to be 
expected, since earlier in the thirteenth century the abbey had been 
endowed with land by the earl of Buchan (a gift which was confirmed 
later in the century). In 1257 the sentence of excommunication which 
the Comyn party had issued against the Durwards was pronounced by the 
bishop of Dunblane in the abbey of Cambuskenneth. 
Malise, earl of Strathearn. 
Married a sister of John Comyn, earl of Buchan. The Strathearn 
family is also represented by Alpinus, who became King John's 
chamberlain and, later, bishop of Dunblane. 
f 
John Comyn, earl of Buchan. 
Son of Alexander, earl of Buchan,, the half-brother of the 
competitor's grandfather. 
Gilbert d'Umphraville, earl of Angus. 
Married a sister of John Comyn, earl of Buchan. The family is also 
represented by his kinsman, Ingram d'Umphraville. 
William, earl of Ross. 
Son of William, earl of Ross and Jean Comyn (daughter of William 
Comyn, later earl of Buchan, by his first wife). The relationship 
with the Comyns was re-affirmed later when, in 1309, he married Mary, 
the niece of John Comyn, earl of Buchan. 
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Alexander Macdougall. lord of Argyll* 
Married to the third daughter of John Comyn of Badenoch. 
Andrew Moray. 
Married, firstly, the fourth daughter of John Comyn of Badenoch. His 
son was the Andrew Moray who led the 'army of Scotland' with William 
Wallace. Andrew (sen. ) married, secondly, the widow of William Comyn 
of Kilbride. The family is also represented by William Moray of 
Tullibardine. 
Geof frey de Mowbray. 
Married the second daughter of John Comyn of Badenoch. 
Herbert Maxwell. 
Son of one of the Comyn party dismissed in 1255. 
David Graham. 
One of the Comyn party dismissed in 1255. The family is also 
represented by Patrick Graham. 
Nicholas Hay. 
Son of Gilbert Hay and Idonea, daughter of William, earl of Buchan. 
William Meldrum. 
Relative (son? ) of Philip Meldrum, who married Agnest daughter of 
William Comyn, earl of Buchan. 
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APPENDIX 2 
THE COMMENCEMENT OF A KING'S REIGN 
AND THE BEGINNING OF HIS REGNAL YEAR 
Professor Duncan has stated that "it was not until 1272 in 
England and 1329 in Scotland that a reign was reckoned to begin 
before ... the inauguration of the king". 
1 He then goes on to explain 
the idea of linterregnuml and the lapse of the king's peace between 
the death of one king and the inauguration of the next. Insofar as 
the importance of the inauguration ceremony is concerned . there can 
be no dispute. If it were otherwise , there could be no point in the 
hurried inaugurations of Alexander II and Alexander III. However, it 
I 
does appear that, once the reign had started, it was then pre-dated 
to a date previous to the inauguration ceremony, normally to the 
death of the preceding king. 
The regnal year of John Balliol was calculated not from his 
inauguration on 30 November 1292, but from a date between 8 and 21 
November, presumably either from the award of the kingdom to him on 
2 17 November . or his oath of fealty to Edward I on 20 November. 
Margaret was never inaugurated, and so did not receive the dignity of 
the realm, and never had letters issued under her own name which bore 
any regnal year-date. Formally, her reign never began. The previous 
king, Alexander III, also dated his regnal year from the death of his 
father, rather than from his inauguration. Alexander II died on 8 
July 1249, and his son was inaugurated on 13 July. On 1 July a. r. 33 
(i. e. 1282) Alexander III sent a letter from Scone to Edward I. 
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excusing the absence of Alexander Comyn . earl of Buchan from the army 
summoned by Edward I for his Welsh expedition of that year. On 12 
July a. r. 34, Alexander issued an almost identical letter, dated at 
Kinross, on behalf of Alexander Balliol of Cavers. 
3 These two 
letters must surely refer to the same English summons 
4, 
and date from 
the same year, 1282. This implies that the regnal year began between 
1 and 11 July, probably on 8 July, the date of Alexander II's death. 
There is not enough evidence to state with any certainty when 
the regnal years of earlier kings began. The inauguration of 
Alexander II took place on the day following William's death, and 
whilst it is usually assumed that the regnal year started on 
December . there is no evidence on which to build a preference for 
I 
'this date as opposed to the previous day. If the regnal year began 
on 5 December, then the grant dated 4 December a. r. 34 at Edinburgh is 
to be dated 1248. By 13 January following he was apparently at 
Stirling, a perfectly feasible itinerary. That he was in Kinghorn by 
1 February, however, might tend to indicate that he was travelling 
more than was normal for the time of year. Just as likely is that 
the grant dated 4 December a. r. 34 comes from the year 1247v the 
regnal year beginning on 4 December. Six days previous to that be 
was at Holyrood. 
The only king prior to 1329 whose regnal year it is certain 
started with the date of his inauguration is Robert I. In his case . 
it would be very surprising if any other date had been chosen. The 
previous king had not died, and, from the Scots' point of view, his 
reign had never formally ended. Until Bruce's inauguration,, it was 
not common knowledge that he was to be made king. There was no other 
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date from which his regnal year could logically have been calculated. 
Bruce underwent two inauguration ceremonies , on 25 and 27 March. The 
latter ceremony, at which the countess of Buchan . as representative 
of the Macduff family, enthroned Bruce, was probably seen as being 
the more legal and effectual of the two ceremonies, and that is 
presumably why the regnal year starts on 27 March. 
6 
Thus while the reign of a Scottish king was not reckoned to 
start until the inauguration,, it was, in retrospect, dated back to 
the date of the previous king's death on at least one occasion, and 
perhaps on two. In Balliol's case it was pre-dated probably to the 
date on which it was recognised that he, rather than any other, had 
the right to succeed the most recently deceased monarch. The same 
was true of Bruce: his regnal year was dated from his recognition as 
the rightful king, although in his case that recognition came only 
with his self-arranged inauguration. In other words, the regnal year 
seems to have been dated from a probably fictitious, or purely 
nominal, 'pre-inaugural acclamation'. 
The reason for this apparent contradiction in the calculation of 
when a king' s reign began must lie in the interests of continuity. 
It has been explained above how the Scots believed that there was 
always a king who could, potentially, take up the rule of the 
kingdom. Usually when a king died it was fairly obvious who his 
successor would be. The royal dignity did not die with the king . and 
so it seemed fair to emphasise the continuous aspect of the kingship 
by dating the new reign from the time when it became clear who was 
next to receive that dignity. In this way, when the succession was 
assured, the royal dignity could never seem to lapse, even although 
there was in fact a short period of interregnum between the death of 
one king and the inauguration of the next. 
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However . the system broke down in 1286. When Alexander III died 
it was not certain who should succeed him. His widow Yolande, 
however, produced no child, and so Margaret was accepted as queen, 
and had she been able to undergo an inaugural ceremony, her reign 
would have started then . and her regnal year would probably have been 
dated to some point late in the year, when it had been recognised 
that Yolande would not bear another heir to Alexander III. However, 
it was realised that no inauguration could take place in the short 
term, and other guardians had therefore to be appointed to bear the 
royal dignity in the place of the rightful monarch. When Margaret 
died . however,, the identity of the successor to the throne was even 
less certain. The guardians thus continued to rule in the name of 
the royal dignity until it was rendered up to Edward I. Edward's 
court decided on 17 November that Balliol was the rightful heir to 
the throne, and it is therefore probably to that day that his regnal 
year was dated , even although his reign did not actually start until 
his inauguration. Thereafter, whenever there was independent 
Scottish rule, it was carried on in the name of King John, until 
Bruce's rising of 1306. 
The inauguration of Bruce in many ways pre-dated his actual 
assumption of the rule of the kingdom. His regnal year began on the 
date of his (second) inauguration, however, since that was the date 
on which his right to succeed the ineffectual King John had been 
recognised by at least a sizeable section of the community of the 
realm. However, the break in continuity was not something which the 
Scots wished to repeat. No matter how efficiently the guardians had 
governed, the lack of any ruling monarch was a threat to internal 
stability. Even given the strong theoretical basis of their 
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authority, the guardians had none of the prestige and charisma of a 
king, and their power was, in many ways, only as great as their army. 
The break in continuity, as the Scots had discovered at considerable 
cost, was also a serious threat in terms of international politics, 
and in theoretical terms concerning the realm's integrity and 
independence. Thus the system was changed. It was not possible 
completely to eradicate the possibility of a break in the succession, 
but in April 1315, December 1318 and again in July 1326, elaborate 
attempts -were made to ensure that the choice of successor . when the 
time came, was as easy as possible. When Robert I died, the problems 
which might have arisen from any forced delay in the inauguration of 
his successor were averted by the acceptance of the fact that his 
reign did begin at the same time as his father's had ended, Thus it 
was not necessary for David II to be inaugurated until November 1331 9 
more than two years after Robert I's death. David II's reign had 
started,, and was recognised as having started, on 7 June 1329. He 
was able to issue royal documents under his own name using the full 
royal style between that date and his inauguration. 
7 The problems 
caused by the interregnum between the death of one king and the 
assumption of the royal dignity by another were thus pre-empted by 
this alteration of the custom. 
This part of the theory of Scottish monarchy, then, changed to 
suit practical necessity. The decision actually to give-a king royal 
authority before his inauguration was made in order to give practical 
expression to the old idea, previously expressed through the more 
vague medium of pre-dating the regnal year,, that there should be 
continuity in the monarchy. The political importance of that idea 
had been demonstrated by the drastic consequences of the old system's 
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failure to uphold it. Typically of the Scottish monarchy, the theory 
thus changed to accommodate the newly-found need . in order to avert 
the re-occurrence of a situation similar to that which had so nearly 
destroyed the kingdom. 
NOTES 
1 Duncan, Scotland: The Making of the Kingdom, 
p . 552. 
2) See Handlist of the Acts of Alýxander III, the 
- Guar: d ians and John, no. 385. If the regnal year 
started on 30 November, then the Silksworth 
charter would be dated November 1296, after 
Balliolls abdication. Thus 21 November a. r. 4 must 
be in 1295, indicating that the regnal year 
changed between 8 and 21 November. The Scots are 
surely more likely to have chosen 17 November, 
since that date more truly reflected Balliolls 
acclamation as king. Also, 20 November would have 
represented a considerable coincidence, since that 
was the first day of Edward I's own regnal year. 
3) Ibid., nos. 137,138. 
4) Foedera I, p. 608. 
5) Handlist of the Acts of Alexander II (Regesta 
Regum Scottorum, 1959), nos. 292,293,294,288. 
6) Duncan, Acta, especially nos. 258,282-83,306-308. 
The place-dates of these acts make a regnal year 
beginning 25 March very unlikely. 
7) Ve b5ter, 
-8. (ed. )
7he Acts of David II (Regesta Regum , Scotorum V1 Edinýar-yk lqg. 2-) /,, /- s-. I-7. . ) 
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